

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME TWO

BY

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SELECT OPINIONS ON THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

PADMA-VIBHŪṢAṆA MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA GOPINATH KAVIRAJ, M. A., D. Litt., Varanasi.

"I have glanced through the pages of the History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II by Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Mishra. It is a unique work dealing at great length with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy from Gautama and Vātsyāyana down to the present age. It is not only an intensive study of the system but it also represents a rapid survey of the historical development of the various concepts through the ages. In no other work on the History of Indian Philosophy have I seen such wealth of information as the present treatise. I hope the volumes to follow will make an attempt to follow this method of clarification in respect of the other systems as well. Depth and clarity, together with a fair presentation of truths, should be the guiding principle of the writer. I hope Dr. Mishra will live long with sound health so that he may be able to complete his self-imposed task for the benefit of earnest students of Indian Philosophy.

My loves and good wishes attend on him."

VARANASI
Nov. 2, 1965

Gopinath Kaviraj

(Sd.) Gopinath Kaviraj

BHĀRAT-RATNA Dr. Sir Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, D. Litt., President of India, New Delhi.

The INDIAN PHILOSOPHY is a learned and scholarly work. I hope it will be widely read.

New Delhi
May 17, 1965.

(Sd) S. Radhakrishnan

LATE BHĀRAT-RATNA PANDIT SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi.

You were good enough to present me with Volume I of your History of Indian Philosophy. I am afraid that I have had no time to read any part of this book. Also I am hardly competent to express any opinion on such scholarly books dealing with difficult and abstruse problems. Glancing through your book, however, it seems to me that it is a VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

New Delhi
April 27, 1959.

(Sd.) Jawaharlal Nehru,

PREFACE

It is a great pleasure to present the second volume of my *History of Indian Philosophy* before the scholarly world. Though begun in 1958 and partially printed in 1960, the completion has been delayed mostly because of my going out as Vice-Chancellor to the *Kameshwara Singh Sanskrit University* of Darbhanga established by the Govt. of Bihar, through the munificence of the late Mahārājādhirāja Sir Kāmeshwara Singh. The arduous task of a Vice-Chancellor was enhanced by the absence of any assistance as also by the fact that the University had to be established on account of *initio*.

The previous plan was to finish the history in three volumes; but while treating Nyāya, numerous new works and facts, which have recently come to light had also to be discussed, to make the history a little more comprehensive, with the inevitable result that the projected history shall now be complete in five volumes, instead of three.

The present volume is therefore, limited to the study of Nyāya system alone—both *Prācīna* and *Navya.* Nyāya-Śāstra is a fascinating subject and most appealing to common-sense. Verily, it may be said that Mithilā and Bengal for about a century, had its monopoly and any one interested in Nyāya had to go to Mithilā for its study. Mithilā being the home of *Akṣapāda* Gotama can easily boast to have had the majority of Naiyāyikas, while in the mediaeval period Bengal had no less illustrious scions in Nyāya.

While care has been taken to include all the known theories and incorporate some of the unknown or

lesser known theories as well, my guiding sage in these pages has been Mallinātha whose famous line-*nāmūlaṁ likhyate kiñcit nānapekṣitamucyate*—has been my watchward. This may look to a section of scholars as a *too* orthodox treatment or lacking in interpretation. Interpreting others is a subtle art and is wrought with certain serious shortcomings. First and foremost is that in interpreting others it is many a times seen that one's own views or impressions find a place in that. I have carefully tried to avoid it and remain faithful to the great masters whose accounts are given in this history. But whether my claim is superficial or otherwise, it is for others to judge.

The first volume has been well received and I have every hope the same shall be the fate of the present one. If this volume meets with the approval of the general reader, or the specialist, I shall be satisfied.

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CHAPTER I

NYĀYA-DARŚANA

1. Introduction

PHILOSOPHY in India, as explained earlier[1], is all comprehensive. It covers the entire life of beings as well as the universe beyond it. There is nothing in the universe, jaḍa or Cetana, which does not come within the purview of philosophical enquiry. Unless and until this whole universe, in all its aspects, is known and realized from all possible angles of vision, the ultimate truth can never be visualized and the enquiry of the *jijñāsu* can never be complete.

Nature of Philosophy in India

We know that the absolute truth, the ultimate end of philosophy in India, to be realized through philosophical enquiry, is expressed in the śruti—*ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ*[2]. This vision of the Ātman alone will bring absolute cessation of miseries and establish perfect peace and manifest bliss. This is the *summum bonum* of philosophy and also of life in India. To achieve this end various schools of philosophy have been propounded which represent stages from various angles of vision in course of the visualization of the ultimate truth. It is, therefore, that the enquirer starts to find out the real nature of the Ātman and unless it is ultimately visualized, the enquiry continues birth after birth.

Enquiry into the nature of the Ātman

Within the limitations of time and space nothing can simultaneously come into being and be realized. The law of change which is intrinsically connected with this universe, functions in succession. Nothing except pure Cetana, can remain without undergoing

Manifestation of the Truth in succession

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[1] The following few lines have been explained earlier in the Introductory chapter of the first volume in greater detail, so only a very brief summary of it is given here in order to keep a link between the first and the later volumes.

[2] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. iv. 5.

change in some form or other. Change is the law of Nature (Prakṛti). Under its influence all the knowables of the universe, of course, except the pure Cetana, along with the very process of knowing, manifest, grow and change in succession. Accordingly, any effort to know the nature of these knowables will have to follow very closely their successive manifestation or growth. In fact, leaving aside the Supreme Intelligence, namely, Cetana, all the rest, organic or inorganic matter, undergo change every moment. So says the Lord in the *Bhagavadgītā*[1]—

na hi kaścit kṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt/
kāryate hyavaśaḥ karma sarvaḥ prakṛtijairguṇaiḥ//

Translation—No one indeed ever remains, even for a moment, without doing anything. Every one is compelled to perform action by the guṇas of the Prakṛti, (which constitute every organism).

Experience at every successive stage essential

So, the enquirer has to take his stand on every successive stage in the course of his long pilgrimage to the visualization of the ultimate truth and acquire complete experience of that stage in all its aspects before he leaves it for the next higher stage.

Misery at the root of philosophical enquiry

The universe, including even the organism of the enquirer, is full of miseries. We know that every jaḍa object of this universe constitutes rajas which is of the nature of miseries. It is how pain is the very nature of the universe. It is a fact that no one ever likes pain and, hence, all the activities of a being are, directly or indirectly, only to get rid of it. Accordingly, when the enquirer fails to find out himself any radical cure for his miseries, he approaches the most reliable authority, may be his own preceptor or the śruti, to find out the proper remedy. It is then that the preceptor or the śruti says *ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ*—O, the Ātman should be visualized. Thus, the enquirer, having full faith in these words, starts to search for the nature of the Ātman.

[1] III. 5.

It is also a fact that he has no definite idea about the Ātman as yet, nor can he acquire it at once after hearing the words of the śruti. We also know that the universe is full of mysteries and confusions which put obstacles in the way of an enquiry into the nature of the Ātman. Thus, the enquirer feels serious doubts as to the exact nature of the object of his enquiry. So the enquirer, confounded with doubts, starts to make personal search into the real nature of the Ātman, which is the only Reality for him. Here, in fact, begins the philosophical enquiry.

Doubts about the nature of the Ātman

Summing up the above facts, we find that the feelings of pain force a living being to make an enquiry into the radical and permanent remedy for his miseries. He makes all possible efforts to find out such a remedy, but fails in his first attempts. He then approaches his preceptor who has the vision of the Truth or the śruti itself which is the earliest written record of the direct experiences of the Truth by the seers and learns that the cure lies in the visualization (darśana) of the Ātman alone. The Ātman, however, is so subtle that he still finds himself unable to visualize it at once. Moreover, there are so many aspects of it representing the various different stages before him that he finds himself confounded with doubts about its real and perfect nature. Hence, he starts afresh to have himself the complete vision of the Ātman step by step. Thus, it is clear that like the feelings of pain, doubt also is at the root of philosophical enquiry. So says Vātsyāyana, in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*—[1]

Pain and doubt lead to philosophical enquiry

'nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kiṁ tarhi? saṁśayiter'the.'

Translation—Reasoning starts neither with regard to things entirely unknown, nor with regard to things known beyond doubt. Then how and when does it start? It functions only with regard to things that are doubtful.

[1] I. i. 1.

Starting with a doubtful mind, the enquirer proceeds in gradual succession to realize the real nature of the Ātman. No doubt, he passes through several stages. He finds the Ātman identified with inorganic and with organic matter,[1] or only having various characteristics of inorganic matter.[2] These do not solve his problem.

Stages of the realization

It has been pointed out in the previous volume that the schools of Buddhism do not attempt to deal with the nature of the Ātman. Nor do they accept the existence of Iśvara, the highest ethical entity, which might have been identified with the Ātman in common parlance. According to Śūnyavāda, the Buddhist thought reached its highest consummation in the idea of the indescribable Śūnya. No doubt, the ūnya is also *avā manasagocara* like the Brahman of the Advaitins. But the process of its approach is not direct and is, therefore, not easily convincing to an enquirer in earlier stages. Even prior to Śūnyavāda, the stages of Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda could not make an appeal to the enquirer who tries to follow the gradual manifestation and growth of the nature of the Ātman as he feels it within himself. More-over, the manner in which the theory of Momentary Flux (kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda) is applied to every object, conscious or unconscious, does not encourage the enquirer to proceed on that line. Lastly, the hateful attitude of the Buddhists towards the social order, their wanton activities and non-observance of rigid discipline of body and mind, as revealed in some of the Buddhist works, caused the non-Buddhists to become disgusted with their line of thinking. Then again, the blind faith of the Buddhists to follow reasoning in their own way also created an atmosphere by which people were carried away far beyond the peaceful spiritual path. The followers of the Buddha took keen interest in this method. All this might have led the non-Buddhists to become prejudiced against the viewpoint adopted by them which, none the less, does represent a high stage in the development of philosophical study.

Enquiry cannot stop with Buddhism

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[1] As in the Cārvāka system. [2] As in Jainaism.

Then, there are the Jainas. The standpoint, as has been made clear in the first volume, taken up by them is not free from defects and is impracticable. The nature of the Ātman expounded by them is very confusing. It is, no doubt, of the nature of pure knowledge and vision, but at the same time it is impure and possesses several characteristics found only in jaḍa objects. Lastly, their open denial of the highest ethical entity, namely, Īśvara, represents a very low stage of development and is not in keeping with the characteristics attributed to the Ātman by them. So, this school also does not prevent the enquirer to proceed in his search for the ultimate truth.

Enquiry cannot stop even with Jainaism

All these thoughts about the nature of the highest metaphysical and ethical entity propounded by the materialists (Cārvākas), Jainas and Buddhists, confuse the enquirer so much that he finds himself shrouded in mystery even after having passed through certain stages. He has not been able to realize the independent existence of the Ātman, apart from the jaḍa objects, so far.

Enquirer not satisfied with the views of Nāstikas

It must be kept in mind that realization or even visualization of an object is always in accordance with the manifestation and growth of consciousness in one's own self. So, in the earlier stages the enquirer has to be satisfied even by referring to the Svabhāva of an object. He is not very keen to proceed with reasoning. He takes things as they appear to him obviously. But his credulity cannot take him beyond certain primary stages of mental development. Now, his vision becomes gradually widened. He be ins to see things with doubtful mind and, therefore, it becomes necessary for him to reason about the nature of the things before him. Thus, the method of his understanding and enquiry changes from mere belief to reasoning. He is not ready to believe in anything unless he finds sufficient reasoning in its support. The Svabhāvavāda of the materialists is now replaced by the Science of Reasoning. This is how the enquirer finds himself in a different situation with a changed angle of vision.

Place of Svabhāva

Change from mere faith to reasoning

This stage also is supported by the Śruti itself which says that the Ātman is to be visualized through Reasoning (manana)—*mantavyaścopapattibhiḥ*. It is the very demand of the growing intelligence and also that of the enquirer for acquiring the vision of the Ātman that we pass on to a stage higher than the previous one on the path leading to the ultimate end of philosophy and life. Here reasoning prevails and guides the enquirer.

Jainism and Buddhism lack enquiry into the nature of the Ātman

It may also be pointed out that the Jainas and the Buddhists have, no doubt, made remarkable contribution to the Science of Reasoning and, in fact, for all progressive systems of thought recourse to the Science of Reasoning is indispensable. But what is wanting in these two systems is that they have not utilized the method of reasoning mainly for acquiring the knowledge of the Ātman which is the ultimate goal of the enquirer. Moreover, in a way, it may also be said that they do not deal with reasoning as their main topic. Now, what is required is to take the help of reasoning for the visualization of the Ātman as expressed in the Śruti mentioned before.

Knowledge of the Ātman through reasoning

Hence, it becomes necessary to proceed further to a stage where the nature of the Ātman is acquired mainly through the Science of Reasoning and its independent existence is proved. Thus, in the gradual development of knowledge, the next stage is represented by what is known as the System of Nyāya or Nyāya-Darśana.

Science of Reasoning as old as the Vedas

From what has been said above one should not think that the Science of Reasoning was formulated in India after the Jainas and the Buddhists. We should not forget that reasoning is indispensable for any intellectual development. It is needless to say that the Vedic hymns give sufficient proof of the highly developed intellectual contributions of Indians in different branches of learning. Hence, it may safely be assumed that long before the advent of the Jainas and the Buddhists, there must have been a fully developed Science of Reasoning in some form or other.

As for some definite evidences for the above we may refer to the use of the word 'manana' itself in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which shows that reasoning through arguments was prescribed for acquiring knowledge of the Ātman. Moreover, the Vedic hymns themselves are the store of knowledge derived through direct experiences of the seers of the past involving reasonings. The seers of the Vedic hymns are aware of the fact that the results of their upāsanā may be transferred to another person[1]. Does it not show that through the methods of Agreement and Difference the seers have come to realize the above-mentioned facts? There are references to the life-after-death and also to the experiences of a being in course of its different births[2]. Do these not show that the conclusions arrived at in these cases involve methods of reasoning? There are many references to the mysterious functioning of the Law of Karman in the Vedic hymns. Can any one understand these functions without reasoning[3]? When the devotees of the Vedic Saṁhitās pray for the visualization of the Fearless-Light (abhayam jyotiḥ) does it not prove that the seers have thought of the Light and its nature through reasonings?[4] All these facts found in the Vedic hymns definitely prove the existence of a Science of Reasoning even during the earliest period of human existence. The only point that is not known to us is the nature and form of that Science. There is a mention of *vācaṁ aṣṭāpadīṁ*'[5] in the *Ṛgveda*. It may mean '*a speech* (or syllogism) having eight factors: Sāyaṇa, however, does not explain it in this way. But this deserves our consideration, particularly, when we know of a syllogism having even ten factors.

Syllogism of Eight Factors

[1] *Ṛgveḍa*, VI. 51. 7; VII. 52. 2.

[2] *Ṛgveda*, I. 27.5; I. 45.7; I. 52.9; I. 70.4; IV. 26. 1—3; IV. 27.1.

[3] Umesha Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 64—73.

[4] *Ṛgveda*, II. 27.11.

[5] Vācamaṣṭāpadīm—*Ṛgveda*, VIII. 76.12.

We may also point out that a conclusion is correct only when it is based on Authority, Reasoning and Experience. So, at any time when a conclusion has been drawn it must have been put to test through some reasoning. The seers of the Vedic age, therefore, could never have overlooked the process of reasoning. Not only it is true of the scholarly discussions, but even in our everyday dealings it is most essential that we should have all the three, namely, authority, reasoning and experience to help us to arrive at some definite conclusion. So, it has been said by Akṣapāda Gotama in his *Nyāya-sūtra*—'vimṛśya pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyāmarthāvadhāraṇaṁ nirṇayaḥ'[1], meaning, that a conclusion is arrived at after having discussed the two sides, arguments for and arguments against, of a particular point at issue preceded by doubt about its nature. Now, unless there is a chain of reasoning, how can one discuss the two sides? In fact, both the sides also must place their respective viewpoints in a logical form for discussion. This proves that there must have been a Science of Reasoning much prior to Akṣapāda.

Importance of Authority, Reasoning and Experience

Chāndogya is one of the oldest upaniṣads. In a dialogue narrated in it between Sanatkumāra and Nārada, the former asks Nārada to enumerate the sciences studied by him so far. Amongst the sciences enumerated by Nārada, there is a mention of *Vākovākya*[2] which has been explained by Śaṅkarācārya and others as the Science of Reasoning (Tarkaśāstram). Later in the *Mahābhārata*, Nārada has been described as —'pañcāvayavayuktasya vākyasya guṇadoṣavit.'[3] This shows that the Science of Reasoning studied by Nārada must have been of a fully advanced type where the process of reasoning was based on the syllogism of three or five or even more factors. The entire Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is based on a very high type of reasoning.

Science of Reasoning in the Upaniṣads

[1] I. i. 41.

[2] VII. i. 1; ātyāyana, XIV. 11. Gautama, chapter VIII as quoted by Mm. Tarkavāgīsha.

[3] Sabhāparva, V. 5.

In other older upanişads also, such as, *Chāndogya*,[1] *Kaṭha*,[2] *Kena*,[3] *Māṇḍūkya* and others, we find ample proof of the existence of a Science of Reasoning.

Science of Reasoning in Smṛti and epics

The use of the term 'ānvīkṣikī' meaning, reasoning in the *Manusaṁhitā*,[4] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*.[5] *Rāmāyaṇa*,[6] and *Mahābhārata*,[7] shows that there was a Science of Reasoning even before the advent of Buddhism. The only thing which it is not possible to say is the exact nature of that science.

Besides, the *Mahābhārata* has also mentioned the word 'nyāyatantra'[8] used by the debaters. The term 'Nyāya' has been used, in different senses for Mīmāṁsā and the Science of Reasoning (Nyāya) as well as for an axiom. But, ultimately, all these uses have the same meaning, namely, demonstrated truths. Then again, the term 'tarkavidyā'[9], meaning, the Science of Reasoning, has also been used in the *Mahābhārata*. As the *Mahābhārata* is a pre-Buddhist work, one cannot deny the existence of the Science of Reasoning prior to the advent of Buddhism.

Akṣapāda Gota-ma's *Nyāyasūtra*

So far as the present version of the *Nyāyasūtra* by Akṣapāda Gotama is concerned, as I have already pointed out in the first volume[10], most likely it had to be composed in order to put a stop to the growing chaos in society due to the irresponsible behaviour of the newly baptized disciples of the Buddha. So I have placed the composition of the *Nyāyasūtra* between 483 and 247 B. C. Since then this became the main textbook of the Science of Reasoning.

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[1] Chapter, VI. [2] II.7. [3] I. 6. [4] I. 43. [5] I. 311.

[6] dharmaśāstreṣu mukhyeṣu vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ /
buddhimānvīkṣikīm prāpya nirartham pravadanti te //—
Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 100-39.

[7] tatropaniṣadam caiva pariśeṣañca pārthiva /
mathnāmi manasā tāta dṛṣṭvā cānvīkṣikīm parām //—
Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 318—34.

[8] nyāyatantrāṇyanekāni taistairuktāni vādibhiḥ /
hetvāgamasadācārairyaduktam tadupāsyatām //—
Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 210—22.

[9] ānvīkṣikīm tarkavidyāmanurakto nirarthikām //—
Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 180—41.

[10] *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. pp. 464—465,

The Science of Reasoning was also called 'lokāyatika' or 'lokāyatika-mukhya',[1] because it is a science to represent the viewpoint of common people. Its standpoint is very low in the ladder wherefrom the ordinary man with little intelligence visualizes the Truth. In a way, its place is just after the Cārvākas. So, both these two systems have been rightly called 'lokāyatika'. Similarly, the term 'yoga' was also used for Nyāyaśāstra, because it originally belonged to the old Śaiva school[2] wherein the practice of yoga had a prominent place. Other terms which have been used for the Science of Reasoning from time to time are: 'hetuśāstra,[3]' 'tarkavidyā', 'tarkaśāstra'[4], 'vādavidyā,[5]' 'nyāyaśāstra'[6] 'pramāṇaśāstra'[7] and 'yuktiśāstra.[8]'

Terms used for the Science of Reasoning

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, while discussing the place of Nyāya amongst the fourteen vidyās, tells us that all the śāstras are to show the way to the puruṣārthas and are not for their own independent purpose.[9] Thus, 'Nyāyavistara', that is, the Science of Reasoning, is the basis of all the sciences, as it proves the validity of the Veda.[10] For the Science of Reasoning as taught by Akṣapāda strongly supports the validity of the Veda by

Place of the Science of Reasoning according to Jayanta

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[1] (i) kaccinna lokāyatikān brāhmaṇāṁstāta sevase—*Rāmāyaṇa*, Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa, 100—38; (ii) lokāyatika-mukhyaiśca śuśrūṣuḥ svanamīritam—*Harivaṁśa*, Bhaviṣyaparva, 67—70; (iii) cf. Mm. Tarkavāgiśa, introduction to the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.

[2] Rājaśekhara in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* characterises Nyāya school as 'Śaivadarśana'. Haribhadrasūri also in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* says that Śiva was the object of worship amongst the Naiyāyikas. Vātsyāyana himself uses the term '*Yogāḥ*' in the sense of '*Naiyāyikāḥ*' under *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i-29.

[3] yo'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśrayaddvijāḥ—*Manusmṛti*, II. 11.

[4–6] Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusana, *Indian Logic*. p. 7.

[7] Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana, *Indian Logic*, pp. 7-8.

[8] yuktiśāstrañca te jñeyam śabdaśāstrañca Bhārata—*Mahābhārata*, Anuśāsanaparva, 104; 148.

[9] sarvo hi śāstrārthaḥ paryavasāyī na svarūpaniṣṭha iti—*Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 2—3.

[10] *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 3-4,9.

refuting the arguments of the opponents of the Veda and hence, it is indeed the very foundation of all the sciences even including the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. It is, thus, the Nyāya-vistara (Science of Reasoning) which alone shows the way to the realization of the ultimate puruṣārtha, that is, mokṣa; so it has been called the very foundation of all the sciences. Jayanta further points out that this very science was first known as 'tarka' but subsequently, the same has become known by the name, 'Nyāya-vistara.' Nyāya, meaning Tarka or Inference, is explained in this very śāstra. He says further that there are in all six systems of thought which deal with the Science of Reasoning, known amongst the scholars, namely, Sāṅkhya, Ārhata, Bauddha, Cārvāka, and Vaiśeṣika and Tarka or Nyāyavistara.[1]

From the above it is clear that the Science of Reasoning is important both in life and philosophy.

Place of the Science of Reasoning in life and philosophy

There can be no thoughtful activity of any kind either for the purpose of carrying on worldly dealings or for carrying on any philosophical discussions without the Science of Reasoning.

There are, however, certain works where Reasoning seems to have been discarded and condemned.

Science of Reasoning condemned

For instance, in the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[2] it is said that the knowledge of the Ātman cannot be obtained through Reasoning (tarka); and Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahmasūtra*[3] also says that Reasoning (tarka) is not competent (apratiṣṭhita) to lead to the knowledge of the Ātman. In all these and similar cases, it is to be understood that reasoning carried on simply for the sake of reasoning, without leading to the Truth, is futile. Such

Śuṣka-tarka is condemned

a 'tarka' has been called in common parlance as 'śuṣka-tarka'. It does not in any way help the realization of the Truth. In the *Manusaṁhitā* it is clearly said that reasoning which is in conformity with the Veda

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 3-5

[2] *naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneyā*, II. 9.

[3] II. 11.

and the Śāstra alone helps one in obtaining the knowledge of the Truth (dharma).[1] It has been pointed out before[2] that Reasoning along with Authority and Experience is competent to lead one to the Truth, and not singly. Reasoning, without the other two factors, alone has thus been condemned. Śaṅkarācārya, while explaining his position, has clearly said that tarka (reasoning) not supported by Āgama (Veda or Śāstra) and depending upon unrestrained imagination of a man, is always unreliable. It is found that a conclusion exclusively based on reasoning is subverted by another stronger reasoning, which again, may be overthrown by another intelligent reasoning and so on.[3] Strength of a reasoning wholly depends upon the intelligence of the person who advances the reasoning and no one can give any idea of the limit of the intelligence of a man. But the reasoning which is based on Authority and Experience can easily be relied upon. So says also Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*—[4]

yatnenānumitopyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ /
abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate //

Translation—Any conclusion arrived at through reasoning with great care by experts in argumentations, may be explained in another different way by another expert (and thus, the previous conclusion may be altogether upset).

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[1] pratyakṣamanumānañca śāstrañca vividhāgamam /
trayam suviditam kāryam dharmaśuddhimabhīpsitā //
ārṣam dharmopadeśañca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā/
yastarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharmam veda netaraḥ // XII. 105-106.

[2] Umesha Mishra--*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. pp. 8--9.

[3] itaśca nāgamagamyerthe kevalena tarkeṇa pratyavasthātavyam, yasmānnirāgamāḥ puruṣotprekṣāmātranibandhanāstarkā apratiṣṭhitā bhavanti, utprekṣāyā niraṅkuśatvāt/ tathā hi kaiścidabhiyuktairyatnenotprekśitāstarkā abhiyuktatarairanyairābhāsyamānā dṛśyante / tairapyutprekṣitā santastatonyairābhāsyant iti na pratiṣṭhitatvam tarkāṇām śakyamāśrayitum, puruṣamativairūpyāt—*Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, on the *Brahmasūtra*, II. i. 11.

[4] I. 34.

Hence, '*suṣkatarka*' should never be encouraged and it is in this sense that reasoning has been condemned by scholars. Thus, Vātsyāyana rightly says that reasoning (tarka) is not a means of cognition, but it helps the means of cognition (pramāṇa) to arrive at the truth. No application of any means of cognition can exclude reasoning.

From all these, it can be said that the place of reasoning in our life and also in philosophy is very important and the enquirer should learn all about it from the angle of vision taken up by him for the realization of the truth. As the Science of Reasoning, in all its aspects, is fully dealt with in the philosophical system, called 'Nyāyadarśana,' we proceed to deal with it first in this volume.

Origin of the Science of Reasoning

Documentary evidences have been advanced to show the place and importance of reasoning. Besides, it may be pointed out that really speaking no definite date can be prescribed for the origin of the Science of Reasoning. But we may say with some confidence that the origin of reasoning may be traced to the very beginning of our creation. We find that the question of likes and dislikes begins in a being from the time just after it enters into the womb of its mother. We know that after the mother has become pregnant and is a few months advanced in pregnancy, she cannot, as before, take any and every food. *Her taste is now guided by the likes and dis*likes of the foetus in the womb. She cannot, as usual, freely do any action now, if such an action is disliked by the baby. The harsh sound of the thundering clouds is found to upset the baby in the womb and cause pain to the mother. In other words, all the activities of the mother are now dependent upon the likes and dislikes of the child in the womb. This is a fact of our every day experience. Besides, we are told that Abhimanyu learnt the process of entering into the Cakravyūha from his father, Arjuna, when the former was in the womb of his mother. The great ṛṣi Aṣṭāvakra is similarly known to have offended his father, Gautama, before he came out of the womb of his mother.

Likes and dislikes from the very beginning of creation.

When the child comes out of the womb of the mother, it weeps. Why? Not because it is due to some involuntary action of the child, as some schools think, but because the child whose limbs are so soft and unused to the external environments, finds the hard touch of the fingers of the nurse and of the wind, the dazzling light of the sun or the lamp, the terrible sound arround it directly coming in contact with its ears and similar other feelings which the child does not like due to various reasons, cause it to weep. This is corroborated by the fact that if those things which appear to cause it pain are removed and the nurse touches it with the help of soft cotton, if it is removed to dark and calm place, if the mother puts milk in its mouth, the child does not weep. It becomes calm and quiet. All this shows that the feelings of likes and dislikes have begun with the child from the very beginning of its coming into this world. An expert in child psychology can perhaps easily explain the cause of its weeping, whether it is the feeling of hunger etc., or the presence of the external elements. All these are our every day experiences. With the growth and development of consciousness, the feelings of likes and dislikes become more and more vivid and can easily be realized by even ordinary persons. On the basis of these experiences we can easily say that the process of likes and dis*likes, that is, reasoning, begins in human beings from* the very beginning of their coming to the world. This is not only true of a human being but of all the beings who can think. Reasoning may be very crude in earlier stages, but it is not possible to deny its very existence. But no one can deny that the reasoning at that stage must be very crude. Full-fledged reasoning must have gradually developed in course of time.

Development of child's consciousness leads to Reasoning

In discussing the origin of the Science of Reasoning or that of any other system, I should like to make my position quite clear at the very outset. It has been already pointed out that philosophy in India is based on the single Śruti-*ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ.* O! Ātman should be visualized (in order to achieve the

Origin of Science of Reasoning in philosophical systems

ultimate goal of life, that is, the absolute cessation of pain). So, the quest of the enquirer is the vision of the Ātman. This being the exact position of the quest, the procedure followed in this book is to deal with the gradual manifestation of the vision of the Ātman through the various stages.

Place of Upāsanā for Ātmajñāna

Every one who is properly qualified (*adhikārī*), for the purpose, certainly makes efforts through upāsanā to get the correct vision of the Ātman. In doing so, the qualified person is guided by his environments, equipments, his own physical organism, etc. all of which must differ from those of other persons who are also equally engaged in their upāsanā for the attainment of the vision of the Ātman. But it must be kept in mind that as each of them represents an entirely independent and mutually exclusive and different angle of vision, his experience of the vision must also differ from that of every other person. Thus, there are several independent records of the experiences of the vision of the Ātman from different angles of vision that come before the enquirer into the nature of the Ātman. As a student of philosophy, I have gleaned these various experiences in the form of the various systems of philosophy, in the order of a synthetic gradation to find out the gradual manifestation of the True and complete vision of the Ātman. Therefore, I have arranged the various experiences in order of their manifestation of the nature of the Ātman and adjusted them in one chain of thought, beginning from the apparently crudest stage to the subtlest and purest where the so-called crudest becomes one with the Absolute Truth, as is clear from the Śrutis 'sarvam khalvidam Brahma,' 'neha nānāsti kiñcana', etc. This method alone will be able to present the entire philosophy of India as one whole (*pūrṇa*).

Experiences differ with angle of vision

Synthetic arrangement of experiences

This being the method adopted by me here, my whole attention is directed towards the stages of the gradual mānifestation of the experiences of the ṛṣis of the past. I am not so much concerned with their date of birth, but my main effort is to find out a

'synthetic gradation in their thoughts.' As already made clear in the arrangement of the systems of Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda, I will follow a similar arrangement of the experiences represented by other schools of philosophy in this volume. But as far as possible I will follow the chronological order also amongst the authors and their works of the various schools. My belief is that thoughts are more important than the dates for the study of philosophy, though the two are not mutually exclusive.

Synthetical study of Philosophy

NYĀYA SYSTEM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Nyāya system occupies a very low position in the development of philosophical ideas towards the realization of the Absolute Truth. Its outlook is gross and it visualizes the objects of the universe from an ordinary commonsense standpoint. It tries to expound the objects of the universe in such a way as may be intelligible to the ordinary mind. So, it believes, as it also appears to the exponents of the system, that by acquiring the knowledge of the objects of the gross universe in its various aspects, the ultimate end will be realized. So says the author of the present *Nyāyasūtra* that the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, beginning with Pramāṇa, will enable one to achieve the highest end according to the particular angle of vision represented by the Nyāya system.[1] It must be pointed out here that really speaking the Sūtrakāra aims only at the correct knowledge of the Ātman, but has mentioned nine varieties of knowables (prameyas),[2] namely, the Ātman, physical organism (śarīra), sense-organs, the objects of sense-organs (artha), intellect (buddhi), manas, activity (pravṛtti), defect (doṣa), existence after death (pretyabhāva), fruition (phala), pain and freedom from all miseries (apavarga). The last elven prameyas are meant to elucidate the true nature of the Ātman itself.

Commonsense standpoint

Importance of categories

[1] I. i. 1. [2] I. i. 9.

Then again, of the sixteen categories, the first, namely, means of knowledge (pramāṇa), is required for acquiring the correct knowledge of the Ātman, while the remaining categories are merely some of the specialities of the Science of Reasoning without which the correct position of the system cannot be realized. So says Vātsyāyana-'tasyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ saṁśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ'.[1]

Importance of the last fourteen categories

It is interesting to note here some of the main characteristics of the Naiyāyikas of the ancient period. They were also called Yogins. They carried a stick in their hand, put on kaupīna (a strong small piece of cloth, usually a small strip, worn over the privities), wrapped their body with a blanket, *maintained long matted hair, besmeared their body* with ashes, wore sacred-thread, and carried waterpot (kamaṇḍalu) in their hand. They lived mostly in forest, ate tasteless food and lived under trees having a gourd in their hand. They lived upon fruits, roots and similar other eatables grown under the earth. They lived with their wives and were very hospitable to guests. But those who had no wives were considered to be much better. They performed religious austerities called 'pañcāgnisādhana.' When they reached the highest stage of yogic restraint, they lived and moved about naked. They held that one who practised 'Śaivī dīkṣā' for twelve years attained emancipation whether one was a male or a female attendant.

Certain general characteristics of the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools

The highest spiritual entity according to them is Īśvara who is omniscient, is the creator and destroyer of the universe. This Īśvara assumes the following eighteen *avatāras*: Nakulī, Śoṣya-kauśika, Gārgya, Maitrī, Akauruṣa, Īśāna, Pāragārgya, Kapilāṇḍa, Manuṣyaka, Kuśika, Atri, Piṅgala, Puṣpaka, Bṛhadārya, Agasti, Santāna, Rāśīkara and Vidyāguru. The old Naiyāyikas worshipped these forms as their gods. They held that one should not bow down to the gods standing while face to face.

Īśvara is the highest entity

Avatāras of Īśvara

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

They have their own Yogaśāstra (uktañca taiḥ *svayogaśāstre*). They believed that a Yogin of this school became free from all worldly desires if he concentrated on a *vītarāga* form, but if he happened to concentrate on a *sarāga* form, then he certainly became attached to worldly desires.

Guṇaratna holds that all that has been said above is also true of the Vaiśeṣikas, for there is not much difference between these two systems. The followers of both the schools are called *Tapasvins*. Due to the differences in their manner of conducting themselves, they are divided into four main schools : Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Mahāvratadharas and Kālāmukhas. Their sub-divisions are Bharaṭa, Bhaktara, Laiṅgika, Tāpasa, and others. One who has faith in and devotion towards Śiva could be regarded as Bharaṭa and others. There is caste restriction to enrol onself in any of these four schools. But there is a tradition that the Naiyāyikas, being the devotees of Śiva, are called Śaivas, while the Vaiśeṣikas are called Pāśupatas.[1] It seems that these characteristics and forms were extant in Guṇaratna's time, that is, in the 15th century, for he says very clearly that he has recorded all these things as he heard and saw them directly himself (idam mayā yathā śrutam yathā dṛṣṭam cātrābhidadhe)[2].

Four main divisions and their subdivisions

It may be explained at this place how the conception of Śiva developed from the idea of Rudra as found in the Veda. Śiva has come to be associated with various dangerous and blissful ideas simultaneously, in course of time, according to the manifestation of his various aspects. Thus, the names Rudra, Śarva or Sarva, Ugra and Bhīma denote danger, while the names Bhava, Paśupati, Maheśvara and Śiva or Śaṅkara indicate his benign qualities. Gradually the conception of this God became so widly realized that it could include all sorts of possible conceptions. As the ultimate end of life and philosophy in India is Complete Bliss,

Śiva's association with every School of Philosophy

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[1] *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* by Guṇaratnasūri on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri, pp. 49—51. Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[2] *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 51.

the name of this God has become associated with it and He began to be worshipped by all in some form or other. Thus, the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika which occupy a very low status representing the common-sense standpoint, believe Śiva as their first propounder of thought and associate their schools with His name and call themselves Śaivas, while the Kāshmīra Śaivaism which represents the highest phase of Indian philosophy also propounds that, Parama-Śiva is its highest entity and that everything in the universe, nay the entire universe itself, is the manifestation of that Parama-Śiva. Even the Advaita school of Śaṅkara identifies Śiva with the highest entity. In spite of all this, amongst the various schools there is a difference in their association with the name of Śiva. So Uddyotakara is called *Pāśupatācārya* at the end of his *Vārttika* on the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya.* This being so, there flourished various separate sects with some tenets of their own and came to have their separate names. Thus, Nakulīśa, variously called Lakulīśa, Lākula, Lakula, Lakulin, mixed with Paśupati has become associated with one particular school of thought (as dealt with in the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* of Mādhava).

As the Lord Śiva is associated with Yoga and also with horrid practices prevalent amongst the Aghoras, he is being worshipped by a sect called Kālāmukha. Rāmānujācārya gives some description of this sect in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra.*[1] According to him, the Paśupati school is non-Vedic and is split up into four smaller sects, namely, Kāpāla, Kālāmukha, Pāśupata and Śaiva. The author of the *Bhāmatī,* however, holds that the schools of Śaiva, Pāśupata, Kāruṇikasiddhāntin and Kāpālika are the four sects of the Māheśvara school. This is discussed under the particular sūtra as interpreted by Śaṅkarācārya.

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[1] *Śrībhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra,* II. ii. 35 also see *Bhāmatī* under the same Sūtra.

II. LITERATURE

1 PRĀCĪNA-NYĀYA

(1) GOTAMA

(5th century B. C.)

Composition of the present *Nyāya-sūtra*

It has been said above that undoubtedly the Science of Reasoning in India is very old and that there must have been a full-fledged science even before the author of the present *Nyāyasūtra*, namely, Akṣapāda Gotama, flourished. But it is very difficult to say anything definite about it. So the Nyāyadarśana at present is wholly based on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda Gotama. He must have flourished and written the Sūtra work between 483 and 247 B. C. when the Buddhists had created a social and intellectual chaos as has been already made clear in the first volume.[1] This Sūtra work was really composed, not only for discussing the nature of the Ātman and other knowables of the physical world from common-sense viewpoint, but also for defeating the arguments of the Buddhists who were, antagonistic to the non-Buddhistic ideas. It was, therefore, that Akṣapāda had to include even in his philosophical work *Vāda* (discussion in order to arrive at the truth), *Jalpa* (disputation wherein there is assertion of one's own standpoint and denial of other's standpoint by means of casuistry, wrong rejoinder and clinchers), *Vitaṇḍā* (wrangling wherein there is no establishing of one's own point), *Hetvābhāsa*, (fallacious arguments), *Chala* (casuistry which consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than that which is intended), *Jāti* (false rejoinder which is either incapable of putting aside the opposite view, or which

Purpose of the *Nyāyasūtra*.

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[1] Umesha Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 464-465. On further evidences it seems that the present *Nyāyasūtra* might have been composed in the 5th century B.C. during the time of the Buddha himself. I find that even some foreign scholars also hold this view. H. Ui has distinctly said in his book—The *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, "*We can trace it at the time of Mahāvīra and Buddha.*" Page 82.

involves self-contradictions), and *Nigrahasthāna* (clinchers, that is, a wrong position taken up by a party which prevents it to proceed further in argumentation), as essential factors in order to establish a valid argument. The very nature of these methods shows that there was some peculiar opposition for the refutation of which all the above mentioned categories were found very essential to be included even in a philosophical work, the ultimate end of which was to realize the nature of the Ātman. Naturally, therefore, this work of Akṣapāda became for the Buddhists, a most effective antagonistic work against themselves. With the help of the various forms of disputations discussed in it, the wrong arguments of the Buddhists were refuted and the position of the non-Buddhists was defended. There is reason to believe that thereupon the Buddhists tried their best to destroy or distort the *Nyāyasūtra* as much as possible. For Uddyotakara says—

kutārkikājñāna nivṛttihetuḥ
kariṣyate tasya mayā nibandhaḥ.[1]

Translation—This treatise is being written by me for the purpose of removing the errors of the logicians who argue on wrong lines.

Version of the *Nyāya-sūtra* was distorted and restored

According to Vācaspati as well as Udayana, the word 'kutārkika' was here used for Diṅnāga and others. From the words of Vācaspati, 'dustarakunibandhapaṅkamagnānām'[2], one also infers that the original interpretations of Uddyotakara had been overshadowed by wrong and misleading arguments (kunibandhapaṅkamagnānām), obviously of the Buddhists, and that Vācaspati tried to restore the original interpretations of Uddyotakara in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*. It was due to this reason that Vācaspati Mishra I wrote the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* where he tried to restore the correct version of the *Nyāyasūtras* and concluded his work

[1] *Nyāyavārtika*, benedictory verse.

[2] *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, benedictory verse 4.

with the remark that in the *Nyāyasūtra* there are five adhyāyas, ten āhnikas, eighty-four prakaraṇas, five hundred twenty-eight sūtras, one hundred ninety-six padas and eight thousand three hundred eighty-five letters. Indeed, he makes his position clear unmistakably by saying:

Even letters contained in the *Nyāyasūtra* were counted and recorded

yadalambhi kimapi puṇyam *dustarakunibandhapaṅkamagnānām|*
śrīgotamasugavīnāṁatijaratīnāṁ samuddharaṇāt//.[1]

Translation—Whatever merit has been acquired by me as a result of the restoration of the very old (most authentic) and admirable learning (work) of Śrī Gotama which had merged into the mud of the wrong and misleading writings (of the Buddhists), which are difficult to go across . . . (may the Lord be pleased with it).

To make such a statement about the contents of the *Nyāyasūtra* by a scholar like Vācaspati Mishra I, is indeed, very significant. This definitely shows that some opponents must have done-wrong to this Sūtra-work; of course, these opponents were no other than the Buddhists.

The last effort to restore the original verson of the *Nyāyasūtra* was, however, made by Vācaspati Mishra II in his work called the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.* Vācaspati II flourished in Mithilā in the last quarter of the 15th century[2]. I do not know of any other work in Sanskrit literature which has suffered so much at the hands of opponents and for the restoration of which effort after effort has been made. Nor have such methods of refutation been prescribed in any other work of any other system of Indian thought.

In support of what has been said above regarding the distortion or the interpolation of the Sūtras, I quote below the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana, while commenting on the Sūtra—*Kāraṇadravyasya pradeśaśabdenābhidhānāt*[3] (meaning, what the term

Instances of the distortion of the sūtras

[1] *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, concluding Verse.

[2] Umesha Mishra, Introduction to the *Vivādacintāmaṇi* English Translation by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

[3] II.ii.17.

pradeśa, part, really denotes is the constituent cause), concludes that the Ākāśa and the Ātman cannot have pradeśas (parts) in the true sense of the term. Then, he himself raises the question as to why do we not have any Sūtra of the Sūtrakāra to this effect? to which he himself answers that this is the nature of the revered Sūtrakāra that in many sections he does not assert two views; so that he has asserted at this place only one view, namely, the non-eternity of sound, and has omitted the other view, which he obviously holds, that the Ākāśa and the Ātman have no pradeśa.[1] That this is the nature of the Sūtrakāra is further supported by Udayanācārya in his *Pariśuddhi* where he says that the Sūtrakāra implies that *quality* is distinct from *substance*, but he does not say it in so many words.[2] The author of the *Bhāṣya*, indeed, says that what is implied is to be known through the '*Śāstra-siddhānta*,' which is nothing but the inferential process.[3]

Vātsyāyana has, undoubtedly, given some explanation for such omissions, but these may be also attributed not to the nature of the Sūtrakāra, but to the distortion or interpolation of the sūtras by the Buddhists who found the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama as their great enemy in the scholarly field, as already mentioned before. Here, I also quote what Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, a great scholar of Prācīna-Nyāya, has said in his *Ṭippaṇī* to his Bengali translation of the *Bhāṣya*:

> "Bhāṣyakārera ei kathāra dvārā pūrve vā tāhāra samaye aneka nyāyasūtra vilupta hāiyā chila, pracalita nyāyasūtrera madhye anekasthale sūtrera nyūnatā dekhiyā anekasūtra kalpita haiyā chila, bhāṣyakāra sei kalpita anārṣa sūtragulike parityāga kariyā prakṛta nyāyasūtrera uddhārapūrvaka tāhāra bhāṣya racanā kariyāchena, ihā mane karā yāite pāre".[4]

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[1] The Jainas believe that there are *pardeśas* in the Ākāśa and Ātman-Vide, Dr. Umesha Mishra-*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 314.

[2] darśanasparśābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāditi guṇavyatiriktam dravyamuktam na ca kaṇṭharaveṇa vyavasthāpayatīti—on *Nyāyasūtra*, II. ii. 17.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, on II. ii. 17.

[4] On *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, II. ii. 17, p. 424.

Translation—From the above explanation of the Bhāṣyakāra, it is clear that several of the (genuine) sūtras were lost and many (new) were interpolated in their place, either before the Bhāṣyakāra or during his time. The Bhāṣyakāra recast the Sūtras and composed his *Bhāṣya* after having removed those suprious (anārṣa) sūtras.

As the Buddha was aware of the symptoms of disturbances in the Order even during his life time and as the*Nyāyasūtra* was composed to put an end to those disturbances, I feel that the sūtra work was composed in his very life time. I have fixed the date about the 5th century B. C. when there might have been the first serious socio-intellectual clash between the followers of the Buddha and the non-Buddhists to which group Akṣapāda Gotama belonged.

Views of scholars about his date

Other scholars have also tried to fix the date of the composition of the *Nyāyasūtra*. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa has fixed 6th century B. C. for the composition of the first chapter of the work, the later chapters, according to him, being subsequent additions from different sources. He is of opinion that the author of the *Nyāyasūtra* is identical with the author of the *Gautamadharmasūtra* and the *Pitṛmedhasūtra*.[1]

But then again, Dr. Vidyabhusana says in his *History of Indian Logic*—"The Nyāya-sūtra, which was criticised by Nāgārjuna referred perhaps to the Caraka-saṁhitā under the name of Āyurveda. Akṣapāda seems therefore to have flourished before Nāgārjuna (circa 250-320 A. D.) who employs many logical terms presumably from the Nyāya-sūtra, and after Caraka whose Saṁhitā compiled about 78 A. D. embodies logical doctrines of a cruder form than those of the Nyāya-sūtra. The date of Akṣapāda may therefore be approximately fixed at about 150 A. D."[2]

From this it appears that Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa changed his view from 600 B. C., as noted by Shri Kavirajaji, to 150 A. D. as the date of Akṣapāda. It may also be noted here in passing that Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa thinks that Gotama is different from Akṣapāda.

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[1] *Introduction to the Nyāyasūtras of Gotama*, S. B. H., pp. v-viii.

[2] Page 50.

Shri Mahadev Rajaram Bodas in his Introduction to the *Tarkasaṅgraha* holds that Gotama's work should be assigned to the end of the 5th century or the beginning of the 4th century B. C.[1]

Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasada Śāstrī has shown, on Chinese evidence, that Akṣapāda, the founder of Nyāya, was a pre-Buddhistic teacher. But he thinks that the Sūtras as we have them are comparatively modern, being probably post-Mahāyānic. So he places Gotama in the 2nd century A. D.[2]

Professor Jacobi holds that the *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya* are later than the origin of Śūnyavāda, that is, the end of the 2nd century A. D. and earlier than that of Vijñānavāda, that is, the end of the 5th century A. D.[3]

Professor Garbe believes that the *Nyāyadarśana* as such was known to Pañcaśikha, the Sāṅkhya teacher, who must have lived between 100 and 300 A.D. Hence, Gotama must have been his contemporary and cannot be placed before the Christian era.[4]

Professor Luigi Suali mainly accepts the view of Jacobi but places the composition of the Sūtra work between 300 and 350 A. D.[5]

Professor Stcherbatskoi finds references to Vijñānavāda in the *Nyāyasūtras* and so he places the work posterior to 500 A. D.[6]

Lastly, I quote the words of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopīnātha Kavirāja who has thrown light on various other aspects of the question :

"Assuming that all the Nyāya-sūtras, as we have them to-day, are not genuine and that some of them may possibly represent *later inter-polations, there is no reason to deny that the* general framework of the system is of much earlier date. There is nothing to contradict Dr. Vidyābyūṣaṇa's view that the Sūtras belong to 600 B.C. Mm. Śāstri's opinion that Akṣapāda was pre-Buddhist and was the founder of the school is also acceptable, but where is the proof to show that *all* the Sūtras

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[1] Bombay Sanskrit Series Edition, p. xxxiii.

[2] *J. A. S. B.*, 1905, pp. 177—80.

[3] *J. A. O. S.*, xxxi, 1911, pp. 2, 13.

[4] *Die Sāṅkhya Philosopie*, p. 33.

[5] *Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia Indiana,* 14.

[6] *J. A. O. S.*, 1911, pp. 4-5.

came after the development of the Mahāyānic school and that even some of them were not composed by Akṣapāda himself? The suggestion of the Sūtras having passed through several redactions may be accepted in the main, but this does not militate against the antiquity and genuineness of some parts of the work at any rate. The introduction of Yoga in a work on Nyāya is not altogether inexplicable, if we remember that both yoga and Nyāya (including Vaiśeṣika), as systems of theological philosophy, belonged to the Śaiva school. The very word Īśvara, (as distinguished from 'Puruṣottama' of Sāṅkhya which, as Haribhadra points out, was affiliated to Vaiṣṇavism) signifies *Śiva*. Even in later times, the Saiva Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (800 A.D.) introduced Yoga in his Nyāya tract, *viz.*, *Nyāyasāra*. The section on Yoga in Gotama's work does not bear on it any special mark of later development. The "peculier character" referred to by the Śāstrījī is not apparent to me.

It is interesting to observe that the several doctrines which have been introduced in the 1st Lecture of Chapter IV as *Pūrvapakṣāḥ* do not refer explicitly either to Śūnyavāda or to Vijñānavāda. They may well stand for theories so widely current in Buddhistic and post-Buddhistic (but generally pre-Christian) times."[1]

It is clear from what has been said by Śrī Kavirajaji that there is nothing to reject 600 B. C. a date for the composition of the Sūtra work. But as I have already discussed in greater detail and have fixed 5th century B. C. as the date for the composition of the *Nyāyasūtra*[2], I do not think it is necessary to change my opinion.

As regards the question whether the whole Sūtra work is from the pen of a single person or from different persons, it may be pointed out that the ultimate end of the Nyāyaśāstra of Akṣapāda Gotama is to achieve niḥśreyas or apavarga through the knowledge of the true character of the sixteen categories. In the first chapter definitions and divisions of these sixteen categories alone have been given. This makes us merely acquainted with these categories. But it is not possible to know their true character simply with the help of definition, divisions and sub-

Akṣapāda composed all the five chapters

[1] Introduction to the English translation of *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha.

[2] Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 463—65.

divisions. Really speaking, as Vātsyāyana has said—

Ime pramāṇādayaḥ padārthā uddiṣṭā lakṣitāḥ yathālakṣaṇam parīkṣiṣyante iti trividhā ca'sya śāstrasya pravṛttirveditavyā.[1]

Translation—Thus, have pramāṇa and other categories been mentioned and defined in the order of their enumeration and they will be examined and verified in accordance with their definitions. In this way, the threefold function of the Śāstra is to be regarded as duly completed.

There are *three aspects* of the treatment of the categories and only after all the three processes have been undergone, knowledge of the true nature of these categories can be obtained. In the first chapter only two aspects have been given, the third aspect, which is, in fact, the most important, is dealt with in the second, third, fourth and fifth chapters. Now, if Akṣapāda had composed only the first chapter, then it would have to be assumed that due to some unforeseen reasons, he could not complete his work. But there is no reason to believe so. Moreover, there is no definite proof to support the view which was perhaps upheld by Mm. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa for the first time. Even Mm. Shrī Kavirājajī has questioned the authenticity of the view that some of the Sūtras were not composed by Akṣapāda.

Akṣapāda is identical with Gotama who flourished in the 5th century B C.

Our conclusions, therefore, are that Akṣapāda is the same as Gotama and he is the author of all the five chapters of the *Nyāyasūtra*. He flourished in the 5th century B. C. It must also be kept in mind that the Buddhists did their best to mutilate or distort these sūtras either by removing some of them, or by replacing some of the genuine sūtras by their own new compositions, or by interpolations. Hence, there has been so much confusion even in our own times regarding the arrangement and genuineness of several Sūtras.

Pūrvapakṣas mentioned in the *Nyāyasūtra* are pre-Buddhistic

It is not irrelevent to mention here that there are several old views attributed to various other systems mentioned in the *Nyāyasūtra* as 'pūrvapakṣas' which have led modern scholars to confuse and fix differently

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[1] *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* I. ii. 20.

the date of this Sūtra work. For instance, in the Sūtra 'abhāvādbhāvotpattirnānupamṛdya prādurbhāvāt,'[1] meaning, being comes out of non-being, as nothing comes into existence without having destroyed (its cause), some modern scholars think that there is a reference here to the Śūnyavāda school of Buddhism and hence, the *Nyāyasūtra* must have been composed later than the advent of the Mādhyamika school. But this is not correct. This view is as old as the Upaniṣads rather older than the Upaniṣads, because both the *Chāndogya*[2] and the *Taittirīya*[3] refer to it as if it were an old view. Though, Śaṅkarācārya[4] attributes it to the Bauddhas, yet since these Upaniṣads are pre-Buddhistic, his view does not appear to be convincing. Vācaspati Miśra I also refers to the Śruti—'asadevedamagra āsīt' in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*[5] to support this view. Even in the Pāli works this view is referred to as belonging to the past.

The view that being comes out of non-being is pre-Buddhistic

Then again, in the Sūtra 'sarvamabhāvo bhāveṣvitaretarābhāvasiddheḥ,'[6] Akṣapāda refers to another extremist theory that everything is non-existent or non-being, because, everything is known to be mere negation of one another. Vācaspati Miśra I and others attribute this theory to the Buddhist theory of Śūnyavāda.[7] But in fact, it is a view preparatory to the historical Śūnyavāda.

The view that everything is non-existent is pre-Śūnyavāda

The *Nyāyasūtra* also refers to the theory of the *Sarvānityatāvāda*, that is, everything is impermanent. Some attribute this view to the theory of *momentary flux* of the Buddhist. But this also is a very old view which Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīsha attributes to the old school of the Cārvākas.[8] Mm. Dr. Gopīnātha Kavi-

The view that everything is impermanent is attributed to old Cārvāka school

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 14.

[2] VI. ii. 1. [3] II. 7. [4] *Chāndogyabhāṣya* on VI. ii. 1.

[5] On the *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 14.

[6] IV. i. 37. [7] On the *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 37.

[8] Vide his *Ṭippaṇī* on IV. i. 25.

rāja says that this is the logical antecedent of technical *Kṣaṇikavāda* of subsequent centuries and was an old view.[1]

Similarly, the *Sarvanityatāvāda* referred to in the *Nyāyasūtra*[2] is also a very old view. It was very widely current in earlier days. The old *Śāśvatavāda* and the *Sarvāstivāda* were all connected with this theory. Vācaspati Miśra I attributes this to the old school of Sāṅkhya[3] of which the present *Satkāryavāda* is the later modification.

The view that everything is eternal belongs to the old Sāṅkhya school

Next, the *Sarvapṛthaktvavāda*, that is, all is diversity, there is no unity, is also attributed to the Buddhist *Puñjavāda*, according to which a composite is nothing but a mere aggregate of parts and not a distinct entity; so that a dravya is only an aggregate of various attributes (guṇasamavāyo dravyam). But it must be pointed out that this also is a very old view which only found fresh impetus with the later Buddhists. It is also mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali.[4]

The view that all is diversity, and there is no unity is older than Patañjali

There are several other theories mentioned as pūrvapakṣas in the *Nyāyasūtra* which have been wrongly utilized to fix up a late date for the Sūtra work. But on a critical examination and verification it is clear that all those pūrvapakṣa views are pre-Buddhistic and therefore, the *Nyāyasūtra* cannot be a work of the post-Buddhistic period. I give below what Mm. Dr. Gopīnātha Kavirāj has written in this connection.[5]

"At all events it is plain that the thesis regarding the late origin of some of the Sūtras, especially those referring to the several doctrines, is not conclusively demonstrated, though it may be admitted that interpolations do exist in the *Sūtra* and in the *Bhāṣya*. The similarity of ideas, and even in some cases of stray words, does not necessarily prove, as Paṇḍita Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa rightly remarks in his introduction(p. 34) to his excellent Bengali translation of *Nyāyasūtra*

View of Mm. Kavirāja on the antiquity of *Nyāyasūtra*

[1] Introduction to the English Translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. xiii.

[2] IV. i. 29. [3] IV. i. 32. [4] *Paspaśāhnika*.

[5] *Introduction* to the English translation of the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha.

and *Bhāṣya*, reference to any particular theory of later years, unless it is clearly stated. We know from a study of Indian philosophy and Literature that certain stereotyped sayings have come down from ancient times, and though these may be found in different works they need not be ascribed to any of them. By way of illustration it may be said that *Nyāya-sūtra* IV. 2. 32 reminds one of a similarly-worded saying in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (under-Pāṇini, IV-1-1).

asattu mṛgatṛṣṇāvat gandharvanagaram yathā/
ādityagativat sacca vastrāntarhitavacca tat //

Even this verse which is split up into 4 parts and commented on by Patañjali is apparently older than his own time."

In spite of these efforts to present the correct version of the Sūtras, there have been differences in their readings amongst the *Bhāṣya*, *the Vārtika*, *the Tātparya* and even the *Pariśuddhi*.[1] The references to the various old views in the form of pūrvapakṣas as found in the *Nyāyasūtra* clearly shows that even prior to Akṣapāda Gotama, the philosophical field in ancient India was very rich and fertile. That the author of the Sūtra work does not name any propounder of those views further shows that even the names of those authors or of the propounders of the theories, were forgotten by the time of Akṣapāda, but the views were so popular that Gotama could not overlook their mention and as they were not in conformity with the standpoint of his Nyāya system, Gotama had to refute them. These pūrvapakṣas have been wrongly attributed by later writers and modern scholars after them, to the systems of a much later growth, as has been already discussed.

Extent of the Sūtra work

This Sūtra work is divided into five chapters each chapter is sub-divided into two 'Āhnikas'. According to the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I, as already noted, the work contains 84 sections, 528 sūtras, 196 padas and 8385 letters. In the first chapter enumeration, definition and divisions of the sixteen categories

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, II. iii. 48; II. ii. 58; III. i. 1; III. i. 52; III. ii. 35; Also see the foot-notes of the *Nyāyasūtras* published in the *Vizianagram Sanskrit Series* edition, pp. 1—28.

are given, while in the remaining chapters the author has discussed, examined and verified all the sixteen categories in accordance with the procedure enunciated by the Śāstra in the very beginning.

We may note here some of the more important points from the Sūtras at this place which may be called characteristics of Akṣapāda Gotama :

Ātman not an object of direct perception

1. He says that the existence of the Ātman is proved through inference. It cannot be an object of direct perception through manas[1]. It is, therefore, that he has not mentioned manas as a sense-organ in his work.

Karmendriyas not included amongst the indriyas

2. Akṣapāda believes that there are only five sense-organs, namely, olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactile and auditory. He obviously mentions the sense-organs of cognition alone and omits the five sense-organs of action[2]. It is strange to see that even Vātsyāyana holds the same view and does not regard the sense-organs of action as 'indriya.' Vācaspati Mishra even goes so far as to definitely deny their being sense-organs in any away. He says this is why Gotama has mentioned only five sense-organs. The reason to deny 'indriyatva' to hands, etc, is that these do not produce any direct cognition, nor do they prove the existence of the Ātman, which is called 'Indra.' That these perform certain peculiar functions and therefore, they should merely be called sense-organs is not at all a sound argument; for in that case, throat, heart, etc. also should be called sense-organs as they also perform certain peculiar functions. But nobody ever regards them as sense-organs. Moreover, these sense-organs of cognition are called 'indriya' simply because, these are the probans of 'Indra', meaning, the Ātman which is the agent of cognition. Hands, feet, etc. are not the probans for the existence of the Ātman, hence, these are not regarded as sense-organs.[3] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i.10.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 12.

[3] evañca-indriyapañcatvena hastapādapāyūpasthavācāmindriyatvaniṣedho'pi sūcitaḥ, indriyalakṣaṇavirahāt, etc.—*Tātparyaṭīkā* on the *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 61.

the same view[1]. Padmanābha Mishra denies the recognition of karmendriyas.[2]

Similarly, the Sūtrakāra does not mention anywhere in his work that 'manas' is a sense-organ. Vātsyāyana and others have discussed this matter[3] at great length and have come to the conclusion that Gotama has recognized manas as a sense-organ, though not directly. This is all right. But, as the Bauddha Naiyāyika Dinnāga has pointed out,[4] why does Gotama not mention it anywhere? It seems that Gotama takes a very ordinary common-sense view of indriya according to which the five sense-organs of cognition alone are bhogasādhana and so he did not recognize 'manas' as a sense-organ. Again, from the Sūtra 'ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakśrotrāṇīndriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ'[5]—it is clear that Gotama wanted to say definitely that the 'indriyāṇi', as understood from the angle of vision which he represents, are *bhautika* and not *āhaṅkārika*, as the Sāṅkhya holds from a different angle of vision, and so he did not mention 'manas' amongst the sense-organs.

Manas not recognized as a sense-organ directly

3. From the use of the words 'tantrādhikaraṇa', 'sarvatantra,' 'pratitantra' in the Sūtra,[6] it seems that Gotama had before him several systematized schools of Indian philosophy at the time when he composed his Sūtra-work, otherwise, how could he mention them as different 'tantras'?

Some systems existed during Gotama's time

4. Gotama is of opinion that there is only one visual sense-organ which is divided by a nose-bone and so it looks as if it were two.[7] This view of the Sūtrakāra has been interpreted in a different way by the

Only one visual sense organ, but Bhāṣyakāra holds two

[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 482—84, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, Vārāṇasī.

[2] *Setu* on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, Chowkhamba edition, p. 105.

[3] On *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 61.

[4] na sukhādi prameyaṁ vā mano vā'stīndriyāntaram / aniṣedhādupāttañced anyendriyarutaṁ vṛthā//—*Pramāṇasamuccaya*, I.

[5] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 12.

[6] *Nyāyasūtra*, I.i. 26—29.

[7] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 7.

Bhāṣyakāra who thinks that there are two distinct visual sense-organs. Vārtikakāra, however, supports the Sūtrakāra.

Īśvara is the nimitta-kāraṇa

5. The Sūtrakāra believes that Īśvara, depending upon the actions of the Jīvas, is the instrumental cause of the universe.[1]

(2) VĀTSYĀYANA

(2nd century B. C.)

Possibility of a commentary on the *Sūtra* prior to Vātsyāyana

The earliest commentary available to-day on the *Nyāyasūtra* is the *Bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana,[2] also known as Pakṣilasvāmin,[3] who must have lived earlier than the second century B. C. That there might have been some other commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* prior to Vātsyāyana is not impossible. While explaining the Sūtra-'kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ kālātītaḥ'[4], Vātsyāyana says—'avayavaviparyāsavacanam na sūtrārthaḥ', (that is, reversing of the order of the factors of the syllogistic reasoning is not the meaning of the Sūtra). In other words, to have after the 'pratijñāvākya', the 'udāharaṇavākya' and then, the 'hetuvākya', cannot be an instance of 'kālātyayāpadiṣṭa', simply because the position of the hetu has been changed. Moreover, this type of reversing of the factors has been included under the 'nigrahasthāna'[5] and hence, it cannot be an instance of 'kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.' Vācaspati Mishra

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 19—21. Gotama has criticized the view of the pūrvapakṣin that Īśvara is the cause of the universe independent of the actions of the Jīvas; if it be not so, then the *Īśvaratva of Īśvara has no meaning.*

[2] (*a*) yo'kṣapādamṛṣim nyāyaḥ pratyabhādvadatām varam / tasya Vātsyāyana idam bhāṣyajātamavartayat //—end of the *Nyāyabhāṣya.*

(*b*) yadakṣapādapratibho bhāṣyam Vātsyāyano jagau /—end of the *Nyāyavārtika.*

[3] atha Bhagavatā-Akṣapādena niḥśreyasahetau Śāstre praṇīte vyutpādite ca bhagavatā *Pakṣilasvāminā*—Beginning of the *Tātparyaṭīkā.*

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. ii. 9.

[5] *Nyāyasūtra*, V. ii. 11.

I attributes this view to Bauddhas.[1] Now, this leads us to infer that there was a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* either by some Bauddha scholar or by some non-Buddhist. But there is no doubt that there were some commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtras* even before Vātsyāyana and again, that there was a commentary may also be assumed on the basis of the *Bhāṣya*-'daśāvayavā'neke naiyāyika vākye sañcakṣate,'[2] meaning, some Naiyāyikas declare that there are ten factors in a syllogism. Then, as Dr. Windisch, in his paper *Uber Das Nyāya Bhāṣya* and following him, Mm. Dr. Gopinātha Kavirāja, in his *Introduction* to the English translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, hold that the *Bhāṣya* is not the immediate successor to the Sūtras. They are of opinion that there has been a *Vārtika* of which some fragments exist, not only on the first but even on subsequent chapters. They further hold that the *Bhāṣya*—'guṇaviśiṣṭamātmāntaramīśvaraḥ, tasyātmakalpāt kalpāntarānupapattiḥ'[3]—is a part of the lost *Vārtika*. So says, Mahāmahopādhyāya Shri Kavirājaji—

Vātsyāyana is not the first commentator of the *Nyāyasūtra*

"What is said of the Sūtras applies to a certain extent to the *Bhāṣya* also. The interval between the two is not known, but it is certain, as Windisch has already established, that the *Bhāṣya* was not the immediate successor to the Sūtras. There had been a *Vārtika* of which some fragments exist, not only on the first but even on subsequent chapters. Refer the *Vārtika—Guṇaviśiṣṭamātmāntaramīśvaraḥ, tasyātmakalpāt kalpāntarānupapattiḥ* under *Sūtra* IV. 1. 21. This piece has been explained by Vātsyāyana which practically exhausts the whole *Bhāṣya* on the *Sūtra*. Considering this fact a space of 300 or 400 years would not be an unreasonable interval to suppose between the *Sūtras* and the *Bhāṣya*. In other words, Vātsyāyana may be assigned to the second or third century B. C..

This date would not be incompatible with the general style and structure of his language. The peculiar use of certain particulars, namely, *iti, atha, khalu,* and more particularly, of *vai* would seem to be an indication of the antiquity of the work. The use of *vai* in prose, which reminds one of the Brāhmaṇas and Pāli texts, is remarkable and almost decides the question.[4]

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā* on I. ii. 9. [2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, under I. i. 32.
[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya* under IV. i. 21.
[4] Introduction to the English translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* by Dr. Jha.

But this view is not accepted by many. We know that the most important characteristic of the *Bhāṣya*-type of commentary is that the Bhāṣyakāra explains the Sūtra first very briefly and then, elaborates the same in the following lines—'svapadāni ca varṇyante', that is, he explains his own words. Hence, those lines are the lines of the *Bhāṣya* itself and not of any old Vārtika.

But then it is not impossible to hold that there might have been some commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* even prior to the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana as has been already pointed out above.[1]

Vātsyāyana is different from Kauṭilya

Some scholars have tried to identify Vātsyāyana with Kauṭilya. But there is no positive proof for holding this view. Moreover, the style of their composition is so different that we cannot ever think in that direction.

Dr. Vidyabhusan's view not convincing

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has placed Vātsyāyana in about 400 A. D. on the assumption that there are allusions to Bauddha scholars in the *Bhāṣya*[2]. But this assumption is not very convincing, for there is actually no mention of any name of any Bauddha scholar in the *Bhāṣya*. As to the criticism of some of the views found in the *Bhāṣya* which have been associated with the later Bauddha views, it has already been pointed out that those views are older than the Bauddhas. Some of them are easily traceable to the lines of the upaniṣads where they appear to have been given as pūrvapakṣas. That there might have been non-believers

[1] Prof. Anantalal Thakur holds that the alternative explanation of the terms—Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat etc. under *Nyāyasūtra* I. i. 5 and the view of some on the nature of Apavarga under the *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 22 are proofs of there being other commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtra*. But this is not tenable. The terms Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat etc. have been explained differently by Mīmāṁsā, Sāṅkhya and others. Vātsyāyana refers to their explanation. The view of some on the Apavarga may also either be attributed to some Vedāntin of old or to some one else. These do not prove that there were commentaries on the Sūtra prior to Vātsyāyana. Under II. ii. 9 there is no trace of another explanation—Introduction to the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 16 Ft. Note. Tibetian Sanskrit Work Series, Vol. III. [2] *History of Indian Logic*, p. 115.

even in the very early period of our history is not impossible. Or such views might have been introduced by the Sūtrakāra and also by the Bhāṣyakāra themselves not because those views had been actually prevalent before, or during their own days, but as simply conjectured by the authors in order to explain their own standpoint thoroughly. And these conjectured views, as they represented opposition, came to be wrongly associated with the names of the later opposition camps.[1] So it is not convincing to attribute those discussions of the Bhāṣyakāra to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* or to the *Mādhyamikasūtra*. But then, no doubt, there are criticisms against nāstikas, anātmavādins and Kṣaṇikavādins in the *Bhāṣya*, but these refer to the earlier views of the Bauddhas who must have lived before the second or the third century B. C., as already pointed out on the strength of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*—'tadetad-bhadantadūṣaṇametad-vyākhyānānabhyupagamena pariharati.[2]' This is further supported by the use of the term *'arvācīnaiḥ'* for Diṅnāga and others by the author of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*,[3] which shows that there were Buddhist scholars prior to Diṅnāga and others (prācīnas) who might have written on the *Nyāyasūtra* prior to Vātsyāyana.

Interesting facts from the Bhāṣya

A few facts in the *Bhāṣya* which are of special interest may now be noted here—

1. It is probable that Vātsyāyana flourished after the Buddha, because the four 'arthapadāni' of the *Bhāṣya*[4] seem to be based on the four well-known 'āryasatyāni' of the Buddha, but it may also be said that the ultimate end of life and philosophy being the same, both of them might have thought of the problems in the same manner.

Direct perception of the Ātman

2. Vātsyāyana believes that through the peculiar type of contact between the Ātman and the manas, the former can be directly perceived.[5]

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[1] *Introduction* to his Bengali translation by Mm. Phanibhūṣana Tarkavāgīsha, p. 34.

[2] On *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 9.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the benedictory verse of the *Nyāyavārtika*, Vide *Nyāyaparicaya* by Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, pp. 40-41.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 4.

[5] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

3. Vātsyāyana asserts that *manas* is also a sense-organ and that it has been separately mentioned apart from other sense-organs simply because of its peculiar nature, that is, its being a non-bhautika element.[1] This might have been due to the fact that Vātsyāyana needed a sense-organ for the perception of the Ātman. So he recognized *manas*, like the Vaiśeṣikas.

Inclusion of manas in Nyāya

4. For the first time Vātsyāyana introduces the six positive categories of the Vaiśeṣikas, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, viśeṣa and inherence, into the Nyāya-śāstra and also implies that these categories were in vogue even before the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Akṣapāda.[2] This seems to suggest that the Vaiśeṣika system is earlier than the Nyāya system of Akṣapāda.

Inclusion of Vaiśeṣika categories in Nyāya

5. While explaining the three terms indicating the types of inference, Vātsyāyana has given first his own interpretation. But perhaps he is himself not satisfied with it, so he gives other alternative interpretations and begins with 'atha vā.'[3] In fact, as it will be clear later on, these are technical terms which have been used by Sāṅkhya, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and other systems also. All the authors of different systems appear to be quite doubtful about their correct meaning. It seems that long before these authors flourished, the correct meaning of these terms were lost and later on, the scholars have attempted to give their meaning which is confusing and not very satisfactory.

Definite meaning of the types of Inference uncertain

6. Vātsyāyana makes it clear that a 'nāstika' is unable to accept a 'dṛṣṭānta', that is, 'sapakṣa', as it will lead him to self-contradiction. He also thereby implies that a 'nāstika' cannot accept any 'bahirvyāpti', as it will go against his theory of the *Momentary Flux*, but he can accept only 'antarvyāpti' where a 'sapakṣa' or 'dṛṣṭānta is not required.[4]

Nāstika can neither accept sapakṣa nor bahirvyāpti

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.
[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9; II. i. 35.
[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 5.
[4] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

7. Vātsyāyana holds that the four types of pramāṇa which are used by human beings are equally used by shining ones (devas) and those beings which do not move straight (tiryak) for their activities.[1]

Devas and tiryak beings also use four types of pramāṇas

8. He quotes Pāṇini[2] and Vaiśeṣika sūtras.[3]

9. He gives in detail the process of cooking rice for food. He says that cooking consists of placing the (earthen) pot upon the hearth, of pouring water into the pot, of putting rice into the pot, of removing fuel, lighting of fire[4], stirring it with the ladle, taking out the gruel from the pot, and then bringing down the pot from the hearth.[5] This may indicate that Vātsyāyana lived in that part of the country where cooking of rice was common.

Process of cooking rice in detail

10. While dealing with the examination and verification aspect of the categories, Vātsyāyana has clearly shown how the propounders of the opposite views used the various wrong methods of reasoning, namely, disputation (jalpa), wrangling (vitaṇḍā), casuistry (chala), futile rejoinder (jāti) and clinchers (nigrahasthāna) against the Nyāya views.[6]

Use of wrong reasonings against Nyāya

11. Vātsyāyana has not only commented upon the sūtras but has also added his own original views in many places with a view to elucidate the Nyāya standpoint.[7]

Vātsyāyana's originality

12. There are many points where Vātsyāyana apparently differs from the author of the Sūtras.[8]

Vātsyāyana's differences from Gotama

13. Vātsyāyana holds that the contact of tactile-organ and *manas* is essential for the production of cognition. In *purītat* there is no tactile-organ, so when the *manas* enters into it during the state of soundless

Tactile organ & manas contact essential for cognition

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 7. [2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II. i. 16; II. ii. 40.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 5.

[4] Vārtika has rightly pointed out that the correct process should be—edhopasarpaṇamagnyabhijvālanam sthālyadhiśrayaṇamudakāsecanam taṇḍulapacanam darvīghaṭṭanam maṇḍasrāvaṇamavatāraṇamiti. II. i. 43.

[5] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II. i. 43. [6] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, II. i-ii.

[7] *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, II. ii. 35; I. i. 4. etc. [8] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II. ii. 36.

sleep (*suṣupti*), *no cognition of any kind is produced in that state.*[1]

14. He says that the visual organ encased in the pupil goes out and then comes in contact with the object of perception possessing colour.[2]

Visual organ goes out for cognition

15. Against the view of the Sūtrakāra, Vātsyāyana holds that the visual sense-organ is not one but two different organs. The arguments are : (1) if the cause, that is, a constituent part of an object, is destroyed and yet the effect, that is, the composite, remains intact, then under no circumstances the effect can be destroyed. It will remain as eternal. So if the visual sense-organ be one, then after the destruction of a part of it, the composite whole should also have been destroyed. But in reality we see that even when the left eye is destroyed, the right eye remains intact and does recognize the objects cognized through the left. In other words, there are two visual sense-organs. (2) This is further supported by the fact that two separate holes are found in the dead man's skull, separated by the nasal bone. Had there been only one sense-organ we would not have perceived two separate holes. (3) Lastly, it is pointed out that when we look upon a thing with the two eyes open, we perceive it as one object, but when we press one eye with a finger, we perceive the object as two. This fact is possible only when the two eyes constitute two distinct visual organs. Hence, Vātsyāyana holds that there are two distinct visual sense-organs.[3]

Visual organ is two different organs

16. Vātsyāyana gives the Sāṅkhya view that Buddhi, an internal sense-organ (antaḥkaraṇa), is eternal.[4] This is a peculiar question. Buddhi, according to Nyāya, is an attribute of the Ātman and is synonymous with jñāna (knowledge). It is a product and hence, is non-eternal. According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vijñānabhikṣu, the expounders of Sāṅkhya, 'Buddhi', meaning, intellect, is a manifestation of Prakṛti. It

Vātsyāyana refers to an old view of Sāṅkhya that Buddhi is eternal

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 53—58. [2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 60.
[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 7—11. [4] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 1—3.

is not eternal (nitya). So the term Buddhi is not used in these two systems in the same sense. Even then the Sūtrakāra deals with Buddhi, meaning, jñāna, only to warn students against any confusion in the use of the term. Though Vātsyāyana explains the term *nityā* in the sense that what is real in Sāṅkhya can never be unreal,[1] yet can we not say that it refers to an old view of Sāṅkhya, which is now lost, according to which it is *nityā*?

17. As to the nature of 'Iśvara', Vātsyāyana says that *Iśvara* is a distinct Ātman possessing certain qualities, but as he is of the same type as the Ātman, he cannot be placed under any other separate category. Thus, Iśvara is a distinct Ātman[2] endowed with the qualities of devoid of demerit (adharma), wrong knowledge (mithyājñāna), and negligence (pramāda), and presence of merit (dharma), knowledge (jñāna) and samādhi. Vātsyāyana further makes it clear that Iśvara possesses eternal jñāna, eternal desire (icchā), eternal effort (prayatna), dveṣa (hatred), sukha (happiness), and duḥkha (pain). These are the probans to prove the existence of the Ātman. Vātsyāyana further explains that because *Iśvara* has dharma and samādhi, he is endowed with the eightfold siddhi, namely, aṇimā (becoming the smallest), laghimā (becoming the lightest), mahimā (becoming the greatest), prāpti (touching the moon with one's tip of the finger), prākāmya (dipping into earth as if it were water, *or not to have one's desire frustrated*), *vaśi*tva (having control over everything, organic or inorganic), īśitva (creating, protecting and destroying everything) and yatrakāmāyasāyitva (getting all desires fulfilled). The *merit* (dharma) of Iśvara, due to His own desire, moves the earth and other elements as well as the merit and demerit of individual beings towards creation. Creation takes place simply with the desire of Iśvara which is the result of his own saṅkalpa (mental action). It must be kept in mind that the desire of Iśvara never goes without yielding

Vātsyāyana holds that Iśvara is a distinct Ātman

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[1] Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ /

[2] *Iśvara* is distinct from Jīvātman, but both belong to the same category. They possess distinct attributes.

its fruit. But at the same time it has to be admitted that Īśvara Himself, being *'āptakāma'*, creates the universe not for his own purpose, but only for doing good to others, namely, the would be created beings.[1]

It is held by some scholars that like Akṣapāda Gotama, Vātsyāyana also lived and wrote on Nyāya-śāstra in Mithilā.[2]

But Mm. Dr. Satiśchandra Vidyabhuṣaṇa, holds that he was in all probability a native of Deccan.[3] But this does not seem to be probable.

Merits of the *Bhāṣya*

Of all the works on Prācīna-nyāya, Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* is the most difficult one. Its style is very obscure and elliptical, so that at many places it becomes difficult to connect the *Bhāṣya* with the *Sūtra*. This, again, is perhaps due to the distortion of the texts by the scholars of the opposite views. Besides, the Bhāṣyakāra following the Sūtrakāra has introduced so many old theories in his work and in such a way, that it has become much more difficult to trace them to their sources. We have seen how the later commentators have attributed those theories to the later schools or individual authors, while in fact, they represent very ancient views. As the ancient texts are still hidden in dark, it is really very difficult to place these theories in their right place. However, we shall discuss these in their proper place later on.

3. BHADRABĀHU II

(12 B. C.)

After Vātsyāyana, there flourished many writers on Nyāya. Not only amongst the orthodox, but also amongst the Jainas and the Buddhists there were many scholars of great name and fame who wrote

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 21.

[2] *Introduction to Nyāyavārtika* by Mm. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedī, p. 127.

[3] *Indian Logic*, p. 117.

on Indian logic. We have seen in the first volume[1] that one Bhadrabāhu II flourished about 12 B.C. who wrote the *Daśavaikālikaniryukti* and gave a more elaborate account of a syllogism with ten factors.

4. NĀGĀRJUNA

(2nd century A. D.)

From amongst the followers of the Buddha, the following scholars may be mentioned who contributed to Indian logic prior to Uddyotakara and after Vātsyāyana. Of them, Nāgārjuna of the second century[2] A.D. quotes from the *Nyāyasūtra*[3] and wrote his works on logic.

5—6. ASAṄGA AND VASUBANDHU

(4th century A. D.)

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in the fourth century A.D. wrote many important works and showed their originality in logic. Their views provoked the orthodox scholars who criticized them in their works.[4]

7. DIṄNĀGA

(425 A.D.)

Next, we come to Diṅnāga, who is called the Father of the mediaeval school of Indian Logic, from amongst the followers of the Buddha. He lived and wrote many works in about 425 A.D. Amongst the most important works of Diṅnāga *Pramāṇasamuccaya* along with its *Vṛtti*, *Nyāyapraveśa*, *Hetucakrahamaru*

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[1] Umesha Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. pp. 253-54. The works of the Jaina and the Buddhist logicians have been mentioned in the first volume, but even then some of the most important authors are mentioned here in order to link the thoughts of these authors representing different standpoints.

[2] *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. p. 254.

[3] *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. p. 470.

[4] *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. pp. 473—75.

and *Ālambanaparīkṣā* along with the *Vṛtti* are more important works.

It must be pointed out here that there is a great difference between the orthodox and the Buddhist method of treatment of the scope of Nyāyaśāstra. The former deals not only with Inference and its varieties which may be said to be the most vital problem of the Nyāyaśāstra but also discusses the metaphysical and allied problems and other aspects of epistemology. The followers of the Buddha, on the other hand, confined themselves exclusively to Inference (anumāna) and other aspects connected with it.

Difference in the treatment of the scope of logic between Bauddhas and non-Bauddhas

Vātsyāyana also has explained that the term *Nyāya* is confined to the five factors of a syllogistic reasoning, which he calls 'paramo nyāyaḥ'[1]. But he has also shown how these five factors really represent the four varieties of Pramāṇa. Orthodox scholars did not like to disconnect the Science of Reasoning from metaphysics, ethics, physics and chemistry, etc., because the only object of Pramāṇa is to explain the prameyas representing all other aspects mentioned above. But the followers of the Buddha separated the Science of Reasoning (Nyāyaśāstra) from the rest of the Sciences and, thus confined it to its own limited scope, as if it had nothing to do with the Prameyas.

Diṅnāga undoubtedly played a very important part in the growth of Nyāya (logical reasoning) in India. He made original contributions and attacked both Akṣapāda and Vātsyāyana from time to time in his works. A few illustrations of the above are given below :

Important views of Diṅnāga

We know that the *Nyāyasūtra* does not mention *manas* amongst the sense-organs. But Vātsyāyana adds here that the *manas* is also a sense-organ recognized by the Naiyāyikas which is proved from its being accepted as such by the allied system, that is, Vaiśeṣika; and the views of the other allied system which have not been refuted, are accepted as correct for Nyāya system also.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 4.

This Diṅnāga does not accept and tauntingly remarks that it is strange that the Bhāṣyakāra did not borrow the whole of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra.[1] The Bauddha scholar means that from the *Nyāyasūtra* we know that Akṣapāda mentions eyes, ears, nose, tongue and the tactile organ alone as the five sense-organs and is quite silent as to whether manas is a sense-organ or not. Vātsyāyana explains this silence in such a way as to prove that Gotama does accept manas as the sixth sense-organ. But Diṅnāga does not agree with this interpretation of Vātsyāyana and says that pleasure etc. are not the objects of knowledge (prameya), nor is the manas a sense-organ. He further adds that if silence were a proof of assent, why did then Gotama mention even the other five sense-organs? Those also could have been understood without having been mentioned by him. Other more important views of Diṅnāga have already been mentioned in the first volume and, hence, they are not repeated here.

Diṅnāga denies inclusion of *manas* among indriyas

8. BHARGA

(5th century A.D.)

Amongst the earlier writers on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama, or on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana who joined Uddyotakara in criticizing the views of the Buddhists the name of Bharga has been mentioned by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and also by Kamalaśīla in his commentary the *Pañjikā*. It is said there that Bharga, Uddyotakara and others interpret the words 'kalpanā'poḍhaṁ', of Diṅnāga, meaning, free from mental contributions attributed to the objects, as 'anabhidheyārthaḥ', meaning, inexpressible by words. But this interpretation is not accepted by the Buddhists.[2]

Kamalaśīla also uses the term 'bhargabhāradvāja-prabhṛtayaḥ' which distinctly proves that there were many Āstika Naiyāyikas who opposed the Buddhists

[1] *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter I, vide *Indian Logic* of Mm. Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūsana, p. 279.

[2] Verses 1239—42

either prior to Uddyotakara, or were his contemporaries. This is also evident from what Uddyotakara himself suggests by the use of terms like anye, apare, pare, etc. in his *Vārttika*. From the contexts and the interpretations, it is quite obvious that all of them do not refer to the Buddhists, or Mīmāṁsakas, or Jainas, or Sāṅkhya only, but to the Āstika Naiyāyikas also.

As Bharga has been mentioned by Kamalaśīla and his view is given in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, and also as his name is mentioned along with Uddyotakara, rather the name of Bharga has been mentioned prior to Uddyotakara, it is presmued that Bharga might have flourished before Uddyotakara, sometimes in the fifth century A.D.[1]

9. PARAMĀRTHA
(499—569 A.D.)

Paramārtha was a Buddhist scholar who flourished in the sixth century. It is said that he wrote a work called the *Explanation of the Caṅ-lum* in five voumes but all are lost.[2] It may be assumed that the five volumes of Paramārtha were, in fact, the five chapters of the *Nyāyasūtra* itself.

10. SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA
(6th century A.D.)

After Diṅnāga, Bharga and others mention may be made of a Jaina logician named Siddhasena Divākara who flourished in the sixth century and wrote about 32 different works on logic of which 21 works are known even to-day.[3] He was the first scholar amongst the Jaina writers who wrote systematically on logic.

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[1] It must be kept in mind that in many cases, I have assigned dates to several authors only on the basis of the references found in the works of contemporary writers and also in the same order in which those references are found to have been mentioned.

[2] Vide—H. Ui. *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, pp. 18, 84. Ft. Note 4.

[3] Vide—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, page 254.

Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa makes Uddyotakara a contemporary of Dharmakīrti on the ground that Uddyotakara has referred to the *Vādavidhi* and the *Vādavidhānaṭīkā*[1] which he identifies with Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* and Vinītadeva's *Vādanyāya-vyākhyā*. But there is no sound argument in favour of this identification, so both Mahāmahopādhyāyas Kavirāja and Tarkavāgīśa hold that it is not more than an assumption.[2] On the other hand, the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti is now published and it is found there that Dharmakīrti quotes from Uddyotakara's *Vārtika* many a times,[3] and the *Vārtika* refers to the *Vādavidhi*. Again, the *Vādavidhāna*, also known as the *Vādavidhi*, has been written by Vasubandhu. The *Vādavidhāna* has also been mentioned in the commentary of the *Vādanyāya* by Śāntarakṣita.[4] Hence, the *Vādanyāya* can never be identified with the *Vādavidhāna* as Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa thinks. This also rejectes the identification between the *Vadavidhānaṭīkā* and the *Vādanyāyavyākhyā*.

Dr. Vidyabhusana's view examined and criticized

Uddyotakara is known as the *Pāśupatācārya*.[5] He was deeply and widely read in post-Mahāyānic Buddhist philosophy. In the *Vārtika* there are enough evidences of his wide acquaintance with the details of Buddhist philosophy. There are several quotations from and references to the Buddhist literature in the *Vārtika*. There is a reference to the *Sarvābhisamayasūtra*.[6] This is a very old Buddhist text and may be identical with the well-known *Bhārahārasūtra* mentioned in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* and the Tibetan authorities.[7]

Uddyotakara's full acquaintance with Buddhist logic

[1] *Indian Logic*, p. 124.

[2] Introduction to the English translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha, p. xvii; Introduction to the Bengali translation, p. 36.

[3] *Vādanyāya*, pp. 75, 82, 98, 103, 109, 127, Rāhula's edition.

[4] P. 42,

The Sūtra referred to above is—yaścātmā nāstīti sa mithyādṛṣṭiko bhavatīti.[1] The full text is—

na cātmānamanabhyupagacchatā tathāgatadarśanamarthavattāyām vyavasthāpayitum śakyam. na cedam vacanam nāsti, Sarvābhisamayasūtre abhidhānāt. tasmānnāstyātmā iti bruvāṇaḥ siddhāntam bādhate iti. tathā "Bhāram vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārahārañca, bhāraḥ pa caskandhā bhārahāraśca pudgala iti. yaścātmā nāstīti sa mithyādṛṣṭiko bhavatīti" Sūtram.

Translation—One who does not accept the existence of Ātman can never assert the validity of the Tathāgatadarśana (that is, the Bauddhadarśana). Nor can it be said that (in the Buddhist philosophy) there is no mention of the existence of the Ātman, because it is distinctly mentioned in the *Sarvābhisamayasūtra*. Hence, one (Buddhist) who says that there is no Ātman (in the Buddhist philosophy) goes against the very doctrine of the system.

The Sūtra asserting the existence of the Ātman is as follows :—

Conception of Ātman according to the Pudgalavādins

"O Bhikṣus ! I am going to point out to you the burden and the burden-bearer; the five skandhas are the burden, and the pudgala is the burden-bearer. And who says that there is no Ātman is a disbeliever." It is clear from the above that the old *Pudgalavādins* did believe in the existence of a continuous entity called the Ātman.[2]

Definition of Pratijñā is supported by Uddyotakara

Uddyotakara has criticized many Buddhist scholars in his *Vārtika*. It has been said by the Buddhists that 'Pratijñā' and the other two factors of a syllogism have been badly confounded by the definition given by Gotama himself.[3] To this, Uddyotakara says that Gotama has very clearly and correctly defined all the three factors and that the Buddhist writer himself has confounded the facts.[4]

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[1] *Nyāyavārtika*, III. i. 1.

[2] Mm. Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1., pp. 364-66; Also refer to the *Kathāvatthu* and *Dhammapada*.

[3] *Nyāyavārtika*, 1. i. 37, page 136 Banaras edition.

[4] *Nyāyavārtika*, 1. i. 37.

Again, Uddyotakara criticizes the definition of *Dṛṣṭānta* as given by Nāgārjuna in his *Pramāṇavihetana*.[1] Similarly, he also criticizes the definition of Pratyakṣa as given by Diṅnāga, that is, 'Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham'.[2] In this way, we find that Uddyotakara has criticized almost all the Buddhist definitions and views on logic from orthodox Nyāya standpoint in his *Vārtika*.

Nāgārjuna and Diṅnāga are criticized

It seems, from what Vācaspati I and Udayana have said, that there were many commentaries beside the *Tātparyaṭīkā*[3] on this *Vārtika* and that Uddyotakara had founded a school of his own. But unfortunately, there were severe attacks on the *Vārtika* by the Buddhists, more specially by Dharmakīrti, a very great Buddhist logician, so that the reputation which had been established by Uddyotakara was overthrown and the secrets of the Nyāya-śāstra was lost.[4] So says Udayana-'uddyotakarasampradāyo hyamūṣām (gavīnām) yauvanam, tacca kālavaśād galitamiva.[5]' It is also clear from the words of Vācaspati I and Udayana that most probably, after Uddyotakara there did not flourish any very strong orthodox logician to refute the criticisms levelled against the orthodox logicians by the Buddhists, otherwise, it would not have been left for Vācaspati Miśra I to say—

Uddyotakara's *Sampradāya* was almost lost

icchāmi kimapi puṇyam dustarakunibandhapaṅka-magnānām/
uddyotakaragavīnāmatijaratīnām samuddharaṇāt//.[6]

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[1] *Nyāyavārtika*, 1. i. 37, page 137.

[2] *Nyāyavārtika*, 1. i. 4. page 41.

[3] Mm. Vindhyeshwari Prasada Dvivedin in his *Introduction* to the *Nyāyavārtika* writes on p. 142 Ft. Note (1) that Rāghava Bhaṭṭa wrote a commentary on the Vārtika as has been mentioned by him in his *Nyāyasāravicāra*.

[4] Introduction to Dr. Jha's English translation by Mm. Dr. Kaviraj, p. xvi.

[5] *Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 9 *Bl.* edition,

[6] Beginning of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*,

A few notable facts from the *Vārtika* are given below :

As far as is known to me there have been only three editions of the *Nyāya-Vārtika*, the first from the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, edited by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin, the second from the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Banaras, edited by Mm. Pandita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin and the third is published in the Calcutta Sanskrit Series as No. XVIII in 1936 in two volumes along with the *ṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra I and the *Vṛtti* of Viśwanātha Nyāyapañcānana. There is a good deal of improvement in the third edition, no doubt, but still there remains much to be done in order to bring it up to the mark.

Vārtika explains like a *Bhāsya*

According to the definitions available[1] the *Vārtika* type of commentary is that which deals with topics mentioned, or not mentioned, or mentioned repeatedly in the text, with the help of reasons and right means of cognition (pramāṇas). In addition to all these various methods of explanation, Uddyotakara has adopted his own peculiar method of explaining the facts. Like the Bhāṣyakāra[2], he gives first one explanation of the text, but it seems that not being satisfied with it, he proceeds further to explain his own words in greater detail. In other words, he follows the method of a Bhāṣyakāra as well in the *Vārtika*. His method of explanation is very lucid and sometimes very elaborate. He refers to various previous views, specially of the Buddhists, and refutes them with cogent reasons.

No doubt, Uddyotakara has great regard for Vātsyāyana whom he considers to be as great and in-

[1] (a) uktānuktadviruktānām cintā yatra prasajyate /
tam grantham Vārtikam prāhurvārtikajñā manīṣiṇaḥ //

(b) uktānuktadviruktānām vicārasya nibandhanam /
hetubhiśca pramāṇaiścaitadvārtikalakṣaṇam //

(c) sūtrāṇāmanutpatticodanā tatparihāro viśeṣābhidhānañceti Vārttikalakṣaṇam—Prajñākaragupta in his *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*, p. 521 Tibetan sanskrit work Series, edition.

[2] Vide—Svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyam bhāṣyavido viduḥ /

telligent as Gotama,[1] but it does not mean that Uddyotakara agrees with Vātsyāyana's explanation on every point. He differs from him very often and gives his own reason in support of his explanation. A few instances are given below from the *Vārtika* to illustrate the above differences:

Uddyotakara differs from Vātsyāyana

Under Sūtra I.i.1 while discussing the reason for having mentioned the category of 'hetvābhāsa' separately and also amongst the clinchers (nigrahasthānas), Uddyotakara rejects the answer of the Bhāṣyakāra and gives his own reason. He says that the real purpose why hetvābhāsa has been separately mentioned is—'vidyāprasthānabhedajñāpanārthatvāt[2]—meaning, to denote that the three 'vidyās'[3], namely, Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā, have their distinct scope. But it must be kept in mind that Vācaspati I and Udayana both try to support the *Bhāṣya*.

Under Sūtra I.i.3 the Bhāṣyakāra explains that the compound in the word 'Pratyakṣa' is of the type of 'avyayībhāva'. But the *Vārtika* holds that it cannot be a case of 'avyayībhāva'. It is a case of 'prādisamāsa'.[4]

Again, while discussing the meaning of the 'sāmānyatodṛṣṭa' type of inference, the explanation of the *Bhāṣya* is not liked by the author of the *Vārtika* and therefore, the latter gives his own explanation and illustration. So has been said by the author of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*—'bhāṣyakāravyākhyānamarocayamāno Vārtikakāro'nyathā vyākhyāya udāharaṇāntaramāha.[5]' Again, Uddyotakara does not agree with the instance of 'the movement of the sun' for the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa type of inference as given by the Bhāṣyakāra, but gives his own unique interpretation to justify the instance somehow or other.[6] The *Vārtika* seems to hold that the sun does not move.

The Sun does not move

[1] yadakṣapādapratibhaḥ—Last verse at the end of the *Vārtika*.

[2] *Nyāyavārtika*. I. i. 1, p. 19. Chowkhamba, Banaras, edition.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 66. Chowkhamba, Banaras, edition.

[4] *Vārtika*, p. 24. [5] *Tātparya*, p. 176.

[6] Vārtika, p. 48. Uddyotakara says that there can be no connection with the sun and movement. The sun is never found to leave its place and go anywhere else. Does it refer to the view that the sun never moves?

Again, the *Vārtika* gives different interpretations of *trividhamanumānam*.

There are many more points of difference between the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* which may be worked out in a separate article. What has been said here is only to bring to the notice of scholars a peculiar aspect of the *Vārtika*.

First mention of Ṣodhā sannikarṣa

It seems that it was Uddyotakara who for the first time recognized in his commentary the six kinds of contact (ṣoḍhā sannikarṣa)found in the process of Pratyakṣa[1]. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not mention anything about the types of contact. The *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* uses the term 'catuṣṭayasannikarṣa' in connection with the proces of direct perception. But those four types of contact are quite different. They refer to the contacts of the sense-organ with the objects, sense-organ contact with manas and that of manas with the Ātman.[2] The *Vyomavatī*, however, says that by the very mention of the four types of contact in connection with direct perception, it is clear that the well-known six types of contact (Ṣoḍhā sannikarṣa) are also accepted by the Śāstra[3]. But there is no direct mention of the six types of contact in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. It may be implied. Hence, it is in the *Nyāya-Vārtika* alone that the earliest mention of the six types of contact is found.

From the study of the *Vārtika* it is evident that Uddyotakara was well versed in logic as propounded by the Buddhists and non-Buddhists. He has criticized their views not only because they could not be in harmony with his own standpoint, but also because by doing so he could explain his own views fully well. Amongst the Buddhists he did not spare Diṅnāga in any way. He also criticized the views of Vasubandhu and many others whom he refers to only by the terms, anye, apare, kecit, etc. Similarly, he criticized the views of the Mīmāṁsakas and the Sāṅkhyas whenever he found an opportunity.

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[1] *Vārtika*, p. 31.

[2] Page 553 Chowkhamba, Banaras, edition.

[3] *Vyomavatī*, p. 556.

While criticizing the views of other schools on Inference, Uddyotakara refers to a definition of anumāna according to the Sāṅkhya, as interpreted by the author of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*[1],—'sambandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāt śeṣasiddhiḥ,[2]' meaning, Inference is that where the existence of the object to be inferred (prameya) is inferred from the concomitant relation existing between the sādhana and the sādhya supported by a stronger pramāṇa, namely, Pratyakṣa.

Inference according to the old Sāṅkhya view

It is to be noted that the present available literature on the Sāṅkhya school does not contain any such definition of anumāna. Hence, it may be presumed that this definition was given by a Sāṅkhya author whose work is now lost and who must be very old and have flourished prior to Uddyotakara.

While explaining the idea of 'plurality', Uddyotakara gives instances of 'Pariṣad' and 'Saṅgha'. The former is explained as 'jātiviśiṣṭapuruṣopagraheṇa pravartamānā,' meaning, that congregation which consists of a particular class of persons in definite bands, while the latter as meaning 'pravrajitaviśeṣopagraheṇa, vartamānā', that is, a congregation which consists of persons who have taken to renunciation.[3]

Conception of the terms—Pariṣad and Sangh

We do not know of any congregation existing amongst the Āstika class of people in those old days. But it is certain that the Buddhists had such congregations in those days and so it is perhaps the Buddhist congregations which he means by the terms.

It has already been pointed out that most probably there were some commentaries on the *Sūtra*, or the *Bhāṣya*, prior to the *Vārtika*. This is further proved by the following: while explaining the *Saṁśaya-sūtra*,[4] Uddyotakara gives different interpretations for certain terms used in the sūtra and attributes those to different persons. Again, the same thing may be said about his quoting different interpretations of the negative *Dṛṣṭānta-sūtra*.[5] Similarly, there are several

Different interpretations of the Saṁśayasūtra

[1] Page 194. [2] *Vārtika on Nyāya-sūtra*, I. i. 5. p. 57.

[3] *Vārtika*, p. 76. [4] *Nyāyasūtra* I. i. 23, p. 93.

[5] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 37; *Vārtika*, p. 135.

such instances in the *Vārtika* which definitely suggest the presence of several commentaries on the *Sūtra* or the *Bhāṣya* prior to the *Vārtika* and it is presumed that most of them were by Buddhist scholars.

Uddyotakara holds that eyes come in contact with Paramāṇus

Uddyotakara definitely says that our physical eyes do come in contact with the Paramāṇus, but as they have no magnitude (mahattva), they are not perceived by us.[1] This he supports by referring to two Sūtras[2] of the *Vaiśeṣika-darśana*.

That there was a difference of opinion amongst the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* was also noted with great pleasure by the Buddhists, in the interpretátion of the Sūtras.[3]

12. AVIDDHAKARṆA

(6th Century A. D.)

Aviddhakarṇa is one of the great Niyāyikas whom the Buddhists have referred to and who holds that even without the cognition of the attributes, like colour etc., the cognition of the substance can be had. For instance, in dim light though colour is not perceived, yet the object is perceived.[4]

Aviddhakarṇa's views criticized

Again, while discussing the separate and independent existence of a composite (avayavī), Dharmakīrti and his followers hold that though there is the difference between the reality (sattā) of the part and that of its composite (avayava and avayavī, for instance, tantu and paṭa), yet this does not prove that there exists an avayavī apart from its avayavas. In other

[1] *Vārtika*, p. 230.

[2] II. i. 11; IV. i. 7. The present Sūtra is-satyapi dravyatve mahatve rūpasaṁskārābhāvādvāyoranupalabdhiḥ.

[3] bhāṣyakāramatasya Bhāradvājenaiva dūṣitatvādasmākamarddhantāvadavasitam bhārasyeti—Śāntarakṣita in his *Vipañcitārthā* on the *Vādanyāya*, p. 75, Bihar Research Society edition.

[4] Rūpādyagrahepi dravyagrahaṇamastyeva/yato mandamandaprakāśe, anupalabhyamānarūpādikaṁ dravyamupalabhyate'-niścitarūpaṁ gauraśvo veti.—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 35, Bihar Research Society Journal, Vol. xxi. iv,

words, paṭa is certainly different from the material cause, namely, threads (tantavaḥ), but not from the peculiar collocation of the prior elements (paramāṇus). This view of the Buddhists rejects the view of Aviddhakarṇa who holds that there is a composirte apart from the parts, as one precedes the othe.[1]

Again, while rejecting the meaning of the *Nyāya-sūtra*-'Pratijñātārthapratiṣedhe dharmavikalpāttadartha-nirdeśaḥ pratijñāntaram'[2], meaning, that the '*prati-jñāntara*', a type of nigrahasthāna, occurs when the subject of the original proposition is rejected and a diversity in the properties of the example and the counter-instance is found and put forward with a view to establish the former proposition, Śāntarak-ṣita says that Aviddhakarṇa, in his commentary on the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, has raised the objection of the Buddhist scholar and has criticised it[3].

Again, Śāntarakṣita refers to the view of Aviddha-karṇa as mentioned by the latter in his commentary on the *Bhāṣya* (*Bhāṣyaṭīkāyām*) with an illustration—'vyaktam ekaprakṛtikam' (according to Sāṅkhya all vyaktas are products of one common Prakṛti); because, they are all limited, like small earthen pots. According to the Buddhists there is a contradiction in the probans[4], so they have rejected this view.

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[1] tanna rūpādibhyo'nyo ghaṭa ...arthakriyātastu sattāvya-vahāra। syāt/na sattābhedābhedavyavahāra , ekasyāpyanekār-thakriyādarśanāt. ... na kramārthakriyābhedamātreṇa sattābheda iti kintarhi adṛṣṭārthakriyābhedena/yā arthakriyā yasminnadṛṣṭā punardṛśyate sā sattābhedaṁ sādhayati yathā mṛdyadṛṣṭā satyu-dakadhāranādyarthakriyā ghaṭe dṛśyamānā'dṛṣṭāpi tantuṣu prā-varaṇādyarthakriyā paṭe dṛśyate iti sattābhedaḥ siddhyati/evamar-thāntaram, tathāpyavayavī na siddhyati—*Vādanyāya*, pp. 38-40.

tebhyaśca pūrvebhya · paṭasyānyatvamiṣṭamevāsmābhirapi/na tu viśiṣṭasaṁsthānāvacchinnebhya iti tyajyatāmiyamarthāntarā-vayavisiddhipratyāśeti/tadetenaiva *Aviddhakarṇoktaṁ* pūrvottara-kālabhāvitvādityādi tatsādhanamapahastitaṁ veditavyaṁ—*Vip-añcitārthā* on the above, p. 40.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, V. ii. 3.

[3] Aviddhakarṇastu *Bhāṣyaṭīkāyām* idamāśankya parijihirṣati—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 78.

[4] yatpunarudāhṛtamaviddhakarnena *bhāṣyaṭīkāyāṁ* vyaktame-kaprakṛtikaṁ parimitatvāt śarāvādivat—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 92.

Lastly, Śāntarakṣita quotes the view of Aviddhakarṇa in connection with the *Hīna* type of nigrahasthāna in his commentary on the *Vādanyāya*[1].

Śāntarakṣita has also mentioned, as has been already pointed out, some other views of Aviddhakarṇa in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* which also may be mentioned here.

We are aware that the question of an independent and separate existence of Īśvara was a very important problem and both the non-Buddhists and Buddhists took keen interest in it. The latter denied openly the existence of Īśvara, but very strongly supported the 'sarvajñatva' of the Buddha who was even called 'sarvajña' by them. It may be noted here that in common parlance, 'sarvajña' and 'Īśvara' are used as synonymous. So there was a very important problem before the logicians of that period to discuss. Every great writer wrote on it.

Accordingly, we find Aviddhakarṇa adducing two arguments to prove the existence of Īśvara.

Existence of Īśvara proved

The first argument is that object which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs (like the organs of vision and touch), or not perceptible at all, is found to be produced by an intelligent cause, because it possesses a peculiar collocation of its constituent parts, like a pot etc., or Paramāṇus respectively[2]. The second argument is that the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) of an organism, etc. is found to be dependent upon an intelligent being, as they possess rūpa, etc., like threads etc., which is the material cause of a cloth, only if it is dependent upon an intelligent weaver. Most probably, Kamalaśīla quotes the exact lines of Aviddhakarṇa and they are quoted here also as—yathoktam—

"tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāryamārabhante *iti pratijānīmahe*, *rūpādi*mattvāt, tantvādivaditi[3]."

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[1] tadatrāha—*Aviddhakarṇaḥ* pratibandhakanyāyena pratyavatiṣṭhate—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 109.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 47-48. [3] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 49.

While supporting the 'eternity and ubiquity of the Ātman', Aviddhakarṇa says that the cognitions which are experienced by a man at present must have been cognized by the same cognizer who had cognized his first cognitions after he had come out of his mother's womb, because these are also his own cognitions, like his first cognitions. Similarly, it can be said of pain and other experiences of his. This shows that there is some eternal and continuous entity (which is called the Ātman).

Eternity and ubiquity of the Ātman proved

Again, he says that though earth and other substances are far from him, yet they are all connected with his Ātman, because they have a limited form, like his own organism. Having thus proved the existence of the eternity and ubiquity of the Ātman, it can be said with full confidence that there is nothing which has no Ātman[1].

Speaking about the cause of '*vināśa*', Aviddhakarṇa says that the destruction of a thing cannot exist simultaneously with the existence of that thing, nor can it exist before that thing has come into existence, nor can it come long after that thing has been produced. The reasons are that if it exists simultaneously, then the thing which has even the momentary existence cannot exist; nor can it exist prior to that object, because how can a thing which has not come into existence be at all destroyed? Nor can it come to exist very long after, because all things being destroyed at the third moment of their existence, there can be no other destruction of those very things after a very long time. Hence, a thing when produced must be destroyed in the second moment of its existence. Thus, destruction being certain at a particular time, it must have a cause, like a sprout. Again, if destruction were without any cause, its occasional nature would not have been possible, as in that case its existence would have been possible for all times. Hence, it has a cause, because it is occasional[2].

Examining the cause of destruction

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verses 185-87 along with the *Pañjikā*.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verses 367-68.

Further, as it comes just after the product has come into existence, it must have a cause and also because, not having been in existence, it comes into existence, like the other following moments[1].

Eternity of *aṇus* proved

Proving the eternity of 'aṇus' (atoms), Aviddhakarṇa says that whatever may be regarded as the producer of the atoms cannot have an attribute of *sat*, because it cannot be an object of knowledge of the means of right knowledge (pramāṇāviṣayatvāt), which proves the existence of a thing; like the hare's horn. Thus, it is clear that there is no cause which can produce an atom. What has been proved by the above is that the inference proving the non-eternity of *aṇus* (as advanced by the Buddhists) is frusted by inference, as has been said (in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*)–that which is *sat* (existing) and has no cause is eternal.[2] This shows that Aviddhakarṇa was also a scholar of Vaiśeṣika-Darśana[3].

Proof for the separate existence of qualities, like number etc.

Coming to the question that since the Buddhists deny the very existence of 'substance', all other categories, like 'quality' etc., dependent upon the existence of substance, are also denied, Aviddhakarṇa says that it is not possible; and he proves the existence of the quality—'Number' (saṅkhyā), for instance, as different from the object. Thus, he says that the notion of number (saṅkhyābuddhi) is proved to be quite different from the notions of elephant and other things; hence, the said notion of the 'number' must *arise from* something else, like the notion of the blue cloth and the like.[4]

The above argument of Aviddhakarṇa is something like this : that the qualities of 'Number' and the rest are not non-different from the substance, because they distinguish the substance from other things, like the stick which differentiates Devadatta from the rest.[5]

While discussing the importance of 'pratijñā' and 'nigamana' (conclusion) in the parāthānumāna, Avi-

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[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verse 369.

[2] IV.i.1. [3] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verse 553, along with the *Pañjikā.*

[4] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verse 644.

[5] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verse 677.

ddhakarṇa says that a single idea (conclusion) cannot be asserted with the help of scattered arguments. Hence, in order to bring about connection between those arguments, it is necessary that the separate existence of 'conclusion' should be accepted. Kamalaśīla quotes a verse which has been put within inverted commas by the editor and puts it as—Aviddhakarṇastu āha—

Importance of Pratijñā and Nigamana in Inference proved

> viprakīrṇaiśca vacanairnaikārthaḥ pratipādyate /
> tena sambandhasidhyarthaṁ vācyam nigamanaṁ pṛthak[1]//

The quotation given above further shows that Aviddhakarṇa wrote his work *Tattvaṭīkā*, which seems to be a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* or the *Bhāṣya*, in verse as well as in prose, because Kamalaśīla sometimes quotes long passages in prose also and attributes them to Aviddhakarṇa. This was not uncommon in those days. The main commentary used to be in prose with verses here and there.

Examining the nature of Inference, Aviddhakarṇa says that it may be asked—what is that which is conveyed to the other party by pramāṇa? It is only that what is admitted by both parties (that can convey any meaning). But this is not correct, because Inference is of the form of a verbal statement and it is not a pramāṇa for the speaker. The speaker, on the other hand, conveys the meaning to others through that verbal statement, because the effort is to convey it to the other party. It is not at all necessary that the thing conveyed should be admitted by both parties. So has been said by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and attributed to Aviddhakarṇa that Inference consisting of a verbal statement is not a pramāṇa for the speaker. He only conveys the meaning to the other party by means of the verbal statement.[2]

Nature of Inference examined

1 Verse 1441.

2 *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 1485 along with the *Pañjikā*.

In answer to the view that there are only two Pramāṇas and that there is no prameya (object of knowledge) apart from the svalakṣaṇa (specific characteristic) and sāmānyalakṣaṇa (generic characteristic), Aviddhakarṇa says—

Discussion on the number of Pramāṇas and Prameyas

pratyakṣaṁ anumānavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṁ,
pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat.

OR

anumānaṁ pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṁ,
pramāṇatvāt, anumānavat.

Again, in reply to the second objection, he says—

svalakṣaṇaṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyārthāntarasaddvitīyaṁ,
prameyatvāt, sāmānyalakṣaṇavat.

OR

sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ svalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyāntarasaddvitīyaṁ,
prameyatvāt, svalakṣaṇavat.

Translation—Pratyakṣa has a companion in the form of a pramāṇa other than anumāna, because it is a pramāṇa; like Inference. Similarly, anumāna has a companion in the form of a pramāṇa other than pratyakṣa, because it is a Pramāṇa; like Pratyakṣa. Likewise, svalakṣaṇa has for its companion a Prameya in addition to the generic characteristic, because it is a prameya; like the generic characteristic. Again, sāmānyalakṣaṇa has a companion other than the svalakṣaṇa (specific characteristic), because it is a prameya, like svalakṣaṇa.

Similarly, it can be proved that there are pramāṇas like upamāna and śabda on the same ground; and also because, the number of the pramāṇas as four is already fixed. Similarly, there are three kinds of prameya—sāmānya (generic), viśeṣa (particular) and sāmānya-viśeṣa (generic-particular)[1].

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 1584-86 Verses along with the *Pañjikā*.

Nature of Analogy discussed

Discussing the nature of 'Analogy' (upamāna-pramāṇa), Aviddhakarṇa holds that one has a general notion about the name (gavaya, for instance) through āgama (statement of the forester), and it is through analogy that he gets the definite notion about the same name. So says Śāntarakṣita in terms of Aviddhakarṇa that when one has heard the statement of the forester and then perceives the similarity (between cow and gavaya), then he gets the cognition of the relation of the name with the particular object. Again, he says that the man gets a general notion of the relation through āgama, but it is through the help of analogy that he gets the notion of the particular object[1].

From all these direct and indirect references to the views of Aviddhakarṇa it is clear that he had written a commentary called the *Tattvaṭīkā* on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and was a very important āstika Naiyāyika which compelled the Buddhists to mention his views in their works and try to refute them. As Aviddhakarṇa has been definitely mentioned by Śāntarakṣita, he can easily be placed before him,[2] that is, towards the end of the sixth century. He might have been a contemporary of Bhāvivikta and Uddyotakara, because these names are mentioned by the Buddhist writers together, and in most cases the terms *ādi* (and others), *prabhṛtibhiḥ*, etc. are mentioned after these names[3].

13. PRĪTICANDRA

(6th century A.D.)

Similarly, Śāntarakṣita refers to another scholar named Prīticandra along with Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta and others as reputed writers on Nyāya[4] who have strongly opposed Buddhist writers. Of these,

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 1568-69 along with the *Pañjikā*.

[2] *Vipañcitārthā*, pp. 78,92.

[3] Vide *Vipañcitārthā* on the *Vādanyāya*, p. 142.

[4] kaḥ punarasāvatisāhasiko yo *mahānāgaiḥ* kṣuṇṇam panthānaṁ roddhumīhata ityāha--durvidagdhaḥ samyagvivekarahitatayā jano-yam *Uddyotakara-Prīticandra-Bhāviviktaprabhṛtibhiḥ*—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 142.

Uddyotakara is too well-known as the author of the *Nyāyavārttika*. Except that Prīticandra was a rival of Diṅnāga and whose views had been refuted by Dharmakīrti nothing else is found in either the *Vādanyāya*, or the *Vipañcitārthā* about him. As he is mentioned by Śāntarakṣita even prior to Bhāvivikta, I have placed him in the 6th century A. D.

14. BHĀVIVIKTA

(6th century A.D.)

Lastly, Śāntarakṣita also refers to the views of a Naiyāyika of the orthodox school, named Bhāvivikta. While discussing the *Nyāyasūtra*—Pratijñāhetvorvirodhaḥ pratijñāvirodhah,[1] meaning, when there is contradiction between the pratijñā (proposition) and the hetu (probans), it is called 'Pratijñāvirodha', Śāntarakṣita says that there is no contradiction between Proposition and Probans as they refer to different substratum (adhikaraṇa). To this he quotes the view of Bhāvivikta who has discussed this problem and has shown that there is no 'vyadhikaraṇatvaṁ' in his commentary on the *Bhāṣya* (*Nyāyabhāṣya*).[2]

While discussing the 'pratijñāsannyāsa' type of nigrahasthāna, Śāntarakṣita quotes the view of Bhāvivikta and refutes the same.[3]

Bhāvivikta is criticized

Again, Śāntarakṣita refers to Bhāvivikta's view in connection with the explanation of the fallacy of the type of 'prakaraṇasama' which Bhāvivikta has explained in a different way and has shown how the view of the latter is not tenable.[4]

Beside what has been said above, there are some more available views of Bhāvivikta as mentioned by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalasīla in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pañjikā* which are also mentioned below :

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1 *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. ii. 4.

2 Bhāviviktena *Bhāṣyaṭīkāyāṁ* prayogād vyadhikaraṇatvam nāsti—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 88.

3 tadatra Bhāviviktaḥ svayamāśaṅkya kila pratividhatte sthūlatvenedam nigrahasthānamiti cet—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 96.

4 Bhāvivikto'pyatraiva khararave patitaḥ prakaraṇasamamanyathāsamarthayati—*Vipañcitārthā*, p. 140.

While discussing the use of terms 'kārakādipadaṁ' being wholly dependent upon convention (saṅketa), Bhāvivikta holds that it has for its objective a knowable object which is included under a category which cannot be specified.[1]

On Saṅketa

About the 'existence of the Ātman', Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta and others hold that it is perceptible, because its notion, in the form of *I* (*ahaṁ*), does not depend upon the smṛti of the contact of liṅga and liṅgī like the cognition of colour etc. The notion of 'ahaṁ (I)' cannot have colour etc. as its object. Ātman is svasamvedya (cognized without depending upon anything except ahaṁ.)[2]

On the perceptibility of the Ātman

Arguing against the theory of kṣaṇabhaṅga, Bhāvivikta says that the following Inference sets aside all the arguments of the Buddhists proving the theory of Perpetual Flux. The form of Inference is :

Kṣanabhangavāda citicized

Pratijñā—vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāni candrārkagrahanakṣatrādijñānāni vivakṣitacandrārkagrahatārakādiviṣayaṁ yaddevadattādivijñānaṁ tatkālāvacchinnacandrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādiviṣayāṇi,

Hetu—pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve sati candrārkagrahanakṣatrādijñānaśabdavācyatvāt,

Udāharaṇa—prathamakālabhāvidevadattatārakādijñānavat.

Translation—The cognitions of the moon, the sun, the planets, the stars and similar other taijas objects, which are under discussion, have for their objects the moon, the sun, the planets, the stars and similar other taijas objects related to the particular time at which they appeared to Devadatta and others; because while not apprehended as related to the earth, they are spoken of by means of the terms—cognitions of the moon,

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[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 206.

[2] Refer to the *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 1; *Tattvasaṅgraha*, verse 212.

the sun, the planets, the stars and such other taijas objects, like the cognitions of these stars etc. as they appeared to Devadatta on the first occasion. This sort of cognition would not have been possible had things been momentary[1].

Both the authors of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Pañjikā* further adduce another proof which Bhāvivikta has given in this very connection, and it is this—

ye rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayāḥ, ye ca tadāśrayāḥ, tadviṣayāśca ye pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānārthasiddhadarśanāḥ ekaviparyayānuvyavasāyasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣāḥ, te sarve svātmalābhānantarapradhvamsino na bhavanti, jñeyatvaprameyatvasadasadanyataratvasadasadvyatiriktajñeyaviṣayajñānāvaccedyatvāgrāhyaviṣayagrahaṇāgrāhyatvānabhidhāyakānabhidheyatvasamānāsamānajātīyadravyasaṁyogavibhāgajanitaśabdakāryaśabdābhidheyatvebhyaḥ prāgabhāvādivat.

tatra rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayā rūpādayaḥ, teṣāñca rūpādīnāmāśrayāḥ tadāśrayāḥ; ke te, ghaṭādayaḥ; siddhidarśanam yogivijñānam.

So has been said by Śāntarakṣita—

rūpādyāśrayāḥ sarve ye ca teṣāṁ samāśrayāḥ /
ye ca tadviṣayāḥ kecijjāyante pratyayāstathā //
utpādānantaraṁ dhvamsabhājo naiva bhavanti te[2] //

Translation—The substrata of the Universals, like rūpatva etc., the substrata of those substrata and the particular types of cognitions of these, such as perception, inference, analogical cognition, verbal cognition, remembrance, recognition, 'siddhadarśana' and doubt, perverse cognition, 'anuvyavasāya', dream and dream-end cognitions, all these cannot be subject to destruction just after their having been produced, as they are expressed by such expressions as jñeya, prameya (object of right knowledge), having names, having existence or non-existence, being limited by cognitions whose objects are something different from *sat* and *asat*, not apprehensible by cognitions

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pañjikā*, Verses 462-63.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 464—65.

whose objects are non-apprehensible, not expressible by words which are not expressible, and expressible by words which are the products of such words as are produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances, like prior negation and the like.

The substrata of the universals like colour etc,. are colour etc. themselves. The substrata of these substrata are tadāśrayāḥ. What are these? These are pot etc. By 'siddhadarśana' is meant the yogic perception.

So has been said by Śāntarakṣita also that the substrata of rūpatva (colourness) etc. and the substrata of these, their objects and cognitions all these are not destroyed just after these are produced, like the lotus of the sky, as all these are knowables and nameables.

Again, while proving 'the separate and independent existence of a composite apart from its constitutents', Bhāvivikta along with Uddyotakara and others hold that there are several instances which prove that the composites do exist apart from their constitutents; as for instances, white crystal is actually seen separately when in contact with another object, even though its qualities, like whiteness etc., are not perceived; similarly, in the night the rows of *balākās* (cranes) and similar other things are seen, though in the dim light, their white colour etc. are not perceived; again, when a man is covered with a long robe (kañcuka), though his complexion is not perceived, yet there is the perception of the man; and again, when a cloth is coloured with a brownish red colour, the colour may be suppressed by something and may not be perceived, yet the cloth is perceived. So it is through direct perception that we perceive a composite independent of its qualities and constituents.[1]

Existence of avayavī proved through pratyakṣa

The same is again, proved through direct perception. Bhāvivikta and others hold that had there been no composite of gross nature (independent of its components), then there would have been no perception of a tree and similar things, for instance;

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[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 557-58,

because the atoms (Paramāṇus) which form the constituents are supersensuous and they would not have been called atoms had they been not different from the composite; which again, are so very subtle that they can be so called only if there is a gross substance. Had there been no gross object how could then the notion of subtlety of the atoms be possible[1]?

Again, Bhāvivikta and others prove the separate and independent existence of composite apart from its attributes and qualities through Inference as well. So they hold that just as a colour and other qualities are exclusively different from the lotus and similar other things, because they are distinguished by these lotus etc.; just as horse is differentiated from Caitra, the rider; or the earth and other substances are exclusively distinguished from colour and other qualities respectively, because they are differently spoken of by means of words in the singular and plural numbers; just as the moon used in singular and stars used in plural are different,[2] so a composite is different from its constituents.

Avayavin proved through Inference

Again, Bhāvivikta and others prove similarly, that composite is different from its components. They hold that things having different agents and potencies etc. are regarded as different from one another, just as a cloth is different from threads, or a pillar is different from the pot, because of their having contradictory properties (viruddha-dharma). This is again, obvious from the fact that the cloth is capable of being used as a wrapper to remove cold, but not the threads and that threads are found existing even before the causal operation, while the cloth comes to exist only after the weaver has undergone the process of its production and has produced it. Both the cloth and the thread have separate dimensions. From all these it is proved that a composite is distinct from its components[3].

Avayavin different from avayavas

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 562-63.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 559—60.

[3] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 561 along with the *Pañjikā*.

While examining the nature of 'Sāmānya' (universal), Bhāvivikta and others are of opinion that the peculiarities of the knowledge of names—cow, horse, buffalo, boar, elephant etc., attributed to those cow etc. are due to a cause related to the form associated with each animal which is other than causes, like convention, form (ākṛti), organism etc. In support of the above they give the following form of hetu (reasoning)—

Nature of Universal examined

gavādiviṣayatve sati piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatiriktābhidhānajñānatvāt,

(dṛṣṭānta)—teṣveva gavādiṣu savatsā gaurbhārākrānto mahiṣaḥ saśalyo varāhaḥ sāṅkuśo mātaṅga ityādyabhidhāprajñānaviśeṣavat.

Translation—Because, while relating to cow and similar other objects, they are jñāna and names other than the jñāna, names, form of organism etc.; just like the specific jñāna, names etc. relating to the same cow along with its calf, the bullock with the load, the boar with the dart, the elephant with the goad and so on. Through dissimilarities we arrive at the name, knowledge, form of the organism and other objects. It comes to this that the other causes referred to above must be the universals, such as gotva, aśvatva, etc.[1]

While speaking about the 'comprehensive notion,' Bhāvivikta holds that it is not true to say that the notion is always in keeping with its basis. For instance, the number *bahutva* (plurality), inherent in elephants, horses, dhava and khadira trees, is the basis of army, forest and similar other notions; and again, the mixture of several heterogeneous substances forms the basis of the notions of some drink, or sour gruel and similar other things. Otherwise, that is, if the notions were in keeping with its basis, then the notions would have been of the nature of bahavaḥ (many), saṃyuktāḥ (mixed).[2]

View on notion in keeping with its basis

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 716-20 along with the *Pañjikā*.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 771-72.

While discussing the 'indeterminate and determinate direct perception', Bhāvivikta and others (non-Buddhists) hold that indeterminate knowledge (avikalpakajñāna) cannot bring about the determinate knowledge, because their objects of cognition is different, and also because it is indeterminate, like the cognition of colour etc. and the visual organ etc. respectively. In other words, the cognition obtained through the sense-organs (which is indeterminate) cannot be the cause of determinate mental cognition.[1]

View on determinate & indeterminate perception

It is also to be noted here that there were many other non-Buddhist scholars, contemporaries of Bhāvivikta along with Uddyotakara, who held the above mentioned view against the Buddhist view according to which determinate knowledge cannot be a valid cognition, while the non-Buddhist scholars are of opinion that indeterminate knowledge cannot be used for the common usage and hence, both determinate and indeterminate knowledge are accepted.

Śāntarakṣita also tells us that Bhāvivikta has criticized the views of Diṅnāga which led Dharmakīrti to write his *Vādanyāya* in support of Diṅnāga.[2]

In this connection it may also be pointed out that Śāntarakṣita says that 'tadidam ācāryeṇa svayam pramāṇaviniścaye pratiṣiddham'. That is, the views of Bhāvivikta have been refuted by Ācārya Dharmakīrti himself in his *Pramāṇviniścaya*. Hence, Bhāvivikta may be easily placed before Dharmakirti that is, in the 6th century A. D.

Bhāvivikta is mentioned also in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and its commentary, the *Pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla. His name is mentioned along with that of Uddyotakara and so it seems that he must have been a contemporary of Uddyotakara. He seems to be a Kāshmīrian logician, as suggested by his name, like *Bhāsarvajña*. As Śāntarakṣita criticizes his views with great zeal, it can be said that he must have been regarded a strong opponent of the Buddhists by Śāntarakṣita. As

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1 *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verse 1307.

2 *Vādanyāya* p. 142, *Vipa citārthā* p. 142.

Kamalaśīla uses *Bhāviviktādayaḥ* in plural[1], it is evident that there were many non-Buddhist logicians of whom Bhāvivikta must have been prominent.

15. PRAŚASTAMATI

(6th century A.D.)

Proof in support of the existence of Īśvara

Coming to another important Naiyāyika of that period whose views have also been quoted and refuted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, namely, Praśastamati, we find that he supported the existence of Īśvara. *The argument is that there must be a conscious agent* or teacher to teach the lessons on worldly usage to people in the beginning of the creation. It is therefore, that later on, the usages of enlightened people become restricted to particular things, just as the knowledge of young boys becomes restricted to particular things after he becomes enlightened. So there must be Īśvara to teach people, as the boys have their mother and father to teach them in the beginning. It is also clear from this that the knowledge of Īśvara is not lost even during the period of Final Dissolution.[2]

Īśvara is sarvajña & not the Buddha

As to the question of the 'sarvajñatva' of Īśvara, Praśastamati holds that as He is the agent of everything in the universe, without the help of anything else, He must be an Omniscient being, because a doer must know all the details of the things produced by him.[3] Further on, again, Praśastamati, says that Īśvara takes to activities only for showing 'anugraha' (that is, kindness without considering the deservedness of the person to whom it is shown) to others; just as a certain ascetic takes to the act of teaching others without having anything to be accomplished for himself, or for getting rid of any undesirable thing. Similarly, Īśvara also, having made known to others his aiśvarya (greatness), proceeds to help others; or just as, by the natural potency the *Kāla*, that is, spring and

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[1] *Pañjikā* on the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, verse 1307.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha* along with the *Pañjikā*, verse 51.

[3] *Pañjikā* on verse 54.

other seasons, comes about in succession and there is the *manifestation* of *animate* and *inanimate* products by their very nature, similarly, due to the causality of Īśvara there is the laya (destruction), sthiti (existence) and utpatti (production) of beings in succession, because of the manifestation of his powers of 'āvirbhāva' (manifestation), 'anugraha' (help to exist) and saṁhāra (destruction).[1]

The category of *Viśeṣa* discussed

Again, while discussing the nature of the category called '*Viśeṣa*,' Praśastamati argues that just as the flesh of a dog is by nature impure, and other things also become impure being in contact with it, in the same manner, the 'antya-viśeṣa' is the cause of the knowledge of exclusion by its very nature and paramāṇus also become the basis of exclusion being in close contact with the 'antya-viśeṣa'. Then again, if a thing may not be of a certain nature, yet its notion may come about through the presence of something else; as for example, the notion of the pot is brought about by the lamp, while the cognition of the lamp is not brought about by the pot.[2] This proves that there is a category called Viśeṣa which distinguishes the eternal objects amongst themselves.

Oneness of Samavāya discussed

Again, while discussing the 'ekatva' (oneness) of 'samavāya' (inherence), Praśastamati holds that though *Inherence* is one, yet there is no overlapping of it amongst the five categories. In other words, dravyatva inheres only in dravya, guṇatva inheres in uṇa alone, karmatva inheres in karma alone, so that the restriction of ādhāra and ādheya (container and the contained) also remains in tact. He continues that from the perception of the fact that the notion of *iha* ('as in the expression here it inheres'), which is due to there being inherence, is apprehended everywhere in one identical form (abhinnākāra), it is concluded that there is *one* Inherence everywhere. Being only one, the notions produced by the universals, like dravyatva and the like, become explicable as restricted to certain *ādhāra*; while they

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[1] *Pañjikā* on *the Tattvasaṅgraha* verses 162-63

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verses 817-18 along with the *Pañjikā*.

are found to be absent in other cases. Thus, there is no overlapping (saṅkara) among the five categories. Again, just as there being only one Saṁyoga in the case of curd and the pot, the restriction of the container and contained becomes quite possible; so there being only one Inherence, the restriction of ādhāra and ādheya will easily be explained due to the difference of the nature of vyaṅgya and vyañjaka (manifester and manifested). There would be thus, no incongruity.[1]

16. PĀTRASVĀMIN

(6th century A D.)

There was another very important Naiyāyika of the Āstika school, named Pātrasvāmin, who has been referred to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in their works. We do not know anything about this author, nor have we so far come accross any of his views anywhere else. He also should be placed in the sixth century and might have been a contemporary of the authors mentioned above. Dr. Binayatosha Bhaṭṭācārya, the editor of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Pañjikā*, thinks that he is a Jaina Naiyāyika. The argument is that the view which Pātrasvāmin holds is held by the later Jainas. His views referred to in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* are—

Nature of probans and probandum discussed

While discussing the 'nature of the probans and Inference', Śāntarakṣita holds that there are two kinds of Inference—one for the sake of one's own benefit and the second for the benefit of others (svārtha and parārtha). In the former case, the cognition of the inferred object proceeds from the three featured probans, namely, being present in the pakṣa (subject), being present in the sapakṣa (where the presence of the sādhya is proved beyond doubt), and being entirely absent where the sādhya (probandum) is absent, as in the lake. In the latter case, all the above

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[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verses 841-45 along with the *Pañjikā* .

mentioned three conditions should be in the form of their explicit expression[1].

To this Pātrasvāmin says that a valid probans need not fulfil all the above mentioned three conditions, but the probans should be only such without which there cannot be the inferred conclusion (anyathānupapanna). According to Kamalaśīla, by anyathānupapanna is meant without being accompanied by the probandum.

Pātrasvāmin further argues that even when the above mentioned three conditions are fulfilled, the inference is not valid, but if it is anyathānupapanna, then there is a valid inference; for instance, because he is the son of so and so, therefore, he must be of dark complexion, is not a valid conclusion though it may fulfil all the three conditions. Again, he continues that anyathānupapanna is the only characteristic which is regarded as a valid probans by all. He also says that in fact, the three conditions are implied in this single probans—anyathānupapanna. Hence, this single condition which is the most important should be found in the probans in order to be valid.[2]

17. ŚANKARA OR SANKARASVĀMIN

(6th century A.D.)

References to Śaṅkara

We come accross the name of Śaṅkarasvāmin a Naiyāyika of the Āstika school along with the names of Bhūṣaṇakāra, Trilocana and Vācaspati in the works of Ratnakīrti.[3] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both mention his views on many Nyāya topics in their works as will be shown below. He has also been mentioned by Prajñākaragupta of the seventh century.[4] He has also been referred to by Jñānaśrī of the 11th century, by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*,

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha* Verses 1362-63.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, verses 1364-67 along with the *Pañjikā*.

[3] *Vide-Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*, pp. 35, 46, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, p. 79; *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, pp. 108. 114, 119.

[4] Sanskrit Introduction to the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 35,

by Karṇagomin in his *Pramāṇavārtikavṛttiṭīkā*, by Vidyānanda of the 9th century in his *Āptamīmāṁsā*, by Vādideva in his *Syādvādaratnākara*, and by Udayanācārya of the 10th century in his *Prabodhasiddhi*.[1] From all these references it is clear that Śaṅkara or Śaṅkarasvāmin was a very important writer on the Science of Reasoning and also had very popular and important views. It was therefore, that both the Buddhists and the Jainas also referred to his views and refuted them. The only work of his, known so far, is the *Sthirasiddhi* which has been mentioned by Ratnakīrti in his *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*,[2] Nothing more is known about him as yet.

Existence of the Ātman proved

While examining the 'nature of the Ātman,' Śaṅkara proves its existence on the ground that desire and the like (being qualities) must inhere in some substance, being entities (vastutve sati), they are effects, like colour etc[3]. Again, he says that the term Ātman being one single term must denote something other than the aggregate of Buddhi, sense-organs, and the rest; and also because the term 'Ātman' is known to be different from all the well-known synonyms of Buddhi etc. Śaṅkara also gives a negative argument to prove the independent existence of the Ātman. He says that a living organism is not without the Ātman; because, if it were so, then it would have been regarded as devoid of the functions of breathing etc., like a pot and the like.[4]

Distinction between avayava and avayavin

He further argues, like others, that a composite is quite separate from its constituents. The example he gives is that the quality of Saṁyoga (contact) being of the nature of non-pervasive (avyāpyavṛtti), the colouring of the cloth cannot cover the entire cloth, nor can it belong to the entire cloth.[5] This is so, because the composite is distinct from its constituents.

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[1] *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 35. [2] p. 108.

[3] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verses 178-79.

[4] *Tattvasaṅgraha* verses 182-84 along with the *Pañjikā*.

[5] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, verse 600.

While discussing the nature of 'Universals', Śaṅkara says that the universal, like the *nīlatva* (blueness), for instance, must be of the form of nīla (blue) itself, otherwise there cannot be the cognition of the single notion of nīla, alone.[1] Again, he says that the notion of the cook and the like is not due to the act of cooking, but to the particular action which is related to the universal which is present there, so that even after the actual act of cooking has ceased, the continuous basis of the notion in the form of the universal remains always present there and it is from that, that the idea of cooking is obtained.[2]

Nature of Universals discussed

Examining the question of 'Negation', Śaṅkarasvāmin says that the notions of Negation are never possible without an adjunct; hence, the Negation is always of something (namely, upādhi). For instance, in cases of Negations, like prior negation (prāgabhāva) of a pot, or the destruction of the pot (dhvaṁsābhāva), every-where they are found to rest upon the negations associated with certain objects as their upādhis (adjuncts), which shows that in all cases the notion of Negations is dependent upon the universals inherent in those adjuncts.[3]

Nature of Negation discussed

While examining the nature of Pratyakṣa, particularly the term 'kalpanā', as found in its definition, as given by Diṅnāga—'pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham', Śaṅkarasvāmin and others have criticized the use of the term *Kalpanā*, meaning, the character of being the basis of the verbal expression.[4]

Definition of Pratyakṣa criticized

Again, Śaṅkarasvāmin has said that pleasure, pain, etc. are not of the nature of cognition, because they are never spoken of as cognitions, just like the pot. They are cognized as pleasure and pain etc.[5]

Notion of pleasure is not a cognition

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[1] *Tattvasaṅgrha*, Verse 740.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgrha*, Verse 755 and the *Pañiikā*.

[3] *Tattvasaṅgrha*, Verses 767-68.

[4] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 1214 and the *Pañjikā*.

[5] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 1340 and the *Pañjikā*.

Definition of Pramāṇa

As regards the definition of 'Pramāṇa' Śaṅkarasvāmin says that it must bring about an effect distinct from itself, because it is a kāraka (active agent), like an axe and the rest.[1]

Apprehension of sound examined

While considering the question of the apprehension of sound through our ears even when there is no actual contact between the auditory organ and the sound when it is produced, the Mīmāṁsakas hold that there is a sort of capacity in the ear due to which it attracts the sound, but not everything else, like the capacity of a magnet which can draw iron alone but no other thing, nor can it draw all the irons of the universe. To this instance of magnet, Śaṅkarasvāmin holds that there is the fallacy of wrong-instance (dṛṣṭāntāsiddhi) and so it cannot be a valid argument. He holds that the magnet attracts the iron, because it has a peculiar light-ray (*prabhā*) emanating from it which alone attracts a particular iron, but not all,[2] and hence, there is no potenciality (śakti) of anykind in the magnet.

One thing more may be mentioned here that the Āstika Naiyāyikas, like Vācaspati Mishra I, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and others have, no doubt, either humourously, or being provoked by wrong attitude of the non-Āstikas, used strong language sometimes in their arguments. But it must be known that the Buddhist also did not spare the non-Buddhists in this respect; for instance, Ratnakīrti says about Śaṅkara.—Śaṅkaraḥ paśorapi paśuriti kṛpāpātramevaiṣa jālmaḥ.[3] All this is but natural.

18—19. PURANDARA AND SUMATI

(6th century A.D.)

Sāntarakṣita mentions some other Nāstika scholars like Purandara, who might have been materialists of old.[4] Others are Sumati who is mentioned by

[1] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 1353, with the *Pañjikā*.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 2520, with the *Pañjikā*.

[3] *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, p. 114. [4] *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Verse 1428.

Kamalaśila as a Jaina[1] scholar and Ahrīka[2] who also is taken for a Jaina scholar. All these must have lived long before Śāntarakṣita and had achieved reputation as great scholars on the Science of Reasoning which alone had compelled the Buddhists logician to mention them in their works for their refutation. They may be therefore placed in the 6th century.

Nāstika scholars referred to by Śāntarakṣita

As has already been pointed out before there were many more scholars whom these Buddhist scholars did not mention by name, but indicated their existence by the use of the terms 'ādi' and 'prabhṛti,' etc. It may also be added that the period between the 4th and the 11th centuries was very bright for scholarship but due to some reason or other thousands of important works of several writers are either lost for-ever, or are still hidden in some private collections.

20—21. SĀMAṬA AND YAJÑAṬA (650 A.D.)

The Naiyāyikas as well as the Mīmāṁsakas both attacked the idea of 'sarvajñatva' (being omniscient) being attribute to the Buddha. This problem is connected with the existence of Īśvara and hence, is discussed in logic also. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila both mention the views of Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa in their work on this problem.[3] From their names it seems that they were Mīmāṁsakas first, but they might have also written on Nyāya. In those days generally a Naiyāyika used to be a Mīmāṁsaka as well and *vice versa*. Hence, their names are also mentioned here. They flourished, most probably, after Kumārila and hence, they may be placed about 650 A.D.[4]

View of Sāmaṭa and Yajñaṭa the Mīmāṁsakas, on Īśvara

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[1] *Pañjikā* on the *Tattvasaṅgraha* verses 1265, 1276, 1278, 1724, 1755 and 1980

[2] Vide *Pañjikā* on verses 1709-10.

[3] *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pañjikā*, Kārikās 3247-62.

[4] *Tattvasaṅgraha* with *Pañjikā*, Kārikās 3247-62.

About the date of these Naiyāyikas there are two internal evidences one in the *Vādanyāya* as explained by Śāntarakṣita and the other in the *Vipañcitārthā*. Dharmakīrti concludes his *Vādanyāya* with a verse—

Internal evidence about the date of these Āstika scholars

loke'vidyātimirapaṭalollekhanastattvadṛṣṭer-
Vādanyāyaḥ parahitarataireṣa sadbhiḥ praṇītaḥ/
tattvālokam timirayati tam durvidagdho jano'yam
tasmādyatnaḥ kṛta iha mayā tatsamudghātanāya//

The commentary called *Vipañcitārthā* runs on the above verse as follows—

nanu cāyam vādanyāyamārgaḥ sakalalokānibandhanabandhunā Vādavidhānādau Ācārya-Vasubandhunā Mahārājapathīkṛtaḥ / kṣuṇṇaśca tadanu mahatyām Nyāyaparīkṣāyām kumatimatamattamātaṅgaśiraḥpīṭhapāṭanapaṭubhiḥ Ācārya-Diṅnāgapādaiḥ tatkimidam punaścarvitacarvaṇamāsthitam tvayeti... kaḥ punaḥ asau atisāhasiko yo Mahānāgaiḥ kṣuṇṇam panthānam roddhumīhate ityāha durvidagdhaḥ samyagvivekarahitatayā jano'yam *Uddyotakara-Prīticandra-Bhāviviktaprabhṛtiḥ*/ yataśca evaṁ tasmādyatnaḥ kṛta iha Vādanyāyaprakaraṇe mayā—samujjvālanāya.[1]

It is clear from the text and the commentary quoted above that the orthodox Nyāya scholars had attacked the views of Diṅnāga and had put in dark the views taught by him. So Dharmakīrti made efforts to set aside their criticisms levelled against his own 'paramaguru'. As Dharmakīrti had criticized the views of the above mentioned scholars, naturally, they may be placed before him, sometimes towards the end of the sixth or the beginning of the seventh century.

22. DHARMAKĪRTI

(7th century A.D.)

After Uddyotakara and other orthodox Naiyāyikas mentioned above we come to Dharmapāla who was the teacher of Dharmakīrti. Dharmapāla is believed to have lived in 635 A.D., so Dharmakīrti also must have lived about that tin e. Hence, we lave plaeed him in the beginning of the seventh century A. D.[2] Dharma-

[1] End of the *Vādanyāya* along with the *Vipañcitārthā*, p. 142.
[2] Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I. p. 482.

kīrti was, undoubtedly, a very great logician from amongst the followers of the Buddha and had even surpassed Diṅnāga and others in merit. As we have already discussed much about Dharmakīrti in the first volume we do not like to repeat the same here. After Dharmakīrti up to the eighth century there flourished many writers from the Buddhist side who followed the line of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and wrote commentaries on their works and also some independent works. The result of all these activities was that the orthodox standpoint of the treatment of logic suffered very much at the hands of these followers of the Buddha.

Orthodox school of logic suffered much

It may also be pointed out at this stage that the writers on logic did not care much to make original contributions to and thereby advance the study of higher logic, but devoted almost all their energy to criticize one another's views, though in fact, they held altogether different standpoints, and as such, criticism in the true sense was not possible.

But this does not mean that no orthodox scholar flourished at all in that period. From the contemporary writers' references it is obvious that there were many such scholars who attacked the Buddhists even in the seventh century. This will be clear from the fact that the well-known Buddhist Naiyāyika, named Śāntarakṣita (705—62), refers to the following three names, namely, *Aviddhakarṇa*, *Prīticandra and Bhāvivikta*, in his work, who must have been great Naiyāyikas and must have had written works on Nyāya. He quotes, in his commentary called *Vipañcitārthā* on the *Vādanyāya* of the great Buddhist Naiyāyika Dharmakīrti, four times the views of Aviddhakarṇa.

23. AHRĪKA

(7th century A. D.)

Śāntarakṣita, a Buddhist scholar of the 8th century A.D., refers to the view of a scholar named Ahrīka. He was a Jaina and had followers of his views. He has also been referred to by Durveka Mishra

Reference to Ahrīka

of the 10th century A.D.[1] No other reference to him is found so far. But that he or his followers had some strong views is evident from the very fact that the Buddhist writer like Śāntarakṣita and Durveka have quoted his views and refuted them.

His views

While discussing the *Syādvāda*, the Buddhists hold that "what is capable of effective action is said to be existent, other than that is said to be non-existent, the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory".

Against this view, Ahrīka, a Jaina scholar, says—'every entity has more than one aspect, the general and the particular, just like the lustrous gem which appears to be of variegated colour. Why should then there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between existence and non-existence.[2]

To prove the general and the particular character of things, Ahrīka has given several arguments which have been given by Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.[3]

The other reference to this auther is found in the *Dharmottarapradīpa* in connection with the definition of inference as—'ekalakṣaṇahetujam anumānam', that is, an inference is drawn from only one condition, namely, hetu.[4]

This is all that we know at present. From all that we learn from the various Buddhist works so far published we are capable of knowing several obscure and hidden works and authors. So we can hope that in future we may be able to know much more about our lost works and authors through the discovery of unpublished Buddhist works.

24. ŚĀNTARAKṢITA

(705—762)

We have already spoken of this Śāntarakṣita and his works in the first volume.[5] Somehow, his date has been not correctly recorded there; hence, I refer to him again, at this place. His *Tattvasaṅgraha* is a

[1] *Dharmottarapradīpa*, pp. 36, 246.

[2] *Tattvasaṅgraha* verse 1709 and also the *Pañjikā*.

[3] Verses 1710. [4] P. 36. [5] P. 488.

very important work on Buddhist dialectics. It refers to several old and important orthodx and non-orthodox writers, amongst whom the following names may be mentioned which are not generally known; Aviddhakarṇa, Ahrīka, Kambalāśvatara, Pātrasvāmin, Purandara, Praśastamati, Bhāvivikta, Yajñaṭa, Rudrila, Vindhyavāsin, Śaṅkarasvāmin (Naiyāyika), Sāmaṭa and Sumati. All these are great authors and hold important views which have led the Buddhists to refer to them and refute them from their own angle of vision. In his *Vipañcitārthā*, a running commentary of the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti also, he has mentioned the names of some of the old Naiyāyikas who had written commentaries on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, or the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, amongst whom the following are mentioned here: Aviddhakarṇa, Prīticandra and Bhāvivikta. From these references, we may easily come to the conclusion that Śāntarakṣita lived in the beginning of the 8th century A.D.

25. KAMALAŚĪLA

(713-63)

He is the disciple of Śāntarakṣita and has commened upon the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of his guru. Besides, he has written *Āryasaptaśatika*, a commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Āryavajracchedikā* which is also a commentary of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayanāmaṭīkā*, *Ḍākinīvajraguhyagītināmamarmopadeśa* and translated the *Mahāmudropadeśavajraguhyagīti*. While explaining the lines of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* he has supplied the names of the authors whose views are given in the Kārikās by Śāntarakṣita, but are not mentioned by name. This helps us to find out the real position of the Nyāyaśāstra in that period. He may be placed in the eighth century A.D.

26. BHĀSARVAJÑA

(9th century A.D.)

It was at this time when there flourished a great and independent thinker named Bhāsarvajña, in Kāś-

mira, in the beginning of the ninth century A. D. That Bhāsarvajña, though belonged to the orthodox school, followed the line of the Jainas and the Buddhists in the treatment of logical problems is not correct. It may be reminded here that the most important difference between the two kinds of treatment of logical problems is that the orthodox scholars followed Akṣapāda Gotama and dealt with Pramāṇa and Prameya and other allied topics, while the Jainas and the Buddhists confined themselves to the treatment of Pramāṇa alone and thereby restricted their treatment of logic rigidly to the Science of Reasoning. The orthodox scholars not only dealt with the Science of Reasoning, but also went further to discuss the Prameyas and allied topics for the true knowledge of which the Pramāṇas were necessary. In other words, the treatment of the orthodox scholars is complete, while that of the non-orthodox scholars remains incomplete. The former proceeds to realize the ultimate end of philosophy, namely, the realization of the true nature of the Ātman, from a particula angle of visio n represented by Nyāya, while the latter confines itself to only one aspect of it, namely, Science of Reasoning and naturally, does not aim at the realization of the ultimate end of philosophy. Hence, the view held by Dr. S. Vidyabhūṣaṇa that Bhāsarvajña followed the lines of the non-orthodox scholars and confined his treatment of logic mainly to its limited, though rigid, sense, that is, the treatment of Pramāṇas, is not correct; for we find that the latter portion of the works of Bhāsarvajña is wholly devoted to the treatment of Prameyas, like any other work of orthodox school.

Difference in the method of treatment of logic between Buddhists and non-Buddhists

The only book known to have been written on Nyāya by Bhāsarvajña is his *Nyāyasāra* upon which he has also written a commentary. His commentary is known as the *Bhūṣaṇa*. It has been mentioned by later writers, like Udayana of the 10th century in his *Kiraṇāvalī*,[1] Vallabha of the 12th century in his

Nyāyasāra and its commentary *Bhūṣaṇa* are his works

[1] p. 160.

Nyāyalīlāvatī[1], the Buddhist writer Ratnakīrti of the eleventh century in his *Apohasiddhi*[2], *Saravajñasiddhi*[3] and *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*,[4] the Jain writer Rājaśekhara sūrin[5] of the fourteenth century and Guṇaratnasūrin[6] of the early fifteenth century. Thus, he must have lived before the tenth century.

References to Bhāsarvajña, the Bhūṣaṇakāra

Again, Bhāsarvajña seems to have referred to the view of some (eke) with which he naturally does not agree in connection with the fallacy called 'viruddhāvyabhicārī' in his *Nyāyasāra*.[7] This view is attributed to Dharmakīrti[8] of the seventh century. Dharmakīrti has said that when there is a doubt both as regards 'anvaya' (positive) and 'vyatireka' (negative), then it is said to be a fallacy of the type of 'anaikāntika'. To this again, a question is raised by Dharmakīrti that 'viruddhāvyabhicārī (non-erroneous contradiction)[9] is also a condition for doubt, so why should it also be not included in the fallacy?[10] It is clear from this that Bhāsarvajña lived after Dharmakīrti and before Udayana. Hence, he can be easily placed between 650 and 983 A.D.,[11] the date of Udayana and not later than the 10th century. He has also written a book called, *Gaṇakārikā* on Kāshmīra Śaivaism.

Bhāsarvajña lived after Dharmakīrti and before Udayana

Nyāyasāra became so popular that it was commented upon by great scholars of the period and there were eighteen commentaries on it, as was recorded by Guṇaratnasūrin.[12] The

Popularity of the *Nyāyasāra*

[1] p. 33, Nirnayasagar edition.

[2] *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, Page 57. [3] p. 19. [4] pp. 67-79.

[5] bhāsarvajño nyāyasāratarkasūtravidhāyakaḥ—*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* by Rājaśekharasūrin.

[6] *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, page 94, Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[7] Page 12. Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[8] *Nyāyabindu*, P. 111, Kashi Sanskrit Series edition.

[9] Introduction to *Nyāyasāra* by Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, p. 5.

[10] *Nyāyabindu*, p. 111.

[11] Introduction to *Nyāyasāra*, pp. 4-5.

[12] nyāyasārābhidhe tarke ṭīkā aṣṭādaśa sphuṭāḥ/
nyāyabhūṣaṇanāmnī tu ṭīkā tāsu prasiddhibhāk//—Rājaśekharasūrin. Also see *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 94.

names of some of the more important commentaries mentioned by Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa are[1]:

Commentaries on the *Nyāyasāra*

1. The most important of these commentaries is the commentary of Bhāsarvajña himself called the *Bhūṣaṇa* or *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*[2]. No manuscript of it has been yet found. Bhāsarvajña has been very often quoted as Bhūṣaṇakāra by Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, by Vallabha in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī*,[3] by Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā*,[4] by Pratyaksarūpa in his commentary on the *Tattvapradīpikā*,[5] by Vādīndra in his *Rasasāra*[6], by Varadarāja in his *Tārkikarakṣā*.[7] 2. *Nyāya-kusumāñjalitarka*. 3. Guṇaratna mentions the name of another commentary called *Nyāyakalikā*, and attributes it to Jayantabhaṭṭa. But it is to be kept in mind that no doubt, Jayantabhaṭṭa has written a commentary named *Nyāyakalikā*, but it is a short and very brief commentary on the first Sūtra of the *Nyāyasūtra* alone which has been now published in the *Princess of Wales Sarasvatī-Bhavana Texts* series, as No. 17. It is difficult to say whether Jayanta also wrote a commentary of the same name on the *Nyāyasāra* as mentioned by Guṇaratna.[8] 4. *Nyāyasāraṭīkā* by Vijayasiṁhagaṇi. 5. *Nyāyasāraṭīkā* by Jayatīrtha. 6. *Nyāyasārapadapañjikā* by Vāsudeva. 7. *Nyāyasāravicāra* by Bhaṭṭa Rāghava. 8. *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* by Jayasiṁhasūrin, which is printed in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*, is a very important commentary. This proves the popularity of Bhāsarvajña and his *Nyāyasāra*.

Contents of the *Nyāyasāra*

The book is divided into three chapters in accordance with the three means of right knowledge (pramāṇas), namely Pratyakṣapariccheda, Anumānapariccheda and Āgamapariccheda. He begins with the definition of pramāṇa and discusses the five types of Saṁśaya (doubt) as we have them in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.

[1] Introduction to the *Nyāyasāra*, pp. 6-8.

[2] *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 94.

[3] p. 33.

[4] p. 224, Nirṇayasāgara edition.

[5] Vide—pp. 222, 230.

[6] p. 47 Sarasvatī Bhavana Text series edition.

[7] p. 351.

[8] *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, p. 94.

Pratyakṣa, is either Yogic[1] or non-yogic. The latter gives us the direct perception of gross objects through the sense-organ and object contact helped by light (āloka), space (existence of the object in space without any obstruction), time, that is, within the limitations of time and space, merit, and other conditions, like Īśvara, etc. He also believes in the six kinds of contact like other Naiyāyikas.

Pratyakṣa—non-Yogic perception

In the case of yogic perception, on the other hand, all such objects which are far away in space and time (past and future), by nature imperceptible (svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭāḥ), like Paramāṇus, all are directly perceived individually and also collectively. This is again, of two kinds—(1) 'Perception' when the knower is in the state of samādhi (communion), which is called the state of 'yukta', In this state there is no external contact with the object of perception through sense-organs. In fact, there is the contact of the Ātman and the manas alone in this state. In other words, 'yukta-yogaja-pratyakṣa' is that through which the knower gets the direct perception of all objects situated far away from the perceiver through the Ātman and the manas contact helped by the dharma (merit) produced out of yogic practices and also by the grace of Īśvara.

Yogic perception

(2) 'Perception' not in the state of samādhi is called 'viyuktāvasthā-pratyakṣa'. During this state, there may be contact between all the four factors, namely, Ātman with manas, manas with the sense-organ, and a sense-organ with the object of perception, or it may be between three, namely, contact between Ātman, manas and auditory sense-organ, or it may be between two only, namely, Ātman and manas.

Bhāsarvajña also believes in the 'ārṣa-pramāṇa', but he includes it under 'yogajapratyakṣa' and holds that there is no difference between the two, because both are produced

Ārṣapramāṇa

[1] It is evident here that Bhāsarvajña does not follow the line of Gotama and confines himself to the laukika-pratyakṣa only, but he includes yogic pratyakṣa as an essential aspect of perception. This is all due to his being influenced by yogic practices originally associated with the name of Nyāya which was originally known as the 'yoga' system, or it may be the influence of Kāśmīra Śaivaism.

from yogic practices. It may also be pointed out here that Bhāsarvajña does not believe in mental perception and intuitive perception as something different from 'yogaja' perception.[1]

This yogic perception is again, of two types, namely, determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). The 'yogaja' perception during the state of samādhi is included under indeterminate perception.[2] The only difference between the two is that in 'yogaja' perception every object in its large scale presents itself directly and simultaneously to the knower.[3] In the state of 'viyukta' yogic perception, on the other hand, there are both indeterminate and determinate perceptions.

The author discusses Inference in the second chapter. He defines Inference as a means of cognizing objects beyond the limits of sense-organs through concomitant relation which definitely leads to the proper and uncontradicted conclusion (samyagavinābhāvena parokṣānubhava-sādhanamanumānam). It must be also pointed out that the author of the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasāra*, says that the word *samyag* used in the definition is to deny perverse cognition (bhrānti) being regarded as a valid cognition through the force of the implication (arthasambandhataḥ pramā), as the Buddhists hold. He says that this is the implication of the word 'samyag' which the author of the *Bhūṣaṇa*, that is, Bhāsarvajña, himself means[4]. In this chapter the author also deals with logical fallacies and also some other connected topics of Nyāya, such as, nirṇaya, saṁśaya, vāda, jalpa, chala and nigrahasthāna.

Anumāna

There are two types of Inference—'dṛṣṭa' through which directly perceptible objects are inferred and 'sāmānyato dṛṣṭa' through which objects, which are imperceptible by their very nature, are inferred. Like the Buddhists, Bhāsarvajña divides Inference into two

Types of inference

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[1] *Nyāyasāra*, p. 3. [2] *Nyāyasāra*, p. 4,

[3] *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*, p. 86.

[4] Page, 87,

types—(1) for one's own sake ((svārtha) and (2) Inference for others' sake (parārtha).

The third chapter deals with the Āgama-pramāṇa.

Āgama

Under these three Pramāṇas are included analogy, arthāpatti, sambhava, aitihya, and others.

In the third chapter itself the author also deals with Prameyas, meaning knowables, the knowledge of

Prameya

which leads to 'niḥśreyas'.[1] It is the Prameyas, alone for which Pramāṇas are required and it alone should be cognized and meditated upon.[2] Such [a Prameya

Divisions of Prameya

is of four kinds—(1) 'Heya'—twenty-one kinds of pain which are to come in future (anāgatam), namely, physical organism, six sense-organs, six objects of sense-organs, six types of experiences accruing from their contacts, pleasure and pain. (2) 'Heya-kāraṇa'—The cause of pain (heyasya nirvartakam). Avidyā(nescience), Tṛṣṇā (worldly desire), dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) are the causes of pain. (3) 'Hāna'—Absolute cessation of pain (hānaṁ, ātyantikaṁ) and (4) means to achieve it (upāya),[3] that is, the true knowledge of the Ātman, as it has been said in the śruti—

Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaśca.

This Ātman is of two kinds—Paramātman which

Para-Ātman

is 'para' (transcendent) and 'apara' individual self which is worldly. The 'para' is equipped with all the excellences (aiśvaryādiviśiṣṭaḥ), not even slightly connected with worldly rāga (attachment), dveṣa (hatred), and moha (stupidity). He is the greatest and is known as Bhagavān and Maheśvara.[4] He is also omniscient and is the creator of the universe. This Paramātman is to be realized through inference and also Āgama.

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[1] *Nyāyasāra*, p. 34.

[2] *Nyāyasāra*, p. 34.

[3] These four qualities are exactly what we find in the *Yogasūtras*, II. 16-17; II. 25-26.

[4] From this it is evident that Bhāsarvajña was very much influenced by Śaivaism and Yoga.

The 'apara' is called the Jīva. It reaps the fruits of its own worldly actions and is infinite in number. This Jīva is to be cogniz-ed through inference with Buddhi etc. as its probans. The Ātman is eternal and all-pervasive. It is absolutely distinct from physical organism and other similar objects. That the Ātman is beginningless is proved from the fact that as soon as a baby is born, it feels pleasure, fear, grief and stupidity and also begins to suck its mother's breast. As the Jīva is equipped with the eightfold siddhis, it assumes simultaneously innumerable bodies in order to exhaust the innumerable results of its past actions. So the knowledge of the 'apara-Ātman' helps one to proceed for the attainment of the other world and removes all the causes of demerit and thus, becomes helpful for the realization of 'niḥśreyas.' All this is about the knowledge of the Jīva, the 'apara-Ātman.'

Apara-Ātman

Then the author proceeds to show how the knowledge of the Paramātman helps to achieve final emancipation (mokṣa). The knowledge of the Paramātman helps us to meditate upon it and then to become emancipated. The process of meditation (upāsanā) has been described as a practice to attain samādhi and to put an end to the chain of actions and afflictions. The author supports this by quoting the *Pātañjala-sūtras*—

Knowledge of Paramātman helps the achievement of mokṣa

Practice of austere penance, repetition of mantras, like the 'Praṇava', or the study of scriptures bearing upon liberation and concentration upon the Lord which constitute yogic discipline (kriyāyoga)[1] help one to get success in yoga.

This yogic discipline serves the purpose of helping one to attain samādhi through the practice of yama, niyama, etc. and also to attenuate afflictions.[2]

The author himself explains the above mentioned sūtras. 'Tapas' means the capacity to bear miseries pertaining to self (ādhyātmika) and others, in order to get

Yogic process of achieving mokṣa

[1] II.1. The *kriyāyoga* consists of tapas, svādhyāya and Īśvara praṇidhāna. [2] II. 2.

rid of worldly desires, anger and similar others. By 'svādhyāya' the author means repetition of mantras which refer to Īśvara. By 'Īśvarapraṇidhāna' he means constant meditation upon Parameśvara. Then one should practise the eightfold aspects of yoga, namely, yama (restraint), niyama (observance), āsana (posture), prāṇāyāma (breath-control), pratyāhāra (abstraction), dhāraṇā (concentration), dhyāna (meditation) and samādhi.[1] All these should be practised being very devotedly attached towards Maheśvara in order to achieve emancipation. After one has done so, he is able to perceive Śiva directly (pratyakṣataḥ paśyati) and attain the highest bliss. In other words, final emancipation is achieved after the direct perception of Śiva alone and not otherwise.[2]

Having thus, explained the process of emancipation, the author proceeds to discuss the conception of Mokṣa from different standpoints as advocated by others.

Vaiśeṣika view of mokṣa

Some are of opinion that final emancipation means the eternal existence of the Ātman devoid of all its specific characteristics (viśeṣaguṇas), like the eternal existence of Ākāśa devoid of sound during the state of dissolution. In other words, according to the Aulūkyas, that is, the Vaiśeṣikas, when the nine specific qualities of the Ātman are destroyed, the Ātman remains like a slab of stone. In this case, persons desirous of emancipation are not attracted towords it for the sake of pleasure or bliss which is never bereft of pain, but for the removal of pain. This sort of emancipation is not liked by persons, as it is a sort of the state of stupidity, like the state of fainting.

Bhāsarvajña's conception of mokṣa

Others are of opinion that in fact, getting rid of pain means attainment of pleasure. Hence, the above mentioned view of the Kāṇādas is not sound, hold the Naiyāyikas. In other words, according to Bhāsarvajña,

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[1] *Yogasūtra*, II. 29.

[2] tato'cireṇaiva kālena. . . . śivamavitatham pratyakṣataḥ paśyati/taṁ dṛṣṭvā niratiśayaṁ śreyaḥ prāpnoti . . . tadā duḥkhasyānto bhaviṣyati/tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti . . . tasmācchivadarśanānmokṣaḥ—*Nyāyasāra*, p. 39.

who upholds the position of the Naiyāyikas, mokṣa consists in the attainment of the essentially blissful nature of the Ātman devoid of all miseries which naturally include worldly pleasure also.

In brief, in the early stage of the development of the two systems, according to Vaiśeṣikas, mokṣa consists in the absolute cessation of all specific qualities of the Ātman including pain, sensible pleasure and knowledge. According to the Naiyāyikas, as held by Bhāsarvajña, mokṣa consists of the attainment of essentially blissful character of the Ātman characterized with the absolute cessation of pain (anena nityasamvedyena sukhena viśiṣṭā ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ puruṣasya mokṣa iti)[1]. It may also be pointed out here that according to Bhāsarvajña there is eternal and manifested bliss in the state of emancipation (nityasamvedyam). Jayasiṁhasūrin puts the whole thing in the following words—'sopādhisāvadhikaparimitatridaśamandirasukhādapi nirupādhiniravadhyaparimitasukhasaṁsargodayā yā sārvadikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ sā puruṣasya mokṣo bhavati[2].'

Difference between Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya conception of mokṣa

From whatever has been said above the following points may be concluded about Bhāsarvajña :—

1. His treatment of Prameyas is somewhat on different lines, though ultimately, he also believes that amongst the Prameyas, Ātman and Apavarga are the only two main Prameyas, like Gotama and Vātsyāyana.

2. Bhāsarvajña lived in Kāśmīra which was the centre of *Pratyabhijñā-Darśana*. So we find enough influence of 'yoga' in the *Nyāyasāra*. It is also a fact that the Nyāya system was originally very much connected with yoga and it was therefore, that the word 'Yoga' was also used for the Nyāya system[3]. Hence, according to Bhāsarvajña mokṣa is attained through the practices of Yoga and from the direct realization of Śiva alone. This also proves that the earlier Nyāya system was also much inclined towards Śaiva influence.

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[1] Bhāsarvajña—*Nyāyasāra*, p. 41.

[2] *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*, p. 293.

[3] naiyāyikānām yaugāparabhidhānānām—Guṇaratna's commentary on the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, p. 49; *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, *Vārtika*, I. 1. 29.

This is supported from various references found in our Śāstra[1].

3. Bhāsarvajña emphasises upon 'parā-bhakti' in Maheśvara and also 'anabhirati', that is, 'para-vairāgya' from the achievement of higher regions. This is exactly what the Yogasūtra also teaches.[2]

From all that has been said above it may be said that Bhāsarvajña occupies a unique position in the Nyāya system and tells us many things about the earlier aspects of this system.

26. TĀTPARYĀCĀRYA

(9th century A.D.)

References to Tātparyācārya

Just after Bhāsarvajña we place Tātparyācārya whom Vallabhācārya, the author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, says—*tadanuyāyinaḥ*, follower, or possibly a direct successor, or even a commentator of Bhāsarvajña, as Mm. Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraja has said.[3] He has been wrongly identified with Vācaspati Mishra I by Mm. Pandit Vindhyeshwarī Prasad Dvivedī[4] and also by Chandrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra.[5] The reason for their confusion seems to be the term *Tātparya* used in the name of the author, which is the name given to the commentary of Vācaspati Mishra I on the *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara. But the misunderstanding is removed when we find a reference to this author by Udayana in his *Bodhasiddhi*[6], by Vallabhācārya in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī*[7] and also in the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*[8] by Vācaspati Mishra

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[1] *Nyāyasāra*, p. 29. [2] *Nyāyasāra*, p. 39.

[3] (i) tadanuyāyinastātparyācāryasya siṁhanādaḥ—'Saṁvideva hi bhagavatī'—*Nyāyalīlāvatī*, p. 33 (Nirṇayasāgara, Bombay edition); (ii) *Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III p. 94.

[4] Introduction to the *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana, p. 28. Banaras edition.

[5] Introduction to the commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Haridasī, p.ii.

[6] Ms. belonging to the *Gaṅgānātha Jhā Research Institute*, Allahabad, p. 3. [7] p.33. [8] page 11.

II. As Tātparyācārya seems to be a direct follower of Bhāsarvajña we may place him in the ninth century A.D.

His views

Tātparyācārya was a Naiyāyika like his Guru, but he also sometimes deviated from the generally accepted standpoint of Nyāya. For instance, a question arises whether 'saṅkhyā' (number) should be recognized as a separate and independent attribute (guṇa) or not. The old Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view is that it should be regarded as a separate attribute, but both Bhāsarvajña and Tātparyācārya very boldly deny it. The reason in support of their view is an appeal to *samvid*, that is, the intuitive perception wherein they have a great confidence. In fact, Tātparyācārya very emphatically says that it is the *samvid* which alone is the final decisive element for realizing the real nature of an object. So he quotes the old saying—*samvideva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam*. This is indeed a very bold assertion, but it is not easy to reject it. Even later writers, like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[1], Śaṅkara Mishra[2], Vyāsayatī[3], Shālikanātha Mishra and others have full faith in this *samvid*. It is also clear from the lines of Vallabhācārya that Tātparyācārya was a very bold scholar, and it is therefore, that Udayana also quotes his view in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*[4].

We do not know as yet, if he had written any book on any system, but it is most probable that there might have been some which are now lost to us.

We have seen above that Bhāsarvajña was a Kāśmīrī and as Tātparyācārya was his close follower and as he also had great faith in the *bhagavatī samvit*, it seems that Tātparyācārya was also a Kāśmīrī and had been influenced by the Pratyabhijñā school of philosophy. Kavirajaji also takes him to be the native of Kāśmīra.

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 312, Vizianagram edition.

[2] *Upaskāra* on *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, VII. ii. 26.

[3] *Bhedojjīvana*, p. 12b (kumbhakonam ed.). Here it reads as-Viṣayasattvopagame naḥ śaraṇaṁ'. The commentary on it, called the *sarkarā*, explains *samvid* as *Pratītireva* and *śaraṇam* as *rakṣakaṁ Pramāṇamiti*.

[4] p.

27. NARASIṀHA

(9th century A.D.)

Ratnakīrti in his *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*[1] and his teacher Jñānaśrī[2] also have mentioned the view of one Āstika Naiyāyika, named Narasiṁha, while proving the existence of Īśvara as the creator of the knowables. Ratnakīrti says that according to Narasiṁha the production of knowables is dependent upon the substratum of knowledge, because these are products. The producer (agent) of all these cannot be an ordinary man, like a potmaker. Hence, he, who is the creator of all these, is Īśvara. This view along with the views of Trilocana and others have been criticised by the Buddhists. Ratnakīrti mentions the name of Narasiṁha prior to Trilocana and after Śaṅkara, the Naiyāyika. It may be therefore, assumed that Narasiṁha flourished before the 10th century. It may also be said that though we do not know of any work written by him, yet from the quotation, given by Ratnakīrti, it appears as if Narasiṁha had written some treatise on either Īśvarasiddhi or on any other topic of Nyāya.

Through Inference existence of Īśvara is proved

28. VIDYĀGURU TRILOCANA

(9th century A.D.)

Next, we come to Trilocana who was the teacher of Vācaspati Mishra I. He has been called *vidyāguru* by Varddhamāna, the son of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, in his *Prakāśa*[3] on the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana and also by Udayana himself[4]. Besides, V caspati himself tells that he learnt the secrets of the Nyāyaśāstra as propounded by Gotama and Pakṣilasvāmin from Trilocana. So he says in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*[5] while explaining the Pratyakṣasūtra

Reference to Trilocana

[1] p. 35. [2] Introduction to the *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 36.

[3] trilocanaṣṭīkākṛto vidyāguruḥ, p. 9, *Bibliotheca Indica Series.*

[4] trilocanaguroḥ—*Pariśuddhi*, p. 9,

[5] p. 133, Chowkhamba, Banaras edition.

of Gotama that the term *vyavasāyātmakaṁ* (determinate knowledge) refers to the determinate type of perception (savikalpaka-jñāna). This, according to him, is the sense in which Gotama has used the term. Both Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara, thinking that this is too simple a meaning and that the pupils will easily understand this, did not explain the term in their commentary. But Vācaspati, determined to follow the line of thought as explained by his *guru* Trilocana, has explained it as it is and as it has been proved to be by reasoning[1]. Again, Vācaspati himself has bowed down to his teacher Trilocana in the benedictory verse of his *Nyāyakaṇikā*. Udayana says in his *Pariśuddhi* that the tradition (sampradāya) of Uddyotakara lost its strength and was fast decaying. So Vācaspati took the tonic from his *Guru*-Trilocana in the form of his teachings and applied it to the Nyāyaśāstra in order to restore its lost strength[2]. Varadarāja in his *Tārkikarakṣā* says while discussing the *avijñātārtha* (unintelligible) type of clincher that according to Trilocana, if the assertion is made even four times, there is no harm[3]. This proves that Trilocana had commented upon the entire *Nyāyasūtra* or the *Bhāṣya*. Again, Varadarāja refers to him in connection with the explanation of the *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇas*[4] (the overlooking censurable) type of clincher. This also supports the above fact.

Amongst the non-orthodox writers who have referred to Trilocana mention may be made of Durveka Misra of the 10th century.

It may be further added here that Durveka Mishra of the 10th century A.D. has written in his commentary, called *Dharmottarapradīpa*[5], on the commentary of Dharmottara on the *Nyāyabindu of* Dharmakīrti—

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 133.

[2] page 9.

[3] caturabhidhāne'pi na kaściddoṣa iti vadatastrilocanasyāpi sa evābhiprāyaḥ—p. 337.

[4] V. ii. 21.

[5] pp. 173-174, K. P. *Jayaswal Research Institute*, Patna edition.

Trilocanaḥ punarnyāyabhāṣyaṭīkāyāmidamavādīt—

"sādhyavacanamasādhanāṅgavacanaṁ na bhavati, yato vivādeṣu parapratipattimadhikṛtya na prayoganiyamaḥ śakyaḥ/paṭumandādibhāvena parapratipattīnāmanavasthānāt/tathā hi hetu vacanādeva kaścit pratyeti/ kaścit punarantareṇāpi hetuvacanaṁ vaktṛsvarūpaparíśilanāt prāgeva śabdanispatteroṣṭhādisthānavyāpāropalabdhervakturabhipretamanveti/ tasmādanapekṣitaparapratipattirevāyam jñātā jnānasthamarthaṁ pratipādayantaṁ tasya svapratipattyā-ārūḍhasyārthasya vācakaṁ śabdaṁ prayoktumarhati/ svapratipattiśca liṅgajā jnāpanīyadharmaviśiṣṭaṁ dharmiṇamabhiniviśate / tasmāt parasya vivādayitrā jñānasthamarthaṁ paro boddhavya iti sa eva paraṁ pratyupāya iti."/

tadetat *kārpaṭikakarṇāṭa*-raṭitamaśraddheyaṁ dhīmatām /

Translation—Trilocana, again, has said this in the *Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā*—"the statement of the major term (sādhyavacana) cannot form part of the statement which is not that of the probans, because in discussions it is not possible to lay down limitations to the use of statements (prayoganiyamaḥ); for through the forcible or dull statements the opponents cannot be convinced. So some become convinced only through the mere statement of the probans. Some again, even without the statement of the probans and through the understanding of the nature of the speaker, even before the utterance of the words, only through the knowledge of the movements of the lips etc. one can understand the sense of the speaker. So the knower, even without being dependent upon the cognition of the other party speaking of the object of knowledge, can use the words denoting the meaning which has been brought out through his own knowledge. His own knowledge is produced by the probans which leads to the dharmin qualified by the dharma which is to be implied. Therefore, the debator should explain to the opposite party the meaning and that is the only way to deal with the opposite party.

To this Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra says—this what has been senselessly uttered by the *Kārpaṭika-Karṇāṭa* is not to be accepted with any sense of honour by the wise. Here the use of the word *Kārpaṭika* is, obviously, ironical, meaning, 'wretched.'

This last line is very important. It suggests that Trilocana was a Kārṇāṭa who had come to Mithilā.

It may be pointed out at this place that the kings of Mithilā had been generally themselves great scholars, or at least, great lovers and patrons of Sanskrit. So they had been attracting scholars from distinct places to their assembly of learned Paṇḍitas. Trilocana might have come to Mithilā in order to meet reputed Maithila scholars in the courts of Maithila kings and also to get his scholarship amply rewarded. There he might have met Vācaspati Miśra I. It is clear from the various references found in the works of Vācaspati himself that Trilocana had specialized in Prācīna-Nyāya and had also written a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* called *Nyāyamañjarī*. He had thus, kept the torch of the tradition of Uddyotakara's learning burning through the ages and to which Trilocana had initiated Vācaspati. This may also be the reason why Vācaspati wrote the *Tātparyaṭīkā* so late. It is therefore, that Vācaspati has said—

trilocanagurūnnītamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ /
yathāmānaṁ yathāvastu vyākhyātamidamīdṛśam //.

It may also be pointed out that if the above assumption is correct, then we will have to accept that Vācaspati had been in touch with Trilocana for a very long time, as is clear from Vācaspati's own reference to his *Nyāyamañjarī* in the very beginning of his first work, namely, *Nyāyakaṇikā*.

It may also be mentioned here that it was most *likely, because of Vācaspati's acquaintance with* Trilocana that the former could give an instance of the language of Drāviḍa, while discussing the Nyāyasūtra—'Varṇakramanirdeśavannirarthakam'[1]—

'atra yadā drāviḍaḥ svabhāṣayā tadbhāṣānabhijñamāryaṁ prati śabdanityatvaṁ pratipādayati tadā tannirarthakaṁ nigrahasthānaṁ sa khalu āryabhāṣāṁ jānannasāmarthyapracchādanāya tadbhāṣānabhijñatayā vā svabhāṣayā sādhanaṁ prayuktavān etc.[2]

This instance is not given anywhere else by any other contemporary scholar. So this is also somewhat significant in this context.

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[1] V. ii. 8 [2] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 710.

In this very connection it may also be further said that most probably, Vācaspati could find king Nṛga as his patron through his connection with Trilocana. It is known to all that king Nānyadeva of Kārṇāṭa had come to Mithilā towards the end of the 11th century (śaka 1019-1097 A.D.) and founded a dynasty of rulers in Mithilā It seems strange how without any previous closer connection extending for a pretty long time with Karṇāṭa, Nānyadeva could have come to rule over Mithilā at Simarāongaṛha. So it may be assumed that even prior to Nānyadeva's coming to Mithilā there was a closer contact between Karṇāṭa and Mithilā which alone could establish the rule of Nānyadeva in Mithilā. Along with these rulers, or even otherwise, scholars also had come to Mithilā from Karṇāṭa. Most likely, king Nṛga also in the same manner had come to Mithilā earlier than Nānyadeva and had founded a kingdom in Mithilā. This is also supported by the fact that nowhere else we find the name of this Nṛga mentioned in the history of Mithilā. The name Nṛga also supports my conjecture. I am told that such name is common in Karṇāṭa. It is certain that it is not a Maithila name.

Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti also have quoted Trilocana in their works. For instance, the latter author of the 11th century mentions his views, in his *Sarvajñasiddhi*[1], against the existence of a *Sarvajña*. He also mentions that Trilocana has refuted the Sarvajñasiddhi in his work named *Nyāyaprakīrṇaka*.[2] Again, Ratnakīrti mentions Trilocana's views in his *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*.[3] Trilocana is also mentioned in Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi*,[4] *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*,[5] *Vyāptinirṇaya*[6], *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*[8] In the *Apohasiddhi* it is said that according to Trilocana, *Sāmānyaviśeṣa*, like aśvatva, gotva, etc. inheres in its substrata and is the cause of the name and notion of generality. In the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, Trilocana is said to have said that it is the effect which depends

[1] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 356.

[2] *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*. p. 13, [3] pp. 13, 36, 42. [4] p. 58.

[5] pp. 79, 85. [6] pp. 99, 102. [7] pp. 108, 114. [8] p. 128.

upon the *sahakāri-kāraṇa* and not the cause of the production of the effect. The causal efficiency to produce an effect is of two kinds-internal (nijam) and external (āgantukam). The latter manifests itself out of the sahakāri (concomitant) conditions. So the difference in the successive effects arising out of the difference in the successive concomitant conditions can be explained even if the cause is non-momentary and the differences in the existence of the objects (bhāvas) every moment be inexplicable.

Again, Ratnakīrti twice refutes the views of Trilocana in the same work in different contexts[2].

The Jaina author Vādideva quotes a long passage from the *Prakīrṇaka*, a work of Trilocana, in his *Syādvādaratnākara*, where Trilocana has refuted the kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda of the Buddhists[3]. Varadarāja Miśra, while discussing the avijñātārtha (non-understanding the import of the opponents view) type of nigrahasthāna, suggests in his *Tārkikarakṣā* that there is no objection even if the opponent's view is repeated four times[4]. Again, in the same work Varadarāja Miśra says that the 'Vādī' wins in the debate and the 'Prativādī' is defeated through the fallacy of 'sādhanābhāsa' when applied to Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā. According to Varadarāja Miśra, Trilocana, Vācaspati and others have no objection to the above views[5].

It may further be pointed out that Jñāna rīmitra, a Buddhist writer of the eleventh century in one of his works, quotes from the views of Trilocana among other authors' views of that period. He also refers to *a work on Nyāya called the Mañjarī and attributes the* same to Trilocana. It may be mentioned that this

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[1] trilocanasyāpyayam saṅkṣiptārthaḥ/ kāryameva hi sahakāriṇamapekṣate, na kāryotpattihetuḥ/ yasmāddvividham sāmarthyannijamāgantukañca sahakāryantaram.—*Kṣaṇabhaṅgasidhi* of Ratnakīrti, p. 79.

[2] *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* of Ratnakīrti, pp. 70, 73.

[3] tathā ca Trilocanaḥ *Prakīrṇake*, pages 787-8 (Vide *Indian Culture*, Vol. 14, pp. 39-40, Footnote.

[4] caturabhidhāne'pi na kaściddoṣa iti vadatastrilocanasyāpi sa evābhiprāyaḥ—*Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 337.

[5] atra trilocanavācaspatiprabhṛtīnām na kācidvipratipattiḥ—*Tārkikara ṣā*, p. 356

Mañjarī is quite different from the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[1]. Then again, Aniruddha, who is believed to have flourished just after Vācaspati Miśra I and prior to Udayana, has also quoted the view of Trilocana in his *Vivaraṇapañjikā*, a commentary on the *Nyāyabhā ya-vārtika*. Aniruddha also in this very work quotes Trilocana and his work *Nyāyamañjarī*[2]. Vācaspati himself makes a reference to the *Nyāyamañjarī* as a work of his Guru[3]. One thing is certain that Trilocana kept the tradition of the Science of Reasoning as taught by the āstikas in tact, for how otherwise Vācaspati could have said—'trilocanagurūnnītamārgānugamanonmukhaḥ' for the correct explanation of the texts ?

From the references given above, it becomes certain that Trilocana had written a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, or the *Nyāyasūtra*, called *Nyāyamañjarī*, which is now lost and also a work called *Prakīrṇaka*. As he is the *Vidyāguru* of Vācaspati Miśra I, he may be placed in the beginning of the ninth century.

29. (VṚDDHA) VĀCASPATI MIŚRA I

(9th century A.D.)

The greatest name in the history of Philosophy of this country, as is mentioned by Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, is that of Vācaspati Miśra, the disciple of Trilocana. This Vācaspati is generally called Vṛddha-Vācaspati, or Vācaspati I. His wide and deep scholarship in various branches of learning earned for him the rare distinction of being addressed as *sarva-tantrasvatantra* (master of all branches of learn-

[1] Vide *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, Vol. XLI, Pt. 4. *Nyāyamañjarī of Guru trilocana—A Forgotten work*—Prof. Anantlal Thakur.

[2] Dr. J. S. Jetly—*Vivaraṇapañjikā* of Aniruddha, pp. 240-41 *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda, Vol. IV. It must be noted here that this *Nyāyamañjarī* is different from that of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Vide Prof. Anantalal Thakur's article—*Nyāyamañjarī of Guru Trilocana—A Forgotten work—J.B.R.S.* Vol. XLI, Pt. 4, 1955.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 133. *Nyāyakaṇikā*—Beginning verse—
ajñānatimiraśamanīm paradamanīm *Nyāyamañjarīm* rucirām/ prasavitre prabhavitre vidyātarave namo gurave //—*Nyāyakaṇikā*, verse 3,

In the word *tilakasvāminaḥ* there is the compound of the class of 'Śākapārthivādi', that is, the compound here is split up as *tilakapriyaḥ svāmin* as explained by the *Parimala* also. In this very sense Vācaspati Mishra has the following as one of his benedictory verses of the *Bhāmatī*—

mārtaṇḍatilakasvāmimahāgaṇapatīn vayam /
viśvavandyān namasyāmaḥ sarvasiddhividhāyinaḥ //

which is almost the same as the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*. The late Mm. Bālaśāstrī Ranade of the Banaras Government Sanskrit college, has the very version of the Smṛti text as given above in his edition of the *Bhāmatī*. It is strange to note that except Viśvarūpa who is also a Maithila[1], no one else, including even Vijñāneśvara, has the above mentioned version of the *Smṛti*. Others, however, read it as—

ādityasya sadā pūjāṁ tilakaṁ svāminastathā /
mahāgaṇapateścaiva kurvan siddhimavāpnuyāt //

But the author of the *Mitākṣarā*, while explaining the verse, has split up the compound word *tilakasvāminaḥ* into 'tilakaṁ and svāminaḥ' and has accordingly, explained it quite differently as that if a small round *tilaka* like object made out of gold or silver is presented to the Āditya, or to Svāmin (=Skanda), or to Mahāgaṇapati, then one who presents it will attain siddhi[2].

Wrong interpretation by Mitākṣarākāra

If this version is accepted, then the compound word of the *Bhāmatī*—*mārtaṇḍatilakasvāmimahāgaṇapatīn* will remain unexplained. Hence, it seems to me that Vijāñneśvara, being a Southerner, could not understand the real signific nce of the text of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* and consequently, the tradition of Mithilā, which Yājñavalkya, Vi varūpa and Vācaspati, as inhabitants of Mithilā, could easily remember. So this fact also may help us to prove that Vācaspati was a Maithila.

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[1] Viśvarūpa, a commentator on the *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti*, has also used 'tilakasvāmin' as one compound word. Benedictory verse 5.

[2] ādityaskandagaṇapatīnāmanyatamasya sarveṣāṁ vā tilakaṁ svarṇādinirmitaṁ rūpyanirmitaṁ vā kurvan siddhimabhilaṣitāmāpnoti—*Mitākṣarā*, I. 209.

It seems that after having finished his studies at his place, Vācaspati got shelter under the patronage of king Nṛga. According to Vācaspati, Nṛga was a very powerful king whose unimaginable name and fame had spread far and wide, whose activities could not be imitated by any king, who was himself very learned in śāstras, and who had unthinkable palatial buildings constructed with all imaginable ease[1]. On the basis of some records of Nepal and other traditions current in Mithilā, it may be held that king Nṛga most probably ruled over Mithilā and had his capital at Simarāõga·ha in the District of Muzaffarpur, in the 9th century A.D. prior to king Nānyadeva who also came to rule over Mithilā from Karṇāṭa[2]. As mentioned before this is further supported by the fact that Trilocana, his Vidyāguru, came from Karṇāṭa and might have also lived under king Nṛga, who also might have come from Kārṇāṭa and founded a kingdom in Mithilā, perhaps in Simarāõgaṛha prior to Nānyadeva.

Vācaspati's patron

Vācaspati Mishra must have lived a long life in order to write all these books. In one of his works, he says that longing for material wealth mostly becomes lessened in a man when he has crossed the age of seventy-five. This utterance of Vācaspati may have some connection with his own experience. So it seems that Vācaspati might have been over seventyfive years of age when he wrote his *Tātparyaṭīkā*[3] and he must have lived at least ten years more in order to enjoy the court life of his patron king Nṛga under whom he wrote his *Bhāmatī*. Thus, it may be presumed that Vācaspati lived for about eightyfive years or even more.

Vācaspati must have lived long

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[1] (i) nṛpāntarāṇām manasāpyagamyām bhrūkṣepamātreṇa cakāra kīrtim/
kārtasvarāsārasupūritārthasārthaḥ svayaṁśāstravicakṣaṇaśca// etc. *Bhāmatī*, p. 1020. (ii) na cādyāpi na dṛśyante līlāmātravinirmitāni mahāprāsādapramadavanāni śrīmannṛganarendrāṇāṁ anyeṣām manasāpi duṣkarāṇi nareśvarāṇāṁ—*Bhāmatī*, p. 481.

[2] Introduction to his English translation of the *Tattvakaumudī* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha; First edition.

[3] prāyeṇa pañcaśaptativarṣeṣvativāhiteṣvarthatṛṣṇā tanūbhavati—*Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 629.

Tradition is still current in Mithilā that Vācaspati had no issue and he named his last work, that is, the *Bhāmatī*, in order to commemorate the name of his wife who had grown too old to produce any issue.

As regards the time when Vācaspati Mishra I flourished, we have some definite proof. He has composed his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* in *vasvankavasuvatsara*, meaning, in the year 898. For a long time scholars believed the year to be of the Śaka era which would have brought Vācaspati quite close to Udayana and would have created other confusions. Later on, scholars have come to realize that it is the Vikrama era which Vācaspati has used here. So it is clear that Vācaspati composed this work in 841 A.D. and as he lived a very long life, it may be said that he must have flourished in the beginning of the 9th century.

Vācaspati's date is 898 V. era=841 A.D.

He is regarded as a great authority on Vedānta. Udayanācārya pays a great homage to him as a great authority on Nyāya.[1] His works on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Yoga are very useful for the clear understanding of the original texts. In his *Tattvabindu*, an original work on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, Vācaspati discusses at great length the efficient cause of 'śābdabodha' (import of words). He takes the five traditional views about śābdabodha and discusses them elaborately. The five views are—(1) According to Vaiyākaraṇas, as explained by Bhartṛhari[2], the Vākyārtha (meaning of a sentence) is obtained by the 'vākyasphoṭa'. They hold that a sentence has no parts though due to eternal nescience (anādi-avidyā), it appears as if it has parts[3].

Vācaspati's view on śābdabodha

[1] mātaḥ sarasvati punaḥ punareṣa natvā
baddhāñjaliḥ kimapi vijñapayāmyavehi/
vākcetasormama tathā bhava sāvadhānā
Vācaspatervacasi na skhalato yathaite// Beginning verse of the *Nyāyapariśuddhi.*

[2] pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā iva/
vākyātpadānāmatyantam praviveko na kaścana —
Vākyapadīya, I. 73.

[3] asyā nimittam prati vivadante vādinaḥ—
anavayavameva vākyamanādyavidyopadarśitālīkavarṇapadavibhāgamasyā nimittamiti kecit—*Tattvabindu* of Vācaspati Miśra I, p. 6. Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, edition, No. 3.

(2) According to the old school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya, the vākyārthajñāna is acquired from the cognition of the last word (varṇa) or letter pregnant with impressions caused by the meaning of the previous words or letters[1]. (3) Some again, are of opinion that the cause of the vākyārthajñāna is the *varṇamālā*, a group of varṇas which appear in the mirror like memory produced by the assemblage of mental impressions of each letter (varṇa), word (pada) and the import of padas[2]. (4) The fourth view is attributed to the *anvitābhidhānavādins*, the followers of Prabhākara Mishra. According to them the cause of the *vākyārthajñāna* is the words themselves which imply their own meaning in relation to the meaning of other words (padas) having the threefold conditions of the import of a sentence, namely, ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi[3]. And (5) the last view is attributed to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa whom Vāścapati addresses as 'ācāryāḥ'. He holds that the cause of the Vākyārthajñāna is the meanings of the words which are conveyed by the words possessing those meanings and have ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti[4]. This is the siddhānta view which Vācaspati accepts. The first four views have been rejected by Vācaspati Mishra in the *Tattvabindu*[5].

Chronological order of his works

The chronological order of the works writen by Vācaspati Mishra may be said to be as follows:

He wrote the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka*, a work on Pūrva-

[1] pāramārthikapūrvapūrvapadapadārthānubhavajanitasaṁskāra-sahitamantyavarṇavijñānamityeke—*Tattvabindu*, p. 6.

[2] pratyeka-varṇa-pada-padārthānubhava-bhāvita-bhāvanānicaya-labdha-janmasmṛtidarpaṇārūḍhā varṇamālā-*Tattvabindu*, p. 7.

[3] padānyeva-ākā kṣita-yogya-sannihita-padārthāntarānvita-svārthābhidhāyinī—*Tattvabindu*, p. 7. This view is attributed to the followers of Prabhākara.

[4] padaireva samabhivyāhāravadbhirabhihitāḥ svārthā ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-āsatti-saddhrīcīnā vākyārthadhīhetava ityācāryāḥ—*Tattvabindu*, p. 8. Ṛṣiputraparameśvara, the author of the *Tattvavibhāvanā*, a commentary on the *Tattvabindu*, says that this is the Siddhānta view.

[5] *Tattvavibhāvanā*—pareṣāṁ tu caturṇāmapi pratipakṣatvena nirākaroti—p. 8.

Mīmāṁsā by Maṇḍana Mishra, first. He refers to this work in his *Tātparya-ṭīkā*,[1] *Tattvabindu*,[2] *Bhāmatī*[6] and *Tattvavaiśāradī*.[3] In his *Nyāyakaṇikā*, on the other hand, he does not refer to any of his works. It is here that he mentions the name of his *Vidyāguru* Trilocana as the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* which he calls 'Paradamanī'.

Nyāyakaṇikā

The second work which he wrote is the *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā*. This work is referred to by Vācaspati Mishra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*,[4] *Tattvavaiśāradī* and *Bhāmatī*.[5] As the work is not available, it is very difficult to say anything about its contents.

Brahmatattva-Samīkṣā

The third work of Vācaspati is the *Tattvabindu*. It is an original work on the import of words (Śābdabodha) according to Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. It is referred to in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*[7] and *Bhāmatī*[8]. Some more facts about this work have already been discussed above, hence, they are not repeated here.

Tattvabindu

The next work which he wrote is the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* wherein he has given the date of its composition as *vasvaṅkavasuvatsare*, that is, 'in the year 898'. There has been a good deal of discussion amongst scholars as to

Nyāyasūcīnibandha

[1] Vide pages 207, 561-62, 662 Chowkhamba, Banaras edition.

[2] Page 120 Annamalai University Sanskrit Series edition.

[3] Vide pages 325, 541, 730, 893 Nirṇayasagara, Bombay edition.

[4] Pages 75, 295 Calcutta edition.

[5] Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj in his *History and Bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, p. 102 published in the *Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, Vol.111, writes—"*Tattvasamīkṣā* and *Brahma-Siddhi* are two other Vedāntic works, now lost, by Vācaspati, to which he himself makes passing reference (*Nyāyakaṇikā*, p. 80)." But this does not appear to be supported by the text. The former is, no doubt, a work of Vācaspati, but the latter is the well-known work of Maṇḍana Mishra to which Vācaspati makes a reference in his *Nyāyakaṇikā*. Vācaspati quotes a Kārikā from the *Brhmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Mishra and says—Yathāhācāryaḥ—"tadetat *Brahmasiddhau* kṛtaśramāṇām sugamamiti neha prapañcitam." Here, one should add—Ācāryeṇa. Thus, it is clear that Vācaspati only refers to the work of Maṇḍana and not his own.

[6] Pages 91, 561, 614. [7] Page 75. [8] Pages 541 and 855.

the era of the year. Formerly, many scholars took it to be the Śāka era which would have placed its composition in 977 A. D. We also know that Udayana wrote his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* in 906 Śāka era which would have made Vācaspati older than Udayana by 8 years only. This would have created so many anachronisms. Hence, it is certain that it is the Vikrama era which Vācaspati meant for the composition of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and not Śāka. I may add that in Mithilā, where Vācaspati flourished, both Śāka and Vikrama eras were equally observed with respect and therefore, there should be no difficulty in accepting Vikrama era in the present case also. Thus, it is certain that Vācaspati wrote it about 841 A.D.[1]

Necessity of having a correct version of the *Nyāyasūtras*

We know from so many other contexts that the Bauddhas tried to distort and twist the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gotama and it was very difficult to write a commentary on the sūtras without having fixed their exact[1] nature. It was therefore, necessary for Vācaspati t have fixed the correct version of the sūtras before proceeding to write a commentary even on the *Vārtika* where he had to follow the words of the sūtra-work. We shall see how Vācaspati could get hold of the almost lost tradition of the Nyāya school which alone could help him to fix the exact nature and number of the *Nyāyasūtras*. That there was enough effort from the Buddhist *side to ruin the Nyāya-sūtras is further proved* by the fact that Vācaspati had to record in words and letters not only the number of the sūtras and chapters contained in the *Nyāyasūtra*, but also of the sections, and even of letters. So he says at the end of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, that the *Nyāyaśāstra* contains 5 Adhyāyas, 10 Āhnikas, 84 Prakaraṇas, 530 Sūtras, 206 Padas, and 8411 letters. Does any other work in Sanskrit literature exist where such a record of the text is found? We shall see that this was not the last effort

[1] Page 207. [2] Pages 284 and 330.

[3] *Vide—The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Banaras, Vol. III. p. 101; *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. II, pp. 349-53.

of the Āstika scholars to restore the genuine *sūtra-work*[1]. From all this it is clear that the only aim to write this book was to have before himself the correct version of the *Sūtra* work before proceeding to write his commentary of the *Nyāyavārtika.* He has himself said at the end of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*—I lay at the feet of God Śiva, who can put an end to all the miseries, the result of the merit acquired by me by restoring the very old, charming and most reasonable teachings of Gotama which had merged in the dirty, wrong and unassailable reasonings of the Buddhists.[2]

Aim of writing the Nyāyasūcīnibandha

After this Vācaspati proceeded to write his fifth work, namely, *Tātparyaṭīkā*, a lucid commentary on the *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara. The aim in writing this commentary, as the author himself says, was to acquire some merit by restoring the very old (*atijaratīnāṁ*) teachings of Uddyotakara which had fallen into discredit due to the unassailable wrong reasonings of the Buddhists.

Tātparyaṭīkā

Aim in writing the Tātparyaṭīkā

We are aware that Uddyotakara had established a school (Sampradāya) of his own with his great erudition and criticism of Buddhist views and it was in its prime of youth when Uddyotakara lived; but unfortunately, due to the severe attacks of the Buddhist scholars, like Dharmakīrti and others, and perhaps the absence of equally strong logicians from the non-Buddhist side, the tradition established by Uddyotakara had almost crumbled, but was restored by the efforts of Vācaspati who obtained the secrets of the Science of Reseaning through the help of his Vidyāguru Trilocana, as has been mentioned by Udayana and

Uddyotakara's sampradāya was restored by Vācaspati

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[1] Vācaspati Mishra II of the 15th century wrote his *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* to fix the correct version of the *Nyāyasūtra.* According to him there are 531 Sūtras and not 530 as fixed by Vācaspati Mishra I.

[2] yadalambhikimapi puṇyam dustarakunibandhapaṅkamagnānām/

Śrī Gotamasugavīnāmatijaratīnāṁ samuddharaṇāt //

Varddhamāna[1]. Thus, it is due to Vācaspati alone that the secrets of the Science of Reasoning could be fully restored to us.

Vācaspati's obeisance to Śiva

In the beginning of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, like his other works, Vācaspati prays to God Śiva for the fulfilment of his desires[2]. The reason why he, or as a matter of fact, any other scholar, pays homage to Śiva may be, among others, that in course of time, Śiva became recognized by almost all the āstika schools of thought as the symbol of Jñāna. Again, the ultimate end of philosophy being the removal of miseries, Śiva alone was found capable of doing so; hence, he was regarded as one who alone could help the 'Jijñāsu' to achieve the final emancipation[3].

There has been three editions of this work so far known to me. One in the *Vizianagram Sanskrit Series*, Banaras, then in the *Kashi Sanskrit Series*, Banaras and the last in the *Calcutta Sanskrit Series*, Calcutta.

Vācaspati has referred to the views of Diṅnāga,[4] Vasubandhu[5], Dharmakīrti[6], Vaibhāṣika[7], Sautrāntika,[8] Ārhata[9], Malla[10], Śākya[11], Bhikṣuka[12], Digambara,[13]

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[1] atha sampradāyo vicchinnaḥ kathaṁ tavāpīyaṁ vicchinna-sampradāyā tātparyaṭīkā sunibandha ityata āha—*atijaratīnāmiti*. Uddyotakarasampradāyo hyamūṣām yauvanam tacca kālaparipākavaśādgalitamiva kinnāmātra *Trilocanaguroḥ* etc.—*Nyāyapariśuddhi*, p. 9. Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[2] First benedictory verse of the *Tātparyaṭīkā*.

[3] So says the Smṛti—'jñānamicchenmaheśvarāt'.

[4] pp. 2, 118, 146-7, 153-54, 179-80, 189, 193, 200-01, 266, 270, 273, 277-79, 289-90.

[5] pp. 150, 317.

[6] pp. *693*, *697*, *700*, *703*, *707*,

[7] 398, 500.

[8] pp. 255, 288, 485, 609.

[9] p. 584.

[10] p. 47.

[11] pp. 47, 432.

[12] p. 432.

[13] p. 432.

His reference to authors and works

Saṁsāramocaka[1], Śauddhodani[2], Kāpālika[3], Jaranmīmāṁsaka[4], Bhadanta Dharmottara[5], Pailukaṇṭha[6], Mahābhāṣyakāra[7], Mādhyamika[8], Niruktakāra[9], Ākhyātivādin[10],

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[1] They were a Materialistic sect of the Nāstikas according to whom killing of an animal was an act of merit. They held that emancipation meant the destruction of the Jīva together with the destruction of the physical organism wherein it lived, like the destruction of water along with the destruction of the pot where it was kept. So says Kumārila in his *Ślokavārtika* (p. 209)—Saṁsāramocakādeśca hiṁsā puṇyatvasammatā.

[2] p. 432.

[3] They are Śaivas as Rāmānuja says in his *Bhāṣya—paśupatimatānusāriṇaḥ Kāpālāḥ Kālāmukhāḥ Pāśupatāḥ Śaivāśceti* / ete vedaviruddhāṁ tattvaprakriyāmaihikāmuṣmikaśreyassādhanakalpanāśca kalpayanti / nimittopādānayorbhedaṁ nimittakāraṇañca paśupatimācakṣate / tathā niḥśreyasasādhanamapi mudrikāṣaṭkadhāraṇādikam. So says Kāpālāḥ—

mudrikāṣaṭkatattvajñaḥ paramudrāviśāradaḥ /
bhagāsanasthamātmānaṁ dhyātvā nirvāṇamṛcchati // etc.—

II. ii. 35.

According to the Kāpālika-Darśana, Jīva is of atomic size. They worship Śiva in the lotus of the heart. They have the *Smaśānasiddhi* and possess all the eight *siddhis*, such as, Brāhmī, Māheśvarī, Kaumārī, Vaiṣṇavī, Vārāhī, Māhendrī, Cāmuṇḍā and Caṇḍikā. Their names end with the term *Ghaṇṭā*, as Aghoraghaṇṭā. See Jagaddhara's commentary on the *Mālatīmādhava*, Act, V. p. 46.

[4] p. 445. [5] p. 485. [6] p. 506. [7] p. 31.

[8] pp. 360, 362; 664-5.

[9] p. 135. [10] There are five different types of false imposition (or wrong notions). So has been said—

ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥ khyātiranyathā / /
tathānirvacanīyakhyātiretatkhyātipañcakam //

meaning—(1) *Ātmakhyāti*—This is upheld by the *Kṣaṇika-Vijñānavādin Bauddhas*. According to them there is only one reality and it is *Ideas* (Vijñāna). All the objects that appear before our eyes are nothing but ideas. The so-called independent appearance of knower, knowable and knowledge is also the various forms of ideas which assume different shapes due to their past anādi (beginningless) *vāsanās*, but they are all illusory in that shape.

(2) The theory of *Asatkhyāti*—is associated with the name the *Śūnyavādins*. They hold that the concept *idam rajatam* is neither smṛti nor cognition. It is different from both. In fact, it is an imposition (adhyāsa) of *rajata*, which is false, in the *śukti* which also is illusory.

Bhartṛhari[1], Aulūkyapakṣa[2], *Yogabhāṣya*[3], Guru[4] (Guruḥ Prabhākaraḥ), Sāṅkhya[5]; and amongst his own works he refers to the *Tattvabindu*[6], *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā*[7], and *Nyāyakaṇikā*[8] and his own Guru[9] (Trilocana) in this work. Besides, he refers twice to a *Vṛtti*[10] with whose views he does not agree. It is difficult to say whether this *Vṛtti* was a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, or on the *Vārtika*, by a Buddhist, or by a non-Buddhist.

There are certain peculiar facts which Vācaspati mentions in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* which cannot be overlooked from being mentioned here :—

Reference to an old view of Sāṅkhya on Inference

For instance, he speaks of the seven types of relation in the vyāpti according to Sāṅkhya and criticises them. These relations are not found mentioned in the available texts on Sāṅkhya. Naturally, Vācaspati

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(3) The theory of *Akhyāti*—which is associated with the *Mīmāṁsakas*, means that in the concept *idam rajatam*, for instance, there is no contact of the visual sense-organ with the silver piece. So silver is not directly perceived, but there is its recollection (smaraṇa), while there is the direct perception of *idam*. One is mistaken for the other, simply because of the non-apprehension, (agraha) of the difference between the intellect and the object of perception.

(4) The theory of *Anyathākhyāti*—is upheld by the *Naiyāyikas* according to whom the notion of *idam rajatam* is due to the contact of sense-organ of perception which is defective with the pearl-oyster (śukti) and the silver which is not there at that time but is separated from it both in space and time, through the *Jñānalakṣaṇā* type of extra-ordinary (alaukika) perception.

(5) The theory of the *Anirvacanīyakhyāti* is associated with the name of *Śaṅkara-Vedānta*. According to this view the presence of *rajata* in the object (śukti) which is before the eyes cannot be said to be real (sat), as its notion becomes thwarted later on. But, at the same time it cannot be said that the *rajatatva* is *asat*, because it is apparent there. Thus, *rajata* being quite distinct from both *sat* and *asat*, has been called *anirvacanīya*.

[1] pp. 126-27. [2] p. 332. [3] p. 9. It is to be noted here that Vācaspati quotes a line from the *Yogabhāṣya*, III. 10. p. 287, but attributes the same to Patañjali. Even in the quotation there is some difference in the version. This may be due to his quoting the lines from memory most probably.

[4] p. 148. [5] pp. 194, 165-196. [6] p. 207. [7] pp. 561, 614. [8] pp. 561, 562, 662. [9] p. 133. [10] p. 326.

them from a text which is lost.[1] It must be
, mentioned that the commentary called *Jaya-*
on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* does mention them in
rm[2], but it is strange that Vācaspati who
is commentary on the Sāṅkhya later than his
aṭīkā does not mention them at all.

in, Vācaspati quotes the first Sūtra[3] of the
Āhnika of the ninth Adhyāya of the *Vaiśeṣika-*
sūtra and says that there is no need
of mentioning the four types of con-
tact. All the four types can be had
by the word *Sambandhi*[4]. He has profusely
d from the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti and has
:d them[5].

ion of Vai-
ew on types
t.

gain, we find that he says that for an inference
not necessary to have a contact with the *liṅga*, as
for instance, *smoke*, in the inference
of fire, but even in its absence there
can be an inference only from the
llection of the *liṅga*. This shows that long before
ṣadhara Mishra, the extraordinary type of con-
, called *Jñānalakṣaṇā*, was in vogue amongst the
iyāyikas.

alakṣanā in
pati

It is also believed that Vācaspati Mishra for the
first time distinguished between the
two types of direct perception, namely,
Savikalpaka (determinate) and *Nir-*
kalpaka (indeterminate)[6].

wo types of direct
ception

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1 (i) mātrānimittasaṁyogivirodhisahacāribhiḥ/
svasvāmivadhyaghātādyaiḥ sāṅkhyānāṁ saptadhānumā//
—*Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 165;

(ii) etena Sāṅkhyānāṁ saptavidhaḥ sambandhaḥ pratyuktaḥ,
—*Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 196.

2 *Jayamaṅgalāṭīkā* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5.

3 Vācaspati gives the version of the Sūtra as 'asyedaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sambandhi ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikaṁ', while in the Gujarati Press edition of the Sūtra it is—'asyedaṁ kāryaṁ saṁyogi-virodhi-samavāyi ceti laiṅgikaṁ'. The last version has been followed by all the commentators also.

4 *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 164.

5 *Tātparyaṭīkā*, pp. 697, 723, 700-01, 703, 707, 715. All these references are found in the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti, pp. 2, 77, 79, 90, 96-97, 107.

6 *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 125.

The next work of Vācaspati is his commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, also known as the *Sāṅkhyasaptati*, or *Kanakasaptati* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, called *Tattvakaumudī*. Twice Vācaspati has mentioned the name of his own *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* in this commentary[1]. This commentary is so popular that it has practically eclipsed the text and has been studied as an independent main work on the Sāṅkhya school. There have been several commentaries on this, of which the commentary of Bālarāma Udāsin is more reliable, but it is unfortunately incomplete. There are several lines in this commentary which Vācaspati has repeated from the *Tātparyaṭīkā* with a very slight change in the reading but they have much improved the text[2].

Tattvakaumudī

My own critical study of the *Tattvakaumudī* along with the text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, has convinced me that Vācaspati wrote this commentary from the angle of vision of Nyāya. He did not realize that the Kārikās dealt with the psychic elements of Indian philosophy and that the elements of the Sāṅkhya school have to be studied exclusively from a different angle of vision. So his interpretation of the Kārikās is sometimes very misleading and confusing. He himself felt this, it seems, but he could not do justice to the subject. Moreover, his confusion with the correct interpretation of the nature of the Sāṅkhya *Jña* has practically confused the entire philosophical thought of India, which again, is due to the loss of 'one' particular Kārikā from the text which might have been connected with *Jña*. Like a very great Paṇḍita Vācaspati explained whatever text he could find before him in some way or other. But he could not see whether the synthesis of the thoughts was properly maintained or not with his interpretation.[3] However, the contents of this commentary will be examined thoroughly in the chapter dealing with Sāṅkhya Philosophy.

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[1] *Tattvakaumudī* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 5, 9.

[2] Compare the lines of the *Tattvakaumudī* on the refutation of the Arthāpatti with those of the *Tātparya* on II. ii. 6, pp. 438-39.

[3] Vide—UmeshaMishra—*Sāṅkhya-yoga-Darśana*, TIRABHUKTI PUBLICATIONS, pp. 75, 295.

The next commentary which Vācaspati Mishra wrote is the *Tattvavaiśāradī* on the Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* and Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya*. This is the best commentary on the text. It explains the text very lucidly and in easy language. I do not think there is any other commentary so useful for our students and ordinary readers.

Tattavaiśāradī

Vācaspati has referred to his *Nyāyakaṇikā*[1] and *Brahmatattvasamīkṣā*[2] in this commentary. He has also quoted a Kārikā from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Pramāṇavārtika* of Dharmakīrti[3]. Vācaspati has not spared the Yogācāras whenever he could get an opportunity to criticise them, which shows his deep knowledge of the Buddhist philosophy. Its fuller treatment will be given in the chapter concerned. But only one point which is worth mention here is that Vācaspati while commenting on the Yoga philosophy holds that there is no proof to prove the existence of the *ātivāhika-śarīra* just before the passing away of the Jīva from one body to another in order to carry it away to the proper destination.[4]

The last and the most important of all his works is his commentary, called *Bhāmatī*, on the *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya*. It was written under the patronage of a great king named Nṛga who most probably ruled over Mithilā and had his capital at Simarāongaṛha in Nepal Tarai where Nānyadeva had also ruled, so has been said by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganatha Jhā in his Introduction to his first edition of the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*. It has already been said that as Vāchaspati had no issue, he named his Vedānta work after the name of his wife in order to commemorate her name. This book is not merely a commentary, but it came to be regarded as an independent work and it founded a *prasthāna* of its own with several

Bhāmatī

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[1] *Tattvavaiśāradī*, pp. 75, 295.

[2] *Tattvavaiśāradī*, pp. 75, 295.

[3] (i) sahopālambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ /—*Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

(ii) bhedaśca bhrāntivijñānairdṛśyetendāvivādvaye /—*Pramāṇavārtika*,—p. 294. [4] p. 286.

followers. It became more popular than the *Pañca-pādikā* of Padmapāda. Though originally a great Naiyāyika, yet in his *Bhāmatī* he is at his best and scholars are of opinion that on Śaṅkara-Vedānta *Bhāmatī* is the best exposition. It has been commented upon by Amalānanda Sarasvatī in a very lucid manner which has again, been commented upon by Lakṣmīnṛsiṁha and which is named *Ābhoga*. The *Parimala* by Appayya Dīkṣita is another commentary on it.

Paṇḍita Lakṣmīnātha Jha of Mithilā, a modern writer, has also published a commentary of his own on the first four sūtra's of the *Bhāmatī*.

That Vācaspati wrote a work called *Brahmasiddhi* which is also lost is not substantiated by any proof; hence, it is difficult to accept the view[1]. *Brahmasiddhi* is a work on Vedānta by Maṇḍana Mishra.

It is held by later writers that Vācaspati held the view of *Avacchedavāda* in Vedānta,[2] while it seems, that some are of opinion that he held *Pratibimbavāda*[3] also, on the authority of the *Bhāmatī* itself. All this will be discussed in the chapter on the Śaṅkara-Vedānta.

Avacchedavāda and Pratibimbavāda

It is peculiar to note about Vācaspati that though he has commented upon various texts of different schools from different angles of vision, yet he does not appear to be attached to any particular school. But it may be said that, like great thinkers, he had genuine love towards the Advaita of Śaṅkara. It may also be said that in each one of his commentaries his great erudition in Nyāya is quite evident and it is also a fact that unless one has studied Nyāya, it is not possible to enter into the intricacies of Darśana.

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[1] *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III, p. 102.

[2] ajñānaviṣayīkṛtaṁ caitanyamīśvaraḥ/ ajñānāśrayībhūtaṁ ca jīvaḥ iti Vācaspati Mishrāḥ/asmin pakṣe ajñānanānātvāt jīvanānātvam/pratijīvañca prapañcabhedaḥ/jīvasyaiva svājñānopahitatayā jagadupādānatvāt /pratyabhijñā cāpi sādṛśyāt/ īśvarasya ca saprapañcajīvāvidyādhiṣṭhānatvena kāraṇatvopacāráditi/ ayameva ca *avacchedavādaḥ-Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 227—232. Chaukhamba edition, Banaras.

[3] See *Bhāmatī* on I. iv 22; and the *Kalpataru* on II. i. 33. The question will be discussed in detail in the Śaṅkara Vedānta chapter.

31. VITTOKA

(9th century A.D.)

Ratnakīrti mentions the view of one Āstika Naiyāyika, named Vittoka, in connection with Īśvarasiddhi in his *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*[1]. There is a long passage attributed, as it seems, to Vittoka. Though it is for the first time that we have come across his name, yet from the nature of the quotation and the importance given to his view by Ratnakīrti, it seems that Vittoka wrote some treatise on Nyāya directly, or wrote a commentary on the *Sūtra*, or the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. While quoting the opinion of Vittoka, Ratnakīrti refers to him later than Vācaspati and so he may be placed after Vācaspati I.

Vittoka is a peculiar name, like Umveka, or Uvveka for Maṇḍana Mishra. Either this is a pseudoname of some author in which case, he may be a Maithila, or he might have been a Kāshmīrī where such names were very common and which was a centre of Nyāyaśāstra between the 7th and the 9th centuries.

32. VIŚVARŪPA

(800—825 A. D.)

Discussing the *Punarukta* (repetition) type of clincher, Varadarāja Miśra, the author of the *Tārkikarakṣā*, mentions the name of one Viśvarūpa. He says that according to Viśvarūpa and others that repetition which is used only in the 'niyama-kathā', that is, in the controversy (kathā) where there is 'niyama', is a case of clincher and not in any other place.[2]

Viśvarūpa's interpretation of nigrahasthāna

Again, according to Viśvarūpa as to why *repetition of words* has been separately mentioned is to show that even in the *repetition of idea*, the same word should not be repeated. In this 'niyamakathā' even the repetition of mere words is a case of clincher.[3]

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[1] p. 47.

[2] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 347.

[3] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 347. Pandit edition.

Lastly, Varadarāja referring to his view in connection with the 'paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa' (overlooking the censurable) type of clincher, says that Viśvarūpa holds that the fallacious argument was used to know the power of argumentation of the opponent and even then if the dull witted party could not found out the fallacy, then the 'vādī' himself should point out that fallacy. If however, both the parties were silent then the victory is achieved by the Pariṣad itself. This is the view which is attributed to Viśvarūpa and Jayanta by Mallinātha in his commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā*. This is all that we know about the views of Viśvarūpa on the topics of Nyāya. As the above mentioned views refer to the details of the 'nigrahasthāna' as used in the Nyāyaśāstra, it may be presumed that Viśvarūpa also might have written a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*.

Aagin, Durveka of the 10th century, in his commentary on the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara, has also referred to the view of Viśvarūpa[1]. He says—

'yadapi Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā-Vārtikayor-Viśvarūpa-Uddyotakarau-āhatuḥ.' This is followed by a quota-—tion 'purā viṣayanirūpaṇapūrvakameva hi karaṇa-vyāpāraṇaṁ dṛṣṭam/karaṇañca sādhanaṁ vyāpārayita-vyaṁ/ato viṣayanirūpaṇaṁ sādhyavacanena kriyate, anyathā karaṇapravarttanasyāśakyatvāditi'.

Translation—In the beginning the activity of the 'karaṇa' has been seen along with the mention of the object (viṣayanirūpaṇapūrvaka). Karaṇa is the sādhana (means to achieve the end) and it has to be pushed to function, so that mention of the object is made through the mention of the 'sādhya' (object to be established), otherwise, it would not have been possible to make the karaṇa function.

These lines are not found in the present editions of the *Nyāyavārtika* as the editor of the book has said.[3] So I conclude that it must be a quotation from the *Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā* written by Viśvarūpa.

Varadarāja has always mentioned the name of Viśvarūpa along with that of Jayanta and has placed him earlier. This suggests that Viśvarūpa lived earlier than Jayanta. We do not know anything more about this Viśvarūpa as an author of some Nyāya work.

[1] p. 175. [2]. p. 175. [3]. Foot-note, p. 175.

But we know that there was a Viśvarūpa who had written a commentary called *Bālakrīḍā* on the *Yājña-valkyasmṛti*. On this commentary there is a sub-commentary called *Vibhāvanā*, by a venerable ascetic known as Vedātman. In this commentary Vedātman makes an obeisance to Viśvarūpa who is identified with Bhavabhūti, who is again, identified with Sureśvarācārya, the first disciple of Śaṅkarācārya—

Viśvarūpa author of the *Bālakrīḍā* on the *Yājñavalkya-Smṛti*

yatprasādādayaṁ loko dharmamārgasthitaḥ sukhī /
bhavabhūtisureśākhyaṁ viśvarūpaṁ praṇamya taṁ //

Further, we find Mādhavācārya quoting a line in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgrahe*[1] from Viśva-rūpācārya which is found in the *Bṛha-dāraṇyakavārtika* of Sureśvarācārya[2].

Bhavabhūti, Viśva-rūpa and Sureśvara identified

The lines are—

'adhyāsasyāhamiti maneti cākāradvayaṁ snehatār-atamyādupapadyate/ tattāratamyañca 'tadetad preyaḥ putrād' ityasyāḥ śrutervyākhyānāvasare Viśvarūpā-cāryairdarśitaṁ—

vittāt putraḥ priyaḥ putrāt piṇḍaḥ piṇḍāt tathendriyaṁ/
indriyebhyaḥ priyaḥ prāṇa praṇādātmā paraḥ priyaḥ//

From this there remains no doubt about the identity of Viśvarūpa and Sureśvarācārya. Again, some scholars also hold opinion about the identity of Sureś-vara with Maṇ ana who has again, been identified with Bhavabhūti who has been also identified with Umbeka by Pratyagrūpa Bhagavan in his commentary, called *Nayanaprasādinī*, on the *Tattvapradīpikā* by Citsukhā-cārya[3]. From all these, it may be asserted that Viśva-rūpa, Sureśvara, Bhavabhūti and Umbeka are all identical. If so, we can easily place Viśvarūpa in the beginning of the 9th century A. D.[4] Mm. P. V. Kane, however, holds that "the mutual relations of Sureś-vara, Bhavabhūti, Umbeka and Maṇḍana are a great

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[1] p. 92. Vizianagram edition. [2] I. iv.

[3] Vide—Page 265, Nirnayasagar edition.

[4] Vide—Introduction to the *Bālakrīḍā* by Mm. T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī, pp. ii-iii, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series edition.

puzzle... Maṇḍana's literary activity lies between 690—710, that of Umbeka between 700—730 and Sureśvara's between 810—840 A.D. and that Umbeka and Bhavabhūti are identical, but that Maṇḍana and Sureśvara are separated by about 100 years"[1]. He also says that "It may therefore be held as fairly established that Viśvarūpa and Sureśvara are identical.[2]" That Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa belonged to the maithila tradition is supported by the latter's using the compound word 'tilakasvāminaṁ' in his *Bālakrīḍā*[3].

33. JAYANTA BHAṬṬA

(9th century A.D.)

Next we come to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa an āstika Naiyāyika of great learning and wide reputation. He has been referred to by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the celebrated author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, as the *Jarannaiyāyika* (the hoary Naiyāyika) with great respect[4]. This is the earliest reference to Jayanta. Gaṅgeśa has referred to the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* whose author Vallabha is known to have flourished in the 12th century. Hence, we may place Gaṅgeśa in the 13th century A.D. Thus, Jayanta must have lived long before the 13th century in order to be referred to as the *Jarannaiyāyika* by Gaṅgeśa. Jayanta quotes from the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti in several places[5]. Then again, Jayanta refers to Vācaspati Mishra I as Ācārya—'tadapi parihṛtamācāryaiḥ jātaḥ sambaddhaścetyekaḥ kāla iti vadadbhiḥ[6].' But Mm. Kaviraj does not agree with this[7]. So he must be placed between Vācaspati and Gaṅgeśa.

Reference to Jayanta

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[1] *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I. p. 263.

[2] *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I. p. 362.

[3] p. 1.

[4] Upamānakhaṇḍa, P. 61, Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[5] pp. 639, 646-47, 650.

[6] *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 312; Vide *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 385 on *NS.* II i. 32.

[7] Vide *SBS.*, Vol. III; p. 104.

Jayanta was a Kashmīrī and followed the traditions of Bhāsarvajña. Amongst the Buddhist logicians Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti have been great scholars and have attacked the Āstika logicians. They have criticised Akṣapāda, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and many others. But it is very strange that Jayanta, who did not spare the Buddhists, has not been even mentioned once by Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti. Either they remained ignorant of Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* where Buddhists have been vehemently criticised, or Jayanta might have flourished and written his works after them. In the latter case, Jayanta will have to be placed sometime after the second quarter of the 11th century A.D., that is, after Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti[1]. This is not possible. If we assume that both Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti were unable to get hold of the views or the work of Jayanta, then we may place him even in the 9th century A.D. just after Vācaspati Mishra I, as has been held by Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj[2].

Jayanta's date

As regards his personal history, we may point out that his son Abhinanda, the author of the *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, writes that his 6th ancestor, named Śakti had emigrated from Gauḍa (used for a large part of northern India, and not only for Bengal) and settled in Dārvābhisāra, located in the frontiers of Kashmīr[3]. The village of Gauramūlaka was obtained by Jayanta's grandfather Kalyāṇa Svāmin in consequence of his having performed a 'Sāṅgrahaṇī' sacrifice.[4]

Personal History

In one place, Jayanta mentions the name of a king named Śa karavarman who was a 'dharmatattvajña'

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[1] Vide *Journal Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol, II. pt. IV. p. 356.

[2] Vide *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III, pp. 103-10 ; *Introduction* to the *Nyāyakalikā*, pp. 1-3.

[3] Vide—Introduction to the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 1.

[4] tathā hyasmat-Pitāmaha eva grāmakāmaḥ Sāṅgrahaṇī kṛtavān sa iṣṭisamāptisamanantarameva Gauramūlakaṁ grāmamavāpa-*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 274, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series edition.

and had suppressed the *Nilāmbaravrata*, most probably a Jaina-vrata. From the context it seems that Śaṅkaravarman was a Jaina king—

amitaikapaṭanivītāniyatastrīpuṁsavihitabahuceṣṭam
nīlāmbaravratamidaṁ kila kalpitamāsīdviṭaiḥ kaśicit//
tadapūrvamiti viditvā nivārayāmāsa dharmatattvajñaḥ
rājā Śaṅkaravarmā na punarjainādimatamevaṁ//[1]

As has been also guessed by Col. Jacob[2] and accepted by Mm. Dr. Kaviraj[3], his ancestor Śakti was a minister of king Muktāpīḍa *alias* Lalitāditya of the Karkoṭaka family. Jayanta's father was Candra (sūnurvyāptadigantarasya yaśasā candrasya candratviṣā).[4]

Jayanta is not his original name. He himself says that he became known as 'Jayanta' due to the fact that he obtained victory over his opponents in every controversy—

vādeṣvāptajayo Jayanta iti yaḥ khyātah satāmagraṇīranvartho Nava-Vṛttikāra iti yaṁ śaṁsanti nāmnā budhāḥ /[5].

That he had controversies with opponents or that his views became subject to discussions even after him is clear from the following lines spoken about him—

yasyāṁ śaktisaṁsiddhau majjati-Udayanadvipaḥ/
jayanta hanta kā tatra gaṇanā tvayi kīṭake//

His being called a 'Navavṛttikāra' (a new commentator) indicates that there must have been a *Vṛtti* type of commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* even prior to the *Nyāyamañjarī*[6] to which Vācaspati also refers and that he was held as the foremost amongst the scholars of the period is clear from his own words—anvartho navavṛttikāra iti yaṁ śaṁsanti nāmnā budhāḥ[7].

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 271.

[2] *JRAS*, 1911, p. 511.

[3] *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III. p. 106.

[4] End of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

[5] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 659.

[6] End of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 659; *Tātparyaṭīkā* p. 326.

[7] End of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 659.

Jayanta himself, though very polite and humble in his attitude, speaks highly of his *Nyāyamañjarī* in the following verses—

nyāyauṣadhivanebhyo'yamāhṛtaḥ paramo rasaḥ /
idamānvīkṣikīkṣīrānnavanītamivoddhṛtam //

kuto vā nūtanaṁ vastu vayamutprekṣituṁ kṣamāḥ /
vacovinyāsavaicitryamātramatra vicāryatām //

tairaiva kusumaiḥ pūrvamasakṛtkṛtaśekharāḥ /
apūrvaracane dāmni dadhatyeva kutūhalam //[1]

Translation—This (treatise) is the most tasteful juice taken out of the forests of Science of Reasoning, like herbs, or it is like the fresh butter taken out of the Science of Reasoning, like milk.

He adds that how is it possible for persons like him to think of new themes or thoughts? So one should expect here only a strange type of peculiar expressions. Though out of the same flowers many a time garlands worn on the head had been stringed together before, yet when they were again, stringed together in a peculiar form of garland, they assumed a charming appearance.

It seems that his efforts were not very much appreciated by his own people. So he says—

asaṅkhyairapi nātmīyairalpairapi parasthitaiḥ /
guṇaiḥ santaḥ prahṛṣyanti citrameṣāṁ viceṣṭitam //[2]

Translation—It is strange that good people are not pleased with innumerable qualities of their own, but are very much satisfied with a very few of those *qualities when possessed by others.*

There are certain interesting and important facts which we can pick up from this book. This is a common practice to name the *Ṛgveda* first, but Jayanta starts with the *Atharvaveda*. He gives first place to it.[3] Is it the influence of Kāshmīr?[4] He says that all the śāstras aim at the achievement of the (parama) 'puruṣārtha', namely, 'mokṣa' and have no individual aim to achieve (sarvo hi śāstrārthaḥ puruṣārthaparyavasāyī, na svarūpaniṣṭha iti)[5].

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[1] Beginning verses of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 1.

[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 2. [3] *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 253-55.

[4] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 2. [5] *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 2-3.

The style of the *Nyāyamañjarī* deserves our notice. It seems it has been influenced by the writings of the great Vācaspati Mishra. It is so very humorous and yet very piercing or biting, particularly for the Cārvākas, Ārhatas and Bauddhas and also for the Mīmāṁsakas. He never spares his opponents even in *vāk-cāturya*. He is very rigid in his own position as a Naiyāyika and it is therefore, that he has said in asserting the existence of Īśvara—

Characteristics of Jayanta's writings

ye tvīśvaraṁ nirapavādadṛḍhapramāṇa-
siddhasvarūpamapi nābhyupayanti mūḍhāḥ/
pāpāya taiḥ saha kathā'pi vitanyamānā
jāyeta nūnamiti yuktamato virantum//[1]

Again, he says[2]—

bho bhagavantaḥ sabhyāḥ kvedaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ kva vā śrutaṁ loke/
yadvākyeṣu padānāṁ racanā naisargikī bhavati//
yadi svābhāvikī Vede padānāṁ racanā bhavet/
paṭe hi hanta tantūnāṁ kathaṁ naisargikī na sā//

'Śanno devīrabhiṣṭaye', 'nārāyaṇaṁ namaskṛtya', 'astyuttarasyāṁ diśi devatātmā', iti tulye racanātve kvacit kartṛpūrvakatvamaparatra tadviparyaya iti mahān vyāmohaḥ/evaṁ dhūmo'pi kaścidagnimān kaścidanagnika ityapi syāt/kimidānīṁ Kumārasambhavatulyo'sau Vedaḥ sampannaḥ/aho sarvāstikadhuryeṇa Vedaprāmāṇyaṁ sādhitaṁ Naiyāyikena/alamupahāsena racanāmātrameva tulyaṁ Vedasya Kumārasambhavena nānyat/na ceyatopahasituṁ yuktam/

Again, speaking about the composition of the *Veda* by some extra-ordinary (vilakṣaṇa) Being, called Īśvara, he says[3]—

tenādhyetṛgaṇāḥ sarve rūpād-Vedamakṛtrimam/
manyante eva loke tu pītaṁ Mīmāṁsakairyaśaḥ //
vedā na paṭhitā yaistu tvādṛśaiḥ kuṇṭhabuddhibhiḥ/
kāryatvaṁ bruvate te'sya racanāsāmyamohitāḥ//

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 204. [2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 235.

[3] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 236.

To this Jayanta says—'ucyate—Mīmāṁsakā yaśaḥ pibantu, payo vā pibantu, buddhijāḍyāpanayanāya Brāhmīghṛtam vā pibantu, Vedastu puruṣapraṇīta eva nātra bhrāntiḥ/

Veda is pauruṣeya

From all these above quoted extracts it is clear that Jayanta is very lucid and humorous and at the same time very reasonable in his expressions. He is always aware of his position as a Naiyāyika though he comes from the family of 'Yājñikas' and himself has full faith in the performance of sacrifices, yet he never spares the Mīmāṁsakas. That Jayanta is very well read in Kāvya and Sāhitya is clear from his charming and eloquent flow of the literary style even in the work on Nyāya. So it has been well said by his son Abhinanda in his *Kādambarīkathāsāra*—

sarasāḥ sadalaṅkārāḥ prasādamadhurā giraḥ/
kāntāḥ tāta-Jayantasya jayanti jagatāṁ guroḥ//

Translation—The speech of my father Jayanta, the teacher of the world, pregnant with sentiments, full of alaṅkāras, perspicuity, charm and sweetness, flourishes.

His works

He has written another smaller work on Nyāya, called *Nyāyakalikā*, where he has explained only the first sūtra of the *Nyāyasūtra*. It is clear from the very title of these two works–*Kalikā* and *Mañjarī* how sentimental (sarasa) Jayanta. is These two names also suggest that the *Kalikā*, meaning bud, is the smaller work which has fully blossomed in the form of *Mañjarī*. So has been said by Jayanta himself—

ajātarasaniṣyanda manobhivyaktasaurabhaṁ/
nyāyasya kalikāmātraṁ Jayantaḥ paryadīdṛśat //[1]

He was a staunch Śaiva

Jayanta is mainly a Śaiva. He has offered salutations to Śiva in the beginning of both of his works and also at the end of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.[2] Even in the body of the *Mañjarī* there are sufficient proofs to show that Śiva was his most favourite god. This is per-

[1] End of the *Nyāyakalikā*, p. 27.

[2] p. 659.

haps due to his being a Kāshmīirī, but there is no indication to prove that he belonged to any of the schools of the Kashmīr Śaivaism. It may also be due to the fact that Śiva has been the most favourite deity of the Naiyāyikas, or as a matter of fact, of all those who seek final emancipation through *Jñāna*. He holds that in Īśvara there is eternal Bliss (nityānandātmake Śive)[1] and also eternal and pure jñāna (nityanirmalajñānavatīśvare).[2] He further, says that all the qualities of Īśvara are eternal like his jñāna as these do not depend upon the contact of manas for their production. He perceives everything at all times, so there is no smṛti, nor any inferential knowledge for him. He has also eternal happiness like eternal bliss. In all, Jayanta says that there are five qualities, namely, jñāna, sukha, icchā (desire), prayatna (effort) and dharma, in Īśvara, while there are nine in the Ātman, though Īśvara is not different from the Ātman and is not a separate and independent category. He identifies his Īśvara with that of the *Yogasūtra*[3] and hence, quotes Patañjali in his support.[4]

His conception of Īśvara

Only two works, namely, *Nyāyakalikā* and *Nyāyamañjarī*, are found to have been written by him. The *Kalikā*, as has been already said, is a very brief explanatory commentary on the first sūtra of the *Nyāyasūtra* of Akṣapāda. It has been published in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Text Series*, while the other, that is, the *Nyāyamañjarī* is a very independent, elaborate and lucid commentary on the *lakṣaṇasūtras* of Nyāya-Darśana alone, so has been said by the author himself— 'asmābbistu lakṣaṇasūtrāṇyeva vyākhyāsyante'[5]. The whole book is divided into 12 Āhnikas. It has been published in the *Vizianagram Sanskrit Series* and also in the *Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series*.

Publication of his works

There are references to Dharmakīrti where Jayanta quotes the first verse of the *Vādanyāya*;[6] to Bāṇa,[7]

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[1] *Mañjarī*, p. 200. [2] *Mañjarī*, p. 200
[3] I. 24. [4] *Mañjarī*, p. 201.
[5] p. 12. [6] pp. 639, 646, 647, 650. [7] p. 236.

Vārttikakāra and his *Ślokavārttika* and Bhartṛhari.[1]

References to authors and works

Besides, there is a reference to one Rājā[2]—'yattu, Rājā vyākhyātavān' in connection with the explanation of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*[3] on Pratyakṣa. We do not know yet of this author, but it is certain that he was a Sāṅkhya teacher and had commented on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Can the *Rājavārtika* quoted by Vācaspati in his *Tattvakaumudī* under kārikā 72 be taken to be his work? This is also to be noted that though Jayanta has criticised the Buddhists very often, yet he has admitted that they were great thinkers and logicians—'Bauddhastu yadyapi anumānamārgāvagāhananaipuṇābhimānoddhurāṁ kandharāmudvahanti' etc.[4]

There is a commentary on the *Nyāyamañjarī* by some Jaina scholar, the manuscript of which is in some Jaina Bhaṇḍāra. The manuscript, as far as I remember, is incomplete.

34. ADHYAYANA

(9th century A. D.)

It is for the first time that we have come accross the name of Adhyayana as the author of a commentary, called the *Ruciṭīkā*. Though it is not very clear, yet from the context it may be assumed that Adhyayana also might have written a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* to which he had given the name *Ruciṭīkā*. A quotation from it is—

Adhyayanaḥ punā ruciṭīkāyāmidamavocat—

dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo nirdeśaḥ kriyate śroturāśvāsanārtham/na tvādau dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo nirdeśo yuktaḥ/ ayuktatā tasya pratipattāvadṛṣṭatvāt/tatra pradeśamātramupalabhate, tatsthaṁ ca dharmaṁ/tatovinābhāvaṁ smarati/tadanantaraṁ tadevedamiti parāmṛśati/ tato viśiṣṭatāṁ pradeśasya pratipadyate, na tvādāveva/parāmarśasya ca svārthapūrvakatvaṁ/ na ca svārthe dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo darśanamasti/ tena parapratipattāvapi na kāryaṁ / ādau tu kriyate, pratipādyasyāsthotpādanārthamiti //

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[1] p. 120. [2] p. 109. [3] Kārikā 5.

[4] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 4.

Translation—(While dealing with the mention of *Pakṣa* (major term) "Adhyayana has said in the *Ruciṭīkā*)—For giving consolation to the audience (śrotā), dharmin (subject) qualified with dharma (attributes) is mentioned. It is not proper to mention dharmin qualified with dharma in the beginning. Its impropriety is not found in its cognition (pratipatti). 'Pradeśa' alone is found there to which a dharma is attributed. Then comes the remembrance of the concomitance followed by the notion 'it is that only'. Then the excellence of 'pradeśa' is cognized and not in the very beginning. 'Parāmarśa' is preceded by 'svārtha' (for its own sake); and in 'svārtha', dharmin qualified by a dharma is not seen. So it should not be assumed even for other's sake. It is assumed in the beginning only in order to establish confidence in the object to be established".

This view of Adhyayana has been refuted by Durveka very tauntingly.[1] Nothing more about this author is known so far.

35. AŚOKA PAṆḌITA

(900 A.D.)

After Adhyayana we may mention the name of Aśoka Paṇḍita who may be placed in about 900 A.D. He was awarded the title of 'Paṇḍita' from the Vikramaśilā University. We have already noticed two of his well-known works on logic,[2] namely, *Avayavinirākaraṇa* and *Sāmānyadūṣaṇadikprasāritā* both of which have been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series* under the name *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*[3]. Both the topics of *Avayavin* and *Sāmānya* are very old problems upon which the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas have been exchanging their views. According to Naiyāyikas a composite (avayavin) is absolutely different from its constitu-

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[1] *Dharmottarapradīpa*, pp. 175-76.

[2] *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. page 488.

[3] pp. 78—102.

ents and their relation as whole and parts is an eternal relation called 'samavāya'. The Buddhists, on the other hand, do not believe in this and hold that a composite is nothing but a collocation of the constituents and as such, their relation is also a mere imagination (paramāṇava eva hi pararūpadeśaparihāreṇa utpannāḥ parasparasahitā avabhāsamānā deśavitānavanto bhāsante)[1]. According to Aśoka Paṇḍita Paramāṇus are produced by avoiding other forms and other space, that is, they have their own individual form. But when they combine together, they assume gross character and appear to occupy a space.

Criticism of Avayavin

As Aśoka Paṇḍita refers to Bhadanta Dharmottara in this treatise[2] he must have lived after the 8th century and may be placed sometime in the 9th century. At the end of this treatise he says that he has removed the thorns in the form of objections against Buddhists and has made the line of thinking, as laid down by the Ācārya, free from all objections[3].

Aśoka Paṇḍita lived in the 9th century.

The second treatise is also equally important as it deals with a very important problem, namely, 'generality' (sāmānya). According to Naiyāyikas, a generality is eternal, one and is the cause of a common idea present in all similar objects. This the Buddhists do not believe in. Aśoka Paṇḍita, like so many other Buddhist logicians, refute this 'sāmānya.' He holds that it is due to resemblance that a common idea is perceived. It is not one and perceptible. All this is mere wrongly apprehended through resemblance.

Sāmānya criticised

36. PAṆḌITA JETĀRI OR JITĀRI

(940—80 A.D.)

Next, we come to Paṇḍita Jetāri or Jitāri. We have already mentioned his works[4]. He got the title of 'Paṇḍita' from the Vikramaśilā University from king Mahāpāla who reigned up to 940 A.D. He taught

Pandita Jitāri lived in the 10th century.

[1] p. 79. [2] P. 82. [3] P. 93.

[4] *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1. p. 488.

Dīpaṅkara who was born in 980 A.D. Durveka Mishra, the author of the *Dharmottarapradīpa*, a commentary on the commentary of Dharmottara on the *Nyāyabindu* was also his disciple.[1] Jitāri is quoted by Ratnakīrti in his *Sarvajñasiddhi*[2] and *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇaṁ*[3] Hence, he must have lived towards the end of the 10th century A.D. or in the beginning of the 11th century A.D. His *Hetutattvopadeśa* has been published both in Sanskrit and Tibetan, with an Introduction and notes by Professor Durgacharan Chattopadhyaya, M.A. from the University of Calcutta. The work is influenced by the writings of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. But he follows more closely the latter. So he gives his definition of Pratyakṣa as found in Dharmakīrti–'pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaṁ'[4] and says further that Pratyakṣa is 'nāmajātyādikalpanāpoḍhaṁ nirvikalpaṁ', which clearly shows that Jitāri has accepted a portion of the definition of Diṅnāga as 'pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍhaṁ' (nāmajātyādyasaṁyutaṁ) and has added to it the term 'abhrāntaṁ' from Dharmakīrti. He holds that the 'nāmavikalpa' such as the cognition in the form of—this is *Devadatta*,' jātivikalpa,' as the apprehension of *this is cow* and 'viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇavikalpa,' as *this is a red lotus* and similar other forms of determinate cognitions are all instances of the fallacy of Pratyakṣa (pratyakṣābhāsa).[5]

Analysis of his Hetutattvopadeśa

Pratyakṣa defined.

He believes in three types of Pratyakṣa: 'cognition'-produced by sense-organs for the worldly usage; 'svasamvedana' (cognition, within one's ownself, of all cittas and caittas, or as if, they are one's own—sarvacittacaittānāmātmasaṁvedanaṁ) and 'yogijñānaṁ'. Here also, he omits the fourth 'manovijñānaṁ' which has been accepted by Dharmakīrti as the fourth type.[6]

Three types of Pratyakṣa

[1] Vide-'Gurorjitāreḥ'—*Dharmottarapradīpa*, pp. 149, 257.

[2] gage 28.

[3] p. 94.

[4] p. 20.

[5] page 20.

[6] page 21.

Fifty kinds of fallacy

He has dealt with fifty kinds of fallacy: *pakṣābhāsas* eight, *hetvābhāsas* twentyfour and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* eighteen. Speaking about the three forms of Inference (anumāna), namely, Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, as accepted by the Naiyāyikas, he holds that these are fallacious (anumānābhāsas), because of the absense of 'vyāpti' between hetu (probans) and phala (probandum), based on the relation of identity and 'tadutpatti' (teṣām tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇena pratibandhābhāvāt).[1]

Denies the three types of Inference

Ratnakīrti refers to his another work named—*Vedāprāmāṇyaṁ*[2] wherein Paṇḍita Jitāri has shown that whatever is proved to be free from all defects should be accepted by wisemen.

37. DURVEKA MISHRA

(10th century A.D.)

Through the devotion of Shrī Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana to discover the hidden treasures of Buddhist thought we have been able to get several unknown contributions of Buddhist scholars to the Science of Reasoning from Tibet. Amongst these works, the *Darmottarapradīpa*, a sub-commentary on the commentary of Dharmottara on the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti, by Paṇḍita Durveka Mishra finds a very important place. It has been recently edited by Śrī Dalsukhbhai Malvania of the Banaras Hindu University and published by the *K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute*, Patna. From a study of this edition of the book we have come to know of its author Paṇḍita Durveka Mishra. No other reference of this author has been traced so far.

At the end of this work, Durveka Mishra says—

gurorjitāreradyigamya dhīdhanaṁ mayā hi ṭīkā vivṛtā paṭīyasī/
kutūhalenāpi tadatra yujyate nirīkṣaṇaṁ sādhu vivecakānām//

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[1] p. 22. [2] Vide—*Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇaṁ*, page 94.

From this and also from the colophon of the second pariccheda 'Paṇḍita-Jitāri-śiṣya-Durvekamishra-viracita-Dharmottaranibandhasya dvitīyaḥ paricchedaḥ,' we learn that Durveka was the disciple of Paṇḍita Jitāri of the end of the 10th century. So Durveka also can be easily placed about the same time.

Personal history

From another verse of his at the end of his commentary—

imaṁ nibandhaṁ vidhivadvidhāya mayā hyavāptaṁ sukṛtaṁ kathañcit/

it may be suggested that he had most probably the line of Vācaspati Mishra I.

yadalambhi kimapi puṇyaṁ dustarakunibandhapaṅkamagnānām/

Śrīgotamasugavīnāmatijaratīnāṁ samuddharaṇāt[1] in his mind, so he should have been fully acquainted with his works. But it is strange that he has made no reference to Vācaspati or his works. He knows however, Vācaspati's Vidyāguru Trilocana[2]. Again, in giving an instance of *siddhi* he says-'yathā odanasya siddhiḥ' which suggests his being acquainted with the cooking of rice[3]. Again, his use of a very common expression of Maithila Naiyāyikas-'kiṁ naścchinnaṁ' also suggests the probability of his being a Maithila scholar. This is further supported by his surname 'miśra' which he has retained even though he has commented upon a Buddhist work and was a disciple of Jitāri, a Buddhist scholar. His lucid explanation of the method of performing 'maṅgalācaraṇa' also tends towards his being a Brāhmaṇa by birth. From all these facts taken together one may conclude that he was also a Maithila Brāhmaṇa.

We also learn from a verse of his given in his *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*[4]—

dāridryaduḥkhādabhiyogamātrād viśuddhabuddhervirahādabodhāt/

nāstīha sūktam mama yat punaḥ syāt gurorjitāreḥ sa khalu prasādaḥ //

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[1] End of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. [2] p. 173. [3] p. 31. [4] p. 441.

that he was a poor Brāhmaṇa, which might have been also the cause of his going away to the Buddhist camp for studies. Nothing more about his personal history can be gathered from his works.

His works

He has mentioned the following works of his in the *Dharmottarapradīpa* - *Viśeṣākhyāna*,[1] *Arcaṭāloka* (Arcaṭanibandhanam, which Durveka had promised to write later),[2] and *Svayūthyavicāra*.[3] Besides, he had also composed the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* and the *Catuḥśatī* which he has mentioned in his commentary on the *Hetubinduṭīkāloka*.

References to authors and works

The *Dharmottara pradīpa* is a very lucid work. It is very rare to find philosophical texts written in such an easy style. The author explains even ordinary words very clearly. It is very informative and gives references to the following works and authors: *Abhidharmakośa*,[4] *Arcaṭāloka*,[5] *Kāvyālaṅkāra*[6] and its *Vṛtti*,[7] *Nyāyabindu*,[8] *Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā* by Trilocana,[9] *Nyayabhāṣyaṭīkā* by Viśvarūpa,[10] *Prakīrṇavṛtti*,[11] *Pramāṇavārtika*,[12] *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā*,[13] *Bhaṭṭārcaṭanibandhana*,[14] *Ruciṭīkā* by Adhyayana,[15] *Viniścaya* and its *Ṭīkā*,[16] *Viśeṣākhyāna*,[17] *Ślokavārtika*,[18] *Svayūthyavicāra*,[19] and *Hetubindu*[20].

Amongst the authors mentioned therein, the more important are given below: Aṁśasaṁvādavādī,[21] Akalaṅka,[22] Adhyayana,[23] Ahrīka,[24] Īśvarasena,[25] Uddyotakara.[26] Kumārila,[27] Gauḍa-Kāśmira,[28] Cirantanavaiśeṣika,[29] Jalpamahodadhi,[30] Jitāri,[31] and Trilocana[32] (the Vidyāguru of Vācaspati Mishra I). He has also

[1] pp. 83,205. [2] p. 90. [3] p. 224.
[4] pp. 59, 62. [5] p. 90. [6] p. 6.
[7] p. 6. [8] p. 257. [9] p. 173.
[10] p. 175. [11] p. 35.
[12] pp. 12, 35, 68, 124. [13] p. 24. [14] pp. 75, 90.
[15] p. 175. [16] pp. 44, 67, 68, 91, 97, 98; 333, 41, 70, 72, 73.
[17] pp. 83, 205. [18] p. 13. [19] p. 224. [20] pp. 59, 75.
[21] pp. 35, 45. [22] p. 246. [23] p. 175. [24] pp. 35, 246.
[25] pp. 103, 108. [26] pp. 42, 54, 175, 183, 222.
[27] p. 108. [28] p. 175. [29] p. 35.
[30] pp. 128, 205. [31] pp. 1, 25, 49. [32] p. 173.

referred to Vinītadeva[1], Viśvarūpa[2] about whom Durveka Mishra says that he had written a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* from which he also quotes a few lines. He also refers to Śaṅkarācārya[3] and Śāntabhadra, a Buddhist scholar[4].

Nothing more is known about him so far.

38-39. JNĀÑAŚRĪMITRA AND RATNAKRĪTI

(11th century A.D.)

Next, we pass on to a period which seems to be somewhat dark and our knowledge of that period is not yet fully conclusive. But the researches of our scholars have shown that before we come to Udayana, we find two very important names of Buddhist scholars, namely, Jñānaśrīmitra and his pupil Ratnakīrti, who have contributed much to the Science of Reasoning. According to reliable Tibetan evidence, Prof. D. C. Bhattacharya has placed these two authors in the 2nd quarter of the 11th century A.D.[5] About Jñānaśrīmitra we have already dealt with in the first volume. So we now take up the small works of Ratnakīrti here.

Ratnakīrti's treatises examined

We have had some fragmentary works of Ratnakīrti from a pretty long time published under the heading *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts* published in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*. It included only three treatises of Ratnakīrti, namely, *Apohasiddhi*, Two *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhis—Anvayātmikā* and *Vyatirekātmikā*. It is a matter of great satisfaction that Professor Anantalal Thakur has brought out a volume in the *Tibetan Sanskrit works Series* and has named it *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* which contains all the available fragmentary works of Ratnakīrti. It contains—*Sarvajñasiddhi*, *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam*, *Apohasiddhi*, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi-Anvayātmikā* and *Vyatirekātmikā*, *Pramāṇāntarabhāvaprakaraṇaṁ*, *Vyāptinirṇaya*, *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇaṁ*, *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda and Santānāntaradūṣaṇaṁ*. The author-

[1] pp. 5, 31, 34. [2] pp. 175, 247. [3] p. 172.

[4] pp. 5, 31-32, 61, 138, 202.

[5] Vide *JGJRI*, vol. II. Pt. 4, p. 356.

ship of all these ten works belongs to Ratnakīrti. Of these, almost all deal with topics of Nyāya even when the subject matter is not directly concerned with Nyāya, as in the *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*, *Sarvajñasiddhi*, *Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa*, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* and *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*.

In the *Apohasiddhi* the author deals with the imports of words. It establishes that a word denotes something positive (apohanāmā vidhireva vivakṣitatvāt)[1] and at the same time differentiates it from all others[2]. But indirectly, it also deals with certain logical topics. In this work, he quotes from Vācaspati four times, Trilocana, Dharmottara, Kaumārila and Nyāyabhūṣaṇa twice. Nyāyabhūṣaṇa naturally refers to Bhāsarvajña who has written a commentary on his *Nyāyasāra* and has named it *Bhūṣaṇa* and so, he is generally known as Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, or Bhūṣaṇakāra. It is surprising to note that he has not only criticised the āstika scholars, but also the well-known Buddhist scholar Dharmottara who has commentated upon the *Nyāyabindu* and has written several works.[3] He quotes the *Pramāṇavārttika* in his own support.[4]

In the two *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhis*, Ratnakīrti establishes the momentariness of the cosmos by positive and negative methods. In these two works he refers to *Bhāṣya*,[5] *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya* of his Guru,[6] *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*[7] of his own and refutes the views of Trilocana, the Vidyāguru of Vācaspati, Vācaspati, Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, that is, Bhāsarvajña and Śaṅkara.

This Śaṅkara is quite different from the great Śaṅkarācārya. From the various references to him, it seems that Śaṅkara is a well-reputed figure amongst the Naiyāyikas of the old. No book of his is known to exist at present. He is referred to by Jñānaśrī, Ratnakīrti in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, Karṇagomin in his *Pramāṇavārtikavṛttiṭīkā*, Vidyānanda in his *Āptaparīkṣā*, Vādideva or Vādisūri in his *Syādvādaratnākara*,

Śaṅkara a reputed scholar

[1] Page 1. *Bibliotheca Indica* series edition.

[2] nāsmābhirapohaśabdena vidhireva kevalo'bhipretaḥ, nāpyanyavyāvṛttimatram,kintu anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānāmarthaḥ—*Apohasiddhi*, p. 3.

[3] p. 60. [4] pp. 55, 58-59. [5] p. 71. [6] p. 81. [7] p. 84

and by Udayana in his *Prabodhasiddhi*. He is also referred to by Prajñākaragupta of the 7th century[1].

The next treatise included in the *Nibandhāvalī* is the *Sarvajñasiddhi* where the author proves the existence of *Sarvajñatva* of the Buddha. He refers to Kumārila[2], the author of the *Kāśikā*[3], Vācaspati Mishra[4], Trilocana[5], Nyāyabhūṣaṇa[6], Guravaḥ[7], Paṇḍita Jitāri[8], Bhāṭṭa[9], Yogācāra[10], *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*[11], *Kārika*[12], *Nyāyakaṇikā*[13] of Vācaspati, Yogaśāstra[14]. *Nyāyaprakīrṇaka* of Trilocana[15], *Pramāṇavārttika*[16], *Bhāṣya*,[17] *Alaṅkāra*[18] and Bhāṣyakārīya.[19] This is his second work. He refers to this work in his *Sarvajñasiddhi*[20].

Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa is his first treatise. Ratnakīrti criticises in this the arguments of the orthodox logicians advanced to prove the existence of Īsvara. He refuses the views of Naiyāyikādayaḥ[21], Vācaspati[22], Śaṅkara[23], Narasiṁha[24], Trilocana[25], Kāśikākāra[26], Alaṅkārakāra[27], Vittoka[28], Ācāryapādaiḥ[29] whom he quotes in his own support. Amongst the books he has referred to in this treatise, *Nyāyakaṇikā*[30], Saugatādyāgama,[31] *Mīmāṁsā-Vārttika*[32] and *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*[33] may be mentioned.

Next, we come to his *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* which has been referred to by the author himself in his own *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi-Vyatirekātmikā*.[34] As the very name of the treatise shows, the existence of permanence (sthairya) is denied in this treatise and all the proofs of the āstikas are refuted in the light of the fact that the Buddhists are the followers of the Law of Flux. He

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[1] *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, p. 35.

[2] pp. 1, 25. [3] pp. 8, 16, 22. [4] pp. 9, 16, 19. [5] p. 13.

[6] Bhāsarvajña p. 19. [7] Jñānaśrīmitra, p. 24.

[8] p. 28. [9] p. 5. [10] p. 1.

[11] pp. 7, 8, 21-22, 27. [12] *Ślokavārttika*, pp. 6-7, 21-22, 24, 26, 27. [13] p. 9. [14] p. 8. [15] pp. 13, 18.

[16] pp. 11-12, 19. [17] *Pramāṇa*—p. 20.

[18] *Pramāṇavārttika*, p. 23. [19] p. 28. [20] p. 16.

[21] pp. 29, 46-47, 49. [22] pp. 33, 36, 38, 41-43, 46, 48, 50.

[23] pp. 35, 46. [24] p. 35. [25] pp. 36, 42. [26] p. 42. [27] p. 43 whom he quotes in his own support. [28] p. 47. [29] p. 48. [30] pp. 31-33.

[31] p. 35. [32] p. 38,42. [33] p. 38. [34] p. 84.

fers to the views of 'pare'[1] and Śaṅkara as the author : a work called *Sthirasiddhi*[2] and has refuted their ews vehemently. About this Sankara, Ratnakīrti ys—ata evātraprastāve bhuvanaikagurūn bhagavataḥ rtipādānavamanyamānaḥ Śaṅkaraḥ paśorapi paśuriti pāpātramevaiṣa jālmaḥ[3]. Trilocana[4] and Vācaspati[5] so have been refuted and Kīrtipāda and Guravaḥ ive been quoted in his own support.[6] Amongst the orks referred to are *Kārikā*,[7] *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*,[8] his own *pohasiddhi*,[9] *Mahābhāṣyālaṅkāra*.[10]

The next work of Ratnakīrti is the *Citrādvaitapra-iśavāda* where the author establishes unity amidst versity according to Buddhists—'yaṣya yadā yāva-ikāracakrapratibhāsaṁ yadvijāñnam parisphurati sya tadā tāvadākāracakraparikāritaṁ tadvijñānaṁ itrādvaitamiti'.[11] So he says further—'yat prakāśate dekam.'[12]

In this work he refers to a Kārikā of Dharmakīrti—

sahopālambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ/
bhedaśca bhrāntavijñānaiḥ dṛśyetendāvivādvaye//[13]

id to Guravaḥ,[14] Trilocana,[15] Vācaspati,[16] Bhagavān hāṣyakāra,[17] Ācārya Maitreyanāthapāda,[18] Ārya ägārjunapāda,[19] and Ācārya·.[20]

Next, we come to the two treatises on the *Kṣaṇab-ṅgasiddhi*. The author proves the well-known theory f perpetual momentary Flux through positive and egative methods (anvaya and vyatireka). He criti-ses in this work the views of Nyāyabhūṣaṇa,[21] Śaṅ-ara,[22] Trilocana,[23] Vācaspati[24] and supports his own iew by referring to Gurubhiḥ and Guravaḥ,[25] cāryaḥ[26] and Alaṅkāraḥ.[27] He also refers to his own

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[1] Naiyāyikas, p. 104. [2] pp. 108, 114 and 119.
[3] p. 114. [4] pp. 108, 114.
[5] p. 110. [6] pp. 114 and 112 respectively.
[7] p. 105. [8] pp. 105-106. [9] p. 115. [10] p. 120. [11] p. 122.
[12] Page 122. [13] *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Pamāṇavārttika*, p. 122.
[14] Jñānaśrī, pp. 126, 129, 131, 132, 134-35. [15] p. 128.
[16] p. 128. [17] p. 130. [18] p. 132. [19] p. 132. [20] p. 133.
[21] Bhāsarvajña, pp. 67, 79. [22] p. 79. [23] pp. 79, 85.
[24] p 80. [25] p. 81. [26] p. 82. [27] p. 67.

work—*Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* in this treatise[1] and also to a *Bhāṣya*.[2]

Next, we come to his eighth treatise named *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇaṁ*. In this the author establishes that there are really speaking only two means to right knowledge (Pramāṇa), namely, Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, while all other Pramāṇas accepted by the āstikas have been refuted. In doing so the author refers to Cārvāka[3], Gurubhiḥ[4], Ācāryaḥ[5], Kumārila[6], Naiyāyikas[7], Mīmāṁsakas[8], Bhaṭṭa,[9] Paṇḍita Jitāripāda[10] and Rājakulapāda an unknown Buddhist writer.[11] He also refers to some lines of the *Ślokavārttika*[12].

Coming to the *Vyāptinirṇaya*, it is found that Ratnakīrti refutes the definition of vyāpti as 'bhūyo-darśanagamyā' (based on invariable concomitance) and establishes the Buddhist view. In doing so the author refers to the views of the Kāśikākāra[13], Trilocana, Vācaspati and Bhaṭṭaprabhṛtayaḥ[14] and the Mīmāṁsāvārttikakāra.[15]

The last treatise of Ratnakīrti published in the *Nibandhāvalī* is the *Santānāntaradūṣaṇaṁ*. The author refutes in this work the idea of believing in the existence of one continuous permanent entity apart from the Buddhist idea of 'santāna'. Dharmottara, Bhāṣyakāra and Vārttikakāra are the only three persons who are mentioned in this work.[16] *Pravacana*, *Pradīpa*, *Śrīsākārasaṅgraha* of Jñānaśrīmitra are referred to, along with the *Bhedapratibhāsadūṣaṇa*, in support of the Buddhist view[17].

This is all that we have come to know from the small works of Ratnakīrti. He has criticized Śaṅkara, Trilocana, and Vācaspati and similar other orthodox authors. Hence, we can easily place him after Vācaspati I, that is, in the 11th century A. D.

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[1] p. 84. [2] p. 71. [3] p. 89.
[4] p. 89. [5] p. 90. [6] pp. 90, 92.
[7] pp. 90-91, 95-96. [8] pp. 90-91. [9] pp. 91.
[10] p. 94. [11] p. 96. [12] p. 95.
[13] p. 99. [14] pp. 99, 102. [15] p. 100.
[16] pp. 139-42. [17] p. 140.

40. SĀNĀTANI

(10th century A. D.)

The earliest reference to Sānātani found so far is in the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana. We know that the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *Nyāyavārtika* and the *Tātparyaṭīkā* have mentioned that there are three types of *kathā*, which has been explained as an arrangement of several sentences (vākyasand bdhiḥ) dealing with various topics for consideration (vicāraviṣaya) wherein several persons take part, as in a debate.[1] The three types are —vāda (discussion), jalpa (disputation) and vitaṇḍā (wrangling).

Udayana in his *Pariśuddhi*, on the other hand, says that according to the *Prauḍha-Gauḍa-Naiyāyika*[2], *kathā*

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[1] *Nyāsūtrabhāṣya*, I.ii.1.

[2] It is to be pointed out here that the term *Gauḍa* is not necessarily used for the province of Bengal as many scholars think. It is a well-known fact that almost the entire northern India was once called *Gauḍadeśa*. So says the *Śaktisaṅgamatantra*—

Vaṅgadeśaṁ samārabhya bhuvaneśāntagaṁ śive /
'gauḍadeśaḥ samākhyātaḥ sarvavidyāviśāradaiḥ //

Thus, it is clear that 'Gauḍadeśa' extends from Bengal and goes beyond it and it does not include Bengal alone. This is further supported by the fact that the entire country is divided into two main divisions—Gauḍa and Drāviḍa. The Gauḍa consists of five classes of brāhmaṇas, namely—

Sārasvatāḥ kānyakubjāḥ gauḍa-maithila – utkalāḥ
pañca gauḍā iti khyātā vindhyottaranivāsinaḥ //

These alone are known as the five 'Gauḍas'. It needs no comment that Bengal did never include kānyakubja, mithilā and utkala. They were separate states since time immemorial. So it is difficult to say that this 'Prauḍha-Gauḍa-Naiyāyika' was a Bengali, as Bengali scholars have said. This is further supported by the use of the term *pañca-gauḍādhipa* for Rājā Śivasiṁha, the patron of Vidyāpati Ṭhākura by Vidyāpati himself—

janmadātā mora Gaṇapatiṭhākura mithilādeśa karu vāsa /
pañca-gauḍādhipa śivasiṁha bhūpati kṛpā kari lela nija pāsa //

(Vide—Umesha Mishra—Vidyāpatiṭhākura, P. 13, ft. note 2, Hindustani Academy, U. P., Allahabad, third edition)
To me it seems that he was also an inhabitant of Mithilā, for, really speaking, at that time we do not hear of any scholar of Nyāya from nearing states and Maithilas alone had contributed to this system.

is of four types. It must be made clear here that in *kathā*, the aim, directly or indirectly, should be either an enquiry into the truth or attainment of victory over the opponent as has been made clear by Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti*—'tattvánirṇaya-vijayānyatara-svarūpayogyo nyāyānugatavaçanasandarbhaḥ kathā.' The vādin and the prativādin proceed to take part in a debate only with the above mentioned aims. This classification of four types is attributed to Sānātani.[1] Of course, by the way, Udayana mentions that the 'Bāhyas', that is, Buddhists, admit only one kind of kathā, while some accept four and even five types of kathā[2]. The four types of kathā as held by Sānātani are—jalpa, pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno jalpaḥ, vādaḥ and pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vādaḥ.[3] This view along with the views of Ratnakoṣakāra Taraṇi Miśra, Buddhists and others has been rejected by Śaṅkara Miśra and also, later on, by Vācaspati Miśra II in his *Tattvāloka*[4] and *Nyāyaratnaprakāśa*.[5]

Again, Udayana refers to Sānātani under *Nyāyasūtra*, V. i. 1 in his *Pariśuddhi*,[6] while discussing the sense of the whole chapter. According to Sānātani and others (Śānātaniprabhṛtayaḥ) the sense of the entire chapter is 'investigation' or 'verification' (parīkṣā), while others hold that it is 'definition' (uddeśa). Udayana does not agree with the former view. He says—'lakṣaṇamiti brūmaḥ'. Later on, Varddhamāna, in his *Tattvabodha* has supported the view of Sānātani and says—'prācāmidamākūtam'.

Another reference to Sānātani is found in the *Tattvabodha* of Varddhamāna under *Nyāyasūtra*, V. i. 32 while discussing the change in the order of the two

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[1] Vide—prauḍha-Gauḍa-Naiyāyikamate catasraḥ kathāḥ sa pratipaṣkasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍetyatra jalpavad vādasyāpi parāmarśāt puruṣābhiprāyānurodhena caturthodāharaṇasyāpi upapatteriti Sānātaniḥ—*Pariśuddhi*—*pp*. 779-80.

[2] *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* of Jayarāma, p. 54. Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts Series, Varanasi.

[3] *Vādivinoda* of Śaṅkara Miśra, p. 2.

[4] fol. 82a.

[5] fol. 95b. taken from the *History of Navyanyāya*, p. 19.

[6] P. 1157, ms. with the author.

fallacies 'nityasama' and 'anityasama' by the sūtrakāra himself. It is really a question whether the Sūtrakāra himself changed the order or the Bhāṣyakāra. Varddhamān on the authority of the old writers, like Sānātani and others, holds that it was the Sūtrakāra himself who made this change—(atha bhāṣya-kārasyaivāyam kramaviparyayo·na tu sūtrakārasya ityeva kiṁ na syāt? maivaṁ, sūtrakārasyaivāyaṁ kramaviparyāsa iti pūrvācāryaih sānātaniprabhṛtibhirapyabhidhānāt)[1].

From all these references it is clear that Sānātani was a reputed scholar of Mithilā who must have written on the *Nyāyasūtra* or the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. As he is referred to by Udayana and Śaṅkara Miśra and others, he cannot be later than Udayana. But he is not found to have been referred to by any Buddhist or non-Buddhist writer prior to Udayana or even Vatsa, so he may be placed before Vatsa, that is, in the 10th century A. D. I presume that he was an inhabitant of Mithilā, because by that period we do not hear of non-Maithilas entering into the field of Nyāya and also because, no non-Maithila scholars have referred to him.

41. ANIRUDDHA

(11th century A.D.)

Dr. J. S. Jetly in his paper on the *Vivaraṇapañjikā* of Aniruddha (in Ms. form) submitted to the 17th Session of the *All India Oriental Conference*, held at Ahmedabad, in 1953 and later on, published in the *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda[2], has drawn our attention to an unknown author named Aniruddha. He is different from Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Sāṅkhya-Vṛtti*. This Aniruddha has written commentaries on the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya-Vārttika* and *Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā*. These manuscripts have been found in the Jaina Bhaṇḍāras of Jaisalmer. The colophon of the manuscripts runs

Aniruddha's works

[1] As quoted from the *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, p. 20.

[2] Vol. 4. Nos. 2-3, pp. 240-44.

like—'paṇḍitā Śrī aniruddhaviracitāyāṁ Bhāṣya-Vārttika—ṭīkāvivaraṇa-Pañjikāyāṁ'.

The manuscripts thus discovered are incomplete. Aniruddha's commentary on the first Adhyāya is not found in that collection. But from the opening lines of the second Adhyāya[1], it becomes clear that Aniruddha had written a commentary on the first chapter also. It seems from the colophon that all the commentaries of Aniruddha are called *Vivaraṇa-pañjikā*.

Dr. Jetly has suggested that as Aniruddha has written only on the *Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika* and *Tātparya* and not on the *Pariśuddhi*, it may be held that Aniruddha flourished between Vācaspati I and Udayana. In his commentaries he has referred to Trilocana and his commentary on the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, called *Nyāyamañjarī*. It may be pointed out here that many scholars, not knowing that the Vidyāguru Trilocana has written a commentary called *Nyāyamañjarī*, have wrongly identified this *Nyāyamañjarī* with the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, and have made some confusion in placing Jayanta earlier than Vācaspati Mishra I. As has already been pointed out above that the name of the commentary written by Trilocana was also *Nyāyamañjarī* to which a reference has been made by Vācaspati himself in his *Nyāyakaṇikā* (beginning verse) and also by the Buddhist scholar Jñānaśrī,[2] the above view is untenable and hence, we cannot agree to what has been said by Dr. Jetly in his article. On the same ground, we do not agree with the earlier view of Prof. A. L. Thakur as given in his article on *Jñānaśrīmitra*.[3]

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[1] syādetat prathamādhyāye pramāṇādayaḥ padārthāḥ uddiṣṭā yathoddeśaṁ ca sajātīyavyāvṛttā lakṣaṇato'dhigatāḥ tatkimaparamavaśiṣyate yadarthaṁ dvitīyādhyāyaḥ ārabhyate.

[2] (i) ajñānatimiraśamanīṁ paradamanīṁ Nyāyamañjarīm rucirām/
prasavitre prabhavitre vidyātarave namogurave//—
Nyāyakaṇikā—Beginning verse 3.

(ii) *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, Vol. xli, Pt. 4, 1955.

[3] *JBRS*. Vol. xxxvi, Pts. 1-2. p. 68.

From the fragments quoted by Dr. Jetly in his article, it is clear that Aniruddha not only explained the various lines of the three works quite lucidly, but also pointed out their weaknesses at various places and had given his own better explanations. For instance, the *Tātparya* says in one place—'*bhavatu vā saṁyogajaṁ jñānaṁ*'[1]. Aniruddha gives a very good explanation why Vācaspati was led to accept this view. He supplies the link—'*Mañjarībhaṅgaṁ paśyannāha*. Naturally, Vācaspati's acceptance of the 'saṁyogajaṁ jñānaṁ' at this place was only to support the *Mañjarī*, the work of his Vidyāguru.

No doubt, as pointed out by Dr. Jetly, on the basis of the available material we may place Aniruddha between Vācaspati and Udayana. But as Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti do not appear to have made any reference to Aniruddha, I have placed him after these two Bauddha scholars and prior to Udayana, that is, in the beginning of the second half of the 11th century A.D.

Aniruddha lived in the 2nd half of the 11th century A.D.

PRE-GAṄGEŚA AUTHORS

There are many more authors whose views have been referred to, or even quoted in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. But we do not know anything about them. Even Gaṅgeśa could not give their names. He has mentioned them as *anye, pare, apare, prāñcaḥ, sampradāyavidaḥ, navyāḥ, ācāryacaraṇāḥ, ekadeśinaḥ, itare, navīnāḥ, kecit, ye, atinavīnāḥ, sampradāyaḥ*, and so on. Amongst those whom he has mentioned by name and about whom we know a little, the following may be mentioned :

[1] Page 373 line 10.

42. ŚRĪKARĀCĀRYA

(Earlier than the 11th century)

Gaṅgeśa refers to the view of Śrīkara according to whom, says Gaṅgeśa, Jāti and Vyakti *singly* have no *kārakatva*. The connection with the kriyā (the act of doing) is based on the āśrayatā of the vyakti and the limitedness of the jāti, like the cow which is the karaṇa (instrumental) and the āruṇya (redness) of the cow which is the limitation (avacchedaka) in the sentence 'aruṇayā ekahānyā gavā somaṁ krīṇāti'.[1] In other words, though there is the svarūpa in the vyakti, yet there is no śakti in it.[2]

References to Śrīkara.

We find some more references to Śrīkara so far. In the *Mitākṣarā* of Vijñāneśvara on the *Yajñavalkyasmṛti*—'etenālpadhanaviṣayatvaṁ Śrīkarādibhiruktam nirastamiti'.[3] Again, in the Asvāmivikraya section of the *Yajñavalkyasmṛti*,[4] Vijñāneśvara says—'tāvataivāsau śuddho bhavatīti Śrīkarācāryeṇa vyākhyātam tadidamanupapannam'—from which it seems that Śrīkara had also written a commentary on the above smṛti. Lastly, we find from the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta *Manuscript Catalogue*[5] that Śrīkarācārya had a son named Ācārya Cūḍāmaṇi who had written a digest (nibandha) called *Śrāddhadīpikā*. Besides, Śrīkara and his views are referred to in the *Tripādīnītinayanam* of Murāri Miśra II of the 11th century A. D.[6] and also by Bhavanātha Mishra of the 11th century A. D. in his *Nayaviveka*.[7] Then he is also quoted by Candra of the 11th century in his *Nayaratnākara*.[8]

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabdakhaṇḍa, Jātiśaktivāda, p. 569.

[2] Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, p. 570 foot-note.

[3] P. 201, Vapū-Śāstrī Moghe's edition, Bombay.

[4] P. 229.

[5] Volume II, p. 389, Ms. No. 425.

[6] Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Mishra—*Murāreststṛtīyaḥ Panthāḥ*—Proceedings of the fifth All India Oriental Conference pp. 967-94.

[7] Dr. Umesha Mishra—*Mīmāṁsākusumāñjali*, p. 43.

[8] Dr. Umesha Mishra—*Mīmāṁsākusumāñjali*, p. 44.

All these support the view that Śrīkara lived before the 11th century A. D. and that he was a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṁsaka and a Dharmaśāstrin. No other reference to this name has been found by me so far. But it is not known whether all these refer to the same person. From the nature of the references it seems that these refer to one and the same Śrīkara, as these refer to Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra. But the reference found in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is about his view on the significance of a word (śabdaśakti). It may, however, be pointed out that almost all the Maithila writers in that period were equally authors of Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra. In fact, it is difficult to be a successful Dharmaśāstrin without being a Naiyāyika and a Mīmāṁsak. So it is not impossible to conclude that all these references relate to one and the same Śrīkara. Assuming the above conclusion as correct, we may say that he flourished before Vijñāneśvara whose date is about the 11th century. So Śrīkara must have lived before the 11th century and can be placed in the 10th century.

43. ŚRĪ-VATSA

(11th Century A. D.)

We have found no other reference to Śrī-Vatsa except those found in the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana.

References to Śrī-Vatsa.

From the verse found in the beginning of the second chapter of the *Pariśuddhi*.—

saṁśodhya darśitarasā marukūparūpā-
ṣṭikākṛtaḥ prathama eva giro gabhīrāḥ /
tātparyato yadadhunā punarudyamo naḥ
Śrī-Vatsa vatsalatayaiva tayā tathāpi //

Translation—It is the affection of Śrī-Vatsa alone which has made me capable of making this fresh effort to bring out the meaning of the difficult and deep and obscure sense of the text that is, (the *Tātparyaṭīkā*) of the Ṭīkākṛt, namely, Vācaspati Miśra I, who had previously removed the dirts (difficulties) of the well

lying in the desert, uncared for and had shown the way to the tasteful water.

It seems that Śrī-Vatsa most probably was the teacher of Udayana. Udayana quotes his views in his *Pariśuddhi* several times from the beginning of the second Āhnika of the second chapter onwards. In the very beginning[1] Udayana says—'atra Śrī-Vatsaḥ' and then ends with—'there is no over-lapping of the meaning between the two Āhnikas'.[2]

Udayana, while discussing the question of including Śabda under inference in the apprehension of the sense of a sentence, raises a question that it is not proper to say that sentences are mere collection of words, as sentences also do not require any association (saṅgati) in giving their own meaning or depend upon, at the same time, any prior and subsequent contradiction.

In this connection Udayana refers to the view of Śrī-Vatsa who holds that as there is no necessity to establish mutual connection, words or their meanings cannot be a probans in understanding the sense of a sentence. To this the reply is that certain sentences do indicate the above as in cases like 'yathakārayāmbabhūva' etc. and it is in this sense that Vācaspati has written so in his *Tīkā*[3].

Then again, Udayana refers to him in connection with the examination of the exact nature of the physical organism[4] and says that Śrī-vatsa raises here the question why this section does not form part of the *previous section, that is, the section on the examination* of the Ātman, because this section also deals with the examination of the Ātman and so there is mutual relation between the two ?[5].

To this Udayana gives the answer that as it is necessary to examine all the elements (tattvas) accepted in the system and since the examination of the Ātman has been made in the previous section, it is now necessary to discuss the nature of the physical

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[1] Ms. with the author, p. 924.

[2] iti nāhnikayorarthasaṅkaraḥ, Ms. p. 925.

[3] *Vide-Tātparyaṭīkā* on II. i. 52.

[4] On the *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 27-31.

[5] Ms. p. 1001.

organism separately in the next section. This point was not made clear in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* and hence, it was necessary to clarify it here.

Again, towards the end of the second Āhnika of chapter three under sūtras 61-62, Gotama discusses the question of the production of physical organism. The Nāstika-view is that just as a material image (mūrti) is made out of sand, stone, concretes, etc. without depending upon the deeds of the past life, for the use of human beings, so the physical organism also is produced out of the five elements without depending upon the deeds of the past, for the use of human beings[1].

In this very connection Udayana quotes the view of Śrī-Vatsa who says that the physical organism is produced out of the *bhūtas* which are prompted to form the body by the specific qualities (merit and demerit) of the man as the body is capable of serving the end of human beings (puruṣārthakriyāsamarthatvāt), like a chariot. In this argument though there is no fallacy of 'satpratipakṣa' (fallacy of parity per neutralisation), nor that of anaikāntika even, yet there is the fallacy of anaikāntika with the eternal manas, etc., because though these are not prompted by the specific qualities of any human being, yet these have the capability of puruṣārthakriyā (action to achieve the end of human beings). This point was not detected by Vācaspati Mishra[2]. This is what Śrī-Vatsa has said as mentioned by Udayana. However, Udayana defends Vācaspati and says that the above fallacy can be removed by adding—'*kāryatve sati*[3].'

Further again, Udayana refers to a question raised by Śrī-Vatsa regarding the fallacies of parity per eternal and non-eternal.[4] Lastly, Udayana refers to Śrī-Vatsa in connection with the 'Pratijñāhāni' (violating the proposition) type of clincher and says that in order to show that there is no mutual dependence

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. ii. 61.

[2] Also see *Tātparyāṭīkā* on II. ii. 61-63.

[3] Ms. p. 1073.

[4] Ms. p. 1182.

between the various types of clinchers, it has been said that similar is the case with Jāti (futile rejoinder), so there will be no compound.[1]

These are the only references to Śrī-Vatsa given by Udayana in his *Pariśuddhi*. From the nature of these references it is evident that Śrī-Vatsa also might have written a regular commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* or the *Bhāṣya* which is not available now. There is another point in support of this fact that he says – 'etenānyatrāpīndriyadvaitādiprakaraṇeṣu saṅgatiranusandheyeti', that is, similar explanation is to be given in other contexts, like '*indriyadvaitādi*'.[2]

But that he was an important writer cannot be denied, otherwise, Udayana would have never mentioned his name. But it is strange that Udayana does not refer to him in the first chapter. As he is likely to be regarded as the Guru of Udayana he must be placed about the end of the 10th or in the beginning of the 11th century A. D.

44. UDAYANĀCĀRYA

(11th century A. D.)

Udayana is the last representative of the old school of Nyāya and he may easily be said to be the greatest of the thinkers of his period. Almost all the great authors mentioned above have been directly connected with the tradition of the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama and have written commentary on it, or on its direct or indirect commentaries. We have also seen that both the orthodox and the non-orthodox Naiyāyikas have discussed the views of one another and that there is a connecting link between the works of the Buddhist scholars and the non-Buddhist scholars in the form of mutual criticisms. But after Vācaspati Misra I these scholars seem to be less enthusiastic in mutual attack. This may be either due to the fact that there did not

[1] svaprayojane nigrahasthānānām parasparāgapekṣatvasūcanāya jātiṣvapyetatsamānamityasamāsaprasaktiriti Śrī-vatsaḥ—Ms. p. 1197.

[2] III. i. 52.

flourish great scholars amongst the Buddhists who could continue the old scholastic polemics any more, or that there was very little left to be done after Vācaspati and Ratnakīrti. It should not be understood by this remark that the refutation of the non-orthodox views did not continue after Vācaspati. We shall see that the orthodox scholars did continue to criticize the Buddhists even later on, though there was practically none from the other side to meet their refutation, just as the views of the Cārvākas are being criticized even today, without there being any Cārvāka scholar to give any reply.

Traditional Scholastic polemics ended with Vācaspati and Ratnakīrti.

After Vācaspati, the greatest scholar of the old school is Udayana. It was he who took the cudgel against the Buddhists and gave a final blow to their views and in a way, it is therefore, that we do not hear much about these Buddhist scholars after Udayana. It is most likely due to this that the credit to put an end to the old academic quarrel between the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists is given to Udayana.

Udayana gave a final blow to the Buddhist views for ever.

By writing a commentary on the *Tātparyaṭīkā*, named *Nibandha* or *Pariśuddhi*, Udayana is placed in the direct line of the commentators on the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama and hence he is a Naiyāyika. But we shall see that he has made most valuable contribution to the Vaiśeṣika school of Philosophy and therefore he is a great scholar of the Vaiśeṣika school as well. Beside contributing directly to the two sister systems of our philosophy, Udayana has written two most important and unique works, namely, *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Ātmatattvaviveka* wherein we find marks of his genius and original thinking. These two works have been written from the common standpoint of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. So Udayana can easily be called both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika. He was in fact, one of the greatest philosophers that India has produced. His extraordinary genius is evinced from every line of his works.

Udayana is both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika.

It may be pointed out here that, no doubt, the two schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika flourished separately

and independent of each other from the very beginning, but it is also a fact which cannot be gainsaid that they had inter-relations on many problems.[1] The credit, however, to combine these two schools for the first time into a joint or syncretic school is traditionally given to Udayana. This is clear from the fact that Udayana has freely syncretized the characteristic doctrines of one school with those of the other. For example, it is well known that the Vaiśeṣikas do not admit Upamāna and Śabda as distinct pramāṇas[3] but Udayana, as a Naiyāyika, proves that their separate character cannot be denied.[3] Again, it may be pointed out that the Vaiśeṣikas include dream-cognitions under *anubhava* and so distinct from smṛti (remembrance),[4] while the Naiyāyikas hold that dream-cognition is not *anubhava*. Though there are somewhat confused opinions on this topic amongst the Naiyāyikas,[5] yet the prevailing view of the Naiyāyikas is that dream-cognition is not *anubhava*, but it is a kind of *smṛti*. Udayana, being both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika, holds that it should be accepted as *anubhava*.[6] Thus, it seems that Udayana has made a sort of compromise between the two schools.

Inter-relation between two schools.

Udayana combined the two Schools.

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[1] Vide—(i) manasaścendriyabhāvāt tanna vācyam lakṣaṇāntaramiti tantrāntarasamācārācca-*Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i.4; tantrāntare mana indriyamiti paṭhyate—*Nyāyavārttika*, I.i. 4; astyanyadapi dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ prameyam—*Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9; pūrvasaṁyogapradhvaṁśāduttarasaṁyogotpatterityādi Vaiśeṣike 'vaseyaṁ-*Pariśuddhi*, Ms. Fol. 1092 and 1121 with the author; *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 36 Mm. Vindhyeshwari Prasad's edition, Banaras.

(ii) Umesha Mishra—*Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, pp. 37-50.

[2] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 56. Reprint from the Pandit.

[3] *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, III. 12. pp. 443—50. Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[4] *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, IX. ii. 7; *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 548, Chowkhamba Banaras edition; smṛtireva paṭīyasī ye vadanti te mūḍhamanaso'nukampanīyāḥ, *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 275; Umesha Mishra —*Dream Theory in Indian Thought*, pp. 273-80.

[5] Umesha Mishra, *Dream Theory in Indian Thought*, pp. 273-78.

[6] tasmādanubhava evāsau svīkartavyaḥ—*Nyāyakusumāñjali*, p. 236.

Udayana and Gaṅgeśa founders of the Neo-Nyāya School.

Again, it is traditionally held that Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya is the founder of the Neo-Nyāya school. But a careful study of the works of Udayana shows that the methodology of the Neo-Nyāya school had actually started even at the time of Udayana. In fact, the term *Neo* or *Navya* is a relative one. Any one may be called *Navya* with reference to some senior author. Thus, Gaṅgeśa himself has used the term *Navya* for Soṇḍala Upādhyāya, a great Maithila scholar, who lived long before Gaṅgeśa and after Udayana.[1] So says my revered teacher Mm. Gopinath Kavirāj, "Personally I am disposed to believe that the distinction between the old and the new school in the history of Nyāya Philosophy dates from after Udayana and Śrīdhara".[2]

Udayana's native place.

Udayana, like so many authors of old, has not given any direct hint as to the part of the country where he flourished. He was for some time believed to have lived in Bengal and by some over enthusiastic Bengali was even identified with one Udayana Bhāduḍi.[3] But this is not correct. We find that Udayana has made ironical remarks against the Gauḍa (that is, Bengali) Mīmāṁsakas who did not know even to pronounce vedic accents correctly and pronounced the lines of Manu with Vedic accents and also who pronounced both the letters *śa* and *ṣa* as *śa*.[4] Again, some took him as a Southerner.[5] But as is clear from what he says in the *Bodhasiddhi*–'anyathā tu asāmarthyasamvaraṇārtham Dākṣiṇātyasya svadeśabhāṣayā pratyavatiṣṭhamānasya',

[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabdakhaṇḍa, Vidhivāda, p. 276, Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[2] *Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. II. p. 200.

[3] Introduction to the *Ātmatattvaviveka* by Mm. G. N. Kavirāj, p. 5 and also Introduction to the *Kiraṇāvalī* by Mm. Vindhyeshwari Prasad, p. 22.

[4] Vide—bhavati hi Vedānukāreṇa paṭhyamāneṣu manvādivākyeṣu apauruṣeyatvābhimānino Gauḍa-Mīmāṁsakasyārthaniścayaḥ-*Nyāya-kusumāñjāli*, p. 466. Bibliotheca Indica edition; Yathā śaṣayoḥ śavyavahāraḥ Gauḍānām, *Pariśuddhi*, Ms. Fol. 812.

[5] *Nyāyavārttika-Bhūmikā* by Mm. Vindhyeshwari Prasad, Benares edition, p. 152.

etc.,[1] it is clear that he cannot be a Southerner. All these assumptions have been now totally rejected unanimously by scholars all over the world and the view that Udayana was an inhabitant of Mithilā is accepted beyond doubt.

According to the tradition current in Mithilā, Udayana lived in a village named 'Karion' in the Samastipur Sub-Division, District Darbhanga. The ruins of the *Caupāḍi* (*Catuṣpāṭhī*) where Udayana lived and taught are still looked upon with great sanctity and respect by all. People even today take out a little clay from those ruins to make chalk-sticks for the *akṣarārambha* ceremony of their children as a symbol of Udayana's blessings.

From the internal evidences as gleaned from his works, we may say that he flourished where paddy grew in abundance and agriculturists started their ploughing from the month of Māgha. He says—ploughing of the fields in the month of Māgha is extremely beneficial for having a good harvest of paddy (suvarṇamayam phalamādhatte).[2] This indicates the Maithila custom of starting ploughing from the *Pañcamī tithi* in the bright half of the month of Māgha which is therefore, called *Sīra-Pañcamī*, meaning *hala-Pañcamī*, that is, the day from which ploughing starts a fresh with due ceremony to the plough.

Internal evidences about Udayana's being a Maithila.

Besides, he uses certain Maithili words and expressions in his works which may also give weight to his being a Maithila. He uses the word *temana*, meaning 'soup,'[3] *Śākasūpau pacati* (cooks vegetables of the class of Śāka and soup; *śākasupau-danān* pacati (cooks Śāka, soup and boiled rice).[4] Further, his reference to the cultivation of paddy grains[5] and his. knowledge of the Tāntric use of pigeon-meat sprinkled with water coloured with turmeric and burnt in the fire

[1] Ms. p. 72 in possession of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad.

[2] *Pariśuddhi*, p. 355 Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[3] *Kusumāñjali*, Stavaka V. p. 150.

[4] *Kusumāñjali*, Stavaka V. p. 153.

[5] *Pariśuddhi*, p. 40.

of turmeric causing immediate death,[1] all these show that he lived in Mithilā where these conditions were prevalent.

Date of Udayana. We are not at all in dark as to his exact date. He has said at the end of his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*—

tarkāmbarāṅkapramiteṣvatīteṣu śakāntataḥ/
varṣeṣūdayanaścakre subodhām lakṣaṇāvalīm//

Translation—Udayana composed the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, a booklet on the definitions of some of the terms of Vaiśeṣika school, which can be easily grasped, after the śaka era 906 had expired.

This makes it quite clear that Udayana was living in 906 śaka era, that is, 984 A. D. when he completed his booklet, the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. Professor Dinesh Chandra Bhaṭṭāchāryya, however, holds that this date 'conflicts with all evidences about Udayana and must be rejected'.[2] He, therefore, suggests that the reading of the above quoted verse should be *tarkasvarāṅka* which gives 976 śaka era=1054 A. D., the year when the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* was composed.

In this connection we should consider the internal evidences found in his works as well. Udayana quotes and refers to Ratnakīrti,[3] Prajñākaragupta,[4] Jñānaśrī.[5] Of these, Jñānaśrī and his disciple Ratnakīrti are the latest Buddhist scholars both of whom are placed in the 11th century A. D.[6] So Udayana must have lived after these scholars or must have been at least their junior contemporary. Now, it is to be considered that even taking for granted that Ratnakīrti ended his literary activity about 1025 A. D., as Professor Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharyya says,[7] Udayana could not have

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[1] *Kusumāñjali*, Stavaka I, p. 137.

[2] *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. II, pp. 353-56.

[3] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 344-45 as interpreted by Śaṅkara Mishra in his *Kalpalatā*.

[4] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 344-45, *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 146.

[5] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 33-34, 37, Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara's edition, Calcutta.

[6] Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 488.

[7] *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. II. p. 356.

written any of his works before 1040 A. D. He therefore, further suggests that Udayana should have written his *Lakṣaṇāvalī* in 1054 A. D. His entire argument is based on the Tibetan evidence.

To the above we may, however, say that difference between Prof. Bhattacharyya's suggested date and the traditional date is only 69 years. In the light of this small difference a question may be asked here how can we be so accurate even about the Tibetan evidence as against the traditional and literary evidences? Moreover, in such cases a difference of 69 years only is not worth considering in the face of the traditional literary evidence found in the work itself. The Tibetan evidence upon which Prof. Bhattacharyya has based his arguments itself can be pushed 69 years back.

To me it appears that they were contemporaries and the Buddhist scholars had propounded their views earlier. It may be said with some confidence that in those old days the Buddhists and the non-Buddhists both were very eager to crticize one another's views whenever they could find an opportunity. It is well-known that Jñānaśrī and Ratnakīrti were reputed Buddhist philosophers of that time and so the non-Buddhists must have been ever in the look-out of the fresh contributions of the Buddhists on philosophical problems in order to criticize them immediately. We know that the most important problem of that period was relating to the Ātman, Iśvara and Sarvajña. Udayana, therefore, must have known the Buddhist views earlier and must have taken steps to refute them in his works, may be even in their very life time. Hence, it is not at all necessary to hold the view that Udayana referred to the Buddhist views long after their death. There are so many instances in our literature where mutual references of different contemporary authors are found in their works. So I do not see any reason to accept Prof. Bhattacharyya's suggestion. I therefore, hold that Udayana lived towards the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century A. D.

From the respectful and kind references to Śrī-Vatsa it is just probable that the latter was Udayana's *Vidyāguru*. He has referred to Śrī-Vatsa's

views very often almost on every debatable problem in his *Pariśuddhi*.[1] Besides, Udayana gives a very clear suggestion about his relation with Śrī-Vatsa in a verse at the beginning of the second Adhyāya of his *Pariśuddhi* which has already been quoted above—

Udayana's vidyā-guru.

> saṁśodhya darśitarasā marukūparūpā-
> ṣṭīkākṛtaḥ prathama eva giro gabhīrāḥ /
> tātparyato yadadhunā punarudyamo naḥ
> Śrīvatsa vatsalatayaiva tayā tathāpi //

Translation—The meaning of the verse is something like this—It is the affection of Śrī-Vatsa alone which has made me capable of making this fresh effort to bring out the meaning of the difficult and deep sense of the text (that is, the *Tātparyaṭīkā*) of the Ṭīkākṛt, namely, Vācaspati Mishra I, who had previously removed the dirts (difficulties) of the well lying in the desert uncared for and had shown the way to the tasteful water.

This last line of his reference to Śrīvatsa seems to be similar to the last line of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*—'kāle kāruṇika tvayaiva kṛpayā te bhāvanīyā narāḥ'.

That Udayana was a staunch orthodox Brāhmaṇa may also be proved from his frequent use of the term—*dattajalāñjaliḥ*—meaning, to which the last offering of water by the cavity formed by folding and joining the open hands together has been made. In other words, it means that when a man is dead he is offered the last water by his relations. In the contexts it means that the arguments used by the opponent have put an end to the entire problem[2]. His reference to the practice of putting on red turban upon the head by the ṛtviks—'Lauhityaviśiṣṭamuṣṇīṣam vidhīyate'[3] may also be pointed out to his being a staunch orthodox Brāhmaṇa. Again, he says that it is not only from the Āgama that we decide what action is meritorious and what not, but also from the consistent and

Udayana was a staunch Brāhmaṇa.

[1] Vide. Ms., pp. 923-24 end of *Nyāyasūtra*, II. i and beginning of II. ii; 1001, 1073, 1182, 1197.

[2] *Pariśuddhi*, p. 160; *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 117, 202, 524.

[3] *Pariśuddhi*, p. 273.

uncensured customs prevalent in the locality amongst the cultured class of people. This also may be adduced in support of his being a very staunch orthodox Brāhmaṇa.[1]

Again, his statements that there are persons who do not perform all the religious (Vaidikī) ceremonies beginning with the *Garbhādhāna* and ending with the performance of funeral rites, that they do not observe the practice of touchability or untouchability, that they do not perform the expiatory rites by taking bath, etc. when they transgress the rules of Dharmaśāstra[2] show that he cannot but be an orthodox Brāhmaṇa.

Udayana's sampradāya.

Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj holds that Udayana was a Śaiva.[3] Perhaps this opinion may be based mainly on Udayana's reference to 'Pināki' in the beginning of the second Adhyāya of the *Pariśuddhi*[4] and also to his general approach to the problems of philosophy as is evinced in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and also in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

No Sāmpradāyikatā in Mithilā.

But it may be pointed out at this place that Mithilā has never been a rigid Sāmpradāyika place in the sense it is understood these days, nor has there been any movement of any cult even in the past. No doubt, it is a Śākta province and Śakti is worshipped throughout Mithilā with great devotion and in true spirit. But it is to be kept in mind that the inhabitants of Mithilā never have any narrow feeling towards Śaivaism or Vaiṣṇavaism; rather the Maithilas have been worshipping Śakti, Śiva and Viṣṇu together with equal respect even in their daily worship. They, as a mark of their being the followers of the Trinity, put on their forehead *ūrdhva-puṇḍra* with *sandal paste* (Śrīkhaṇḍa) as a mark of their being

Maithilas are Śāktas, Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas also at the same time.

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[1] *Pariśuddhi*, p. 279.

[2] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 121, Jivānanda Vidyasagara's edition, Calcutta.

[3] *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III, p. 112.

[4] apakṣapātine viṣvagajñānadhvāntaghātine/
namaḥ sarvaśaraṇyāya pramāṇāya Pirākine//

Vaiṣṇavas, *Bhasma* over the 'ūrdhva-puṇḍra' as a mark of their being Śaivas and red-*tilaka* (a round mark put between the two eye-brows or on the forehead with red *candana* paste) as a mark of their being a Śākta. Thus, all Maithilas are at the same time a Śākta, a Śaiva and a Vaiṣṇava. From all this it is clear that Udayana cannot be called a Śaiva alone, or a Vaiṣṇava alone, or even a Śākta alone.

Conception of Vaiṣṇavaism in Mithilā.

Even being so, a Maithila calls himself a 'Vaiṣṇava' only when due to some physical inability, he cannot partake in the distribution of the *prasāda* of the Goddess. But even then he is the worshipper and follower of all the three deities.

As regards his personal history we are aware only of two events of his life which have traditionally come down to us.

Personal history.

Once, he badly defeated Śrī-Hīra, the father of Śrī-Harṣa, the well-known author of the *Naiṣadhacaritam* in an academic discussion. Śrī-Hīra himself could not take the revenge, but asked his son Śrī-Harṣa, at the time of his death, to take vengeance upon Udayana. Śrī-Harṣa also failed to fulfil the last desire of his father. But he did not spare Udayana. It is believed that he criticized Udayana's views in his well-known work, the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* very often.[1] But after a careful study of these contexts, it appears to me that being a Vaitaṇḍika Śrī-Harṣa has criticized the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā and Bauddha views in his work. He has not given any hint to prove that the criticism against the views of Udayana is in the revengeful spirit. He has not gone beyond the standpoint of a Vaitaṇḍika in all these criticisms. So I do not see any justification in levelling any charge at Śrī-Harṣa on that account.

There is another tradition. Once Udayana, while establishing the existence of Īśvara, had caused the death of a Bauddha. Afterwards he was asked by his friends and followers to proceed to the *Puruṣottama-*

[1] Vide—pp. 78, 369-70, 561, 663, 687. E. J. Lazarus & Co., Banaras edition.

kṣetra where Īśvara is found in the incarnation of the Buddha to perform expiation for causing death of a Bauddha. It is said that he went to Jagannātha Purī and remained there in the temple for three days and nights prostrated and meditating upon the God in order to have His blessings and condonation for his crime. The God did not appear before him. At this negligence or inattentiveness of the God Udayana became awfully enraged and in a revengeful tone uttered the following verse —

aiśvaryamadamatto'si māmavajñāya vartase /
punar Bauddhe samāyāte madadhīnā tava sthitiḥ//

Translation—O God (Īśvara) ! (I have been here for the last three days and nights and) you have treated me with contempt (by not appearing before me), because of your being proud of your position. (But you must remember that history repeats itself and) again, the Bauddhas will flourish in the country (in the next cycle and will criticize your very existence as Īśvara and then) your existence will certainly depend upon me (as one who proves the existence of Īśvara against the onslaught of the Bauddhas).

After this it is said that the Baudhāvatāra Īśvara appeared before him and told him to proceed to Kāśī which is the only place where such expiation is possible and then Udayana came to Kāsī and passed his days there.

There is a third story about him. Once when he was discussing certain problem against the Buddhists, the latter objected to some of Udayana's arguments and demanded proof for them. At this there was a bold utterance of Udayana (prauḍhokti)—

vāyamiha padavidyām tarkamānvīkṣikīm vā
yadi pathi vipathe vā vartayāmaḥ sa panthāḥ /
udayati diśi yasyām bhānumān saiva pūrvā
nahi taraṇirudite dik parādhīnavṛttiḥ //

Translation—Whatever reason, right or wrong, I advance (on any topic) in 'Padavidyā' (Vyākaraṇa—Grammar, or may mean even Mīmāṁsā as it discusses the purity or otherwise of words), 'Tarka' (Nyāya—logic or Vaiśeṣika) and 'Ānvīkṣikī' (Ātmavidyā), is to be accepted as valid. It is well-known that the

eastern direction is that towards which the sun rises and there remains no doubt about the knowledge of a particular direction when the sun has risen. There is, no doubt, a *śleṣa* in this verse having the two meanings—Udayana and the Sun.

Udayana's idea of synthetic gradation in philosophy.

The last point regarding Udayana's contribution to philosophy is his attitude towards the systems of Philosophy in India. In the last section of his *Ātmatattaviveka* Udayana has emphasized the idea of synthetic gradation amongst the various schools, both Nāstika and Āstika, towards the realization of the highest goal of philosophy in India, where the school of Advaita is the ultimate end, while other schools even including the Cārvāka system represent the lower stages.[1] This is indeed an unique contribution to philosophy which has been also advocated by later scholars like Sarvajñātamuni in his *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Prasthānabheda*,[2] Vijñānabhikṣu in his Introduction to the *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*.[3]

Lastly, it may also be pointed out that Udayana sometimes referred to himself as *Udayakara* also as it is found in the line—'Idamudayakareṇa nyāyalokāgamānām vyatihatimavadhūya vyañjitam vartma mukteḥ'.[4] This had led some to wrongly identify Udayana with Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāyavārttika* which is sheer impossible.[5]

WORKS OF UDAYANA

Probable circumstances which led him to write on Ātman and Īśvara.

Before we come to examine the works of Udayana in details, particularly, his two most unique works, namely, *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, we should try to under-stand what circumstances

[1] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 130-32, Jivananda Vidyasagar's edition.

[2] Puṣpadanta's *Śivamahimnaḥstotra*, verse 7.

[3] Also vide—Umesha Mishra—*Synthetic gradation in Indian philosophy*, Allahabad University Studies, Vol. 1.

[4] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, last lines.

[5] Introduction to the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* by Mm. Chandrakanta Tarkalankara, p. 10.

might have led Udayana to devote so much emphasis on these two *tattvas*, namely, Ātman and Īśvara.

Even in our earliest records references to views denying the independent and separate existence of Ātman are not wanting. It is difficult to say that there was no section of people who had not even heard of Ātman. Even the Cārvākas, who believed only in unconscious matter and its products, did not deny the existence of Ātman. According to them Ātman is either the physical organism, or the physical sense-organ, or Prāṇa, or Manas and so on.

Conception of Ātman in various systems.

According to the earlier Buddhists, particularly, the Puggalavādins consisting of Vajjiputtakas, Sammitiyas and some others, there exists a personal entity, called Soul, as a perduring immortal essence in man. It transmigrates from this world to the other and from there to this world again.[1] Though the later Bauddhas denied categorically the independent existence of Ātman, yet formerly they did accept it in some form or other.

Again, according to the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, undoubtedly, there exists an independent and separate entity called Ātman,[2] but it seems, as has been pointed out by Kumārila himself, that people do not become quite convinced about its existence and it is, therefore, that Kumārila has asked them to study Vedānta in order to get their doubts removed and be fully and firmly assured of the existence of Ātman.[3]

But, however, it cannot be the attitude of the Mīmāṁsakas, nor even that of the Cārvākas which might have led Udayana to write an independent treatise to prove the independent and separate existence of Ātman, for they did believe in its

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[1] Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 364-65.

[2] *Ślokavārttika*, Ātmavāda.

[3] ityāha nāstikyanirākariṣṇu-
rātmāstitām bhāṣya-kṛdatra yuktyā/
dṛḍhattvametadviṣayaśca bodhaḥ
prayāti Vedāntaniṣevaṇena//—*Ślokavārttika*, Ātmavāda, Verse 148.

existence in some from or other and did not ever make any effort to organise any active and forcible propaganda against its existence. It was really due to the most unhealthy propaganda of the Buddhists against the existence of Ātman as generally understood that might have compelled Udayana to give a final blow to the Buddhist thoughts by writing his work, called *Ātmatattvaviveka*, also known as *Bauddhādhikāra* (a discourse concerned with the Buddhists) or *Bauddhādhikkāra* (reproach to the Buddhists) the name which supports my view.

Even earlier the author of the *Nyāyasūtra* and its commentators have discussed the problem and have refuted the Buddhist views on this topic. But no such attempt was ever made prior to Udayana to write a treatise exclusively on the existence of Ātman.

Topics discussed in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

Here in this work the author has divided and discussed the whole question under four different heads, as the Buddhists hold, namely, *Kṣaṇabhaṅga*, that is, everything is momentary, *Bāhyārthabhaṅga*, that is, there does not exist any external reality (this is from the Yogācāra point of view), *Guṇaguṇibhedabhaṅga*, that is, a substance is not different from the mere collocation of its attributes and *Anupalambha*, that is, the world is nothing but void. These four are the problems which prevent the existence of Ātman as it is ordinarily accepted in common parlance, according to Udayana. So he divides the work under these four sections and refutes them one by one boldly—'tatra bādhakam bhavadātmani'—etc.[1] After having fully refuted the Buddhist arguments Udayana has given his own clear proofs in support of the existence of the Ātman in the fifth section of the book, which again, ultimately, ends in giving sufficient proof in support of the synthetic gradation existing in the realization of the Ultimate Truth.

Idea of synthesis in philosophy.

One thing must be pointed out at this place which I have already made clear even before[2] that considering the synthetic gradation which is the very heart of Indian philosophy

[1] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 1.

[2] *Introduction to History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1.

towards the realization of the ultimate truth, the earliest, the most undeveloped crudest stage of the growth of philosophical thought in India, like the similar growth of the intellect of a human being, we cannot expect more than what has been said by Indian Materialists, called Cārvākas. It is at the stage of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika alone that the *sat* aspect of the Ātman as an independent substance quite apart from the other substances is to be proved. Representing the commonsense point of view we do not expect more on this point at the very outset from the Naiyāyikas. But it is something more than what the position of Nyāya would allow that Udayana has gone beyond his scope and has traced the entire path of Self-realization and has disclosed more about the nature of the Ātman in his works. But it must be made clear that Udayana has even then been firm in his idea about the ultimate end of Nyāya śāstra according to which the total annihilation of the twentyone kinds of pain is the nature of its ultimate goal.[1]

There is no other work on the subject so far known to me in our philosophical literature which so strongly has refuted all the main theories of the Buddhists against the existence of the Ātman as an independent and separate entity.

Independent and separate existence of Iśvara.

Having proved with great success the existence of an eternal, independent and separate Ātman, Udayana proceeds to discuss another similar most important topic, namely, the existence of Iśvara. The author of the *Nyāyasūtra* has said that since the Ātman is proved to be eternal (nitya), rebirth or existence of the Ātman even after death does not require any proof.[2] By rebirth is meant the abandoning of the previous organism and taking up of another by the eternal Jīvātman. Ātman continues to be the same in both the organisms and it is not ever destroyed. It is the old and shattered body which is destroyed and then a fresh one is

[1] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 128, Calcutta edition.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 10.

constituted in another birth.[1] This leads the philosophers to discuss a very important question about the cause of a production. In other words, the philosophers discuss the problem of the most efficient cause of any production, or even of the universe.

Problem of Causality.

The most natural view on the question of causality is that every thing happens in the universe by its very nature (sva-bhāva) and that there is no cause nor is there any necessity of postulating the existence of any cause for any production. This is called *Sva-bhāvavāda*. This theory does not give any chance to reasoning. It is not proper to expect any other reasonable theory at the very outset of our knowledge. This is indeed the cradle of our thought process. Hence this view is more or less associated with the school of Lokāyatikas or Cārvākas which represents the crudest form of thinking. At this stage everything happens by its very nature. As such the question of Causality does not arise at this stage. Appeal to *Nature* is the only criterion of this stage.

Sva-bhāvavāda.

But when we grow a little wiser, we find that we can admit some reasoning to explain the natural phenomena. Thus, the theory of Causality comes in at a somewhat later stage. No doubt, reasonings are adduced and causes are found to explain phenomena of the universe to a certain extent, but again, there comes a stage when we, and even the great scientists, have to stop our enquiry into the mysteries of the universe and cry in despair that '*it is so*' simply because it is its very nature. This is also nothing but *Sva-bhāvavāda*, though of an advanced type.

In ordinary sense there is no end to our knowledge. It goes on growing till we reach the highest goal of life and philosophy, which is identical with

[1] Really speaking, the Ātman never abandons nor takes up any organism. When due to the natural functioning of the Prakṛti a physical organism is formed then the ever existing and all-pervasive eternal Ātman becomes manifested in that organism. When due to the *functioning of the energetic force the same* organism becomes disrupted, then the Ātman ceases to manifest in it. In fact, this is the meaning of 'birth' and 'death'.

Pūrṇajñāna.[1] Prior to that there are several stages with different views which lead to various theories which also deny, in a way, higher reasoning. For instance, they are *Kālavāda, Niyativāda, Yadṛcchāvāda, Bhūtavāda* and *Puruṣavāda,* or *Īśvaravāda.*[2] These views are very old and are found mentioned even in the *Mahābhārata,* Purāṇas and in later literature, Āstika and Nāstika.[3] Gotama in his *Nyāyasūtra*[4] also discusses many of these views. A very brief idea of these is necessary at this stage in order to trace the gradual growth of the *theory of Causality* and place of Īśvara in our schools.

Various materialistic theories regarding Causality.

These are undoubtedly very old views about Causality. Even coming to the *Nyāyasūtras* as referred to above we find that some more views are added to those already mentioned. Thus, it is said there that there are individual or universal production from *abhāva*—Void.[5] This naturally has become associated with the later Śūnyavāda of the Buddhist school. It must be pointed out here that this *abhāvavāda* is much older than the later Śūnyavāda, but as there is some similarity between the two, scholars have associated it with the modern Śūnyavāda school. Further, it is said that *Īśvara* is the cause of the universe.[6] This is the same as is found in the *Śvetāśvatara*[7] and also in the *Mahābhārata,*[8] where it is made clear that the non-conscious Jīva is not the master of its own pleasure and pain. It is through the agency of Īśvara that one goes to heaven or to hell—

Abhāvavāda

Īśvaravāda.

ajño janturanīśoyamātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ /
Īśvaraprerito gacchet svargam vā śvabhrameva vā. //

Vācaspati Mishra also makes a reference to it in his *Tātparyaṭīkā.*[9] This view appears to be much

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[1] Satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ Brahma—*Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II.1.

[2] *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad,* I. 2.

[3] *Princess of Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies,* Vol. II, pp. 93—111.

[4] IV. i. 14-43.

[5] *Nyāyasūtra,* IV. i. 14.

[6] *Nyāyasūtra,* IV. i. 19.

[7] I. 2.

[8] Vanaparva, xxx. 28.

[9] PP. 604-605. Chowkhamba Banaras edition.

more popular. This may be said to be the underlying idea in the following verse also—

jānāmi dharmaṁ na ca me pravṛttir-
jānāmyadharmam na ca me nivṛttiḥ /
tvayā Hṛṣīkeśa hṛdi sthitena
yathā niyuktosmi tathā karomi //

Translation—O Hṛṣīkeśa! the Jīva says, I know what is dharma (duty), but I cannot move towards it; similarly, I know what is adharma (not to be performed), but I cannot refrain from it (in other words, I am totally *parādhīna* and have no freedom at all to do or not to do anything). You, my Lord! dwell in my heart and I do as you guide me.

Again, the same idea is found in the *Bhagavadgītā*[1]—

Īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṁ hṛddeśe'rjuna tiṣṭhati /
bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā//

Translation—O Arjuna! the Lord Himself says, Īśvara dwells in the heart of all beings. Like a doll placed on some machine through the agency of His Māyā, He makes all beings move.

It is also mentioned in the *Mahābodhijātaka*—

Issaro savvalokassa sace kappeti jīvitam etc.[2] and also in the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa.[3] In the Buddhist work this view has been mentioned as upheld by *others*.

Nirnimittavāda.

Then again, Gotama refers to the view that *bhāva-padārthas* (objects having existence) are produced without any cause (*nirnimittataḥ*). This is also, most likely, an aspect of the *Sva-bhāvavāda* itself as it seems from the lines of the *Śvetāśvatara*. This view is also found in the *Suśruta*,[4] the *Buddhacarita*[5] and also in the *Gommaṭasāra* of Ācārya Nemicandra.[6]

Sarvānityavāda.

Again, we find that Gotama mentions a view that everything of the universe is non-eternal and is produced and destroyed. That is, nothing exists before the production and after the destruction. So everything is non-eternal (*anitya*).[7]

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[1] XVIII. 61. [2] *Jātaka*, Vol. 5. [3] IX. 53.
[4] Śarīrasthāna, I. 11. [5] IX. 52. [6] Verse 883.
[7] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 25.

There is another extremist view that everything is eternal, as the five '*bhūtas*' which constitute the universe are eternal.[1] Hence, there is no need of any cause or effect. So from the above we find that there are some who accept the theory of Causality, while others totally deny it. All the views which reject the theory of causality are closely connected.

Sarvānityavāda.

All non-believers are closely connected.

According to Śaṅkarānanda, a commentator on the *Śvetāśvatara*, there appears a sort of gradation between some of these views. Thus, he says in his *Dīpikā*[2] that the *Paramāṇuvāda* of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, in support of the causality of the universe is a very cumbrous process and, therefore, it is better to have *Kāla* as the cause of the creation. Śaṅkarācārya, in his *Bhāṣya* on the upaniṣad, explains *Kāla* as the cause which brings change in all the *bhūtas*.[3]

Kālavāda.

Some, however, take this *Kāla* as *Īśvara*.[4] But as *Kāla* cannot do anything without the immanent nature of a thing (*sva-bhāva*), it is replaced by the *Sva-bhāva-vāda*. But, again, it has been found that the latter itself cannot do anything without *niyati*, meaning, *karman* of the type of merit and demerit,[5] so *Niyativāda* should be accepted as the cause of the universe. *Niyati* has been explained by Ḍalhaṇa as merit and demerit themselves (pūrvajanmārjitau dharmādharmau niyatiḥ). This also must be pointed out here that *niyati* identified with *adṛṣṭa* has not been objected to by the orthodox schools; hence, it seems that in this context the word *niyati* has been used in the sense of mere *chance* and so, it has been objected to by the orthodox and rejected.

Niyativāda.

Yadṛcchā has been used in the sense of mere *coincidence* (ākasmikaprāptiḥ). Another view is that the *bhūtas*, namely, Akāśa, Vāyu, etc., singly or collectively, are the cause of the universe.

Yadṛcchāvāda.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 29. [2] I.1.

[3] Sarvabhutānāṁ vipariṇāmahetuḥ—I. 1.

[4] Vide—Ḍalhaṇa's commentary on the *Suśrutasaṁhitā*.

[5] aviṣamapuṇyapāpalakṣaṇam karma—*Śaṅkarabhāṣya*.

[illegible] also been accepted [illegible] to be the cause of [illegible]

[illegible] has been variously [illegible] it as *Vijñānātmā*. [illegible] by it unattached [illegible] (udāsīna), Con[illegible] (cidānandātman). Nārāyaṇa[illegible] by *Puruṣa*, Man as. [illegible] views about the cause of the [illegible] even prior to the advent [illegible] some similarity between [illegible] have been associated [illegible] become the source of [illegible]

[illegible] views, as has been al[illegible] some other schools. He says [illegible] there is a view that every [illegible] is from *Void* (abhāva) or [illegible] connection we are told of [illegible] irrespective of the deeds or [illegible] the Jīva, is the cause.[2] Some, [illegible] hold that no doubt, Īśvara is [illegible] cause of the creation, but only [illegible] help of the adṛṣṭa of the Jīvas. [illegible] to our scholars that the exis[illegible] independent and separate entity [illegible] in India[illegible]osophy from [illegible]. Ordina[illegible] people [illegible] Īśvara is that [illegible] Omniscient, Omni[illegible] tent, all good, all [illegible] divine, a supre[illegible] and [illegible] ller of the un[illegible] found on[illegible] these [illegible] lower [illegible] in [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] IV.i.14.

creation of the universe. Questions are asked: who is the creator? How is the universe created? What is the necessity of believing in the existence of a conscious agent, like Īśvara, if creation is possible without His agency? and so on.

We know that the entire universe with all its constituents, except the Universal Consciousness, is in constant motion. So has been said by the Lord in the *Bhagavadgītā*—[1]

na hi kaścit kṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt/
kāryate hyavaśaḥ karma sarvaḥ prakṛtijairguṇaiḥ//

Causes of creation.

Nothing under heavens remains static even for a moment. In reality, it is the very nature of organic or inorganic matter which constitutes the universe to be constantly in successive motion without the help of any conscious agent. This is what the Materialists and Sāṅkhya school hold. Similarly, the Mīmāṁsakas having full faith in the 'theory of Karman', also think that Individual selves (Jīvas) have been constantly performing actions from time immemorial as a result of which the universe comes to exist and help the Jīvas to reap the fruits of their past deeds. So, it is really the deeds of the Jīvas which are the causes of the creation of the univese. Hence, there is no need of postulating the existence of any conscious agent as the creator of the universe. Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara also have denied the existence of Īśvara (Puruṣa) as the creator[2] of anything even including the belief that Īśvara is the cause of establishing relation between a word and its meaning.

Mīmāṁsakas deny the agency of Īśvara.

Then, again, Gotama refers to an old view in his *Nyāyasūtra*[3] according to which there is no need of postulating the existence of Īśvara for creation.

Vedānta denies the agency of Īśvara.

Again, even in Vedānta there are views of Bhāskara and others that

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[1] III. 5.

[2] *Śabarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminīyasūtra*, I. 1. 4, 527. *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā*, pp. 133-37; *Ślokavārtika*, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, verses 41-141.

[3] IV.i.19.

Then *Prakṛti*, *Māyā* or *Avidyā* have also been accepted by various schools of thought to be the cause of the universe.

Puruṣavāda.

Lastly, we come to *Puruṣa* wh ich has been variously explained. Śaṅkarācārya explains it as *Vijñānātmā*. Śaṅkarānanda means by it unattached (asaṅga), indifferent (udāsīna), Conscious and Blissful Ātman (cidānandātman). Nārāyaṇatīrtha, on the other hand, understands by *Puruṣa*, Man as.

These are the various views about the cause of the universe from very old time, even prior to the advent of the Buddha. Because of some similarity between them with the later views they have been associated with modern schools and have become the source of various misunderstandings.

Abhāvavāda.

Īśvara and adṛṣta as the cause of the Universe.

Gotama also has given the views, as has been already mentioned, of some other schools. He says that there is a view that every production is from *Void* (abhāva) or destruction.[1] In this very connection we are told of a view that *Īśvara* alone, irrespective of the deeds or merit and demerit of the Jīva, is the cause.[2] Some, again, hold that no doubt, Īśvara is the cause of the creation, but only with the help of the adṛṣṭa of the Jīvas.

Conception of Īśvara.

It is very well known to our scholars that the existence of Īśvara as an independent and separate entity is a very vexed problem in Indian philosophy from various angles of vision. Ordinarily what people at large understand by Īśvara is that He is Omnipresent, Omniscient, Omnipotent, all benevolent, all good, all merciful, all holy, all divine, a supreme being and the creator, ruler and controller of the universe. Though all these attributes are found only in the Supreme Being called Īśvara, yet all these or at least some of them are also attributed to lower beings, like a king or any other person in power, in accordance with the growth and development of the intellect of the person using these attributes. In the field of philosophy, however, the most important question is about the

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV.i.14. [2] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV.i.19.

creation of the universe. Questions are asked: who is the creator? How is the universe created? What is the necessity of believing in the existence of a conscious agent, like Iśvara, if creation is possible without His agency? and so on.

We know that the entire universe with all its constituents, except the Universal Consciousness, is in constant motion. So has been said by the Lord in the *Bhagavadgitā*—[1]

> na hi kaścit kṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt/
> kāryate hyavaśaḥ karma sarvaḥ prakṛtijairguṇaiḥ//

Causes of creation.

Nothing under heavens remains static even for a moment. In reality, it is the very nature of organic or inorganic matter which constitutes the universe to be constantly in successive motion without the help of any conscious agent. This is what the Materialists and Sāṅkhya school hold. Similarly, the Mīmāṁsakas having full faith in the 'theory of Karman', also think that Individual selves (Jīvas) have been constantly performing actions from time immemorial as a result of which the universe comes to exist and help the Jīvas to reap the fruits of their past deeds. So, it is really the deeds of the Jīvas which are the causes of the creation of the univese. Hence, there is no need of postulating the existence of any conscious agent as the creator of the universe. Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara also have denied the existence of Iśvara (Puruṣa) as the creator[2] of anything even including the belief that Iśvara is the cause of establishing relation between a word and its meaning.

Mīmāmsakas deny the agency of Iśvara.

Then, again, Gotama refers to an old view in his *Nyāyasūtra*[3] according to which there is no need of postulating the existence of Iśvara for creation.

Vedānta denies the agency of Iśvara.

Again, even in Vedānta there are views of Bhāskara and others that

[1] III. 5.

[2] *Śabarabhāṣya* on *Jaiminīyasūtra*, I. 1. 4, 527. *Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā*, pp. 133-37; *Ślokavārtika*, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, verses 41-141.

[3] IV.i.19.

the universe is the Pariṇāma of Brahman and has nothing to do anything with Īśvara.

Vācaspati Mishra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* holds that in order to reject such a view Gotama asserts that Īśvara is the cause of universe. We also know that even Śaṅkarācārya, while discussing the causality, supports the Pariṇāmavāda with the examples of clay and jar, milk and curd, gold and ring, etc., though he holds that the pariṇāma or the products are all false. Rāmānuja and Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava schools also support Pariṇāma. Besides the view that Īśvara is the cause of creation with the assistance of the deeds of the Jīvas or without the assistance of their deeds has also been variously interpreted from time to time by various schools.

To sum up the above, the points before the scholars were: there is no cause; there is no Īśvara; the universe is the pariṇāma of Brahman; Karman alone is the cause of creation; Īśvara without the assistance of the deeds of Jīvas is the cause of universe. These were the views which had been confusing the scholars for a pretty long time and it was, therefore, that Udayana felt it necessary to sum up all the points mainly from the Nyāya-point of view and write his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*.

Thus, the causality of Īśvara has been variously discussed and almost all the schools have taken part in this. The Buddhists, no doubt, denied the existence of Īśvara as understood by the Naiyāyikas, but they, on the other hand, estalished the existence of *Sarvajña* and wrote treatises on *Śarvajñasiddhi*. All this shows that there was a good 'deal of confusion about Īśvara and His agency in creating the universe from time immemorial in a way.

Udayana felt a great desideratum for writing a book on the existence of Īśvara in such a language full of devotion, respect, and sympathetic in tune with the very nature of Īśvara. These may be said to be the conditions, which led Udayana to write his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, offering of a handful of flowers in the form of Nyāya to the feet of Īśvara.

The first work which Udayana wrote was the *Ātmatattvaviveka*, also called by scholars of the orthodox

school *Bauddhādhikkāra*, or *Bauddhādhikāra*. It is a unique work in the history of Indian Philosophy. It has been written in defence of the orthodox Nyāya position against the so-called attacks of the Cārvāks and the Buddhists in regard to the independent existence of the Ātman. As has been already pointed out above, Udayana has vehemently criticized Buddhist theories of Kṣaṇabhaṅga (theory of Perpetual flux), Bāhyārthabhaṅga, Guṇaguṇibhedabhaṅga and the theory of Universal Void (anupalambha). Though the earlier Sammitiyas and Vajjiputtakas had advocated, as has been also pointed out by Uddyotakara under the *Nyāyasūtra*[1], the eternal existence of an entity called Ātman, yet the present work is based on the assumption of the later Buddhists denying the existence of the Ātman.

Ātmatattvaviveka, first work.

The earliest commentator of *Ātmatattvaviveka* known so far is Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura, *alias* Megha Ṭhākura of Mithilā. He was the pupil of Pakṣadhara Mishra. He became a renowned scholar at the early age of twenty (Viṁśābde Jayadevapaṇḍita kavestarkābdhikāraṅgataḥ.)[2] Śaṅkara Mishra refutes his view in his *Kalpalatā*.[3] He lived in the first half of the 15th century.

Commentators on the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

(i) Bhagīratha.

The next commentary is by Śaṅkara Mishra, the author of the *Upaskāra* of the middle of the 15th century. The commentary called *Kalpalatā* has been printed in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. The other commentator known so far is Narahari Upādhyāya, son of Yajñapati, the author of the *Prabhā* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, grand-son of Śivapati[4]—

(ii) Śaṅkara Mishra.

(iii) Narahari.

anusṛtya matam samyak pituḥ Śivapatermayā /
anumāna-paricchede Prabhā samprati tanyate //

great-grand-son of Paśupati whose younger brother Raghupati wrote the *Śuddhicandrikā* and the *Taḍāgayā-*

[1] III. ii.
[2] *Dravya-Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa-Prakāśikā* by Bhagīratha.
[3] p. 304.
[4] Vide—the second verse of the *Prabhā*.

gapaddhati and the great-great-grand-son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Vaṭeśvara. Narahari had also a son named Pakṣadhara Upādhyāya[1] who had written the *Tattvanirṇaya* and several smārta Nibandhas. Narahari had also written a commentary on the *Mudrārākṣasa*.[2]

The commentary of Narahari is not yet published. I have a copy of its manuscript copied from the State Library, Nepal. It is a very bad manuscript which is full of lacuna and extends upto the line *tatkāryatvasya*.[3] But even then it is obvious that it is a very lucid commentary. Narahari says in the second benedictory verse of his commentary—

sūktyā pitṛcaraṇānāmavagatasandarbhasāreṇa/
kriyate Narahariṇā vyākhyā Bauddhādhikārasya//

which shows that he had studied all these from his father Yajñapati. Even in his well-known work *Duṣaṇoddhāra*, written in defence of the views of his father, he writes a similar verse—

Sūktya pitṛcaraṇānāmadhigatasiddhāntasāreṇa/
Śrī-Narahariṇā kriyate tātamate Dūṣaṇoddhāraḥ //

Narahari was the pupil of the well-known scholar Pakṣadhara Mishra, the author of the *Āloka*, whom he very often refers to in his *Dūṣaṇoddhāra* and also criticizes him.[4] He must have lived towards the end of the 15th century earlier than Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.

Narahari was also a great authority on Dharmaśāstra. His work called *Dvaitanirṇaya*[5] is regarded as an important work on the subject amongst the Maithilas. He was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa of the Māṇḍara family of Mithilā.

(iv) Raghunātha.

The other important commentator on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* is the well-known Bengali scholar Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of the 16th century. His commentary is known as the

[1] He is quite different from Pakṣadhara, the author of the *Āloka* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

[2] It is interesting to note that Vaṭeśvara's daughter's son was Bhavanātha Mishra *alias* Ayāci, or Dūve Mishra, the father of Śaṅkara Mishra, the author of the *Upaskāra*.

[3] P. 111 of the text edited by Jīvananda Vidyasāgar.

[4] *Vaṅge Navya-Nyāyacarcā* by Prof. D.C. Bhattacharyya, p. 24

[5] Published from Darbhanga.

Dīdhiti. He is the pupil of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma who lived in the court of Pratāparudra of Orissa. This has been published in the *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*.

The fifth commentator on this is Rāma Tarkālaṅkāra, the father of the well-known Naiyāyika Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, the direct pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. That Śrī Rama was also a pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi is not accepted even by Bengali scholars. But somehow he must have been connected with him, for he refers to Raghunātha with great respect in his works. He lived in the 16th century A. D. His commentary is called *Ṭippaṇī* and is really on the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha and not directly of the *Ātmatattaviveka*. It has been published in the *Chwovkhamba Sanskrit Series* along with the *Kalpalatā* and the *Dīdhiti*.

(v) a. Rāma.

(vi) Mathurānātha. Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, son of Srī Rāma and direct pupil of Raghunātha, also has commented upon the *Ātmatattvaviveka*. His commentary is known as the *Bauddhādhikāravivṛti*—

Śrīmatā Mathurānāthatarkavāgīśadhīmatā./
bauddhādhikāravivṛtirviśadīkṛtya racyate.//[1]

It has been partly published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*. He lived in the 16th century.

Other commentators are—Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa of Bengal of the 16th century who wrote his *Viveka* on the *Dīdhiti* of Raghunātha. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācāryya, the well-known Bengali scholar of the 17th century and author of several important works, also wrote his *Viveka* on the *Ātmatattvadīdhiti* of Raghunātha. It has been partly published in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*. Another small *Ṭippaṇi* is on the *Māthurī-Vivṛti* by Yadunātha Sārvabhauma of the 20th century. It has been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series* along with the *Māthurī*. He does not agree with Raghunātha's views on many points.

(vii) b. Gunānanda.

(viii) c. Gadādhara.

(ix) a. Yadunātha.

[1] Benedictory verse of Mathurānātha's commentary.

These are some of the direct and indirect commentaries on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* which have come to my knowledge so far. This shows how popular the work was even in the very beginning that almost all the great writers wrote commentary on it. It may also be due to its having been written against the Buddhists who had criticized the very independent existence of the Ātman.

References to authors and works in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

In the *Ātmatattvaviveka* which is the earliest work of Udayana we have references to Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Jñānaśrī (according to the *Kalpalatā*)[1]. Udayana quotes Jñānaśrī[2] and refers to him,[3] Tātparyācārya[4] and Traidaṇḍikamata[5] and *Saṁsāramocakāgama*.[6]

Proverbial sayings in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

Like other works of Udayana, the *Ātmatattvaviveka* contains several well-known proverbial expressions, such as *kaphoḍi guḍāvito vartate* (meaning, something beyond our reach, just as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue);[7] Śataṁ śiraśchede'pi na dadāti viṁśatipañcakañ tu prayacchati (meaning, does not give hundred even at the risk of beheading, but certainly gives twentyfive);[8] Na tṛṇakubjīkaraṇe'pi samarthāḥ (meaning, not capable of even bending a blade of straw);[9] Grāmyajanadhandhīkaraṇaṁ (meaning confusing vulgar people);[10] Mūle eva nihitaḥ kuṭhāraḥ (meaning, cut off at the very root);[11] Karṇasparśe kaṭicālanaṁ (meaning, wagging of the buttocks at the touch of the ears, that is, as explained by Śaṅkara Mishra—Sabdaliṅgasvābhāvyaṁ karṇasparśaḥ, tadvadeva pratyakṣasvābhāvyāpādanaṁ kaṭicālanam/ yadvā yāvaddharmāṇāmagrahaṇaṁ karṇasparśaḥ, tadvadeva dharmiṇopyagrahaṇāpādanaṁ kaṭicālanaṁ[12]). *Subhagābhikṣuka-Nyāya* (it is used to denote the improbability of many opposed characteristics attributed to one parti-

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1 Pp. 344-45. 2 P. 349. 3 P. 374.
4 P. 79 Jivananda Vidyasagara's text. 5 P. 131.
6 P. 122. 7 P. 26. 8 P. 31.
9 P. 32. 10 P. 34. 11 P. 34.
12 *Kalpalatā*, p. 389.

cular object—ekatraviruddhānekadharmasamāveśāsambhavavivakṣāyām tu Subhagābhikṣukanyāyah pravartate);[1]Kimārdrakavaṇijo vahitracintayā[2] (meaning, what is the sense in thinking of the naval business by one who deals in the business of wet ginger); Kulīrasyeva svaprasūtayuktyāpatyenaiva pratihatatvāt[3] (meaning, like the crab which is destroyed by its own issue, the arguments have been refuted by its own issues); Saviśeṣaṇe hi vidhiniṣedhau (Viśeṣye·bādhye sati) viśeṣaṇamupasaṅkrāmate,[4] (meaning, an affirmation or negation when made of a subject together with its predicate, applies to the predicate if a bar exists to the affirmation or negation being attached to the subject); Yo yena saṁyujyate vibhajyate vā sa tatkāryadravyeṇāpi;[5] Pradīpāntareṇa pradīpaṁ nirvāpya timirāpādanaṁ[6] (meaning, causing darkness by putting off one lamp by another, that is, causing confusion by setting aside one argument by another). There is just an opposite of this maxim—Pradīpe pradīpam prajjvālya tamonāśāya yatamānaḥ; Svapne hastam prasārayati;[7] Vadhūmāṣamāpanavṛttāntam[8] (meaning, measuring out of beans by the daughter-in-law).[9] There is a fine line about its origin—

kaṇadevyo sopyo sasura laghutara hātī jāni /
rūpalahaṭa kī cahaṭa ten sava jaga māgani āni; //

Viḍālavratanyāya;[10] and svaviṣamūrchitā bhujaṅgī ātmānameva daśatīti.[11]

Nyāyakusumāñjali—The second work of Udayana is his most famous *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. It consists of 73 kārikās divided into five chapters called clusters. The first contains 20, the second contains 4, the third contains 23, the fourth contains 6, while the fifth has 20 Kārikās. The author has himself added to these kārikās a sort of commen-

Nyāyakusumāñjali, the second work.

[1] Raghunātha Śiromaṇi-*Ātmatattvaviveka*, p. 54.
[2] P. 62. [3] P. 67. [4] P. 72.
[5] P. 73. [6] P. 80. [7] P. 82.
[8] P. 87.
[9] Vide—*Laukikanyāyāñjali* by Col. Jacob, Pt. II, p. 72.
[10] P. 121. [11] P. 67.

tary in prose which together with the Kārikās is known as the *Kusumāñjali-Prakaraṇa*. The kārikās are so charming and full of devotion and reasonings that they have become themselves most popular amongst the scholars as is clear from the various commentaries written exclusively on these kārikās. It is to be pointed out at this place that many teachers and students of the present generation understand that the work consists of only the Kārikās and not the prose. The entire work deals with Īśvara whose worship enables us to realize the highest goal of life. So says Udayana himself in the following verses—

satpakṣaprasaraḥ satāmparimalaprodbodhavaddhotsavo
vimlāno na vimarddane'mṛtarasaprasyandamādhvī-
kabhūḥ/
iśasyaiṣa niveśitaḥ padayuge bhṛṅgāyamāṇam-bhramac-
ceto me ramayatvavighnamanagho nyāyaprasūnāñjaliḥ//

Translation—May this handful of flowers of Nyāya, free from any fault laid at the feet of Īśvara (Īśa), delight my mind, bee-like roving about them—this handful of flowers having the petals blooming under favourable conditions, and affording delight by its fragrance to those whose olfactory organ is not affected by phlegm, etc.—one which is not disfigured even when rubbed with the hand; and which is the source of a honey as sweet as nectar.[1]

svargāpavargayormārgamāmananti manīṣiṇaḥ/
yadupāstimasāvatra Paramātmā nirūpyate//

Translation (from Mm. Kaviraj)—He whose worship the sages declare to be the means of Heaven and Liberation—that Supreme Self is here ascertained.

This work has been written to confirm the existence of Īśvara about whose existence there is no doubt whatsoever; and unless there is a doubt about Him no investigation about Him is necessary as has been said by Vātsyāyana 'nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kim tarhi? saṁśayite'rthe'[2]. So says, Udayana—

[1] From Mm. G. N. Kaviraj's translation. This verse has a double meaning applying to the work as well as to a handful of flowers.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya* on I i. 1.

Although with regard to that Being whom all men worship, whichever of the four aims of man they may strive after, *viz.*, the Being whom the followers of the Upaniṣads worship as One by nature pure and enlightened, the followers of Kapila as the perfect First-Knower, the followers of Patañjali as the Being who is untouched by afflictions (kleśas), actions, fruits and deserts, and who by assuming a *phantasmal body* (nirmāṇakāya) revealed the Veda and imparts (Saving) Grace; the followers of Mahāpaśupati as the absolutely Independent One who is undefiled by actions opposed to those enjoined in the Vedas and sanctioned by popular usage; the Śaivas as Śiva; the Vaiṣṇavas as Puruṣottama; the Paurāṇikas as the Supreme Father (Father of father); the Sacrificialists as the Soul of the sacrifice; the Saugatas (that is, the Bauddhas) as the Omniscient; the Digambaras as the Uncovered; the Mīmāṁsakas as That which is enjoined (by the Vedas) as the Object of worship; the Naiyāyikas as the Being who is endowed with all the attributes (among those mentioned above) which befit Him; the Cārvākas as One whose authority is established by the convention of the world, what more —whom even the artisans worship as Viśvakarman; the Great Architect—now, although with regard to such a Being, the Lord Śiva, whose power is universally recognized, like caste, family (gotra) meaning the name of the Ṛṣi in whose line one is born, the ancestor being a son or a descendant of one of the seven great Ṛṣis and the eighth Agastya—'Saptānām saptarṣiṇāmagastyāṣṭamānām yadapatyam tadgotramityācakṣate,'/pravara (meaning the Ṛṣi chosen by the Yajamāna in a sacrifice). So says Vardhamāna Upādhyāya —Ṛṣaya eva yajño vṛyamāṇā pravarāḥ,[1] school (of Veda), family duties, etc., there can hardly be any ground for doubt and consequently, any need for investigation,—still

nyāyacarceyamīśasya mananavyapadeśabhāk /
upāsanaiva kriyate śravaṇānantarāgatā//

Translation (from Mm. Pandit Kaviraj)—This logical dissertation of God, which may be called

[1] p. 18.

His contemplation, constitutes verily His worship, in as much as it follows the hearing (śravaṇa) of the śruti.[1]

Ultimate Aim of the *Kusumāñjali.*

From what has been said above by way of introducing the nature of the work, it is clear that Udayana holds that whatever Puruṣārtha one desires he gets through the worship of Īśvara. And he asserts that there can be no denial of Īśvara from any standpoint, who alone can fulfil all his desires and as long as a man has some want. No doubt, the *adṛṣṭa* of a man is very essential for the fulfilment of his desires, but even then *adṛṣṭa* cannot function without the Will of the Supreme Being, so has been, therefore, said in the *Nyāyasūtra*[2] and its commentaries. Udayana does not emphasise any particular form of Īśvara for worship. What he asserts is that every school of thought does believe in the Supreme object of worship and it is, therefore, that he holds that even the schools of Cārvāka, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṁsā, Bauddha, Jaina and so on, who are in a way atheist, do believe in the existence of Īśvara in some form or other. It is in this very sense that the Lord Himself has declared in the *Bhagavadgītā*[3]—

mama vartmānuvartante manuṣyāḥ pārtha sarvaśaḥ/

Again, the Lord says[4]—

ye'pyanyadevatābhaktā yajante śraddhayānvitāḥ/
te'pi māmeva Kaunteya yajantyavidhipūrvakam//

Translation—O son of Kuntī ! those who being full of faith and belief, worship other gods also worship me alone and none else, though their way of worship is different and not according to the proper method.

No denial of Īśvara by any school.

So Udayana looks into the faith and belief of every school of thought and finds that there is really speaking no denial of the existence of Supreme Being anywhere. Udayana makes it clear that there is no human being who does not seek after the attainment of any of the four *Vargas,* ends of life. And whosoever

[1] Verse 3. [2] IV. i. 21. [3] IV. 11. [4] IX. 23.

seeks after any one of these must believe and worship God in some form or other. Udayana looks at this problem from a very practical standpoint and he is sure that every one believes in the existence of God (Paramātman), otherwise a human being cannot achieve the goal of his life. Udayana has made it clear that there can be no human being without any final end in view, it may be mundane or spiritual, and in order to achieve it a strong and full faith and belief in the existence of the Supreme Being who controls all these must be had. Udayana has tried to trace the idea of this Supreme Being from the Upaniṣad down to the Cārvākas and supports his thesis.

Without a belief in Īśvara goal of life cannot be realized.

That the Upaniṣads, Vedānta and some others believe in the Supreme Being is quite clear and needs no explanation. But that the Sāṅkhya also believes in Īśvara requires some explanation. We know that the Sāṅkhya does not believe in the existence of an eternal Īśvara as the cause of the universe or its destroyer, nor even for imparting the fruit of the actions done by beings in their past lives.

Sāṅkhya does not ordinarily believe in Īśvara.

Believing in the theory of *Satkārya*, Sāṅkhya holds that every effect is present in potentiality in the Prakṛti which manifests the entire creation by its very nature, having *rajas* as one of its constituents. The entire universe, again, is destroyed and merges into Prakṛti by its very nature, as it has *Sarūpa* and *Virūpa* pariṇāmas[1]. Prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas and that state is destroyed for the manifestation of the universe under the influence of the deeds or saṁskāras of the created beings for the fruition of their deeds done in the past.[2] Thus, the manifestation or creation of the universe is under the influence of the adṛṣṭa and only natural, without the agency of any intelligent being. So ordinarily, there

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[1] Prakṛtisarūpam virūpañca—*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 8.

[2] *Sāṅkhyasūtra*-karmavaicitryāt pradhānaceṣṭā, garbhadāsavat—III. 51; karmākṛṣṭervāpyanāditaḥ—III. 62.

is no need of believing in the existence of Īśvara according to Sāṅkhya.

Again, postulating the existence of Īśvara for influencing the *jaḍa adṛṣṭa* to yield fruits of the deeds of beings is also not necessary according to Sāṅkhya. So says the *Sāṅkhyasūtra*—neśvarādhiṣṭhite phalasampattiḥ, karmaṇā tat siddheḥ.[1]

Translation—Fruits of the past deeds do not accrue under the influence of Īśvara; it is through the deeds alone that fruits are achieved.

Hence, according to them, karman alone is the cause of the universe and there is no need of any Īśvara; otherwise, if Īśvara is believed to be the cause of the universe or the creation, attributes like attachment or hatred, etc. will have to be posited in Īśvara which will be most undesirable. So, there is no need of postulating the existence of Īśvara in Sāṅkhya.

No need of Īśvara in Sāṅkhya.

Thus, it is clear that there is no place of Īśvara in Sāṅkhya in the sense it is understood in common parlance. But then, there may be a question : why then Udayana has declared that even Sāṅkhya believes in the existence of Īśvara ? To make his position clear, Udayana has said that the Īśvara of the Sāṅkhya is the *ādividvān siddha*. In other words, 'Kapila', the founder of the school, is the *Īśvara* according to Sāṅkhya, as it is he who possesses all those attributes which are eternally found in Īśvara. Though the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* does not refer to Kapila as such, yet Pañcaśikha, Vācaspati and others have referred to Kapila as *ādividvān*, *paramarṣi*, etc. (ādividvān nirmāṇacittamadhiṣṭhāya bhagavān paramarṣirāsuraye jijñāsamānāya tantram provāca).[2] Īśvarakṛṣṇa also has used the term *paramarṣi*, evidently for Kapila in his *Kārikā*.[3] However, it must be made clear here that all those attributes, like sarvajña (omniscient), sarvasya karta (doer

Udayana proves that *Ādividvān, Siddha* kapila of Sāṅkhya is Īśvara.

[1] V. 2.

[2] *Pañcaśikhasūtra* quoted in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*, I. 54.

[3] 69.

of everything), antaryāmī (one who regulates mankind or his internal feelings), etc. belong to those Yogins who are *Siddhas* and have attained the highest stage of *siddhis* through upāsanā (evam tarhi 'sa hi sarvavit sarvasya kartā' ityādiśrutibādhaḥ syādityatra āha—muktātmana praśaṁsā upāsāsiddhasya vā).[1] Now, such a being is the *Hiraṇyagarbha* who lords over the universe and has attained the stage at which the *Mahattattva* is realized. He becomes *Prakṛtilīna* when his 'citta' is in the state of suspense, but his 'citta' is liable to come back to the state of manifestation.[2] Each of these Puruṣas, as they are also called, is known as Janya or Kārya Īśvara.[3] In fact, the *Sāṅkhyasūtra* has definitely said that such a being is the *Īśvara* which *Sāṅkhya* believes in—'Īdṛśeśvarasiddhiḥ siddhā;'[4] 'prakṛtilīnasya janyeśvarasya siddhiryaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavidyasya jñānamayaṁ tapaḥ';[5] 'yaḥ uktalakṣaṇo' kṣarākhyah sarvajñaḥ sāmānyena sarvam jānātīti sarvajñaḥ/viśeṣeṇa sarvam vettīti sarvavit/yasya jñānamayam jñānavikārameva sārvajñalakṣaṇam tapo-anāyāsalakṣaṇam, tasmādyathoktāt sarvajñādetaduktam kāryalakṣaṇam brahma hiraṇyākhyam jāyate/kiñca nāmāsau devadatto yajñadatta ityādilakṣaṇam/rūpamidam śuklam nīlamityādi/annam ca vrīhiyavādilakṣaṇam jāyate.[6]

So, it is quite evident that according to Sāṅkhya, Īśvara is identical with *ādividvān* and *Siddha* who is again, identified with Kapila who is regarded as an avatāra. This is in brief the conception of Īśvara in Sāṅkhya.

Such being the fact, Udayana holds that there is no necessity of making any effort to prove the existence of Īśvara. But even then why Udayana is making effort in his work is only by way of *upāsanā* (mananavyapadeśabhāk). In other words, Udayana is of opinion

Necessity to prove the existence of Īśvara even when He is accepted by all.

[1] *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, I. 95.

[2] Vide—na kāraṇalayāt kṛtakṛtyatā magnavadutthānāt—*Aniruddhavṛtti* on the *Sāṅkhyasūtra* along with the *Bhāṣya*—III. 54.

[3] *Sāṅkhyasūtra* with *Bhāṣya* and *Vṛtti*, I. 95-99; III. 54-58.

[4] *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, III. 57.

[5] *Muṇḍaka*, I. i.9.

[6] *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Muṇḍaka*, I. i.9.

that, no doubt, there is Īśvara and no school of thought ever has any doubt about His existence, even then why it is necessary to write a book on it, is to clarify and convince even the heretics through pure and simple reasonings the same which is evident in the authoritative texts of all the schools of thought. In philosophy, both theoretical proofs along with practical arguments are necessary to determine a reality. Hence, a book like *Nyāyakusumāñjali* has been written.

Theme of the book.

Five objections and their refutations.

This book is divided into five clusters, called 'stavakas' and deals with five-fold objection against the postulating of an eternal Īśvara and refutes them one by one. The objections are: (1) absence of a supersensuous means to prove the existence of life after death (alaukikasya paralokasādhanasyābhāvāt), (2) possibility of even otherwise (that is, without admitting the existence of Īśvara) carrying out the means to prove the existence of another world, namely, scarifice (anyathāpi paralokasādhanānuṣṭhānasambhavāt); (3) presence of proofs to prove His non-existence (tadabhāvāvedakapramāṇasadbhāvāt); (4) His not being regarded as the means to right knowledge, even if His existence is admitted (sattve'pi tasyāpramāṇatvāt) and (5) absence of proofs to demonstrate His existence (tatsādhakapramāṇābhāvācca).

Udayana refutes all these objections in his book. As to the first point the author says that it is untenable because —

sāpekṣatvādanāditvādvaicitryādviśvavṛttitaḥ /
pratyātmaniyamādbhukterasti heturalaukikaḥ //[1]

Translation (from Shri Kaviraj)—The supersensuous ground exists by reason of independence, beginninglessness, variety, universal belief, and the restriction of joy and sorrow to each individual.

As the problem is so very important, it will not be out of place to give a very brief summary of the fivefold objection of the unbelievers, namely, Cārvāka, Mīmāṁsakas, Bauddhas, Jainas and Sāṅkhyas, and their reply from the Nyāya standpoint according to Udayana at this place.

[1] Kārikā 4.

The Cārvākas hold that there is no means to prove the existence of the supersensuous 'paraloka' (life after death), which may necessitate a belief in the existence of Īśvara.

Cārvāka-view.

As to the ground advanced that there is 'adṛṣṭa' produced by the performance of actions and as that 'adṛṣṭa' is 'jaḍa', it is necessary to believe in the existence of an eternal and omniscient Īśvara to help the fructification of that 'adṛṣṭa' and, subsequently, cause the creation, the Cārvākas hold that there is no such quality as 'adṛṣṭa', for want of proof. It cannot be cognized through direct means, nor by inference which the Cārvākas do not believe. Śabda which depends upon inference is not worth being regarded as a means to right knowledge. Moreover, there is no Ātman distinct from physical organism, or sense-organs, or manas, or prāṇa, for whose *bhoga*, life after death or the existence of heaven can be postulated. Creation is either natural or by chance. So there is no need to believe in the existence of any eternal ominscient Īśvara.

The above contention of the Cārvākas has been refuted by Udayana. He argues that it is evident that in this world, which is full of miseries, all beings are not of one nature; some are happy, others are

Refutation of the Cārvāka-view.

unhappy, some are rich, while others are poor, and so on. This sort of inequality is not possible to be explained without there being a cause behind *all these. We cannot find any obvious cause for* any of these differences in the universe; hence, it becomes necessary to believe in a cause called *adṛṣṭa*. In the absence of such an 'adṛṣṭa', which is produced out of the actions, even including the performance of sacrificial rites, no one would have ever dared to perform any ordinary action and what to speak of the performance of sacrificial rites which requires a good deal of expenditure and effort. It is also a fact that no perceptible result accrues from the performance of sacrificial rites and there can be no action without yeilding any result. It is not convincing to hold that all people perform sacrifices only for getting name and fame, or only for some pheno-

menal gain. Nor can we say that the performance of sacrifices is only under the deceitful influence of some fraudulent people, for it is impossible to think of any person who can take so much trouble and incur immense expenditure simply to deceive religious-minded person.

As to the argument that inference is not at all a means to right knowledge, it is said that the Cārvākas cannot but accept inference as a pramāṇa for the obvious reason that when they say that inference is not a pramāṇa, it itself is nothing but inference, which they accept as correct. So inference is also a means to right knowledge.

Lastly, as regards the identification of physical organism with Ātman, it may be said that if it were so, then a person, in his old age, could not have remembered what he had seen in his childhood, for the obvious reason that the physical organism changes from time to time and does not remain static. Hence, it is necessary to believe in the existence of 'adṛṣṭa', 'paraloka' and Ātman and also in the eternal omniscient Īśvara.

Mīmāṁsā-view.

The second objection is solved in the second stavaka. Some school of thought like the Mīmāṁsakas, holds that the creation is possible through the agency of karman (sacrifices) alone as enjoined by the Vedas (*nanu nityanirdoṣa-vedadvārako yogakarma-siddhasarvajña-advārako vā dharmasampradāyaḥ syāt, kim parameśvarakalpanayā iti*) which produces adṛṣṭa or *saṁskāra*, *for the fructification of which there is* the creation. So the Mīmāṁsakas hold that Veda, which is free from defects and is eternal and self-valid will itself be the cause for giving a start to the world-process and there is no need of any Īśvara for the purpose. If, on the other hand, Veda is not accepted to be eternal, even then, as held by the Sāṅkhya and others, through the agency of Kapila and others, who have acquired direct perception of dharma and adharma due to their attainment of yogic siddhis, the world-process will be explained without any agency of Īśvara.

To this Udayana holds that Veda itself is not self-valid. It is non-eternal and as such, it cannot be

the source of right knowledge unless its author is believed to be an infallible being. Such a person is Īśvara. From the Nyāya-point of view Udayana goes on arguing that there is no self-validity of Veda, because all right knowledge depends upon some cause and as 'Śabda' is non-eternal, and Veda being 'śabda', it is also non-eternal. Thus, through the agency of Veda world-custom and usage will not be established. Again, nor can Kapila and others be ever regarded as giving a start to the world-process in the beginning of the creation, because one does not possess perfect faith in Kapila who is quite different from Īśvara; nor can we be sure that the saṁskāra produced by yogic powers always give valid results (na hi yoga-balaprabhāvitā bhāvanā pramātmakameva sākṣāt-kāraṁ karotīti niyamaḥ). Hence, holds Udayana that there is an eternal and omniscient Īśvara.[1]

Refutation of Mīmāṁsā-view.

Coming to the third stavaka we come to the third objection, *namely, presence of proofs to prove the* non-existence of Īśvara. This is advanced by the Saugata. They hold that there cannot be any inference to prove the existence of Īśvara, as inference is based on direct perception, while there is no pratyakṣa of Īśvara. Again, he who is the doer is always in possession of a physical organism, but even according to the Naiyāyikas, Īśvara does not possess any organism. Hence, it is not possible to prove the existence of an agent (kartṛ) of the universe having no organism, like a pot-maker. Further, he who does something has always some definite end in view for the attainment of which he does that particular action. Īśvara, as the Naiyāyikas hold, is *āptakāma* (one who has achieved by His very nature all the desires fulfilled and possesses no more desire to be fulfilled). Hence, such a being cannot be the doer of any action.

Buddhist-view.

To this the reply of Udayana is that, no doubt, in the absence of direct perception of an object, inference is impossible. But it must be kept in mind that absence of the pratyakṣa of that object which is

Refutation of Buddhist-view.

[1] *Bodhanī* on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, II. 1.

by its very nature perceptible prevents inference; but if the object is by nature imperceptible, it cannot be said to be non-existent simply because it is not directly perceived. The horn of a hare is by nature imperceptible and it is also not perceived, so its non-perception proves its absence. If it were not so, then elements like Ākāśa, Kāla and others also would not have existed. Īśvara is not perceptible (pratyakṣo-palambhayogya). Hence, because one does not get the perception of Īśvara, it is not possible to deny His very existence.

Inference is possible in some āśraya, as in the case of inference of fire, mountain is the āśraya. Inferring the absence of 'kartṛtva' in Īśvara on the basis of the probans like the absence of body or absence of aim (prayojana) itself shows that the advocates of the view do admit Īśvara as the *āśraya* of that inference, otherwise, how can the inference of the absence of 'kartṛtva' be possible?

Again, there is no definite reason to prove that the agent must have an organism, for there is no proof to disprove the opposite view. In the case of the inference of fire where there is smoke, the causality itself is the 'bādhaka' of the opposite view (kāryakāraṇabhāva eva vipakṣabādhakaḥ).

As to the argument that Īśvara is without any aim, it may be pointed out that, no doubt, He has no personal aim to realize, but there is no doubt as doing good to the created beings is his aim (bhūtānugraha). So the existence of Īśvara cannot be denied.

Jaina-view.

Now, we come to the fourth objection. It is held by the Jainas that Īśvara, as believed by the Naiyāyikas, cannot be regarded as a source to right knowledge (apramāṇatva). Īśvara cannot be the Pramākaraṇa, for there is no proof to show that He can be a karaṇa in our pramā (right knowledge). His knowledge is eternal and has every object of the universe as His jñānaviṣaya (as held by the Naiyāyikas). But it is not possible for an eternal element to be a karaṇa, or a doer, or an agent (kartṛ). Hence, He cannot be the

karaṇa, or even the *kartṛ* even o His own knowledge. Nor is the knowledge of Īśvara a *pramā*, for a pramā is that knowledge which is attained as regards objects unknown. But there is nothing unknown to Īśvara. It is therefore, that the knowledge about the objects known before is of the nature of memory and not pramā. So the knowledge of Īśvara is not pramā, nor is Īśvara a source to knowledge. Hence, it is not possible to believe in the words of Īśvara who is not a pramāṇa.

Refutation of Jaina-view.

To this Udayana points out that even when the knowledge of Īśvara is eternal, He is the āśraya of that eternal knowledge and that which is the substratum of a *kriyā* (kriyāśrayasya) is a 'kartṛ'. So Isvara is a pramāṇa. Nor can we say that knowing the unknown is pramā, otherwise, the 'dhārāvāhika-jñāna' (knowledge in serial order) cannot be called a correct knowledge, while the erroneous knowledge, like 'idam rajatam' in the pearl-oyster also, will have to be accepted as 'pramā'. The Naiyāyikas, therefore, are of opinion that the correct definition of 'pramā' is 'yathārthānubhavaḥ'. As memory is not 'anubhava', it is not 'pramā'. The knowledge of Īśvara is both 'yathārtha' (correct, infallible) and 'anubhava' (direct cognition) and so it must be 'pramā'. It is thus, how Udayana finishes the fourth stavaka.

Sāṅkhya-view.

The fifth and the last stavaka begins with the last objection namely, absence of proof to demonstrate the existence of Īśvara. It is not possible, holds the Sāṅkhya, to infer the existence of Īśvara on the basis of His being the creator of the universe (jagatkartṛtayā). In fact, it is the Prakṛti which is the cause of the universe. Veda cannot prove His existence, because all the injunctions (vidhi-vākya) and methods of upāsanās do not lead to the existence of Īśvara.

Refutation of Sāṅkhya-view.

To all this Udayana with his humourous method says that it is not the fault of the branchless trunk (sthāṇu) if the blind man does not perceive it. He proceeds further and adds—

kāryāyojanadhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥ/
vākyāt saṅkhyāviśeṣācca sādhyo viśvavidavyayaḥ//[1]

Translation—The existence of the Omniscient eternal Being is proved on the following grounds : 'kārya', that is, the universe is a product and every product requires a conscious agent; 'āyojana', meaning, karman, that is, motion produced in the paramāṇus at the time of creation of dvyaṇukas by coming in contact with one another is due to the effort of a conscious agent; 'dhṛti', that is, that the universe is held up and is not allowed to fall down is due to the effort of some conscious being; destruction of the universe at the time of pralaya is also due to the effort of some conscious being; 'pada', that is, world-process (vyavahāra). It is necessary to postulate the existence of some independent and eternal conscious being to start the world-process of giving nomenclature to ghata, paṭa, etc., in the beginning of creation; 'pratyaya', that is, prāmāṇya. In other words, the knowledge derived from Veda is correct beyond doubt, simply because the Veda is a composition of some being who is Himself pramā or pramāṇa, like the direct perception; again, because of śruti, that is, Veda being a composition, must have an author (Vedaḥ pauruṣeyaḥ); 'saṅkhyāviśeṣa', that is, the dimension of dvyaṇuka is due to number, because the dimension of aṇus having eternal dimension cannot produce any dimension. Now, ordinarily number two is produced by the *apekṣābuddhi* of ordinary beings, but in the absence of such beings in the beginning of the creation, it is necessary to postulate the existence of a being whose *apekṣābuddhi* can produce the number two. On these grounds Udayana proves the existence of an eternal Īśvara.

Udayana says that like the creator of a pot there must be a creator of the universe, as the universe is also a product like the pot. This 'kartṛtva' is not possible in ordinary beings. Hence, the creator of the universe is Īśvara. Prakṛti cannot be the cause of the creation, because it is 'jaḍā' and as such, it is not possible for it to be the doer. A doer must be a

[1] Kārikā, V. 1.

conscious being. The *ārambhaka-saṁyoga* between the various paramāṇus in the beginning of the creation for the creation must be caused by the agency of Īśvara, for all actions invariably proceed from a conscious agent. Besides, there are Vedic injunctions like 'pray to Iśvara' (Iśvaram upāsīta), which also support the existence of Iśvara. The entire universe is kept in its place through the effort of Iśvara. Even the destruction of the universe is possible only through His effort. From all these various proofs it is evident that there is Iśvara.

This is in brief the substance of the five stavakas of the *Kusumāñjali* where Udayana has refuted the arguments of Cārvāka, Bauddha, Mīmāṁsā, Jaina, Sāṅkhya and others who do not believe in the independent existence of an eternal omniscient Īśvara. By the way, many other allied topics are also discusscused.

After having mercilessly criticized, of course, with sound reasonings, the views of the non-believers, Udayana with a merciful heart offers prayers to Īśvara to have compassion on those non-believers also in the following immortal lines :

Udayana's attitude towards his opponents.

ityevam śrutinītisamplavajalairbhūyobhirākṣālite
yeṣām nāspadamādadhāsi hṛdaye te śailasārāśayāḥ/
kintu prastutavipratīpavidhayo'pyuccairbhavaccintakāḥ
kāle kāruṇika tvayaiva kṛpayā te tāraṇīyā narāḥ//[1]

Translation—O Kind and Compassionate Lord! those in whose hearts thou canst find a place are indeed as hard-hearted as rocks or iron, though repeatedly their hearts are washed by the overflow of water in the form of ethical and Vaidic teachings; still in time Thou with Thy mercy wilt take them away across the ocean-like saṁsāra which is full of miseries, because even in the act of opposing Thy existence, they have very sincerely thought of Thee.

What a generous and merciful heart Udayana had even for his enemies!

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[1] V. 18.

Obviously, this work became so immortal, important and popular that great scholars from different parts of the country commented upon it. Most of them wrote their commentary on the Kārikā portion alone parts which became so popular that later on, both teachers and students forgot that there was any prose portion of it by the author himself.

Commentaries on the Kusumāñjali.

The earliest commentator on the *Prakaraṇa* is Varadarāja Mishra, son of Rāmadeva Mishra of Mithilā.[1] Earliest reference to his commentary called *Nyāyakusumāñjalibodhanī* is found in the *Niṣkaṇṭakā* by Kolācala Mallinātha, the famous commentator of Kāvyas, a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* by Varadarāja Mishra (etacca granthakṛtaiva spaṣṭīkṛtaṁ *Nyāyakusumāñjaliṭīkāyām*).[2] Varadarāja flourished in the 11th century A.D.[3] He also wrote a very useful book on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in kārikās and added an elaborate prose commentary on the same most probably being influenced by Udayana's *Kusumāñjali*. He himself says at the end of the *Tārkikarakṣā*—[4]

Kusumāñjalibodhanī by Varadarāja Mishra.

ālodya dustaragabhīratarān prabandhān
Vācaspaterudayanasya tathā pareṣām.

He was a great Mīmāṁsaka also (Nyāyavidyāvidagdhasya Mīmāṁsāpāradṛśvanaḥ).[5] The *Bodhanī* has been published in the *Princess of Wales Saraswati-Bhavana Texts Series*, Banaras. It is available only up to the end of the third stavaka in print but that Varadarāja most probably commented upon all the five chapters is evident, from what he says —'vakṣyāmaścaturthapariccede',[6] 'pañcame vakṣyāmaḥ'.[7] It is the best commentary so far available which explains the most abstruse lines of Udayana so well that one can very easily understand

[1] Vide—colophons of his commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*.

[2] P. 46. Reprint from the Pandit, Banaras.

[3] Introduction to the *Kusumāñjalibodhanī*, p. ii.

[4] P. 364. [5] Vide—end of the *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 364.

[6] P. 136. Very recently last chapters have also been discovered

[7] P. 128.

all the implications of the text. From the way in which Varadarāja explains Udayana it is clear that the former was very well acquainted with even the Buddhist works. He refers to the *Ātmatattvaviveka*,[1] *Uttaragītā*,[2] Dharmakīrti,[3] Sūtrakāra, Bṛhaspati, the author of the *Cārvākasūtra*,[4] Gauḍa Mīmāṁsaka,[5] *Tārkikarakṣā*,[6] *Nyāyasūtram*,[7] Mahāvratah[8] Vāhaṭa,[9] *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*,[10] Śālikanātha,[11] Pañcikākāra,[12] *Ślokavārtika*,[13] *Sāṅkhyakārikā*,[14] *Sārasaṅgraha*[15] a commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* by Varadarāja himself,[16] Prābh ākara,[17] *Nyāyabhāṣya*[18] and jarannaiyāyika.[19]

There is one very important point to be noted here that from the study of the *Bodhanī* and the author's referring to *kecittu* in several contexts it is evident that there were other commentaries on the *Kusumāñjali* before Varadarāja. Then another still more important point to note is what Varadarāja says in the beginning of his commentary—

audayane pathi gahane videśikaḥ pratipadaṁ skhalati lokaḥ /
tasya kṛte kṛtireṣā kusumāñjalibodhanī jayati//

Translation—The course of argumentation of Udayana is very abstruse and, therefore, non-Maithila scholars faulter[20] at every step. It is for such persons that this commentary named *Kusumāñjalibodhanī* is flourishing (that is, is written).

Purpose of writing the *Bodhanī*.

This definitely shows that there were some commentaries on the *Kusumāñjali* prior to the *Bodhanī* and which were not able to explain the texts of Udayana correctly. So Varadarāja wrote such a

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[1] P. 46. [2] P. 90. [3] Pp. 7, 8, 9, 10.
[4] P. 44. [5] P. 123. [6] P. 117-18.
[7] Pp. 3, 41, 72. [8] P. 31. [9] Pp. 32-33, 82-83.
[10] Pp. 75-76, 97, 110, 111. [11] P. 127.
[12] P. 123. [13] Pp. 62, 74, 103, 110, 113.
[14] Pp. 38, 40. [15] P. 118. [16] Pp. 117-18.
[17] P. 125. [18] P. 63. [19] P. 115.

[20] It is to be noted here that the word '*Videśikaḥ*' has been used for non-Maithilas. Even today the Maithilas use the term '*anyadeśīya*' for other than Maithilas in common parlance.

nice and easy running commentary on the text in order that non-Maithilas may understand its lines.

There are certain very interesting facts in this commentary which may be mentioned here.

Gleanings from the *Bodhanī.*

He says—*Milk or its constituents cannot produce* curd: for every product is produced from many 'dravyas', while at the time when it is curd, there does not exist milk. Nor can it be said that curd is produced with milk and some acid (amla) substance; for nothing can be produced with dissimilar objects functioning together. So the curd is produced out of the constituents of milk mixed with the acid substance when the milk-product (dugdha-kārya) is destroyed; so, the difference in the product is not due to the diffence in the samavāyi.[1]

Varadarāja himself says that he is an expert in expounding the most difficult thoughts of Udayana.[2]

Udayanagambhīrabhāvaprakaṭananipuṇena varadarājena/
vyākhyāta eva gahanaḥ kusumāñjaleḥ prathama khaṇḍaḥ//

Translation—Varadarāja, who is an expert in bringing out the deep sense of Udayana, has explained the difficult first chapter of the *Kusumāñjali.*

Meaning of Veda.

While explaining the meaning of Veda, he says that it is a group of letters coming out of the mouth of the teacher who has been pleased with the devotion and service of the pupils and which is studied by the dvijātis and is endowed with krama, accent, etc. It is not merely letters.[3]

Paramāṇus constitute the organism of Īśvara.

Paramāṇus constitute the organism of Īśvara, because it is to be dependent upon direct efforts (of some conscious agent), so that the motion found in those Paramāṇus is the breath of Īśvara.[4] If that be so, a question is asked—the quality of 'saṁyoga' being to attract (one another) there should have been

[1] *Bodhanī*, p. 14. [2] *Bodhanī*, p. 58.
[3] *Bodhanī*, p. 85. [4] *Bodhanī*, p. 91.

creation of universe in usual process of dvyaṇuka, etc. To this it is replied that the motion produced in the paramāṇus produces at that time contact of the type of *pracaya* meaning, contact of paramāṇus producing dvyaṇukas only. So says Vardhamāna—'pracayaśca yadyapyvayavamātravṛttiḥ saṃyogah, tathāpi dvyaṇukārambhakasaṁyogamātramatra vivakṣitam'[1] and not that of origination (kāryārambhaka) in order to produce the universe.

Utility of motion during pralaya.

The utility for the motion at that time is to keep the exact record of the time-limit of the duration of the period of dissolution, and which remains in tune with the breathing of Īśvara. Just as the breath of a living person during his sleep is to keep the record of his *āyu* (span of life).[2]

While explaining the term *Gauḍa Mimāṁsakaḥ*[3] Varadarāja says *Gauḍo Mīmāṁsakaḥ, Pañcikākāraḥ.*[4] Here my teacher says that by the *Pañcikākāra*, Varadarāja means Śālikanātha Miśra, the author of the *Prakaraṇapañcikā.*[5] But as the term *Gauḍa* was used for the country even beyond Bengal,[6] it is not at all justified to call Śālikanātha a Bengali.[7]

Explaining the maxim of day-break in the vicinity of the toll-collector's hut, Varadarāja says—'ghaṭṭakuṭī nāma śaulkikaśālā/ yathā hi śaulkikebhyo vibhyato rātrāveva śulkaśalā'tikramitavyeti gacchataḥ pānthasya tasyāmeva prabhātā śarvarī, that is, being afraid of the toll-collectors, travellers decide to go beyond the toll-collector's hut during the night, but by bad luck while they reach the hut, day dawned and they could not escape the payment of toll.[8]

Prakāśa by Varddhamāna

The next best commentary on the *Nyāyakusumañjali* is the *Prakāśa* by Varddhamāna Upādhyāya, son of the well-known founder of the Navya-Nyāya Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya,

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[1] P. 333.
[2] *Bodhanī* p. 91.
[3] *Kusumāñjali*, p. 466.
[4] *Bodhanī*, p. 123.
[5] *Bodhanī*, p. 123.
[6] See Foot-note 4 page 150 *Sūpra.*
[7] *Critical Bibliography of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-(Mīmaṁsākusumāñjali)* by Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra, p. 34.
[8] *Bodhanī*, pp. 130-31.

whom the author quotes profusely in this commentary. In fact, the *Prakāśa* is a sort of independent work and not a running commentary on the *Kusumāñjali*. It itself is a text and does not very much help a beginner to understand the lines of Udayana. It is, no doubt, a very scholarly work like other works of Maithila scholars. Varddhamāna can be easily placed in the beginning of the 14th century.[1]

Personal history.

He was also a Maithila Brāhmaṇa. He wrote on almost all the works of Udayana and all his commentaries are called *Prakāśa*. He also refers to several commentaries existing prior to his own. Varddhamāna refers to the following authorities in his *Prakāśa*: *Koṣa*,[2] quotes one well-known verse from Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khādya*[3], *Tattvakaumudī* by Vācsapati Mishra,[4] *Nyāyanibandha-Prakāśa*,[5] *Pariśiṣṭa-Prakāśa*,[6] Anvitābhidhānavādi,[7] Jaranmīmāṁsaka,[8] Prabhākara,[9] Bhāskara;[10] Murāri Mishra,[11] Ratnakoṣakṛt.[12]

Sub-Commenteries on the *Prakāśa*—Rucidatta.

Upon the *Kusumāñjali-Prakāśa*, Rucidatta Mishra, son of Devadatta Mishra and Reṇukā and a renowned disciple of Jayadeva Mishra, *alias* Pakṣadhara Mishra, wrote a commentary called *Makaranda*. So says the author himself in the beginning of his commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa—

'adhītya Rucidattena Jayadevājjagadguroḥ/
Cintāmaṇau granthamaṇau prakāśoyaṁ prakāśyate'.//

Again, it is a matter of great pride to the present author that his family belongs originally to the same village where Rucidatta lived—

sodarapuranivāsī Rucidattaḥ sūrimūrddhanyaḥ/
Cintāmaṇiprakāśaṁ vyaracayadānvīkṣikīkoṣam//

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1 Vide—*Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. 111, pp. 133-134; *Vaṅge Navya-Nyāyacarcā* by D. C. Bhattacharyya, pp. 18-19.

2 P. 41. 3 P. 386. 4 PP. 13-14.

5 P. 181, Part 1, P. 424, Part 1. Most probably this is his own commentary on the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana.

6 P. 533. 7 P. 478. 8 PP. 91, 427. 9 P. 481.

10 P. 332. 11 P. 114, 219. 12 P. 68.

He had two brothers named Śaktidatta and Matidatta. That he lived in the year 380 La. Saṁ corresponding to 1505 A. D. is clear from the colophon of a manuscript of a copy of the *Kiraṇāvalī* transcribed by himself—

rasavasuharanetre caitrike śuklapakṣe
pratipadi budhavāre vatsare lākṣmaṇe ca/
vibudhavinodaṁ kārayantīṁ supustīm
alikhadamalapāṇī śrī-Rucih śrīsametaṁ[1]//

Though the *Makaranda* is not a running commentary, yet it is very useful and explains some of the most important lines of the *Prakāśa* of Varddhamāna. It is also published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series* along with the *Prakāśa*. There are references to the following authorities in the *Makaranda* : *anumāna-Prakāśa*-Vardhamāna's commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Guṇabhāṣya*,[2] *Cintāmaṇi*,[3] *Dravya-Prakāśa*,[4] *Parimala*,[5] a commentary on the *Kusumāñjali* by Divākara Upādhyāya of the 13th century, earlier than Gaṅgeśa[6] also referred to by Śaṅkara Mishra in the beginning of his commentary on the *Kusmuāñjali*—'*Makarande Prakāśe* vā vyākhyā *Parimale'tha* vā'; *Pratyakṣa-Prakāśa*,[7] *Prameya-Tattvabodha*—[8] 'tadāha *Prameya-Tattvabodhe* Varddhamānaḥ, *Bauddhādhikāra*,[9] *Līlāvatī*,[10] *Līlāvatī-Prakāśa*,[11] Śabda-*Prakāśa*[12] and *Prakāśa*;[13] Anyathākhyātivāda;[14] Abhihitānvavavādī;[15] Prakāśakṛt;[16] Mishra;[17] Kathakasampradāya.[18]

There is another commentary on the *Prakāśa* of Varddhamāna by the well-known scholar Bhagīratha

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[1] Vide—Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda's Introduction to the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 28 Foot-note.

[2] *Praśastapādabhāṣya* on Sthitisthāpaka, Pp. 633-34.

[3] P. 131. [4] Pp. 67, 153, 317. [5] P. 52.

[6] Vide—*Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, Pp. 12, 13, 15, 252.

[7] Pp. 91, 108, 186, 210, 212, 225, 234, 351, 356, 523.

[8] P. 384. [9] P. 330. [10] P. 131.

[11] Pp. 105, 118, 146.

[12] Pp. 260, 273, 280, 286, 295, 311, 319, 448, 463; Pt. II, Pp. 107, 152, 179, 204, 221, 223, 226.

[13] P. 211. [14] P. 12. [15] P. 479.

[16] P. 518. [17] P. 231. [18] P. 106.

Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura.

Ṭhakkura *alias* Megha Ṭhākura, pupil of Jayadeva Mishra, and the elder brother of Maheśa Ṭhakkura, author of the *Āloka-Darpaṇa* and the founder of the present Darbhanga Rāja. His commentary is known as the *Prakāśikā*.

Besides these direct and indirect commentaries, we have the commentaries of Śaṅkara Mishra, son of Bhavanātha and Bhavānī, of the 16th century, called *Āmoda*,[1] of Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa of Nadiā, of the 16th century whose commentary is known as the *Viveka*. These few commentaries are on the whole of the *Kusumāñjaliprakaraṇa*.

Commentaries on the Kārikās alone.

Of the commentaries written only on the Kārikā the most popular is by Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra which is generally known as the *Haridāsī*. These days students read this commentary alone on which we have two commentaries, one by Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra and the other by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa of the 20th century. The latter is much better. Besides, we have commentaries by Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma Bhaṭṭācāryya (17th century), Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra (1650 A. D.), Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana (1675 A. D.), Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and Maheśacandra Nyāyaratna. The late Paṇḍita Ambādāsa Shāstrī of Vārāṇasī also have added short notes to the Kārikās. Trilocanadeva Nyāyapañcānana of the 17th century, son of Rāma of Nadiā has also written a commentary on the *Kusumāñjali*—

trilocanena devena nyāyapañcānanena ca /
prathamastavakavyākhyā niramāyi mayottamā.[2]

From all this it may be said that all great scholars of ancient period considered it a great honour to write something on the works of Udayana, because that itself added to their reputation. So there may be many more commentaries on these two most important works of Udayana not known to me.

It may also be mentioned that the latest commentary on the *Kusumāñjaliprakaraṇa* in the 19th century is

[1] A complete ms. of it is in the Saraswati Bhavana Library, Vārāṇasī.

[2] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 116.

by one Arjuna Jhā of the village Māṅgarauni, in the District of Darbhanga. A manuscript of this work has in its colophon the following—

kārtikakṛṣṇapratipacchukre Govindasyārthe likhitamidaṁ
pustakalikhanapariśramavettā vidvajjano mānyaḥ (nānyaḥ?)
sāgaralaṅghanakhedo Hanūmānekaḥ paramvetti//[1]

Lastly, I add here some notes from the *Kusumāñjali* as they are interesting and important at the same time—

A few interesting gleanings from the *Kusumāñjali.*

When an oblation is offered to some god in the fire, then it purifies the person who offers it and not the fire, nor the gods.[2]

He says there is no portion of the Veda where Parameśvara is not praised. Thus, in the *Puruṣasūkta* He is referred to as the Creator, in the Rudra mantras His superhuman powers are mentioned, in the Maṇḍala-Brāhmaṇa He is referred to as the Śabda-Brahman, in the Upaniṣads He is mentioned as above transcendent, in the Injunctive mantras He is mentioned as Yajña-Puruṣa, in the Upākhyānas He is referred to in His various ways of manifestation and lastly, He is mentioned everywhere as a Deity worthy of worship.[3]

Some people have heard of that Bhagavān, some have again reali ed Him, while some have also directly perceived Him. No doubt, says Udayana, He cannot be seen with our physical eyes, because for direct perception there must be necessary implements which are either dependent upon external sense-organs or on Manas. But the Lord cannot be seen with our physical sense-orgains, as eyes have their definite objects of perception, nor can He be seen with Manas as it is not capable of functioning outside the physical organism. But His existence cannot be denied. It is seen that in dreaming state objects not present then in time and space, are also directly perceived. We cannot say that such cognitions are not other than sharp and intelligent recollections—'na ca smṛtire-

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[1] iti *Śāke* 1743 San 1229. *History of Tirbuta*, by S.N. Singh, p. 114.
[2] P. 128. [3] Part II, p. 225.

vāsau paṭīyasī', for the form of the dream-cognitions is not like 'I recollect', or 'I have recollected'; while, on the other hand, it is like the direct cognitions expressed in the form 'I am perceiving', or 'I have seen'. We cannot say that such cases of perception are not correct but are false impositions, because there is annulment of those cognitions later on, and also because we perceive in dreams cutting off one's own head which had not happened ever before. Further, he says that dream-cognitions are also sometimes correct as they correspond with the reality. The reason for their being correct is only dharma (results ofgood deeds of the past) which, again, may be due to yogic achievements.[1] It is to be noted here that exactly the same idea in almost the same language occurs in Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī* also[2].

Varddhamāna adds here that just as in dream-cognitions the Manas is free to move even outside the physical organism being assisted by a particular type of helper (sahakāriviśeṣānmanaso bahiḥ svātantryaṁ), so with the assistance of 'yogaja dharmas' dream-cognitions can be correct also.[3]

Direct perception of Iśvara and Validity of dream-cognitions.

This makes it clear that Udayana believed in the direct perception of the Lord and also that sometimes dream-cognitions are quite correct.

There is a reference to the *Ātmatattvaviveka* in this work, it can be said with confidence that the *Kusumāñjali* was written by Udayana after the former and that it is his second work—'sarvam Ātmatattvaviveke nipuṇataramupapāditamiti.'[4]

The third work of Udayana is his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama, variously called *Pariśiṣṭa*

Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa-third work.

or *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, or *Bodhasiddhi*, or *Prabodhasiddhi*, or *Bodhaśuddhi*.[5] This is an original commentary on the *Nyāysūtra*. This

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[1] *Kusumāñjali*, Part II. Pp. 235-36.

[2] P. 275, Vindhyeshvari Prasad's edition.

[3] *Prakāśa* on the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 235.

[4] Part II. Page 88.

[5] *Introduction* to the *Nyāyavārttika* by V. P. Dwivedi, p. 162, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition.

independent work is based on the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika* and *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati as has been made clear in the *Tārkikarakṣā* by Varadarāja Mishra —'atra Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Ṭīkāsu saṅkulāni vacāṁsi Praboddhasiddhau Ācāryaiḥ, etc.[1]

We are still in dark as to the extent of this work. As it is available both in print and in manuscript it is only on the fifth chapter. There is some justification in support of its being only on the fifth chapter. It is a fact that Udayana was bent upon criticizing Buddhists and as Dharmakīrti had written his *Vādanyāya* criticizing the Nyāya view on Nigrahasthāna, the subject matter of the fifth chapter alone, Udayana also might have written his *Bodhasiddhi* only on the fifth chapter. The view that the *Pariśiṣṭa* is only on the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra* is further supported by Varadarāja's line—'asaduttararūpā sā, draṣṭavyā *Pariśiṣṭataḥ*'.[2] So he also refers to the *Pariśiṣṭa* only in connection with the topics of the fifth chapter alone and not those of previous chapters. This is what I am also inclined to think.

But then there is another side also to be considered. The manuscript begins and ends stating that this portion is the fifth chapter. It has no maṅgalācaraṇa, so it seems as if it is a part of a bigger book.

There is another point also. Udayana wrote this work before the *Pariśuddhi*. In the latter, Udayana refers to *Pariśiṣṭa* six times.[3] He does not refer to the *Pariśiṣṭa* in the first four chapters. When he refers so many times to his *Pariśiṣṭa* in one chapter, why does he not refer to it in other chapters even once? There must be some reason. The only reason is that the *Pariśiṣṭa* does not exist on the first four chapters and hence, nowhere its reference is found in the first four chapters of the *Pariśuddhi*. So it seems that the *Pariśiṣṭa* is a running commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, chapter V alone.

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[1] P. 308.

[2] *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 311.

[3] Vide—Manuscript of the *Pariśuddhi* with the author, Pp. 1172, 1181, 1182, 1185, 1199 and 1211.

In this work Udayana refers to Ācārya,[1] Tātparyācārya,[2] Diṅnāga[3], anye[4] kecit,[5] Īśvarānumāne... vyākhyātaṁ,[6] Dharmakīrti,[7] eke,[8] kaścit.[9] Besides, he refers to *Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika* and *Ṭīkā* in several places. It was written prior to the *Pariśuddhi*, because there are references, as noted above, to this work in the latter work.

From the various references found in this work it is evident that the Buddhists had enough polemic discussions with the Mīmāṁsakas also.

Udayana says that *Vāda* proceeds only when the polemic is between the propounders of the opposite systems and not otherwise.[10] It has been published in *the Calcutta Sanskrit Series*.

The fourth work of Udayana in chronological order is his commentary called *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi*, or *Nyāyanibandha* or only *Nibandha*, on the *Ṭīkā*, more popularly known *Tātparyaṭīkā*, or only *Tātparya* of Vācaspati Mishra I. It is a very elaborate commentary on the *Ṭīkā*. It is partly printed in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*. Udayana had a great regard for the scholarship of Vācaspati and he is very cautious to see that he does not misinterpret Vācaspati's lines. So he prays to the Goddess of learning in the very beginning of his work in the following words—

Pariśuddhi-fourth work.

mātaḥ sarasvati punaḥ punareṣa natvā
baddhāñjaliṁ kimapi vijñapayāmyavehi/
vākcetasormama tathā bhava sāvadhānā
vācaspatervacasi na skhalato yathaite//

Translation—O Mother Sarasvati! having repeatedly bowed down to you I pray to you for an insignificant matter. Be attentive. You should so cautiously guard my power of speech and mind that these may not blunder upon the lines of Vācaspati (while I comment upon them).

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1 P. 1. 2 P. 3. 3 Pp. 9, 40.
4 P. 16. 5 P. 20, 75.
6 P. 36. Does he refer to the *Kusumāñjali*?
7 P. 52. 8 P. 69. 9 P. 5
10 P. 91.

It is in this very commentary that Udayana has mentioned the name of Śrī-Vatsa who is believed to be Udayana's *Guru*. He has quoted Śrīvatsa's views very often in the *Pariśuddhi*.[1] He has also referred to Trilocana and Bhūṣaṇa[2], Svāyambhuvamata[3] which seems to be connected with the Sāṅkhya school, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*,[4] *Kīrti*,[5] *Pariśiṣṭa*,[6] Prauḍha-Gauḍa-Naiyāyika-mata,[7] Sampradāyavidaḥ,[8] Vṛddhasammati,[9] Jarannaiyāyika Jayanta-prabhṛtīnām,[10] *Kusumāñjali* lines quoted.[11] Prācyānām,[12] Sānātanih,[13] Bāhyāḥ,[14] Gauḍānām,[15] Ācāryadeśīyānām,[16] Sampradāya-pravartakāstu Sauddhodani-prabhṛtayaḥ,[17] *Viśvaṭīkā*,[18] Śaṅkarācārya,[19] Trilocana,[20] refutes Bhūṣaṇa,[21] Ācārya (for Vācaspati Mishra).[22]

A few peculiarities of the *Pariśuddhi*.

Some of the peculiarities of this work may be mentioned here—

The *Pariśuddhi* is very elaborate on the first chapter. The first Āhnika itself covers 777 pages of our manuscript, while the second Āhnika of the first chapter extends from page 777 to 829. The first Āhnika of the second begins from page 830 and ends on page 923, while the second Āhnika of the chapter covers from page 923 to 970. The first Āhnika of the thirdchapter begins from page 971 and ends on 1026, while the second Āhnika covers pages 1026 to 1077. The first Āhnika of the fourth chapter begins from page 1078 and ends on page 1137. The second Āhnika of the fourth begins from page 1138 and ends on page 1155. The first Āhnika of the fifth chapter

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1 Ms. Pp. 923-24, 1001, 1073, 1182, 1197.
2 Ms. Pp. 731, 1041.
3 Ms. P. 1115.
4 Ms. Pp. 618, 963, 1201.
5 Ms. P. 1198.
6 Ms. P. 1172, 1181, 1185, 1199, 1211.
7 Ms. P. 779.
8 P. 156.
9 Pp. 531, 551.
10 Ms. Pp. 599, 601, 926, 930 935.
11 Ms. P. 618.
12 Ms. P. 609.
13 Ms. P. 779.
14 Ms. P. 780.
15 Ms. P. 812.
16 Ms. Pp. 855, 1012.
17 Ms. P. 922.
18 Ms. P. 928.
19 Ms. Pp. 1039, 1149.
20 Ms. P. 1041.
21 Ms. P. 1041.
22 Ms. P. 1010.

begins from page 1156 and ends on page 1193, while the second Āhnika covers pages from 1193 to 1215.

In this there is some defect in the manuscript in my possession that it includes in the first chapter about 197 pages of the *Tātparya*. So after deducting 197 pages from the first chapter the number of pages in our manuscript chapterwise is as follows: First adhyāya pages 632; Second adhyāya pages 140; Third adhyāya pages 106; Fourth adhyāya pages 76, while the fifth adhyāya has only 59 pages. That is, the first is the largest chapter. The author has applied much more energy in this chapter which is really very important. It is notable that gradually the *Pariśuddhi* has become smaller and smaller, so that the last chapter is the smallest and covers only 59 pages. It is also to be kept in mind that the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* itself covers only 27 pages for the fifth chapter. Can it not be said that in order to make his commentary on the fifth more elaborate Udayana wrote his *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* only on the fifth Adhyāya and so he has called it *Pariśiṣṭa*, meaning, supplement or appendix?

There is another point to be noted here that in the beginning of each Adhyāya Udayana has one verse by way of *maṅgalācaraṇa* except in the beginning of the second, where he adds one more verse in praise of his *Guru* Śrī-Vatsa. These verses are somewhat significant, so it will not be out of place to quote them here. These are—

mātaḥ Sarasvati punaḥ punareṣa natvā
baddhāñjaliḥ kimapi vijñapayāmyavehi /
vākcetasormama tathā bhava sāvadhānā
vācaspatervacasi na skhalato yathaite//

The translation of this verse has already been given above. The only comment is that he has addressed Sarasvatī as *Mother*, that is, he expects that like one's mother the Goddess will certainly fulfil the demands of the son. He is, as already pointed out above, also a śākta and as such, he has made invocation to the Śakti in the form of Sarasvatī. Then this is also a maṅgalācaraṇa.

The verse in the beginning of the second Adhyāya is—

apakṣapātine viṣvagajñānadhvāntaghātine/
namaḥ sarvasaraṇyāya pramāṇāya Pinākine//

Translation—Salutation to Śiva in the form of *Pinākin* (meaning, one who has a bow in his hand to protect all against evil-doers), who is Pramāṇa (meaning, authority, or true knowledge; and as it is a work on Pramāṇaśāstra, it is in the fitness of things that Udayana has used the term *Pramāṇa* which is infallible for the Lord), and also to destroy all the obstacles and nescience, the Lord, the Deity of Udayana, should carry a bow in his hand; it may also be said that Udayana's Deity carries a bow to destroy the wrong arguments of the non-believers, and, therefore, He has been called as one who is the destroyer of darkness in the form of nescience spreading all around and Who is not at all partial. Udayana might have in his mind an idea to show that while criticizing the views of his opponents he is never partial. He is always just. All these might have been in the mind of Udayana while writing this verse. So this is also a maṅgalācaraṇa.

The following is the verse in the beginning of the third Adhyāya—

vidyāsandhyodayodrekādavidyā rajanīkṣaye/
yadudeti namastasmai kasmaicid viśvatastviṣe//

Translation—Salutations to that indescribable, all pervasive eternal light (as described in the Veda—*abhayaṁ jyotiḥ*) which rises up (manifests or reveals itself) after the night like nescience has been cast off due to the diffusion of revelation at the union of the spiritual knowledge. This gives us an idea of Udayana's inner-light also.

It seems, as if, this verse was originally written for the *Pariśuddhi*, but later on, it was added to the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* at the end and was also used as a maṅgalācaraṇa of the *Kiraṇāvalī*.

In the beginning of the fourth Adhyāya he writes a maṅgal verse—

yānāsanavinirmuktaṁ sandhivigrahavarjitam/
vidhūtasaṁsayadvaidhaṁ nirguṇam nṛpatim numaḥ//

Translation—Salutations to that Lord of human beings who is free from attachment, hatred and delu-

sion of mind (moha), who has dispelled diversity due to doubts and who is above the six modes of kingly policies, as He is the Lord of human beings (nṛpatiḥ).

Lastly, in the beginning of the fifth chapter he says—

rāgānugatasaṁbhedaṁcandrasūryānalekṣaṇau/
namāmi girijeśānau yāminīvāsarāviva//

In this verse Udayana bows down to both Śiva and Śakti joined together; because, both together can lord over the universe and fulfil the ambitions of their devotees. This shows that Udayana is not only a Śaiva, but as I have already said above, he is *a devotee of all the three main deities; or we may* also say that as the verse *vidyāsandhyodayāt* has been explained as a salutation to the God Sun by Varddhamāna, Udayana has given proof of his being a devotee of the *Pañcadevas* (Pañcadevopāsaka).

He says that due to sufferings from diseases even wise men are found committing suicide by falling down (into the waters of the Triveṇī) from the Vaṭa tree at Prayāga.[1]

The ultimate end in performing the *sandhyopāsana* (morning, noon and evening prayers) and performance of 'prayaścitta' is to put an end to effects not conducive to happiness. According to Udayana *darkness* (tamas) is the absense of light. Apavarga is absence of pain for all persons.[2] *Pretyabhāva* (birth after death), though it is positive, yet as there is the absence of the previous body, it is also negative in form, says Udayana.[3]

Such religious rites as are performed to atone for sins (Prāyaścitta) destroy the effects of past deeds which have not yet yielded any result.[4]

People of the world realize pleasure in four ways—by constant practice, as in hunting; due to self-conceit, as in sandal paste; by using material objects, such as sweets, fragrance, fair colour, music, etc. and also through the experience of mental desires (manorathādisampratyaya), as in thinking of the festivity

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[1] P. 86.
[2] P. 220.
[3] P. 220.
[4] P. 376.

on the occasion of the birth of the would be son. But then there is some difference in all these kinds of pleasure and therefore, there is also the difference in the cause of each of these.[1]

There are two kinds of *sambandha* (contact)—*Prāptilakṣaṇa* (of the type of touching), as in the case of light with a pot; and opposite of the former (aprāptilakṣaṇa, not of the state of touching), as in the case of name, knowledge, etc. with namables and knowables, etc.[2]

We should not say that there is no pleasure in the dreaming-end-cognition (svapnāntika), for if it were not so, then no lover would have longed for that state. So, that state is not the cause of pleasure, yet due to *moha* (stupidity) one's inclination is towards that which is not its cause,[3] just as the activity of the monkey is towards the heap of red-black berry beads (guñjāpuñja) for overcoming cold.[4]

A sentient being never thinks that a man, who is on the death-bed and is even unable to drink water, has eaten up a bread.[5]

Udayana says that Pariṇāma according to the Buddhists is the production of another 'dharmin' after the previous 'dharmin' has been destroyed, while the Sāṅkhya holds that it is the manifestation of another 'dharma' after the previous one has beome unmanifest,[6] the basic element remains unchanged.

Different interpretation of the term Pariṇāma by Sāṅkhya and Buddhist.

Udayana says that a *Bhāṣya* is an independent comment on the sūtra with the help of its author's imagination (Pratibhā). So the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* explains the sūtra even without it. This is but the habit of the Bhāṣyakāra.[7]

Udayana quotes a maxim called *Gardabhīkṣīramanthana*, apparently meaning that no butter is found even after the churning of the milk of the she-ass.[8]

Udayana says that according to the *Prauḍha-Gauḍa Naiyāyika* there are four types of *Kathā* instead of the

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1 Pp. 526-27. 2 Ms. Pp. 446-47. 3 Ms. P. 457.
4 Ms. P. 457. 5 Ms. P. 572. 6 Ms. P. 697.
7 Ms. P. 729 8 Ms. P. 739.

usually recognized three types.[1] Who is this *Prauḍha Gauḍa Naiyāyika?* The four types are: Jalpa (pure) and Jalpa free from pratipakṣasthāpanā; Pure Vāda and Vāda free from pratipakṣasthāpānā. But according to Bāhyas there is only one kind of Vāda.

There seems to have been a view that creation or production of one substance is out of two earthly atoms and one watery atom, which Udayana does not accept.[2]

With these few notes we proceed further to Udayana's contributions to the Vaiśeṣika school. There are only two works known to have been written on the Vaiśeṣika school by Udayana of which the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* is his smallest work. It begins with a verse promising to write a book on the definitions of all the substances after having bowed down to the Lord of Pārvatī who is 'nityavijñāna' and 'Īśvara'.

Udayana's contribution to Vaiśeṣika School.

Lakṣanāvalī fifth work of *Udayana*.

It begins with the two-fold broad division of the nameables, namely, bhāva (positive) and abhāva (negation). A very brief treatment of the six bhāvapadārsthas has been given and also of the four-fold division of the negation from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint. Along with such a treatment the author has given some different kinds of definitions of dravya, pṛthivī, tejas, ākāśa, Ātman, manas, guṇa, rūpa, saṁyoga, sneha, and samavāya. He has also said that the Ātman has two-fold division, namely, Īśvara and Anīśvara. The former is proved by inference, the form of which is—sprout, etc. must have an agent, as these are products, like a pot, (and an ordinary being cannot be such an agent, so there is Īśvara who alone can produce sprout, etc.). The second type of Ātman is to be realized through the cognition of '*ahaṁ*' within oneself and it is infinite; otherwise, there can be no order of things in the world.[3]

Udayana has given the process of the creation of the number '*dvitva*' in a well arranged verse which elsewhere has been given in prose.[4]

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[1] Tisraḥ Kathā bhavanti-*Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. ii. I; Ms. P. 779.

[2] Ms. P. 1006. [3] P. 7. [4] P. 10.

The most important fact about this book is that at the end of this work Udayana has given the date of its composition already referred to before which helps us to determine his time so accurately.

It has been published by Messrs Braj Bhusan Daṣ, Banaras. It has been commented upon by Śeṣa Sārṅgadhara Ācārya which is not yet published.[1]

It should not be confused with the *Lakṣaṇamālā* which Mallinātha in his commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* has attributed to Udayana.[2] This is supported by the fact that the references which Varadarāja has given are found in the *Lakṣaṇamālā* and not in the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*.[3]

Kiraṇāvalī Udayana's sixth work.

The last work of Udayana is his *Kiraṇāvalī*, a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Praśastapāda. Udayana has referred to his *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Kusumāñjali* in the *Kiraṇāval* .[5] Udayana has made references to Bhūṣaṇa[4] and has criticized it and to Bhāsarvajña.[6] It must be pointed out again, at this place, that though Udayana has mentioned the names of Bhūṣaṇa and Bhāsarvajña separately, as if these refer to two distinct persons, yet this is not the fact. *Bhūṣaṇa* is the name of Bhāsarvajña's commentary on his own *Nyāyasāra*. So he is very often called as Bhūṣaṇakāra. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, whose commentary on the *Nyāyasāra* is believed to be the oldest in extant, has definitely said that Bhāsarvajña has accepted a particular reading of the text in his *Bhūṣaṇa*[7]—Bhūṣaṇe ca Bhāṣarvajñairajñānasya yāgāderiti vyākurvadhiḥ, etc.— and also by Vallabhācārya in his *Nyāyalīlāvatī*—'tadidaṁ cirantana—Vaiśeṣikamatadūṣaṇam *Bhūṣaṇa*-kārasyātitrapākaram/tadidamanāmnātatā Bhāsarvajñasya yadidamācāryamapyavamanyate'.[8] Now, these two

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[1] Vide *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, p. 1, foot-note.

[2] pp. 179, 225.

[3] Vide—*Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III, p. 13, foot-note.

[4] PP. 103, 147. [5] PP. 43, 160, 192. [6] P. 232.

[7] Ms. Fol. 116 in possession of the Varanaseya Sanskrit University.

[8] PP. 57-58, *Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series, Banaras edition.*

references leave no doubt as to his having refferred to the same person. Again, Citsukhācārya quotes in his *Tattvapradīpikā*[1] the definition of *Viparyaya* as 'Mithyādhyavasāyaḥ' and attributes it to Bhūṣaṇakāra which definition is exactly what Bhāsarvajña has given in his *Nyāyasāra*.[2] Udayana has also referred to Ācāryāḥ,[3] Tautātitāḥ,[4] *Bhūṣaṇa*[5], *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Ātmatattvaviveka*[6], Ācāryaḥ, that is, Vyomaśivācāryāḥ as explained by Varddhamāna Upādhyāya in his *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*,[7] Prajñākara,[8] Bhāsarvajña.[9]

It is though a running commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, yet it is in many ways like an original work on the Vaiśeṣika system of Philosophy. It is unique in its treatment. Unfortunately, Udayana left it unfinished and might have died just after it. The book ends with the 'Buddhinirūpaṇa'. As it is a work on the Vaiśeṣika system I reserve its detailed treatment for the next chapter.

Lakṣaṇamalā, his sixth work Bhagīratha Ṭhakura

Varadarāja Miśra refers to another work of Udayana in his *Tārkikarakṣā*,[10] called *Lakṣaṇamālā* which according to Mallinātha is a work of Udayana. Varadarāja says while defining the probans—'nirupādhikasādhyasambandhaśāli liṅgamiti *Lakṣaṇamālāyām*'. Again, he says while dealing with the three varieties of the *Asiddha* type of fallacy—'yathāhuḥ—asiddhaḥ Sādhyasamaḥ sa cāvidyamānasapakṣaḥ, pakṣe'vidyamāno', vidyamānavyāptikaśceti tridheti'. These lines again, are attributed to Udayana's *Lakṣaṇamālā* by Mallinātha —ādyabhedatraye tāvadudayana-lakṣaṇamālāṁ saṁvādayati—Yathāhuriti.[11] Both these quotations are found in the *Lakṣaṇamālā*.[12]

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[1] Page 224, Nirṇayasāgar, Bombay edition.

[2] P. 2, Dr. S. C. Vidyabhūṣaṇa's edition.

[3] P. 9.

[4] P. 8.

[5] Pp. 43, 160.

[6] Pp. 103, 147.

[7] P. 114-115.

[8] P. 146.

[9] P. 232.

[10] Foot Note Pp. 179, 225 *Pandit* edition.

[11] P. 225.

[12] P. 15, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga edition.

This work deals with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories beginning with Pramā. As it is more or less a Vaiśeṣika work, I reserve its treatment for the next chapter.

Thus, we finish in brief the life and works of Udayanācārya, a great genius of Indian Philosophy.

45. VARADARĀJA MIŚRA

(11th century)

After Udayana and before Gaṅgeśa, Varadarāja Miśhra, son of Rāmadeva Mishra, was a well-known Naiyāyika who flourished in Mithilā. Apparently nothing more can be said about his personal history. But even then something could be gleaned from his works.

Personal history

He was a great scholar of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā and had critically studied the most difficult works of Vācaspati, Udayana and of others. So he himself says—

nyāyavidyāvidagdhasya mīmāṁsāpāradṛśvanaḥ|
ālodya dustaragabhīratarān prabandhān
vācaspaterudayanasya tathā pareṣām/[1]

He was very much influenced by Udayana whom he quoted profusely in his *Tārkikarakṣā*. Then, again, he says, as has been already noticed before, that he has written the commentary called *Bodhanī* on the *Kusumāñjali* simply to help the non-Maithila scholars who are puzzled at every step to understand the most difficult lines of Udayana.[2] It appears that he had taken the vaiṣṇava mantra of Narasiṁha for his Dīkṣā and it was, therefore, that he invoked the divine light-like image of Narasiṁha[3] in order to cast off his nescience and reveal the truth.

His first work is the *Tārkikarakṣā* written in fine easy verses to which he has added himself a prose commentary under the name *Sārasaṅgraha*.[4] It appears he was influenced by

His works

[1] End of the *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 304, *Pandit* edition, Banaras.

[2] *Bodhanī*, p. 1, verse 3. [3] Beginning verse of the *Bodhanī*.

[4] Vide the colophon of the work, Pp. 363-64.

the *Kusumāñjali* of Udayana and so he wrote his work first in verses and added later on, a commentary of his own in prose to the kārikās. This is a very important work. It contains three chapters called 'Paricchedas': the first deals with all the topics of Nyāya excluding 'Jāti' and 'Nigrahasthāna', which have been dealt with in the second and third Paricchedas, respectively. From this division it appears that he, like Udayana and Dharmakīrti, has given more importance to 'Jāti' and 'Nigrahasthāna'. Udayana exclusively discusses in his *Bodhasiddhi* the two topics 'Jāti' and 'Nigrahasthāna', so was done by Dharmakīrti in his *Vādanyāya*. This was the period when controversies, discussions and similar other types of argumentations were very common, because of the Buddhist influence.

References in the work

There are important references in this work to old authors and their works. I give below the names of some of them: Jayanta[1], Jarannaiyāyika,[2] Jainajanāḥ,[3] Ṭīkākārāḥ,[4], Tātparyapariśuddhikārāḥ,[5] Trilocana,[6] Prabodhasiddhikārāḥ,[7] *Prabodhasiddināmani Pariśiṣṭe*,[8] *Prabodhasiddhau*,[9] Bhūṣaṇakārādayaḥ,[10] Mūlācārya,[11] Vācaspati Miśra,[12] Viśvarūpa and Jayanta,[13] Śālikanātha,[14] and *Lakṣaṇamālā*.[15]

Commentaries on the *Tārkikarakṣā*

The work has been commented upon by Jñānapūrṇa who has named it *Laghudīpikā*. This Jñānapūrṇa is identified with Jñānadeva, pupil and immediate successor of Viṣṇusvāmin, son of Yajñeśvarahari-

sarvaiśvaryanijāvāsaṁ sarvavidyāniveśitam/
śrīyajñeśvarahareḥ sūnuṁ Śrī Viṣṇusvāmigurum̐ numaḥ//[16]

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[1] P. 347.
[2] Pp. 183-84.
[3] P. 117.
[4] Pp. 248-49.
[5] Pp. 186, 248.
[6] Pp. 337, 356.
[7] P. 343.
[8] P. 310.
[9] Pp. 189, 308, 357.
[10] Pp. 337, 341, 351, 353.
[11] P. 360.
[12] Pp. 355-56, 364.
[13] Pp. 347, 355.
[14] Pp. 22.
[15] Pp. 179, 225.
[16] End of the *Laghudīpikā*, p. 364.

Jñānapūrṇa says in the beginning of his *Laghudīpikā*—

purā Varadarājena nyāyaśāstrārthasaṅgrahaḥ/
kṛtaḥ paratvato buddhvā padyānāṁ durgrahārthatām//
Tenaiva racitā vyākhyā sā ca śāstrapadam gatā/
tatastadarthasiddhyarthaṁ karomi laghudīpikām//

From these two verses it becomes clear that originally Varadarāja wrote the work only in verses, but it was felt that the work was difficult and so he added to it his own short commentary called *Sārasāṅgraha*. Even then it was felt necessary to elucidate the work for which Jñānapūrṇa wrote his *Laghudīpikā*.

Date of Varadarāja

Another more important point what Jñānapūrṇa says is that Varadarāja wrote his work *purā* (long before), and as the date of Jñānapūrṇa cannot be later than the 13th century, the date of Varadarāja must also be pushed back to the 11th century. It was, therefore, that both the late Dr. A. Venis and Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj have placed him in the 11th century. Dr. A. Venis, however, has placed him between 1050 and 1300.[1]

Another commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* is by the well-known commentator Mallinātha. It is called *Niṣkaṇṭakā*. The author himself says that as this commentary explains all the difficult lines of the *Tārkikarakṣā*, (niḥśeṣakaṇṭakanirākaraṇena nāmnā) it is called *Niṣkaṇṭakā* (free from thorns). That Mallinātha was a great scholar not only of Kāvya-Sāhitya but also of the systems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta and Pāṇinīya is clear from what his son Vīrabhadra, the younger brother of Bhīmasena, wrote in his commentary on the *Durgāsaptaśatī*[2] and also in the beginning verses of the *Niṣkaṇṭakā* and also from the fact that he wrote a commentary called *Niṣkaṇṭakā* on the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* which he himself mentioned in his commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* (Praśastapādabhāṣyaniṣkaṇṭakāyāmasmābhirvyākhyātārtho draṣṭavyaḥ).[3]

[1] Vide Introduction to the *Kusumāñjalibodhanī*, p. iii.

[2] Introduction to the *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 27. [3] Pp. 76, 139.

So says Mallinātha himself in the beginning of his *Niṣkaṇṭakā*—

yāṇīṁ kāṇabhujīmajīgaṇadavāsāsīcca vaiyāsikī—
mantastantramaransta pannagagavīgumpheṣu cājāgarīt/
vācāmākalayadrahasyamakhilaṁ yaścākṣapādasphurām
loke'bhūdyadupajñameva viduṣām saujanyajanyaṁ yaśaḥ//

The same has been said by his son Vīrabhadra—

yo vai bhūpālacūḍāmaṇinikarakarairarcitāṅghrirdvījendraḥ
kāṇāde cākṣapāde kapilaphaṇipatiproktatantre ca tantre/
vaiyāse pāṇiniye'pratihatadhiṣaṇo'laṅkṛtau kāvyamūle
ṭīkāṁ kṛtvāgragaṇyo'bhavadiha viduṣāṁ mallināthaḥ kavīndraḥ//[1]

Both these commentaries are very important and informative. In the *Niṣkaṇṭakā* we have the following more important references: *Bhūṣaṇa*[2], Bhūṣaṇakāra,[3] Vṛttikāra,[4] *Nikaṣaḥ* (Vistarastu Nikaṣe draṣṭavyaḥ),[5] *Pariśiṣṭa* and *Prabodhasiddhi*[6] and Vilāsakāra.[7] According to Mallinātha Varadarāja has referred to the view of the author of the *Vilāsa* on Mokṣa. The last reference to the work called *Vilāsa* is most probably the *Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśa* of Divākara Upādhyāya.

It will not be out of place to refer to certain interesting and important facts from the *Tārkikarakṣā* here—

Gleanings from the *Tārkikarakṣā*

Varadarāja has included the treatment of the six positive Vaiśeṣika categories in this work from page 132 to 164 and says that having dealt with the six padārthas of the Vaiśeṣika, by the way, I come back to the proper context. So he deals with the Nyāya system both in the beginning and also at the end.

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[1] End of his commentary on the *Durgāsaptśati.*

[2] P. 142. [3] Pp. 4, 152.

[4] P. 140. [5] P. 161.

[6] P. 190. [7] P. 129.

He gives six definitions of Prāmāṇya, namely (1) Pramāyogavyavachedasambandhaḥ (that is, contact with (pramā) after cutting off the relation with that which has no connection with pramā). In other words, Prāmāṇya is that which is in concomitant relation with Pramā and that which possesses it is called 'pramāṇa'. 'Pramā' is of two kinds—nitya (eternal) and anitya (non-eternal). The substratum of eternal 'pramā' is Īśvara which has no *karaṇa*, while that of the other, non-eternal 'pramā', there is always a 'karaṇa', and 'karaṇa' itself is the Pramāṇa. This view is attributed to the Naiyāyikas.[1]

Six types of definition of Prāmāṇya

Naiyāyika View

(2) By the way, the author gives the definitions of Pramāṇa according to Saugata as—'avisaṃvādivijñānam' (meaning, the cognition which is not against the reality, that is, which possesses the pragmatic efficiency (arthakriyākāritva).

Saugata View

(3) Again, he refers to the view that direct cognition (anubhūti) which is different from smṛti (memory), (Anubhūtiḥ Pramāṇam) is 'Pramāṇa'. This is attributed to the Prābhākaras.

Prābhākara View

(4) The next view is that of the Bhaṭṭapāda who holds that Pramāṇa is that which leads to the cognition of reality not cognized before (anadhigatatathābhūtārthaniścāyakam).[2]

Bhāṭṭa View

(5) The fifth view attributed to some one else, is *Prameyavyāpyaṃ pramāṇaṃ*, meaning, pramāṇa is that which is pervaded over by the objects of knowledge.[3]

(6) The last view mentioned by Varadarāja is that Pramāṇa is the provision (sāmagrī) laid down by right cognition (pramāniyatasāmagrī).

All these views have been criticized and refuted by Varadarāja.[4]

He points out and quotes *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari[5] in its support that according to the *Śābdikas* determinate (savikalpaka) is the only type of direct perception.[6] This view

Śābdika's View

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[1] Pp. 6. [2] P. 39. [3] P. 33.
[4] Pp. 13-54. [5] I. 124. [6] P. 61.

is also refuted by Varadarāja. He clearly points out that the terms *avyapadeśyaṁ* and *vyavasāyātmakaṁ* used by Gotama really refer to the two kinds of 'pratyakṣa', namely, 'nirvikalpaka' and 'savikalpaka' (indeterminate and determinate knowledge respectively).[1]

Upādhi defined

Varadarāja quotes a Kārikā defining *Upādhi* which according to Mallinātha is attributed to Udayana—

ekasādhyāvinābhāve mithaḥ sambandhaśūnyayoḥ/
sādhyābhāvāvinābhāvī sa upādhiryadatyayaḥ//[2]

This verse is neither found in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, nor in the *Kusumāñjali*.

According to Varadarāja there are two varieties of Inference—'*viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṁ*' and '*sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṁ*.'

Divisions of Inference

That inference which leads to objects which are capable of direct perception is the '*viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṁ*' as for instance, the inference of fire in the mountain, because there is smoke. That form of inference which leads to objects which are exclusively supersensuous (nitya-atīndriyārtha) is of the latter type, as for instance, the inference of visual sense-organ, because of the cognition of colour, etc.[3]

Types of Analogy

Varadarāja clearly mentions the three types of Analogy:

(1) *Sādharmyopamānaṁ*—where the analogy is based on the similarity; as having heard the statement that *gavaya* is just like the cow, when one goes to the forest and comprehends the similarity of cow in the *gavaya* and comes to have the cognition in the form 'it is cow-like', it is called analogy based on similarity.

(2) *Vaidharmyopamānaṁ*—Analogy based on the dissimilarity between two objects; just as when one is asked 'what sort of animal is called horse'; the reply is given 'it is that which does not possess hoof cut into two parts, like a cow and others'; and so, he comes to comprehend that a horse is different from a cow; and after that he comes to recognize the dissimilarity of the nature of not having hoof cut into two parts in a horse. This is the second type of analogy.

[1] P. 63. [2] P. 67. [3] Pp. 81-82.

(3) The third variety is called *Dharmamātropamānam*, that is, having been told by a northerner that an animal which has long neck, extended lips and is habituated to eat hard, sharp thorns, is called camel. With this knowledge when a southerner happens to see such an animal in northern India, he comes to comprehend that such an animal is camel. This is the example of the third type of analogy.[1]

Varadarāja says that the term *sādharmya* used by Gotama in his sūtra should be interpreted in such a way as to include the last two varieties. In this very connection the author says that the definition of Śabara —that is, the comprehension of the similarity possessed by the object remembered which is the *Pratiyogika* (as the cow of the village is for the *gavaya*) of the object to be cognized from the knowledge of the similarity possessed by the object to be cognized, is analogy.[2] This, Varadarāja says, does not differ from Inference.[3]

Śabara's idea of Analogy not accepted by Varadarāja

Dealing with *Apavarga* (final emancipation), Varadarāja, following the definition of the *Nyāyasūtra*, says —absolute cessation of pain is called *apavarga*. In this very connection he explains the meaning of the term—*ātyantikatva* (of the cessation of pain) as sajātīyasya *tatraivātmani punaranutpādaḥ*, that is, non-appearance (lit. non-manifestation) in that very Ātman of the pain of the same type. To this Mallinātha remarks that Mokṣa is the destruction of the entire pain present in one Ātman. As those desirous of emancipation are distinct from one another there cannot be any fallacy of 'too wide' (atiyāpti).[4]

Conception of Apavarga—Various Views

He also mentions that the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa do not accept 'Viśeṣa' and inherence (samavāya), while those of Prabhākara refuse to believe in 'Viśeṣa' but accept śakti, sādṛśya and saṅkhyā as separate categories. Thus, they believe only in eight categories and not more.[5] Varadarāja refutes both these views.

Mīmāṁsakas' view on 'Viśeṣa' and 'Samavāya'

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[1] Pp. 87-88. [2] P. 92. [3] P. 93.

[4] P. 129. [5] *Niṣkaṇṭakā*, Pp. 163-64.

Five types of Tarka

Varadarāja mentions the five varieties of *Tarka*—*Ātmāśraya*, *itaretarāśraya*, *cakrakāśraya*, *anavasthā* and *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*.[1]

Rules of Debate

Varadarāja, while defining *kathā*, says, it is that series of sentences which has for its controversy an object (vicāragocarārtha viṣaya) wherein there are many persons to take part. It has six factors (aṅga) to be observed, namely (1) *nirūpyanirūpakaniyama* (which involves a topic to be put forth, like Ātman and also pramāṇas, like inferences, etc. to prove it), that is, there should be a sort of agreement (niyama) in the form that 'I shall prove this through this'; (2) *kathāviśeṣavyavasthā*, that is, a sort of restriction to use the various methods of discussion, namely, vāda, Jalpa, etc.; (3) *Vādiprativādiniyama*, that is, there should be an agreement that so and so will represent the upholder of the *prima facie* view and so and so will take the reply side; (4) *sadāsyanuvidheyasamvaraṇam*, an agreement that so and so will be the President and so and so will be the members attending the meeting (sabhyas); (5) an agreement to use all the forms of the clinchers or only a few and (6) *kathāparyavasānasamvittiḥ*, that is fixation of time to finish the debate.[2]

Four factors of kathā

According to some there are only four factors in a *Kathā*, namely, (1) *Vādiniyama*, an agreement as regards the upholder of the *prima facie* view; (2) *Prativādiniyama*, that is, an agreement as to who will represent the reply side; (3) A decision about the President (anuvidheyasamvaraṇa) and (4) also about the members (sabhānusamvaraṇa). Varadarāja says that if there be an occasion for writing down some facts in the course of the debate, then it is necessary that a scribe acceptable to both the parties also should be appointed. It is necessary that both the parties should be of equal strength, otherwise the debate (kathā) meant for specific knowledge will have most undesirable effect. Without discussion (vāda) it is not possible to have any decision. To this it is said that sometimes even without there being any discussion,

[1] P. 186.

[2] Pp. 206-207.

simply because of the greatness of the personality of the person, decision is arrived at from his advice, if the members seeking the advice be devoted and sincere.

As to the qualifications of the members of the *Sabhā*, Varadarāja says that they should be admissible to both the parties, should have acquaintance with the secretes of the standpoint of both the parties, should be free from prejudices and should be capable of understanding and retaining what has been put forth by the parties and also be quite skilful to explain them. Their number should be even three, or more than three, or even more than that, so that in case of differences the decision may be arrived at by taking the opinion of the majority. So it has been said—

Qualifications of members

rāgadveṣavinirmuktāḥ sapta pañca trayo'pi vā/
trayopaviṣṭā viprāḥ syuḥ sā yajñasadṛśī sabhā//

Majority to decide a problem

And also—dvaidhe bahūnām vacanamiti ca/

Translation—The *Sabhā* (the debating assembly) should consist of three, or five, or even seven members (vipras) who are free from attachment and hatred towards any party. Such a gathering looks like the sacrificial gathering.

In case of doubts, differences, etc. the opinion of the majority is to be accepted.

The duties of the members are : to put restrictions to the scope of the topic under discussion and also to the 'vādī' and 'prativādī' (disputant and counter-disputant); to point out the merits and defects of the speakers by putting questions to them, or setting aside their views, or by elucidating their implications, to explain and remind those who are defeated and to explain to the weak after reproducing what the other party has said.

Duties of the sadasyas

As regards the qualities and merits of the President, Varadarāja points out the following: He should be agreeable to the disputant and counter-disputant, and also to the members. He should be free from attachment and hatred and should be capable of suppressing and favouring the two parties when necessary. His

Qualifications of the President (sabhāpati)

duties are : to announce the decision of the debate and give away the bets, and other rewards from his own choice. In *Vāda*, those sabhyas (members) who come by chance may also be admitted to the debating meeting only for the purpose of getting their doubts regarding the mis-understood facts removed and not for asserting some of their own views, as it is the case in Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā. This view of his own, Varadarāja supports by referring to the *Vārttika*.[1]

The *Vārttika*, however, discusses this point and says, while discussing this fact against Subandhu's definition, that the convincing of the Prāṣṇika will lead to the convincing of the disputant is not possible, as the means of convincing are different; as a matter of fact, the means whereby the questioner is convinced is entirely different from those by which the disputant is convinced; and certainly, means meant for one cannot bring about its effect with another. Again, there is no such definite rule that the discussion is carried on only for convincing the questioner; for, it is often found carried on with teachers and persons of similar status also who are different from the questioner.[2]

Vācaspati Mishra makes the above clear by saying that in the discussion there is no mention of the questioner; what it means is not to disallow those members who happen to come by chance.[3]

From what Varadarāja has said above it is evident that *Vāda* (discussion) on regular lines was very common during the 11th century when Varadarāja wrote his work.

Varadarāja, being a Maithila, was acquainted with the Tāntrik process of killing (mārana), etc. As he says that in the case of killing one's nephew through the *Tāntrika* process, it is not necessary that the action may take place only by coming in close touch with the nephew.[4]

In one place Varadarāja uses the term 'raktajapākusuma'[5] from which it may be gathered that he knew

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[1] P. 159, lines 7-9.

[2] *Vārttika*, p. 159; *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 209.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 325, *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 209.

[4] P. 273. [5] P. 301.

of the 'blue japākusuma' as well which is most likely used in connection with some tāntrika rites. Blue coloured 'japākusuma' is even now found.

Another work of Varadarāja is his *Bodhanī* a commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, which has been already noticed before.

46. ABHAYATILAKOPĀDHYĀYA

(11th century)

Udayana must have been followed by a host of scholars of whom we are still in dark. But fortunately, Guṇaratnasūri, a Jaina writer of the 15th century, has mentioned some names who came after Udayana. Amongst them he mentions the name of one Naiyāyika named Abhayatilakopādhyāya. From a rotograph preserved in the Mithilā Research Institute, Darbhanga, we learn that he was the author of a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, or the *Bhāṣya*, or the *Vārttika*, or even the *Ṭīkā*, or the *Pariśuddhi*. In the colophon of the manuscript referred to above it is written 'Śrī-Abhayatilakopādhyāya-nirmitāyāṁ pañcaprasthāna-nyāyamahātarka-viṣamapadavyākhyāyāṁ Nyāyālaṅkārākhyāyāṁ pañcamo'dhyāyaḥ'. This colophon is very suggestive. It refers to the *Pañcaprasthāna-nyāya-mahātarka* which obviously means the five important main texts of Nyāya, namely, *Nyāyasūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, *Vārttika*, *Tātparyaṭīkā* and the *Pariśuddhi*. It further says that the commentary is only on difficult portions of the text (viṣamapadavyākhyā). It, however, does not make clear the exact name of the text of which it is the commentary. It may be possible that Abhayatilaka has given the same name to the commentaries of all the five texts. It will not be out of place to mention that Vācaspati Miśra II and Śaṅkara Miśra both had mentioned the term *caturgranthi* as used for the last four texts. Vācaspati Miśra II has in the beginning of his *Nyāyatattvāloka*—

> yadapyatipaṭīyasī jayati sā 'caturgranthikā'
> tathā yadapi bhāskaro tadapi tattvabodho'dhikaḥ.

Again, Śaṅkara Miśra in the beginning of his commentary on the *Pariśuddhi* (trisūtrīnibandha) says—

> piturvyākhyāṁ kṛtvā manasi bhavanāthasya kṛtinaḥ
> caturgranthīgranthānahamiha vimoktum vyavasitaḥ

Abhayatilaka has added the Sūtra text to the list and has made it *pañcaprasthāna*.

Another point which may be suggested by this colophon is that he was a disciple of a Jaina scholar named Śrī-Jineśvarasūrin. It is not necessary to take Abhayatilaka also to be a Jaina. There are two points to support my suggestion. He has retained his surname 'Upādhyāya' which the Maithilas used in those old days for 'Jhā' and the second point is that he has also retained the tradition of Mithilā of adding the letter 'Śrī' to his name indicating that he was living and not dead. Dr. S. C. Vidyabhuṣana also holds that he was a Brāhmaṇa.[1]

That Abhayatilaka was the author of the *Nyāyālaṅkāra* is further supported by a reference to it found in the *Vidyāsāgarī*, a commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* by Ānandapūrṇa—'nyāyālaṅkāragranthe anirvacanīyadūṣaṇaṁ yadabhāṇi tadanuvadati-*n nviti*'.[2] This reference also proves that Abhayatilaka lived before Śrīharṣa. It may further be pointed out that in the long quotation from the *Nyāyālaṅkāra* given by Śrīharṣa, Abhayatilaka has quoted a portion of the *Kusumāñjali's* kārikā 'parasparavirodhe hi na prakārāntarasthitiḥ'[3] which proves that he must have lived after Udayana and before Śrīharṣa.

Lastly, it may also be mentioned that according to the *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratnasūrin, Abhayatilaka had written a *Vṛtti* and the authorship of the *Nyāyālaṅkāra* has been assigned to Śrīkaṇṭha. This is perhaps not correct. It seems that Śrīkaṇṭha might have written the *Vṛtti* and called it *Ṭippaṇa*.[4]

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[1] *Indian Logic*, p. 151.

[2] P. 129, Chowkhamba Banaras edition.

[3] III. 8.

[4] Chapter II, p. 94.

47. ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

(11th century)

Śrīkaṇṭha is mentioned by Guṇaratnasūrin in his commentary on the *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadra[1] along with several others as an author of a Nyāya work. It seems that he must have been a reputed scholar because of which Guṇaratna could mention his name along with Udayana and others. From the same reference it may be concluded that he wrote a *Vṛtti* called *Ṭippaṇa*, on the *Nyāyasūtra* or the *Bhāṣya*. Nothing more we know as yet of him. As his name is mentioned amongst the scholars of the 11th century and earlier he may be placed in the 11th century.

48. NĀRĀYAṆASARVAJÑA

(12th century)

Ānandapūrṇa, in his commentary on the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya*, refers to the view of Nārāyaṇasarvajña which has been refuted by Śr -Harṣa (iti Nārāyaṇasar-vajñamatamapi nirastam,).[2] And again, as this very view has also been refuted by Gaṅgeśa, so, he must have flourished prior to Gaṅgeśa and before Śrī-Harṣa. As Nārāyaṇa has discussed the definition of *Upādhi* of Udayana, it is presumed that he might have written on the *Nyāyasūtra* or the *Bhāṣya*. Śaṅkara Miśra also refers to his view in his *Upaskāra*[3] under the name—*Sarvajña*. He may be placed in the 12th century.

49. RAVĪŚVARA

(12th century)

Gaṅgeśa, while discussing the *prima facie* view of maṅgalavāda refers to a view as *apare tu*, according to whom, as interpreted by Mathurānātha, benediction in the beginning of a work produces *apūrva* (merits), which produces a negation under saṁsargābhāva (that is, prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva and atyantā-bhāva), by which the end of the action is achieved.

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[1] P. 151. [2] P. 714, Chowkamba, edition

[3] VII. ii. 10.

Thus, maṅgalācaraṇa is the cause of the finish of the action through the saṁsargābhāva caused by the merit produced by maṅgalācaraṇa. This is the view which Mathurānātha attributes to some Mīmāṁsakas. But a Maithila commentator named Pragalbha Miśra in his *Pratyakṣa-Pragalbhī-Maṅgalavāda* says—*Ravīśvaramataṁ* dūṣayitumupanyasyati—*apare tu*.[2] Pragalbha Miśra lived towards the end of the 15th century, and hence, Ravīśvara must have lived towards the end of the 12th century. Śeśānantācārya, a commentator on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadharācārya, of the end of the 13th century, also refers to Ravīśvara saying that according to Ravīśvara antecedent negation (prāgabhāva) also being the Vighnasaṁsargābhāva, is the means (dvāra) of finishing the action.[3] We do not know as yet of any of his work. But that he was a Naiyāyika is certain from the above references.

50. ŚAŚADHARA UPĀDHYĀYA

(12th century)

The next more importan author is Śaśadhara Upādhyāya[4] who flourished in Mithilā towards the end of the 12th century A.D.[5] It is believed amongst the Maithilas and also Bengalis that Śaśadhara and Maṇidhara were the two brothers, well-known for their scholarship, because of which they were called 'lion and tiger' (*Siṁha-Vyāghra*) and it was, therefore, that the definition given by them of 'Vyāpti' is called *Siṁha-Vyāghrokta-lakṣaṇa*. The view which Dr. Vidyabhusaṇa holds about the two Jaina scholars representing the above mentioned 'Siṁha' and

Personal history.

[1] Vide—*Tattvacintāmaṇi-Rahasya*, p. 73, Bibliotheca Indica Series edition.

[2] *Pragalbhī* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 147. Sarasvati Bhavana Text Series.

[3] P. 8. Reprint from the *Pandit* Banaras edition.

[4] Vide—The commentary on the *Padārthacandrikā* on the *Saptapadārthī*, Fol. 28 b.

[5] Dr. Vidyabhusana—*Indian Logic*, p. 397.

'Vyāghra' is baseless and not at all reliable,[1] for Gaṅgeśa has nowhere mentioned the name of any Jaina writer in his book and also because the reference which Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa had in his mind is to *Vyaghrasimhaśiśu* and not to *Simha-Vyāghra*.

In the beginning of his work Śaśadhara says—'Śaśadharaśarmā prakāśayati'[2] which suggests that he was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa, as this has been the form—that is, of writing the name of a Brāhmaṇa (ending in Śarmā), which Maithilas have been habituated to use after their name. He is the son of Dharaṇīdharācārya and grandson of Maheśvara. He had another brother Pṛthvīdhara.[3] He must have lived long before Gaṅgeśa who, according to his commentator Śeṣānanta, has criticized Śaśadhara and whom Śeṣānanta has criticized in return[4] and after Vādivāgīśvara, the author of *Mānamanohara*, whose view on *gold* being regarded as *Pṛthvī*, has been criticized by Śaśadhara (Vādivāgīśvarastu suvarṇaṁ na pārthivaṁ tathāvidhānalasaṁyoge sati bhasmānārambhakatvāt—ityāha tadapi tuccham).[5] As he quotes a Kār kā from the *Kusumāñjali*[6], he must have lived after Udayana. He is thus placed in the 12th century.

Before we enter into the details of his contributions, it is necessary to examine the circumstances under which Śaśadhara wrote his work. He says in the beginning of his *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*—

Reason to write the book.

dhvaṁsitaparasiddhānta-
dhvāntaṁ Gautamamataikasiddhāntam/

natvā nityamadhīśaṁ
Śaśadharaśarmā prakāśayati//

From the above verse it is clear, as has been also explained by Śeṣānanta, (mīmāṁsakādisiddhāntasantamasāvṛtatayā na yathāvat prathate), that though the system of Nyāya, which is the only reasonable system, has criticized other systems, yet it has itself become

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[1] Vide—*Vaṅge 'Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 11. [2] P. 1.

[3] Introduction to the edition of the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* Reprint from the *Paṇḍit*.

[4] Vide—*Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, pp. 140, 141, 164, 185.

[5] P. 305. [6] P. 42.

darkened, that is, made obscure by the criticizms of Mīmāṁsakas. In order to criticize them in detail, therefore, Śaśadhara has made this attempt. It is, therefore, that the author has mostly discussed only those topics where there is an obvious clash between the two systems. Some of them may be mentioned here.

Andhakāravāda—the view that darkness is a substance of positive nature. This view is also held by the Mīmāṁsakas.[1] The view of the author of the *Kandalī* that darkness has imposed blue colour is refuted.[2] He has also refuted the view of Śivāditya Miśra that darkness is the saṁsargābhāva of tejas, qualified by the imposition of blue colour.[3]

Śaktivāda—the view that in addition to the well-known seven categories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is another substance called 'Śakti' (efficiency) by which a particular word denotes a particular meaning. According to the Tautātitas (Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas) such an efficiency is inherent in jāti (class-names or genus) alone while the Naiyāyikas hold that it is in 'Vyaktyākṛtijāti' (vyakti, ākṛti and jāti). This question has been discussed at length.[4]

He gives the view of some one also according to whom *trasareṇu* (triad) being very subtle, cannot be directly touched.[5]

Next, the author discusses whether *manastva* belongs to Paramāṇu or not-manastvam paramāṇuvṛtti na vā (*Mano'ṇutvavāda*). In this chapter, he also deals with whether *Mūrtatva* (limitedness) belongs to substances having no touch or not. The *prima facie* view is not held by the Mīmāṁsakas[6] in both the cases.

After this, comes the theory of *Jñānakarmasamuccaya*, where he starts with the view of Bhāskara who holds that both 'tattvajñāna' and 'karman' are, equally mutually helping each other, causes of *apavarga*.[7] He criticizes this view.[8] He refers to Udayana at this place according to whom 'karman', through the instrumentality of 'tattvajñāna', is the cause of *apavarga*.[9]

1 P. 76. 2 Pp 37-33 3 Pp. 133-168.
4 P. 96. 5 p. 438. 6 Pp. 169-84.
7 P. P. 201. 8 P. 201. 9 P. 201.

Then follows a very important section on *apavarga* where he refers to the views of *tautātita* (Bhāṭṭas) according to whom final emancipation is the manifestation of happiness *par excellence* which is the very nature of the Ātman and is eternal (nitya-niratiśayasukhābhivyaktiḥ); of *Bhāskara* who holds that it is the destruction of the subtle-body (*liṅgaśarīra*), consisting of eleven sense-organs, and the subtle elements of the five mahābhūtas which together cause pleasure and pain to the Jīva limited within the particular organism of the Jīva, which is the merging of Jīva in the Para-Brahman; of *Sāṅkhya* according to whom it is the existence of the self (Puruṣa) in its own nature (svarūpāvasthānam) after the dissolution of the Prakṛti and its evolutes; of *some other* according to whom it is the undisturbed (nirupaplava) state of 'Cittasantati' (successive series of thoughts); of *some one else* according to whom it is the destruction of previous ideas or thoughts without the manifestation of any other future ideas (agrimacittānutpāde pūrvacittanivṛttiḥ); of *some others* (*apare*) according to whom again, Ātmahānam —destruction of Ātman (that is, physical organism) is Mokṣa; of *Gurumatatatvavedins* who think that 'mukti' is the retaining of the Prāgabhāva (antecedent non-existence) of pain (duḥkhaprāgabhāvaparipālanam). Having criticized all these views Śaśadhara says that the view—'absolute cessation of pain held by the followers of Gautama alone is valid'.[1] He further says that the definition of the *Prāñca—Jarannaiyāyika* (Jayanta?) that it is *duḥkhātyantābhāva* also means the same.[2]

Idea of Mokṣa according to various Schools.

While refuting the direct perception of air, he refers to the view of *some* who hold that after functioning of the tactile organ, there is a common notion that air blows. From this, they conclude that there is the direct perception of air also[3] and it is not a case of inference. This view also has been refuted at great length. Next, the author discusses the *nirvikalpakavāda*[4] and proves that the indeterminate form of cognition is also very essential.[5]

His views on other topics.

[1] Pp. 214-16. [2] P. 243. [3] P. 260. [4] Pp. 276-98. [5] Pp. 282-97.

Similarly, the author deals with the topics of—tejovāda, yogirūḍhivāda, liṅgaparāmarśavāda, vyāptivāda (where he gives some ten different views), vidhivāda, apūrvavāda, anyathākhyātivāda, arthāpattivāda, abhāvavāda, śabdānityatvavāda and Īśvaravāda.

In every section the author has placed the Mīmāṁsakas on the *prima facie* side and has criticized their views very critically. The author has explained the *prima facie* very clearly in all its details and then has shown how their views are untenable from the Nyāya point of view. Though he has taken in some cases the siddhānta of the Vaiśeṣikas also to support his case, yet he is not primarily a Vaiśeṣika but a Naiyāyika. His style seems to give growth to the neo-Nyāya method of examining the problems under discussion.

It is no wonder that he had to face the Mīmāṁsakas at every step and had to strengthen the Nyāya position. We know that both Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā schools flourished and developed in the same atmosphere and almost at the same time in Mithilā and the ultimate end of both the schools was to fight against the Buddhists. It is also clear that philosophically their standpoint is not very much distinct, so they always fall out on common grounds.

After the mahānirvāṇa of the Buddha, jealousy grew up between the orthodox and non-orthodox scholars in Mithilā and Magadha. This led to the growth of the Science of Reasoning (Nyāyaśāstra) and Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in Mithilā. It seems that Mīmāṁsā scholars were equally strong in their attempts to drive away the Buddhists and perhaps that might have been the reason why as late as the 15th century, during the reign of Bhairava Siṁha, king of Mithilā, it is said that 1400 or so Mīmāṁsakas alone were invited in a 'Puṣkariṇī Yāga' ceremony in the village-Jarahaṭiyā. From this reference it is also evident that there were two sorts of polemics among the scholars in those days—one, with the Buddhists and the other, within the orthodox fold itself with the Mīmāṁsakas.

Probable reasons why Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas very often fell out.

We may also mention here some of the more important references found in his work. They are—

References found in the *Nyāya-Siddhāntadīpa.*

tautātita[1], Kandalīkāra as interpreted by Śeṣānanta[2], Śivāditya Miśra as interpreted by Śeṣānanta[3], Maṇḍana Miśra[4], Jarannaiyāyika[5], (Mānamanoharakāra) Vādivāgīśvara[6].

It has been commented upon by Śeṣānanta, pupil of Śārṅgadharācārya, of the 16th century. This commentary is also very lucid and easy and incomplete like the original work.

It may be noticed here that in the *Catalogus Catalogorum*[7] Aufrecht mentions the following works against

Other works attributed to Śaśadhara.

Śaśadhara's name: *Nyāyanaya*, *Nyāyamīmāṁsāprakaraṇa*, *Nyāyaratnaprakaraṇa* and *Śaśadharamālā*. According to the *India Office Catalogue*[8], the third work is the same as the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*. Burnell, on the other hand, says that the *Nyāyanaya* is the commentary on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* by Dharmarāja Bhaṭṭa. Mm. Pandit G. N. Kavirāj holds that the first and the second works mentioned above are not two different works[9].

51. DIVĀKARA UPĀDHYĀYA

(12th century)

Divākara Upādhyāya flourished in Mithilā and was a Maithila Brāhmaṇa. His father was a court paṇḍita

References to Divākara.

of some Maithila king as has been mentioned by himself at the end of his commentary called *Nyāyanibandhoddyota* on the *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi* of Udayana.

. . . Mithileśvareṇa
śrībhāji śāntikaraṇe vihitaḥ pade yaḥ/
tatsūnunākhilatamāṁsi nudannibandho-
ddyotaḥ sphuṭaṁ racita eṣa divākareṇa[10]//

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[1] PP. 37, 103-04, 601. [2] P. 42. [3] P. 76. [4] Śeṣa.PP. 109, 113.
[5] PP. 243, 406. [6] Śeṣa, PP. 305, 314. [7] P. 638. [8] P. 646.
[9] *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III. P. 125 ft. note.
[10] Vide Manuscript Catalogue, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Ms. No. 7510.

Recent researches show that Divākara was a very authentic scholar of Nyāya. He was called *Uddyotakara.* We know that his view has been referred to by Gaṅgeśa in his *Īśvarānumāna.* Gaṅgeśa quotes a line beginning with *athāraṇimaṇyabhāvavati stomaviśeṣe tṛṇamvinā etc.*[1] While commenting on it the well-known Maithila scholar Pragalbha Miśra says—'*Divākaramatamāśaṅkate*'. Another reference to him is found in the commentary of Varddhamāna Upādhyāya in the *Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, where while commenting on the line of Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*—'seyam pṛthivī yadyanityaiva syāttadāvayavānavasthā syāt[2], Varddhamāna says—

Nityānityabhedakathanasyārthāntaratvamapākaroti—'seyamiti'/ avayavānavastheti/yadyapyanavasthāmātram bījāṅkurasādhāraṇyena na dūṣaṇaṁ tathāpi sarvakāryadravyanāśātpralayānantaraṁ sṛṣṭiriti vyavasthāviraha evānavasthā *ityeke*/[3] dvyaṇukāvayavasyānekadravyārabdhatve mahattvaṁ syādityartha *ityanye*[4].

Here also according to Pragalbha Miśra *ityanye* refers to—*Divākaropādhyāyāḥ.*

Again, Śaṅkara Miśra in the beginning of his commentary on the *Kusumāñjali* makes a reference to his (Divākara's) commentary, called *Parimala*[5].

About his contributions, we may easily refer to his commentaries on Udayana's *Bauddhādhikāra*, called '*Āloka*', on *Kusumāñjali*, called '*Parimala*' which has been referred to by Śaṅkara Miśra—'Makarande Prakāśe vā vyākhyā Parimale tha vā'—on the *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, called '*Nyāyanibandhoddyota*', and on the *Dravyakiraṇāvalī*, called '*Vilāsa*', which has been most probably referred to by Mallinātha in his commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā*—'tathā caikātmaniṣṭhanikhiladuḥkhadhvaṁsasākalyaṁ mokṣaḥ mumūkṣūṇāṁ ca pratyekamekatvānnāvyāptiśceti *Vilāsakāroktalakṣaṇamuktamityanusandheyam.*[6]' Rucidatta also refers to the *Vilāsa* in his *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśavivaraṇa*[7]. But

Divākara's contributions.

[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Īśvarānumāna, P. 131. Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[2] Pt Vindhyeshwari Prasada edition, P. 50.

[3] (here *eke* refers to Prabhākaropādhyāyāḥ-Pragalbha Miśra's Commentary).

[4] *Kiraṇāvalī*, P. 50, foot-note 2. Vindhyeshwari Prasad edition.

[5] P. 364. [6] P. 129. [7] P. 164.

does it not refer to the *Dravyakiraṇāvali-Vilāsa* by Vadīndra? He has also commented upon the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śrī-Harṣa Miśra[1].

This is all that we know so far about him. From all these references it is evident that he was a great scholar devoted to the line of Udayana. As he has been quoted by Gaṅgeśa, he must have lived before him at least by a century or even more. He flourished later than Udayana. So we can place him towards the end of the 12th century. It must be also mentioned that he is different from Divākara Upādhyāya who has referred to the Maithila Śrīdatta Upādhyāya, one of the great digest writers on Dharmaśāstra, of the 14th century[2].

His works have not yet been published except a portion of it on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Text Series.* But manuscripts are not rare. They are found in the collections of the libraries of Darbhanga, Sanskrit University, the Varanasi, Sanskrit University and the Asiatic Society of Bengal and so on.

52. TARAṆI MIŚRA

(12th century)

Taraṇi Miśra is more known by the name of his work *Ratnakoṣa*, as *Ratnakoṣakṛt*. No doubt, he was a very great scholar and his *Ratnakoṣa* is equally important. He has been referred to by Rucidatta Miśra, also called Upādhyāya, of the end of the 15th century[3], by Gaṅgeśa and many others. It is Rucidatta who has made a clear mention of Taraṇi Miśra as the author of the *Ratnakoṣa*[4] —tathā ca *Ratnakoṣe Taraṇimiśrairuktam*. We do not yet know what work he had written, but that he had written on Nyāya-Anumānakhaṇḍa is clear from the reference made by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*[5]. He

References to Taraṇi Miśra.

[1] *Vange Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 13.

[2] S. N. Singh—*History of Tirhut*, P. 169.

[3] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anumāna, PP. 330, 885.

[4] Vide—Rucidatta's *Anumāna-Prakāśa—Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. IV, P. 298.

[5] Ratnakoṣakārastu, P. 885.

believes that the efficiency of a word belongs to the action (Vyāpāre śaktiḥ iti Ratnakośakṛtaḥ prācīnatārkikāḥ)[1], Again, it is said that efficiency is in the production (utpādakatāyāṁ śaktiḥ)[2]. He is therefore, placed a century or more earlier than Gaṅgeśa, that is, in the 12th century.

53. SOṆḌALA UPĀDHYĀYA

(12th century)

In the pre-Gaṅgeśa period the name of Soṇḍala,[3] variously spelt, Soṛḍala, Sauṛḍala, Sondaḍa, Saundalaka and Saundaḍa, Upādhyāya is very well-known amongst the Naiyāyikas. Gaṅgeśa himself refers to him in several places[4].

Soṇḍala's peculiar view.

His view is so peculiar that almost all the great scholars of Nyāya have discussed it as the theory of *Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva*, or more strictly as Gaṅgeśa himself has put it — *Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*[5]. Gaṅgeśa and many later scholars have refuted it. The theory may be thus explained—it is generally admitted in Nyāya that only that attribute (dharma) which exists in the counter-entity (pratiyogī) of a negation can be really said to be the limiting condition (avacchedaka) of its pratiyogitā; in other words, the limiting attribute (avacchedakadharma) must be co-existent with the pratiyogitā; violation of the restrictive condition of the coexistence would be subversive of the theory of error (anyathākhyāti) according to the Naiyāyikas[6]. But Soṇḍala does not accept the restrictive condition. This much we know of him so far. It is certain that he lived long before Gaṅgeśa, though the latter has also used *Navyāḥ* for him. So it will not be improper to place him latest in the 12th century.

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[1] *Nyāyakośa*, P. 785. [2] *Nyāyakośa*, P. 785.

[3] Vācaspati Miśra II in his *Tattvāloka*, Fol. 63a.

[4] Vide *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, PP. 53, 575 Anumāna and also on Pages 24, 276 Śabda under the title 'Navyāstu', which Mathurānātha clarifies as 'Sondaḍasya'.

[5] P. 53 Anumāna.

[6] *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Studies*, Vol. II.

54. BHĀSKARA

(12th century)

While commenting on the line—'atha sādhyasaṁśayajanakakoṭidvayopasthāpakapakṣadharmatājñānaviṣayatve sati hetvabhimataḥ saḥ'[1], Mathurānātha says—'Prācīnamatānusāreṇa lakṣaṇamāha.' But Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa, another modern commentator, says—'Bhāskarakṛllakṣaṇam dūṣayitumutthāpayati'. Again, while commenting on the line-yattviyam pṛthivītyanubhavaḥ, etc[2]. of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Vācaspati Miśra, the second, of Mithilā, says—*Bhāskaramataṁ*[3].

References to Bhāskara.

From these references we gather that there was a Bhāskara before Gaṅgeśa who wrote on Nyāya. From the two references given above, it becomes difficult to determine whether the name Bhāskara is of the book or that of the author. As the author is most probably an inhabitant of Mithilā, the words of Vācaspati should be taken to be more reliable. In the absence of more proofs it is difficult to give any approximate date for the author, but this is certain that he lived before Gaṅgeśa. So I have placed him in the 12th century A. D.

55. KEŚAVA MIŚRA

(12th century)

Another pre-Gaṅgeśa scholar of great name and fame in the field of Nyāyaśāstra is Keśava Miśra. We *do not gather any information whether* Gaṅgeśa has referred to Keśava Miśra at all in his work. Most probably Gaṅgeśa did not refer to him in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. The reason seems to me to be that his only work, the *Tarkabhāṣā* is so petty a work that it does not deserve any mention in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

References to Keśava.

There have been at least two more scholars of the same name. One is the grand-son and pupil of Vācaspati Miśra II, whom, in his work, the *Dvaitapariśiṣṭa*,

[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anumāna, Savyabhicāra, PP. 789-90.

[2] P. 268.

[3] *Vange Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 14.

he always refers to as his *Paramaguravaḥ*[1] He is, no doubt, a Naiyāyika, but he is more known as a Dharmaśāstrī because of his contributions to Dharmaśāstra. The next more important author is the *Tarkācārya* Keśava Miśra, son of Viśvadhara Miśra, of the well-known scholarly family of Sodarapur of Kaṭakā branch in Mithilā.[2] He has written a running commentary on the *Gotamasūtra*, called *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa*. He has also written some works on Dharmaśāstra. He was a court Paṇḍita of Mahārāja Lakṣmīnātha of Mithilā in about 1525 A.D.

The author of the *Tarkabhāṣā* is quite different from both of these. He is decidedly an earlier writer. The earliest reference to his work is to be had from the commentary written on his *Tarkabhāṣā* by Varddhamāna Upādhyāya, son of Gaṅgeśa. A manuscript of this commentary is found in the *Manuscript Library of the Mahārājā of Alwar* as reported by Peterson in his *Catalogue of Ulwar Manuscripts*[3]. The name of the commentary of Varddhamāna is the *Tarkaprakāśa* which has again, been commented upon by Rucidatta Upādhyāya, the pupil of Pakṣadhara[4]. Then again, Cinnam Bhaṭṭa wrote a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā*, called *Tarkabhāṣā-praveśikā*. This Bhaṭṭa lived in the court of king Harihara of Vijayanagar in the latter half of the 14th century[5].

Next, Keśava is the teacher of Govardhana, son of the *Jagadguru* Balabhadra Miśra and Vijayaśrī[6].

[1] *Dvaitapariśiṣṭa*—Paramaguravaḥ, pp. 47, 175, Paramaguru-caraṇāḥ, p. 76; asmatpitāmahacaraṇapavitrīkṛtaḥ panthāḥ, p. 81; kṛtyamahārṇave paramaguravaḥ, p. 125 and this *kṛtyamahārṇava* is the work of Vācaspati Miśra II.

[2] diśatu purandara-Sodara-mindīvarasundaraṁ śreyaḥ /
abhilaṣitamindirayā vidhuntudanudaṁ tejaḥ //

[3] Peterson's *Mss. Cat. Ulwar*. Ms. No. 653, 1892, p. 28.

[4] Introduction to the *Tarkabhāṣā*, Pandit edition.

[5] Dr. Vidyābhūssṇa, *Indian Logic*, p. 381.

[6] Vijayaśrītanūjanmā govardhana iti śrutaḥ /
tarkabhāṣām tanute vivicya gurunirmitim //
śrīviśvanāthānuja-padmanābhā-
nujogarīyān balabhadrajanmā /
tanoti tarkānadhigatya sarvān
śrīpadmanābhādviduṣo vinodam //

Viśvanātha and Padmanābha are the two elder brothers of Govardhana. He has written a commentary called *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśa*. This Govardhana has also commented upon the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annam Bhaṭṭa, called *Nyāyabodhinī*.

From all these references and the family relations, it may be concluded that Keśava Miśra flourished in Mithilā long before Varddhamāna. Then, Keśava has referred to Udayana and has not referred to either *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* or Jayanta, nor has he referred to Gaṅgeśa. All this shows that Keśava lived before Gaṅgeśa and after Udayana. So he is placed in the 12th century A.D.

Date of Keśava.

This book though so small and simple yet has been commented upon by more than 20 great scholars, a large majority of whom hails from the South. From the list of the commentaries given by Pandit Surendralal Śarmā in his introduction to the *Pandit* Edition, it is evident that Govardhana is the only commentator from Mithilā so far known.

Contents of the *Tarkabhāṣā*.

The *Tarkabhāṣā* is a very small work meant for the beginners. The author himself introduces the text saying—

bālo'pi yo nyāyanaye praveśa-
malpena vāñchatyalasaḥ śrutena/
saṅkṣiptayuktyanvitatarkabhāṣā
prakāśyate tasya kṛte mayaiṣā.

Translation—This Tarkabhāṣā (wherein the sixteen categories of the science of Reasoning have been dealt with) is being brought into light. It is brief and full of reasoning. It is written for a boy (beginner) who is idle and wants to enter into the science of Reasoning with very little study.

This whole treatise is a brief explanatory commentary on the first sūtra of Gotama. It is therefore, purely a Nyāya work, of course, not much burdened with the dialectical Nyāya terminology. So it is very easy. One can very easily understand all the impor-

—Beginning verses of Govardhana's commentary. Colophon of the *Kiraṇāvalībhāskara* and *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśa*.

tant topics or aspects of Prācīna-Nyāya from this small book. As it is exclusively meant for the beginners, the author says at the end that whatever is considered very necessary to understand the science has been repeatedly explained here in so many ways. But that which is not necessary, has been left out without any explanation. This is not considered to be a defect. This is enough for the accomplishment of scholarship for the beginners.

It begins with the first sūtra of the *Gotamasūtra* and explains with various illustrations each of the sixteen categories of Nyāya. As already mentioned, in several places, the Naiyāyikas have to face the Mīmāṁsakas on all points from the āstika side and the Bauddhas from the nāstika side. Why do the Naiyāyikas face the Bauddhas is not due to their having common platform, because their standpoints are different, but simply because the Bauddhas are regarded as nāstikas and without caring for what they mean, the orthodox people refute their views. So we find even in this small elementary book, from time to time, two types of opponents appearing with *prima facie* views against the Naiyāyikas.

Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṁsakas and Bauddhas-opposing one another

From the study of this work it is evident that Keśava had Udayana before him as an ideal scholar. So he often refers to Udayana. The definition of *pramā* (yathārthānubhavaḥ) is exactly what Udayana has said in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*,[1]. Again, Keśava quotes the definition of the fallacy, called *asiddhi*, from Udayana[2]. In the latter case Keśava even names Udayana.

Besides, Keśava quotes two kārikās from some unknown source not traced so far. He says, *taduktam*[3], while defining *ayutasiddhas* :

tāvevāyutasiddhau dvau vijñātavyau yayordvayoḥ/
anaśyadekamaparāśritamevāvatiṣṭhate//

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 10. Reprint from the *Pandit*. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, IV.1

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 167; *Pariśuddhi*, Fol. p. 1211; *Kusumāñjali*, III. 7. P. 416

[3] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 16 Pandit Edition.

Then again, summing up the two varieties of prat-kṣa with their preliminary stages, he quotes two rses compiled (saṁgraha) from some unknown urce[1]:

akṣajā pramitirdvedhā savikalpā'vikalpikā/
karaṇaṁ trividhaṁ tasyāḥ sannikarṣastu ṣaḍvidhaḥ//

ghaṭatannīlanīlatvaśabdaśabdatvajātayaḥ/
abhāvasamavāyau ca grāhyā sambandhaṣaṭkataḥ//

milarly, he quotes three kārikās regarding the logical *ethod of Conversion*:

vyāpyavyāpakabhāvo hi bhāvayoryādṛgiṣyate/
tayorabhāvayostasmādviparītaḥ pratīyate//

anvaye sādhanaṁ vyāpyaṁ
sādhyaṁ vyāpakamiṣyate/

sādhyābhāvo'nyathā vyāpyo
vyāpakaḥ sādhanātyayaḥ//

vyāpyasya vacanam pūrvaṁ vyāpakasya tataḥ param/
evam parīkṣitā vyāptiḥ sphuṭībhavati tattvataḥ//

these, the first two lines are from the *Ślokavārttika*.[2] he last two verses are from some unknown source.

According to the Commentator Viśvakarman,[3] eśava has refuted the view of Kandalīkāra and others at Inference is drawn from the perception of the :obans and the remembrance of the vyāpti (generali-tion) alone.

Vaiśeṣika elements in the work.

Undoubtedly, it is a Nyāya work but by the time eśava flourished the two schools of Nyāya and Vai-śeṣika came to be mixed up into one. So there is a little digression in the treatmet of the knowables in this work. or instance, while defining the term *artha* one of the ine prameyas, the *Nyāyasūtra* means gandha, rasa, ūpa, sparśa and śabda, the specific qualities of the ve mahābhūtas, namely, earth, water, fire, air and kāśa, respectively[4]. Keśava Miśara, on the other and, means by *artha* the six positive (bhāva) objects f knowledge, namely, substance (dravya), quality

[1] *Tarkabbāṣā* p. 30. [2] Anumāna, Verse 121.

[3] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 42. Pandit Edition.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 14.

(guṇa), action (karman), generality (sāmānya), specific attribute (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya)[1]. These are in fact, the categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. Thereafter, he proceeds with the treatment of these six categories and discusses the process of creation and destruction also. After this he also discusses the *abhāva padārtha*. Then he comes back to those categories of Nyāya which had been left out before.

With this diviation the author has finished his work. Lastly, it may be mentioned that according to Govardhana Miśra, a commentator of the *Tarkabhāṣā*, Keśava Miśra has committed a blunder in giving an example of the *pratitantra-Siddhānta* in the form—Manas's being a sense-organ according to the Naiyāyikas (naiyāyikasya mate manasaḥ indriyatvam)[2]. According to Govardhana a *pratitantra-Siddhānta* is that which is accepted by only one party ; as for instance, the acceptance of sound as eternal according to Prābhākara. The Naiyāyikas do not accept it or even *Vice-Versa*[3].

Mistake in Tarkabhāṣā.

It may be also pointed out here that Vātsyāyana has also explained it like Govardhana, in his *Bhāṣya*. So translates Dr. Jha that which is accepted by only one philosophy, and is not accepted by any other philosophy, is called the doctrine peculiar to one philosophy (pratitantra-siddhānta).

56. MAṆIKAṆṬHA MIŚRA

(13th century)

We shall see later on that Vācaspati Miśra II has written a commentary called *Nyāyaratnaprakāśa* on the *Nyāyaratna* of Maṇikaṇṭha Miśra. This Maṇikaṇṭha has been referred to in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśa. In the

References to Manikantha Miśra.

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 1 Pandit edition.

[2] *Tarkabhṣā*, p. 161 Pandit edition.

[3] ekamātrābhyupagamaḥ pratitantrasiddhāntaḥ/ yathā Prābhākarasya śabdanityatvābhyupagamaḥ / naiyāyikairanaṅgīkārāt / yathā vā naiyāyikānāṁ tadanityatābhyupagamaḥ / Prābhākarairanaṅgīkārāt / dvitīyo yathetyādistu tarkabhāṣāpramādastasyābhyupagamasiddhāntodāharaṇatvāt—Govardhana's Commentry. Parāñjape's Ed. pp. 93-94.

colophon of the *Nyāyaratna*[1], it is written that Maṇikaṇṭha was a *Rājadharmādhikārī* of some 'tairabhuktīya' king. So, evidently he was a Maithila scholar of great repute. Again, according to Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, author of the *Anumānamaṇiparīkṣā*, Gaṅgeśa quotes Maṇikaṇṭha in his *Tattvacintāmaṇī*, Upādhivāda.[2] According to Dinesha Chandra Bhattacharyya, Maṇikaṇṭha refers to Sānātani and quotes from the *Ratnakoṣa*—'saṁśayavirodhidharmadvayaviṣayānumitijanakatva satpratipakṣatvamiti Rátnakoṣaḥ'; upon which Vācaspati Miśra II comments—'Taraṇi Miśramatamāha-Saṁśayeti'.

Besides these short references to the old writers on Nyāya, there are many more, whom Gaṅgeśa has referred to but they are not known to day for want of further researches in the subject. I therefore, proceed further and leave them for future researches.

Concluding remarks on Prācīna-Nyāya.

As already pointed out, there must have been many more and more important writers on Nyāya even whose names along with their works are almost forgotten. But as contemporary writers and also others of later period have referred to them, it is just possible that if genuine efforts are made to search for the manuscripts, thousands of which are scattered all over the country, we may be able to bring them into light some day or other.

The section which has just finished began with Akṣapāda Gotama as the first writer on the Nyāya system after the Buddha. The ultimate end of this school of thought, nay of every system of Indian Philosophy and also of all other śāstras, is to achieve the highest goal of life, namely, realization of the Ātman. It may be called absolute freedom from miseries, or attainment of Absolute Bliss, or whatever name may be given to it. But all these mean the same *akhaṇḍa-jñāna* and *bliss*.

It is well-known to all that of the four *Puruṣārthas*, namely, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*, it is the last

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[1] Vide-A Tanjore Ms. in the Telugu script Mss. Catalogue, P. 4736.

[2] Fol. 104b: Upādhivāda, P. 365—*anye tu*.

[3] *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. IV. PP. 302-03.

which is ultimately aimed at by Indians in their life and which therefore, has been also recognized even in our śāstras as the ultimate end of life. As already said before[1] the aim of life is the same as that of Philosophy in India.

This system of Nyāya is likewise a system of philosophical thought which though represents a particular lower stage, and though the present *Nyāyasūtra* was originally aimed against the Buddhists and to refute them, categories like jalpa, vitaṇḍā etc. were introduced into the system, yet it is, in fact, devoted to a real search after the absolute truth, that is, the realization of the Ātman. So, also the propounders of this system have said that true knowledge of the sixteen categories, Pramāṇa and others, will, ultimately, lead to the realization of *niḥśreyas*[2] through the removal of wrong notions, etc. It is therefore, that in the Prameyasūtra[3], really speaking, the author has made it clear that essentially there is only one 'prameya', namely, the Ātman for the absolute knowledge of which the correct knowledge of the rest of the prameyas (knowables) is essential. It is therefore, that Vācaspati I has specifically said that of these knowables, Ātman is acceptable and fit to be selected (upādeya) along with *apavarga* and others, namely, physical organism etc. are to be rejected. Again, out of the two acceptables, the knowledge of *apavarga* is meant only for the sake of knowing the Ātman absolutely (apavargasyātmārthatvena prameyeṣu pariganaṇanam Ātmanaḥ prādhānyāt)[4]. So all our Śāstras ultimately aim at the realization of the Ātman. It will not be out of place to say that the realization of the first three values of life is also meant ultimately for realizing the absolute truth, namely, the absolute knowledge of the Ātman. It is therefore that the Nyāya Śāstra was originally called *Ānvīkṣikī*, meaning, *Ātmavidyā*. So says *Kāmandaka*—[5]

ānvīkṣikyātmavidyā syāt īkṣaṇāt sukhaduḥkhayoḥ/
īkṣamāṇastayā tattvam harṣaśokau vyudasyati.//

With this aim in view Gotama propounded the system by writing his *Nyāyasūtra* in about the 5th cen. B. C.

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[1] Vol. I. pp. 1—7. [2] *Nyāyasūtra*, 1. i. 1. [3] I. i. 9.
[4] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, P. 210. [5] II. 11.

2 NAVYA-NYĀYA
(NEO-LOGIC)

But a sudden change was brought about in the study of the system. Formerly, the system as a whole was studied and much more attention was given mainly to the study of the knowables (prameyas) and the study of the means to right knowledge (pramāṇa) occupied a subordinate place and was taken up only to explain the knowables. It was studied as an Ātmavidyā[1].

Change in outlook.

But in the 12th century, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā took out the third sūtra of the first chapter and first āhnika of the *Gotamasūtra—'pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni'*, and wrote his *magnum opus* called *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in four chapters, one chapter devoted to each of the four pramāṇas, namely, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamana and Śabda, which became the nucleus for the study of the system only as the *Pramāṇaśāstra*.

Gaṅgeśa introduced an epoch making era in the history of the Nyāya system. He is known as the founder of the Neo-logic (Navya-Nyāya) in India which, with its pugnacious dialectics and spirit of analytical criticizms, has won its way into every kind of intellectual life in the country. It has not only changed the very trend of thought of the various systems of philosophy in India, but has also affected the methodology of almost all the other Śāstras. It gave a new life to the study of the Nyāya system and ultimately, it became the very basis of the science of dialectics in India. It deals almost exclusively with the Theory of knowledge and has practically left out all the metaphysical problems.[2] Even the chapter on the

Founder of Neo-logic-Pramāna-Śāstra.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] As already pointed out in the first volume that the main object of writing the *Nyāyasūtra* was to combat with the Buddhists, as is clear from the inclusion of vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna amongst the categories, the correct knowledge of which leads to the attainment of niḥśreyas. Thereby it may also be said that the *Nyāyasūtra* gave rise to the methodology of academic struggle in order to attain victory over the opponents in the literary field. It was therefore that the *Nyāyasūtra* became the source of conflict between the nāstikas, particularly, the Buddhists, and āstikas, like the Nāiyā-

Īśvarānumāna does not deal with the question of Ontology. It forms part of the chapter on Inference and is not a separate chapter though separately printed. It might have been written and added to the text later on. We know that prior to Gaṅgeśa, the Buddhists, like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and the Jainas, like Vidyānanda and Devasūrin, had already dealt with the problem of pramāṇa in their works which Gaṅgeśa must have seen; so, simply by writing on pramāṇa one cannot be called a Navya-Naiyāyika. But it was the particular methodology which Gaṅgeśa adopted that made him the founder of the *Science of Dialectics* (Neo-Logic). It must be at the same time pointed out that no doubt, the trend of thought on the lines of neo-logic was obvious even in Udayana, but it is Gaṅgeśa who is called the founder of the New science of logical reasoning and not Udayana.

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yikas. This method came to be called, later on, the method of *śāstrārtha* amongst the traditional scholars of India and Tibet. This became so charming that it attracted the best brains from amongst the traditional scholars. In course of time it became the best test of merit. That is, one who happened to shine in putting up a good fight against any scholarly party was considered to be the best scholar of the time. Several books were written on this subject by great scholars. Udayana wrote *Bodhasiddhi*, Dharmakīrti wrote his *Vādanyāya*, Śrī Harṣa wrote *khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, Saṅkara Miśra of the 15th century wrote *Vādivinoda*, Jayadeva Miśra of the 20th century wrote *Śāstrārtharatnāvalī* exclusively on this very subject. Even today scholars as well as persons interested in Sanskrit learning take great delight in entering into the arena and showing their feat amidst great scholars. This is the tradition of *Śāstrārtha* which started during the Buddhist period and has continued till today without any interruption.

The method involved hairsplitting test in argumentation. It was a great test of high intelligence. The science of reasoning could develop to its great height through this method. The result was that scholars developed great intelligence and power of thinking independently. But then it must not be forgotten that this method totally shadowed the study of the reality. Original and old texts were forgotten. The secrets of the sciences were cast in total darkness and the traditional scholars' knowledge to day is very very shallow. It is almost lost for ever. This is the greatest injury which has been done to the real study of the Śāstra, which was meant for attaining the highest value of life even by this method of the so-called *Śāstrārtha* which had its utility at one time, but now its has no purpose.

1. GAṄGEŚA UPĀDHYĀYA

(13th century)

We have seen before that Udayana had to fight mainly against the Buddhists and the Mīmāṁsakas, who did not believe in the existence of Īśvara. In the present case, Gaṅgeśa says in the very beginning of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*—

anvīkṣānayamākalayya gurubhirjñātvā gurūṇāṁ mataṁ
cintādivyavilocanena ca tayoḥ sāraṁ vilokyākhilam/
tantre doṣagaṇena durgamatare siddhāntadīkṣāguru-
rgaṅgeśastanute mitena vacasā śrītattvacintāmaṇim//

Translation.—That is, having studied the Nyāya system under my *gurus* and having acquired knowledge of the views of the followers of Prabhākara Miśra, the Mīmāṁsaka, and having realized the essence of these two systems in all their entirety through meditation (which is like the divine eyes for Gaṅgeśa), Gaṅgeśa, the *guru* of the secrets of the conclusions of the system which, because of its multitude defects, is so very difficult to explain, is composing the *Śrītattvacintāmāṇi* in brief.

He further says—

yato maṇeḥ paṇḍitamaṇḍanakriyā
pracaṇḍapāṣaṇḍatamastiraṣkriyā/
vipakṣapakṣe na vicāracāturī
na ca svasiddhāntavaco daridratā//

Aim of writing Tattvacintāmani.

Translation.—That with the help of this Jewel in the form of thoughts (cintāmaṇi) the position of the Paṇḍitas is adorned and that of the ignorant and impetuous heretics, namely, the Bauddhas, is refuted, the skill in argumentation on the side of the opponents is not retained, nor there remains any lack of reasoning in the exposition of the conclusions of the Nyāya system.[1]

From the above it becomes clear that he had fully studied the Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and had refuted the views of the Buddhists and the Mīmāṁsakas of the Prabhākara school. This is but natural, as has been also said before. The

[1] Beginning verses of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*

Buddhists were the common and old enemies of the Tārkikas and the Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, were like the claimants of common property with the Naiyāyikas. So Naiyāyikas picked up academic quarrel with them very often.

Personal history.

Gaṅgeśa was also known as Gaṅgeśvara[1]. In the *Pañjī* also he is called Gaṅgeśvara. It is to be noted that in the *Pañjī*[2] of old families not only the genealogies were recorded but also the most important achievements and qualifications of the male members, used to be added to their names. So, against the name of Gaṅgeśvara we find the words, *Mahāmahopādhyāya*, *Paramaguru* and *Jagadguru* and also *Tattvacintāmaṇikāraka*, mentioned. These words leave no doubt as to his being the author of the great work called *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, and the founder of the Neo-Logic or the Science of Dialectics, in India. From the same source we learn that he belonged to the 'Kāśyapagotra' which may be supported by what his son Varddhamāna Upādhyāya, (or Jhā, which is the later form of the same Sanskrit word *Upādhyāya*), has said '*Gotram Kāśyapādi*' in his *Kusumāñjali-Prakāśa*[3].

The *Pañjī* also points out that his original home was in a village named *Chādana* of which we have no knowledge at present. But afterwards he is said to have lived in Karion, the home village of Udayana. Again, we find therein that Gaṅgeśvara had one son and one daughter. The daughter was married to

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[1] Vide—Varddhamāna Upādhyāya's beginning verses of his *Prakāśa* on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and on the *Nyāyanibandha* which is ordinarily known as the *Pariśuddhi*, or *Nyāya-Pariśuddhi* of Udayana.

[2] It is the *Genealogical Records* of the inhabitants of Mithilā, particularly of Brāhmanas and *Karṇa* Kāyasthas coming from Kārṇāṭa preserved by the Pañji-kāras, genealogical Record keepers of Mithilā, containing various details of the family genealogy and traditions of Maithilas from about the 10th or 11th centuries till present day. It was revised on strict scientific lines during the reign of Harisiṁhadeva, king of Mithilā, in 1232 Śaka era, that is, 1310 A.D.

—Śāke śrīharisiṁhadevanṛpaterbhūpārkatulye'janiḥ/
tasmāddantamite'bdake dvijagaṇaiḥ Pañjīprabandhaḥ kṛtaḥ//

[3] P. 18 Bibliotheca Indica edition.

one Sādhukara of the original home village *Bambhanināma*, who was ordinarily known as Sāṭhū. From the daughter of Gaṅgeśvara, Sādhukara had one son named Ratnākara and one daughter. Of these, we have a continued record in the *Pañjī*[1].

From another source of the *Pañjī*, we find a record—*Chādanasaṁ tattvacintāmaṇikāraka Jagadguru Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgeśasuta Sūpana dau bhaṇḍāri samasaṁ harāditya-du(hitṛ-dauhitra)—Sūpanabhrātṛ Hariśarma dāviti kaccijajibāle*[2], where there is a reference to *Gaṅgeśasuta Sūpana* and further to *Sūpanabhrātṛ-Hariśarma*. From this, we conclude that Gaṅgeśa had two more sons, named Sūpana and Hariśarman, from the daughter of one Harāditya. In other words, Gaṅgeśa, as was also the custom in Mithilā, had married more than one wife. From one wife he had Varddhamāna, who was generally called *Bāḍhū*, being the eldest son from one wife, and from the other, he had two sons-Sūpana and Hari. This is also evident from the fact that the eldest son of the second wife was called by a *pseudonym* Sūpana[3]. Thus, Gaṅgeśa had three sons and one daughter. It is said that Gaṅgeśa in his early life was illiterate, but due to his devotion to goddess Kālī, he became such a great scholar. This is also suggested by his own words—'Cintādivyavilocanena'. No more information is available about his personal history.

About the date of Gaṅgeśa there has been several suggestions both by Indian and European scholars.

Date of Gaṅgeśa.

Weber has placed him in the 12th century. Keith[4] has placed him between 1150-1200 A. D. Dr. Vidyabhusana has assigned him to the last quarter of the 12th century A.D[5]. Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj has placed

[1] Vide—*Svadeśa*, a Maithilī Journal, Darbhanga, Vol. I. Pt. 1. PP. 17-22.

[2] Quoted by Dineshchandra Bhattacharya in his *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 98.

[3] The tradition is not to utter the name of one's eldest son (Śreyaskāmo na gṛhṇīyāt jyeṣṭhāpatyakalatrayoḥ), so people give a *pseudonym* to such sons.

[4] *Indian Logic and Atomism*, P. 33.

[5] *Indian Logic*, P. 406.

him somewhere in the 13th century A. D. M. R. Bodas placed him after the 12th century[1].

We may, however, adduce the following points in fixing his date. Gaṅgeśa has mentioned several authors in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of whom Harinātha Upādhyāya[2], as interpreted by Mathurānātha in his commentary (Harināthopādhyāyalakṣaṇam dūṣayitu-māha-*apare tviti*), is the latest. That Harinātha was a great Naiyāyika is proved by the fact that he was called—*Nyāyaratna*.[3] We do not know any of his work as yet, but it seems that there must have been some. He was also a great Dharma-śāstrin and it is therefore, that Gaṅgeśa discussed his definition of 'hiṁsā' in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.[4]

Re-organization of *Pañji* in Mithilā.

There is a tradition in Mithilā that King Harisiṁhadeva of the Kārnāṭa dynasty re-organized the *Pañjī* of Mithilā in 1232 Śaka=1310 A. D. The reason why he did so is traditionally known, that Mahāmahopādhyāya Harinātha had unknowingly married the girl who happened to be related to him by being within the prohibited degrees of relationship and thus not capable of being married with him. It is said that once Harinātha, who had been away from his home on some academic call, was informed on his return by some mischief-makers about the infidelity of his wife. Harinātha, a great scholar of the time, became doubtful about the chastity of his wife and tried to prove it by asking her to appear in public for a fire ordeal test. As it is prescribed in the Dharmaśāstra, thrice a burning piece of hot iron was placed on her hand intervened by a *pippal* leaf and unfortunately, all the three times her palm of the right hand was burnt. This assured the Paṇḍita of her infidelity and she was accordingly, kept aloof from the family. The lady, however, being

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1 Introduction to his edition of the *Takrasaṅgraha*, P. Li.

2 *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabdakhaṇḍa, Vidhivāda, P. 222, Bibliotheca Indica edition.

3 Vide-*Dvaitanirṇaya*—Of Narahari Son of Yajñapati, p. 26 Darbhanga edition.

4 Śabda, p. 222.

very sure of her chastity, approached the king Harisiṁhadeva and requested him to examine the case more seriously. The king took a keen interest in the matter and wanted to do every justice to both the parties. A meeting of scholars was called and again, she had to appear for the ordeal test before the assembly of the Paṇḍitas. She burnt her hand again, as before. The sentence, the lady had to utter in *saṅkalpa* just before the burning iron piece was placed on her palm of the hand, was—'*nāhaṁ cāṇḍālagāminī*' (that is, I have no illicit connection with a *cāṇḍāla*, as the suspected paramour belonged to the *duḥsādhya* class of *viloma* untouchable *varṇasaṅkara* who are called *cāṇḍālas*)[1].

A suggestion however, was made by the lady herself, or by some Paṇḍita present there that the *saṅkalpa* should be amended as '*nāhampatyatirikta-cāṇḍālagāminī*' (that is, I have no illicit connection with any cāṇḍāla other than my own husband). With this *saṅkalpa* when the burning hot iron-piece was again, placed on her palm, not once, but thrice as before, the palm remained unhurt. It was then proved that the husband himself is a *cāṇḍāla* and according to the Dharmaśāstra'a *Cāṇḍāla* is one who has illicit connection with his own relation (*Cāṇḍālaḥ svajanāgāmī*). The Pañjikāras, thereupon, were called upon to make a thorough investigation into the matter and it was found that in fact, their marriage had been within the prohibited degrees of relationship. This led the King to re-organize, on more scientific basis, the genealogies of the Maithilas in Mithilā and hence, it is said that Harisiṁhadeva re-organized the *Pañjīprabandha* in 1232 śaka=1310 A. D. From this incident we understand that Paṇḍita Harinātha Upādhyāya was living in 1310. Gaṅgeśa must have lived about that time.

Again, the earliest writer to refer to Gaṅgeśa, according to Professor Bhattacharya, is the great Maithila scholar Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya, who must have criticized Gaṅgeśa sometime between 1350-75 A.D. Lastly, Professor Bhattacharya says that no "foreign"

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1 *Āryāsaptaśatī*, *Rasapradīpikā* by Bhavānīnātha Miśra, Vide P. 132. Pt. Keshi Miśra's edition.

(meaning non-Maithila) scholar has ever referred to Gaṅgeśa before 1400 A.D.

Again, according to the Mithilā *Pañjī*, Gaṅgeśa's dauhitra (daughter's son), the famous Ratnākara, was married with the dauhitrī of one Sūpana, son of Jaṭeśvara, the fourth son of Devāditya, the grand-father of Caṇḍeśvara Ṭhākura. The wife of Ratnākara was a niece from the side of the younger brother of the great-grand-father of the renowned poet Vidyāpati Ṭhākura who must have been born in 1360 A.D[1]. The father of Vidyāpati was murdered by Aslan in 1372 A.D. Keeping 50 years for the grand-father of Vidyāpati, we may say that Jayadatta might have been living about 1320 A. D. whose contemporary might have been Gaṅgeśa. All this shows that Gaṅgeśvara can easily be placed in about 1300 or a few years earlier, but in no case we can place him earlier than 1275 A.D.

Works of Gaṅgeśa.

We know of only one work of Gaṅgeśa and it is his *magnum opus* the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. We do not know as yet of any of his other contributions. But this much we can say that he had the boon of the goddess of learning. Once, it is said that when some one had encountered him on an occasion, he uttered the following verse—

anāsvādya gauḍīmanārādhya gaurīṁ
vinā tantramantrairvinā śabdacauryāt/
prasiddhaprabuddhaprabandhapravaktā
virañciprapañce madanyaḥ kaviḥ kaḥ//

Translation—In the creation of the creator who else, other than myself, is a critical scholar or a poet, without having tasted the wine prepared from *guḍa*, without having won the favour of the goddess Gaurī, without the help of tantra and mantra and also without having been a plagiarist? In the last verse of his *Kusumāñjali-Prakāśa*, his son Varddhamāna says—

yastarkatantraśatapatrasahasraraśmir-//
Gaṅgeśvaraḥ sukavikairavakānanenduḥ//

Translation—He who is like the sun for the lotus in the form of the Tarkaśāstra and who is like the

[1] Vide—Umesha Mishra, *Vidyāpati Ṭhākura*, third edition, pp. 13, 39.

moon in the forest of kairava-flower (white lotus which blossoms when the moon rises) in the form of good poets.

From both these references we may conclude that like other Naiyāyikas Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya used to take delight in composing verses, or even writing some poems which are not available at present.

Peculiarities of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

In his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, as has been already pointed out, Gaṅgeśa has stated that the work will remove the ignorance of the Buddhists and also strengthen the arguments of the Tarkaśāstrins. The language is somewhat obscure and pregnant with deep thoughts which have led later scholars develop the science of Indian dialectics so minutely, critically and thoroughly. Sometimes, we come across sūtra like sentences which have been so comprehensibly explained by great scholars of Mithilā and later on, by scholars from Bengal and South. It is a unique characteristic of the style that apparently the language and the sentences do not seem to be very difficult, but once scholars enter into their hair-splitting examination, thoughts are found coming out of them like the endless threads from the body of a spider. His book is so full of thoughts and criticizms that one becomes lost in them. Perhaps this is the only book on philosophy which has attracted the attention of almost all great scholars of of philosophy past and also of present to write direct and indirect commentaries on it.

Commentators and sub-commentators on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has cast a shadow on the *Gotamasūtra* and its most important commentaries. It alone shines in the field of Nyāya literature today. Voluminous commentaries on it have been written by Maithilas, and later on, by Bengalis and Southerners. Amongst these the most famous are Varddhamāna, Jīvanātha Miśra, Gaṅgāditya, Ghaṭeśopādhyāya, Nyāyālocanakāra, Pakṣadhara Miśra, Jagadiśa, Maheśa Ṭhākura etc., from amongst the Maithilas and Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Gadādhara and others from Bengal and Mahādeva Puṇatāmakara and others from the South. These direct and indirect commentaries became so important that scholars con-

fined themselves in many cases to the commentaries of the sub-commentaries of the small sections of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, like Prāmāṇyavāda, Pañcalakṣaṇī, Pakṣatā, Vidhi-vāda and so on and students also likewise, confined their studies mostly to these small sections with direct or indirect commentaries in such a way that in modern period most of the scholars have forgotten the original text, namely, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*

The study of the Nyāyaśāstra after Gaṅgeśa became exclusively limited and narrow in outlook but even then almost all the inelligent students became attracted towards the intricacies of the Neo-Logic (science of Dialectics) started by Gaṅgeśa and his followers. It seems that those students who did not like to study this new Pramāṇa-śāstra were considered to be dullards and were looked down even by the cultured class of people. As I have already said, the study of other Śāstras, such as Vyākaraṇa, other Darśanas and even Kāvya-Sāhitya, etc. began to be taught through the same methodology and terminology. Even the specialists of other Śāstras could not shine in their field without having been acquainted with this new method of logical study. In fact, in the 18th and 19th centuries by the word 'Śāstra' a large majority of scholars, at least in Mithilā, understood 'Navya-Nyāya' alone. Thus, the *Tattvacintā*:*aṇi* became so popular that it was called only *maṇi*.

References to works and authors in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*

Gaṅgeśa has mentioned only a few authors of old by name, but his commentators have attributed the views which Gaṅgeśa has referred to, or quoted from various sources, and various authors by name. So we find hundreds of views referred and in this huge text of about 12000 granthas in extent. I give below some of those names which have been so far traced out from different sources. Gaṅgeśa mentions the following by name:

Śivāditya Miśra (12th cen. A.D.)

Śivāditya Miśra who maybe placed earlier than Gaṅgeśa, in the 12th century A.D. He was more of a Vaiśeṣika than a Naiyāyika; so, I have reserved his treatment for the next chapter. Gaṅgeśa quotes a line from his work which might have been both in prose

and in Kārikā form in imitation of Udayana whose influence existed for more than two centuries. The line is—

vyāvarttanīyamadhitiṣṭhati yaddhi sākṣā-
detadviśeṣaṇamato viparītamanyat/

daṇḍī pumāniti viśeṣaṇamatra daṇḍaḥ
puṁso na jātiranudaṇḍamasau ca tasya//

Translation—The term 'daṇḍī', in the sentence 'daṇḍī pumān', is an adjective qualifying the term 'pumān'. It is not the jāti (genus). 'Daṇḍatva' is the jāti present in the daṇḍa (stick), so that which directly remains in that which is to be excluded (vyāvartanīya) is the *viśeṣaṇa* and the *upaeakṣaṇa* is different from it.

This line is quoted as a Pūrvapakṣa which Gaṅgeśa has refuted,[1] where the sense of *atadvyāvṛtti* (svabhinnabhinna—not excluded from itself), or 'Viśeṣaṇa' or 'Upalakṣaṇa' in a piece of knowledge having an object with a qualifying word (viśiṣṭa-jñāna) is discussed. This is followed by a few lines in prose from Śivāditya Miśra—

iti sambandhidvayātiriktasambandhaghaṭakābhāve sati sambandha eva sākṣātsambandhaḥ/ sa ca saṁyoga-samavāya-svarūpasambandhasādhāraṇo jñāne viṣayasyādhikaraṇe abhāvasya sambandhini samavāyasyāstīti teṣāmapi viśeṣaṇatvam iti Śivāditya Miśrāḥ.[2]

As this quotation is not found in his only surviving work, *Saptapadārthī*, it is concluded that he might have written some other work also not known so far. Many believe that the reference to the *Lakṣaṇamālā* attributed to Udayana by Mallinātha in his commentary on the *Tārkikarakṣā* is a mistake for the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana. But it is not so. These lines do not occur in the *Lakṣaṇamālā* even. Professor Dineshchandra Bhattacharya has rightly pointed out that the newly published *Lakṣaṇamālā*[3] is really the work of Udayana to which twice reference has been made

[1] Pratyakṣa, Nirvikalpakavāda PP. 829-30.

[2] Pratyakṣa, PP. 829-30.

[3] Vide *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, XIX. i. PP. 42—52.

by Mallinātha.[1] But why did Udayana write two separate books on 'lakṣaṇa' is itself a problem which will be discussed in the second chapter.

Vācaspati Miśra I (10th century A.D.)

The other author whom Gaṅgeśa mentions by name is Vācaspati Miśra I[2]. He also refers to and quotes a Kārikā from Śrī Harṣa[3] and refutes the same[4] and says—'iti khaṇḍanakāramatamapyapāstam.'

Śrīharṣa (12th cen. A.D.)

Another author whom Gaṅgeśa mentions by name is Śrīkara.[5] Śrīkara, as has been already pointed out, has been quoted by Murāri Miśra, the Mīmāṁsaka of the 11th or the 12th century[6] in his *Tripādīnītinayanam*[7], by Mahāmahopādhyāya Candra of the Prabhākara school of the 11th century[8] and by Bhavanātha Miśra (who is different from the father of Śaṅkara Miśra) of earlier than the 11th century[9] and lastly, by Vijñāneśvara, the author of the *Mitākṣarā* on the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, of the 11th century A. D. So, we can easily place Śrīkara in the 10th century A.D.[10] He was also a Mīmāṁsaka and a Naiyāyika of great reputation.

Śrīkara (10th century A.D.)

Maṇḍana Miśra.

Another author whom he mentions by name is Maṇḍana Miśra, the Mīmāṁsaka.[11] Similarly, he mentions Ratnakoṣakāra[12] who is identified with Taraṇi Miśra of Mithilā by Rucidatta (tathā ca Ratna-

Ratnakoṣakāra (12th century A.D.)

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[1] Vide—*Niṣkaṇṭakā* on the *Tārkikarakṣā*, PP. 179, 225, Reprint from the Paṇḍit.

[2] Īśvarānumāna P. 81.

[3] *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, Chapter I. P. 693

[4] Anumāna, P. 233. [5] Śabda-Jātiśaktivāda, P. 569.

[6] Umesha Mishra-*Introduction to the Ekādaśādyādhikaraṇa.*

[7] Ms. with the author.

[8] Umesha Mishra-*Critical Bibliography of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, P. 44.

[9] Umesha Mishra, *Critical Bibliography of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, P. 43.

[10] Vide—A. B. Keith, *Hist. of Skt. Lit.* P. 447.

[11] Śabdakhaṇḍa, Jātiśaktivāda, P. 587.

[12] Śabda. Ākhyātavāda, P. 830; Anumāna, Satpratipakṣasiddhānta, P. 885.

ko e Taraṇimiśraiḥ),[1] and who lived in about the 12th century A.D. He also mentions the views of the Jaranmīmāṁsaka[2] and refutes them. This old Mīmāṁsaka has not been yet identified. In four or five places Gaṅgeśa quotes and refers to the views of Ācāryāḥ and quotes a few lines from his *Kusumāñjali*.[3] According to Mathurānātha Bhaṭṭācārya Gaṅgeśa uses the term *Ācāryāḥ* for Udayana.[4] Besides, he has mentioned Prabhākara several times.

Jaranmīmāṁsaka. Ācāryāḥ-Udayana. Prabhākara Miśra.

The names of other authors whom Gaṅgeśa has referred to, as interpreted by his commentators, are: Līlāvatīkāra[5], that is, the author of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, namely Vallabhācārya, a great Vaiśeṣika scholar of the end of the 12th century[6]; Siṁha and Vyāghra[7] which refer to the two brothers, Śaśadhara and Maṇidhara of the 12th century already dealt with.; Sondaḍa Upādhyāya;[8] Ṭīkākāra[9] which, generally refers to Vācaspati Miśra I. Ratnakoṣakāra[10] who has been identified with Taraṇi Miśra, already referred to above, of the 12th century. Mahārṇavakāra[11] Prābhākarāstu[12] as interpreted by Pragalbha Miśra[13] is used for Vaṭeśvara, a Mīmāṁsaka of the Prabhākara school. The last view which Gaṅgeśa has referred to as *apare*

Vallabhācārya (12th century A.D.) Siṁha and Vyāghra (12th century A.D.) Sondaḍa Upādhyāya. Ṭīkākāra. Taraṇi Miśra (12th century A.D.) Mahārṇavakāra-Vaṭeśvara.

[1] Anumāna—Vide *Vange Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 13.

[2] Śabda. Śabdā-prāmāṇyavāda, P. 83.

[3] Pratyakṣa, PP. 834, 845; Śabda. Vidhivāda, P. 204 and *Īśvarānumāna*, P. 178; sabdāprāmāṇyvaāla p. 88.

[4] Vide—Śabda, Vidhivāda, P. 284.

[5] Pratyakṣa. P. 409, Anumāna, PP. 86, 284, Śabda, Vol. I. P. 31 as interpreted by Mathurānātha.

[6] Vide—Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies, Vol. III. P. 124.

[7] Anumāna, P. 49.

[8] Anumāna, PP. 53-54, 575, Śabda, Vol. I. P. 202, Vol. II. PP. 24, 217, 276 as interpreted by Mathurānātha.

[9] Anumāna, P. 87.

[10] Anumāna, P. 330, Śabda. Vol. II. P. 830.

[11] Śabda. Vol. I. P. 126 Vol. II. P. 77

[12] Pratyakṣa P. 356. [13] See *Vange Nyāyacarcā*. P. 14.

is atrbuted to Harinātha Upādhyāya by Mathurānātha[1] about whom we have already discussed before. Besides these, there are hundreds of authors whose views Gaṅgeśa has referred to by the terms-kecit, navyāḥ, anye, Mīmāṁsaikadeśinaḥ, prāñcaḥ, Bhaṭṭamataṁ, Nyāyamataṁ, Gurumataṁ, Prābhākarāḥ, Ucchṛṅkhalāḥ, Miśramīmāṁsakaḥ (may be for Murāri Miśra), Prābhākaranavyāḥ, Ekadeśinaḥ, Apare, Svatantrāḥ, Ṛjavaḥ, Sampradāyavidaḥ, Navīnāḥ, *ye, itare, pare,* Abhinava-Vaiśeṣikaikadeśinaḥ, paramatam.

Harinātha Upādhyāya (13th century.)

It is necessary to give here a very brief idea of the contents of the great work which has captured the entire intelligentsia of the traditional school of India from the 13th century down to the present day, and which gave a new light to the method of hair-splitting investigation into the thoughts, at a particular stage of our enquiry into the nature of the Ātman.

Brief contents of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*

The book is divided into four *khaṇḍas*, parts as they are called, namely Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda, the four recognized means of right knowledge according to Nyāya system. Each khaṇḍa, again, is divided and subdivided into various subsections according to the importance of the topics discussed.

The first khaṇḍa begins with a 'maṅgalācaraṇa' invoking God Śiva, the destroyer of the three cities (purabhid), followed by two verses about the composition of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi.* The benedictory verse introduces the discussion whether benediction is at all necessary and if so, what is its aim. This section is known as the *Maṅgalavāda.* Gaṅgeśa gives his view at the very start that one should perform *maṅgala* at the time of beginning a particular desired action in order to see that his action ends successfully, regarding which there is unanimity amongst all the cultured people in the world. At the very outset Gaṅgeśa shows his characteristic method of discussing a topic by first giving all the ideas of the oppo-

Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa Maṅgalavāda.

[1] Śabda. Vol. II. P. 222.

nents and explaining the *prima facie* view very clearly before giving his own criticizm and decision. Accordingly, here he discusses the possible objections, against the performance of maṅgala, of the nāstikas, like Cārvākas and the Buddhists who do not apparently believe in it.

It must be made clear that though there is no direct causality between the performance of maṅgala and the successful finish of the work, yet it is regarded as such only by being the means to remove the obstacles which may beset the work. It is also to be pointed out here that Gaṅgeśa being a staunch orthodox Maithila Brāhmaṇa refers to the customs and practices of the cultured class of people in his support and believes that these are as much valid as the Vedic injunctions. He cites the examples of the performance of the *Ābhyudayika* rite just before the Vivāha (marriage), Upanayana ceremonies[1] and similar other rites for the Vedic yāgas, as the performance of a maṅgala.

Prāmāṇyavāda.

The next section is the most important. It deals with the validity of knowledge (Prāmāṇyavāda). The difficult nature and importance of this can be gathered from an incident which occured in an assembly of Paṇḍitas in the court of a king of Mithilā. Once a Paṇḍita from outside Mithilā came to the *Paṇḍita-sabhā* of Mithileśa and was duly honoured by the king for his extraordinary merit in composing verses quickly with great ease. The Paṇḍita blessed the king and his court with fine verses composed in beautiful Sanskrit. Every one was much impressed with his wonderful memory and quick display of poetic composition. This attracted the attention of the king as well, who repeatedly remarked that his own Maithila Paṇḍitas were not so able to display poetic composition so well. At last a Maithila Paṇḍita took up the courage and submitted that *Rājan*! the Paṇḍita has not studied the śāstra. This was a very curious remark by the Maithila Paṇḍita. In order to verify this, the king enquired from the new-comer if it was a fact. He actually admitted

[1] Pratyakṣa, P. 49.

that it was to study the Śāstra that he had come to Mithilā. He was given every facility to do so and he began his study of the Śāstra, namely, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, in right earnest. After a month when they met again, as usual, in an assembly of the Paṇḍitas, he was asked to compose verses. He found it difficult to compose them so easily as before. Next time, again, when he was asked to do so on a similar occasion, he wanted time to compose a verse. The third time when they met, the king asked him again, to compose a few verses, but with great difficulty the Paṇḍita could compose only one line—

namaḥ Prāmāṇyavādāya matkavitvāpahāriṇe

Translation—I bow down to the *Prāmāṇyavāda* which has deprived me off of my capacity to compose verse in Sanskrit.

Beyond this he could not proceed. Then the king realized what the Maithila Paṇḍitas had said was correct. In other words, the problem of the validity of knowledge is so difficult and all absorbing that one has to forget everything else while studying the problem.

Four views on Prāmāṇyavāda.

In this problem there are mainly four views—*Kumārila's view*, *Prabhākara's view* and *Murāri's view*, all these three represent the Mīmāṁsā standpoint, while that of the Naiyāyika is the fourth. The aim of the Nyāya system (Ānvīkṣikī) is to rescue the universe from miseries and achieve niḥśreyas (Highest Good) and for its achievement the compassionate sage (Akṣapāda Gotama) said that the correct knowledge of all the sixteen categories, namely, pramāṇa, prameya, etc., was necessary. The knowledge of the last fifteen categories, namely, prameya etc. depends upon the knowledge of the pramāṇas and hence, an investigation into the nature of the pramāṇa is made here.[1] This leads Gaṅgeśa to discuss the nature of *pramāṇa* itself. (Pramāṇatattvamatra vivicyate)[2]. This again, depends upon the ascertainment of the nature of *'prama'* which has been explained

[1] Prāmāṇyavāda, PP. 114-16. [2] Prāmāṇyavāda, P. 116.

by Gaṅgeśa as the true knowledge (experience) of *that* (a particular object) in *that place* (=at a particular place) where *that* exists, or it may be explained as the knowledge of the generic nature as inherent in its own subject, inherent in every one of its individual constituents (yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā/tadvati tatprakārakānubhavo vā)[1] for instance, to know a piece of silver to be as such, is a valid knowledge simply because *rajatatva* (silvernes) which is its genus, inheres in each and every piece of *rajata* which is its substratum. *Apramā* (wrong notion) is the knowledge of that object which is not present in that particular place, or the knowledge of the genus in that where its absence is present (tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānam).

Pramā and Apramā defined.

It being so, the next question is where from does the validity arise, and also how is it cognized (kutaḥ utpadyate jñāyate ca)? To the first question there are four types of answer, three from the Mīmāṁsakas and one from the Naiyāyikas. Of the Mīmāṁsakas, the *Prabhākara view* is—that the implement (*sāmagrī*) of the production of the cognition itself, by virtue of its being the object of its validity inherent in itself, determines the validity inherent in that cognition itself.

Source of validity of right knowledge.

Prabhākara's view.

Murāri Miśra, of the *Murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ* fame[2] holds that the validity inherent in the cognition itself is determined by the implement, which is required for direct perception of its ownself which is produced by itself, of the human direct perception (laukika-pratyakṣa) of the object which happens to come to existence just after its own production by virtue of its being the object of its validity inherent in itself (svottaravarttisvaviṣayakalaukikapratyakṣasya svaniṣṭhaprāmāṇyaviṣayakatayā svajanyasvaviṣayakapratyakṣasāmagrī svaniṣṭhaprāmāṇyaniścāyikā)[3].

Murāri Miśra's view.

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyakṣa, Pramālakṣaṇasiddhānta, P. 401

[2] Vide—Umesha Mishra—*Murāreḥ tṛtīyaḥ Panthāḥ*, Proceedings of the Fifth All India Oriental Conference, Lahore, which is also attached to this volume as an Appndix 1.

[3] *Prāmāṇyavāda*, *Māthurī*, P. 126.

Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that the validity present in the cognition itself is determined by the implement (Sāmagrī) of the inference with *jñātatā* as its probans produced by the cognition itself by virtue of there being no possibility of direct perception of *jñāna*, because of the cognition's being supersensuous (jñānasyātīndriyatayā pratyakṣāsambhavena svajanyajñātatāliṅgakānumitisāmagrī svaniṣṭhaprāmāṇyaniścāyikā.)[1].

Kumārila's view.

It is to be understood that by *jnātatā* the Bhaṭṭa school means a 'dharma' which is produced by the cognition expressed in the form—*jñāta* (known). It is produced by cognition. It is inherent in the object (which is known-jñāta) and is a distinct category otherwise known as *prākaṭya* (explicitness).

Jñatatā and its process of production.

Mathurānātha explains the process how through *jñātatā* as a probans the validity of the cognition is inferred.[2] Thus, he says—First there is the direct perception in the form, for instance,—'This is a jar'. Then *jñātatā* (knownness) is produced (in the knowledge produced through direct perception), followed by the remembrance of the concomitant relation (vyāptismaraṇa) in the form—'jñātatā' is such as has jarness (ghaṭatva) as its attribute with jar as its object to be ascribed to and which again, is limited by having the attribute of being produced by cognition which is characterized as having jarness as its attribute and jar as its object to be ascribed to.

Then with the remembrance of the concomitant relation and the contact of the sense-organ with the *jñātatā* of the nature of attributness (viśeṣaṇatātmaka) connected with the sense-organ follows the '*Parāmarśa*' (that is, the knowledge that a *vyāpya*, or a thing which is pervaded by something else, or which is an invariable concomitant of that thing, as smoke is (vyāpya) of fire, exists in the *pakṣa*) of the vyāpyavattā (that is, the attribute of being pervaded) through the relation of identity in the form of that it is in possession of jñātatā characterized as having jar as its

[1] Prāmāṇyavāda, *Māthurī*, P. 126.

[2] P. 183.

object and jarness as its attribute and being pervaded by being produced by that sort of knowledge.[1]

Then follows the inference in the form that this 'jñātatā' is produced by the knowledge characterized with jar as its object and jarness as its attribute (prakāratā), like another 'jñātatā' which is characterized with jar as its object and jarness as its attribute with the help of which supported by the *pakṣadharmatā* (attributed to the pakṣa) is proved the attributeness of the jarness in that which possesses jarness in the particular cognition. In order to make the above lucid to the sanskrit knowing readers I give below the original sanskrit text–

Bhaṭṭamate tu jñātatāliṅgena katham prāmāṇyānumānamiti ceditthaṁ—ādāvayaṁ ghaṭa iti pratyakṣamatha jñātatotpattiḥ ghaṭaviśeṣyakaghaṭatvaprakārakajñānajanyatvavyāpyā ghaṭaviśeṣyakaghaṭatvaprakārakajñātateti vyāptismaraṇañcetyekaḥ kālaḥ/ phalabalena sarvatra tathaiva kalpanāt/tata indriyasambaddhaviśeṣaṇatātmakajñātatendriyasannikarṣavyāptismaraṇāhbyāṁ tādṛśajñānajanyatvavyāpyaghaṭaviśeṣyakaghaṭatvaprakārakajñātatā vatīyamiti tādātmyasambandhena vyāpyavattāparāmarśaḥ .....

tadanantaramiyam jñātatā ghaṭaviśeṣyaka-ghaṭatvaprakārakajñānajanyā ghaṭaviśeṣyaka-ghaṭatvaprakārakajñātatāntaravadityanumityā pakṣadharmatābalāt prakṛtajñāne ghaṭatvavati ghaṭatvaprakārakatvasiddhiḥ.[2]

In all the above mentioned three views upheld by the three Mīmāṁsakas the stand-point taken up is of the validity of the pramāṇa from *svataḥ*, that is, validity is from those very implements which lead to the production of the substratum of the generic (pramātva) of the pramā (cognition) itself (svāśrayajanakasāmagrītaḥ) and not through any other implements (na tadanyasāmagrītaḥ), as against the *Naiyāyikas* who hold that the validity is, in the case of cognition for the first time, realized through other sources.

Gist of the views.

Pakṣadhara Miśra *alias* Jayadeva Miśra makes the main features of the three views clear in his *Āloka* by saying that the validity is realized through the entire assemblage of implements which leads to the cognition itself. In other words, through self-

Pakṣadhara Miśra summarises the views.

[1] P. 183.   [2] *Māthurī*. PP. 183-84.

luminosity etc. according to the stand-point of the (*Guru*) *Prabhākara*, through recognition (anuvyavasāya) etc. according to the stand-point of Murāri Miśra and through the inference based on the probans-jñātatā etc., according to *Kumārila*.[1]

To the above stand-points of the Mīmāṁsakas, Gaṅgeśa, as a Naiyāyika, says that if the validity of cognition be realized through the general sources of cognition itself, then invalid cognition (apramā) would have been identical with valid cognition. Again, he says further, that if the validity is also from the same source and if we were conscious simultaneously both of the cognition and of its validity, then there should have been no doubt about the validity of any of the cognitions even in the first cognition (anabhyāsadaśāpannajñāna). But we cannot ignore the fact that there arise doubts regarding cognitions. So, Gaṅgeśa concludes that the validity of a cognition is through sources other than those which produce cognition. He supports his stand-point by referring to what Ācāryaḥ (=Udayanācāryaḥ) has said—'that the validity of the cognition in the case of its first occurance is realized through sources other than those which produced the cognition itself, because there arises doubt like invalidity[2]. He further argues that the validity of cognition is not realized through our consciousness of that cognition itself, but through inference of its being in confirmity with the actual reality and our activity towards its usage accordingly. This is the substance of the '*Prāmāṇyavāda*'.

Gaṅgeśa criticizes Mīmāṁsaka views.

This is followed by the *theory of error* (anyathākhyātivāda). Gaṅgeśa explains it as the knowledge of that in the place where it is not present (yatra yannāsti tatra tasya jñānamapramā), or the knowledge of its (that is, of a generic nautre, 'tatprakāraka') being the attribute to that object which possesses its negation (tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānam). As for example, the knowledge

Theory of error Nyāya view.

[1] *Āloka* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, P. 60, *Mithila Research Institute publication*, edited by Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, PP. 232-33.

of a piece of silver in the śukti (idam rajatam), wherein there is the negation of the silverness as its attribute. So says Gaṅgeśa-that the experience in the form—'this is a piece of silver' in that object which possesses thisness (idantvavat) is a valid knowledge, while in that which possesses the negation of the silverness (rajatatvābhāvavati) as its attribute, is an invalid knowledge (apramā)[1]. *Similarly, he says that in a pot which has* become red after being subjected to the chemical action, the knowledge of--'this is blue' is valid, because there is the possibility of its having still some tinge of its old blue colour; but in that very substratum to have the experience 'at present there is blue colour in it', is invalid[2]. This is the *Naiyāyika view*.

Prābhākaras hold all knowledge is valid.

The Mīmāṁsakas of the Prabhākara school do not believe in invalid knowledge. According to them all knowledge is valid and leads us to activity independently.[3] They think that we should consider that there are two aspects of knowledge in the experience—'this is silver'; when one happens to have before his eyes a piece of śukti, then one experience is—the knowledge of *this* (idam) which is pratyakṣa, while the second is—*rajatam* which is due to the remembrance of the past experience (smaraṇa). Both the experiences have become mixed together and the only mistake is that the particular person who is acquiring the knowledge, due to some defect, has not been able to distinguish them from each other. His pravṛtti (taking a step accordingly, towards some action) is also due to his not being able to make out the difference between the 'pratyakṣa' and the 'smaraṇa'.

Gaṅgeśa's criticism.

To the above Gaṅgeśa says that his not being able to distinguish (bhedāgraha) is not the cause of his pravṛtti. He however, makes an analysis of the Mīmāṁsaka view thus : there are three parts in this—his pravṛtti is due to his knowledge of *rajata*, his knowledge of *this* (idam) is the cause of his *nivṛtti*, while the non-consciousness of the distinction is neither for his

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi* PP. 402-08.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi* PP. 411-12. [3] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, P. 448.

pravṛtti, nor for his *nivṛtti*. Hence, it cannot be the cause of his pravṛtti.[1]

Gaṅgeśa explains the factors involved in the knowledge —'this is silver' (idam rajatam) by stating that the person gets the knowledge of *idam* (śukti) through ordinary direct contact (saṁyogasambandha), while that of the *silver* which is absent there, through *alaukikasannikarṣa*. Because he, due to some defect, imposes the knowledge of one upon the other, so it becomes invalid.[2]

Then follows the section of types of contact. He defines Pratyakṣa as *janya-pratyakṣam*, that is, the direct knowledge which is produced through sense-organ contact wherein the causality belongs to the sense-organ of vision etc. But Gaṅgeśa gives his own pure and simple definition of Pratyakṣa as *jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*, that is, a knowledge which has no jñāna as its *karaṇa* (most efficient cause).[3] In other words, in pratyakṣa the sense-organs of vision etc. alone are the 'karaṇa' and not jñāna, which is found in inference etc., where the jñāna of probans etc. is the 'karaṇa'[4]. Further, Gaṅgeśa says that in the case of the object to be inferred (meyāṁśe) the inference etc. are due to jñāna, while in the case of *tattāṁśa*, there is the recollection (pratyabhijñā) which is due to jñāna; so these are not the cases of pratyakṣa, but of parokṣa. Both in the case of *miti* and *idantāṁśa* there is pratyakṣa.[5]

Types of contact.

Gaṅgeśa's definition of Pratyakṣa.

After the definition of pratyakṣa, he discusses the various types of *sannikarṣa*.[6] Then he takes up in succession the topics of Samavāya[7], Anupalabdhyaprāmāṇyavāda, Abhāvavāda, and Pratyakṣakāraṇavāda[8]. He also includes in this chapter the theories of the atomic nature of Manas, Anuvyavasāya and indeterminate and deter-

Other topics discussed in Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa.

[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, PP. 476—501.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, PP. 502—37.

[3] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyakṣa, P. 552.

[4] *Māthurī*, P. 559.

[5] P. 561.

[6] PP. 572—76.

[7] P. 640—72.

[8] PP. 720—62.

minate types of direct perception. Thus, ends the first part of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

There is a very interesting verse worth quoting in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which has been attributed to Jñānaśrī by Ratnakīrti in his *sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*[2] representing the view of those who do not believe in *abhāva* (*negation*) as a separate category—

Existence of 'Negation' denied by Buddhists.

dṛṣṭastāvadayam ghaṭo'tra ca patan
dṛṣṭastathā mudgaraḥ
dṛṣṭā kharparasamhatiḥ paramito'-
bhāvo na dṛṣṭo'paraḥ/
tenābhāva iti śrutiḥ kva nihitā
kiñcātra tatkāraṇaṁ
svādhīnā kalaśasya kevalamiyam
dṛṣṭā kapālāvalī//
iti nirastam/mudgarapātādvinaṣṭo
ghaṭa iti pratītyatiriktavināśānubhavāt.

Translation—The jar has been seen at this place, and a staff also has been seen falling upon the jar. After this, pieces of the jar also have been seen, but other than these, a category called 'negation', has not been seen at this place. Therefore, where lies the knowledge that there is a 'negation' of the jar, and what is its cause? Nothing beyond, that the jar has been destroyed by the fall of the staff, is known. Independent existence of the pieces of the jar alone are seen at that place.

Gaṅgeśa has disproved the view expressed in the above verse; for, says he that there exists an experience of negation distinct from the experience—that the jar is destroyed from the fall of a staff, which is neither the surface of the earth, nor is it the knowledge produced by it; because, it exists even without those two.[3]

Gaṅgeśa's refutation.

According to the Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, both these being of the nature of negation, cannot be

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[1] Pratyakṣa P. 717.

[2] P. 111—yadāhurguravaḥ—Edited by Prof. Anantalal Thakur, Patna.

[3] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, P. 717.

destroyed. If, however, they are destroyed, then even negation will have to be accepted as destroyed. Nor can you accept, says Gaṅgeśa to the opponents, *that the 'destruction' is the same as the 'destroyer'*, or the surface of the earth along with it, or its knowledge; for the destruction produced by the fall of the staff is independently experienced.[1]

Anumānakhanda.

The second part of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* deals with inference. It is to be pointed out at the very outset that it is really the *Anumānakhaṇḍa* of the work which has been mostly studied in later centuries and commentaries on this alone are read at present by a large majority of students and teachers. In fact, by the term 'Nyāya', scholars generally mean 'Anumānakhaṇḍa' alone and by 'Naiyāyikas' they mean mostly those who have specialized in the Anumānakhaṇḍa. This is evidently the most popular part of the book.

Sections and sub-sections of Anumānakhaṇḍa.

It contains the following sections and sub-sections—Definition of inference followed by the Vyāptivāda. This portion is one of the most important section. Great scholars have written commentaries, on the invariable concomitant relation between the middle and the major terms which are widely read by modern scholars. The sub-section of 'the definition of Vyāpti attributd to Siṁha and Vyāghra and the subsection on the *Vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva*, that is, the negation limited by a 'dharma' belonging to a different substratum—a view attributed to one of the greatest Maithila Naiyāyikas, named Soṇḍala Upādhyāya, is too original a contribution to the Navya-Nyāya. These are followed by many other definitions of Vyāpti with the final and decisive view (siddhāntalakṣaṇa) of his own. This portion with the commentaries of Bengali scholars, like Raghunātha, Mathurānātha and others are independently studied these days. This leads Gaṅgeśa to discuss Sāmānyābhāva, a distinct type of negation for illucidating a difinition, and Viśeṣavyāpti (other types of specialized definitions of

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[1] *Tattāvacintmaṇi* PP. 717-18.

vyāpti) followed by a section called 'Vyāptigrahopāya' which has two sub-sections—'Tarka' (Confutation) and 'Vyāptyanugama' (Comprehensiveness of invariable concomitance).

Lastly, we have the most important section on the 'Sāmānyalakṣaṇā' (unusual type of Contact with the generic nature).

Sāmānyalakṣaṇā.

Inferences can be drawn from a particular smoke to a particular fire, but it is not possible to infer all cases of fire, past, future and present, from all cases of smoke, unless it is established that the contact of the sense-organ takes place with the generic nature of smoke, that is, with smokeness, in order to infer all cases of fire where there is fireness. This is done with the help of 'alaukikasannikarṣa' (extra-ordinary types of contact), as it is called, which consists of three types, namely, 'Sāmānyalakṣaṇā', 'Jñānalakṣaṇā' and 'Yogaja'.

Upādhivāda.

The next section begins with 'Upādhivāda'. Gaṅgeśa introduces it with a statement that by the knowledge of the conditions (upādhi) one is able to find out the conditional fallacies in the arguments of the opponents and refute them and also to remove such conditions from one's own arguments. Hence, it is necessary to deal with the nature of conditions (*Upādhi*)[1].

Mathurānātha quotes the view of his father, Rāma Tarkālaṅkāra (Pitṛcaraṇāstu), according to whom the necessity to deal with 'Upādhi' is to achieve victory over the opponents by pointing out the conditional fallacies (Upādhis) in the arguments of others and also in one's own arguments.[2]

According to Pakṣadhara Miśra, however, the need to discuss the problem of Upādhi at this place, after the discussion of the sources to establish the concomitant relation, is the very introduction of the nature of the sources to establish Upādhi. This is a very difficult topic and scholars took great pleasure to specialize themselves within such a narrow scope even in our own days. This shows the great critical acumen of our traditional scholars.

[1] Upādhivāda, P. 294 along with the *Māthurī*.

[2] *Māthurī*, PP. 294-95.

Then follow the sub-sections on the causes which lead to the fallacy due to the presence of Upādhi (upādhidūṣakatābījasiddhānta), and the Upādhyābhāsanirūpaṇa. Thereafter we find the treatment of some of the more important factors of the process of inference, namely, *Pakṣatā*, meaning the absence of a knowledge of the thing to be inferred along with the absence of the desire to prove the inference and *Parāmarśa*. Then, we come to the forms of inference, namely, Kevalānvayī and Kevalavyatirekī, and Arthāpatti type of pramāṇa upheld by the Mīmāṁsakas.

Other factors in the process of Inference.

After these, Gaṅgeśa proceeds to discuss the various other factors involved in the process of Anumāna (Avayava). He divides inference into 'for one's own sake' (svārtha)and 'for the sake of others' (parārtha). The latter needs all the five factors of inference together, technically called, 'Nyāya', or 'Parama-Nyāya'[1] (taccānumānaṁ parārthaṁ nyāyasādhyamiti)[2]. This is also an important section of the work which is widely read by the scholars of Navya-Nyāya.

It is evident, as has been pointed out elsewhere, that the ultimate aim of the *Pramāṇa-śāstra* (Neo-Logic) is to achieve victory over the opponents, Āstika and Nāstika, and also to establish the stand-point of the system. So says Gaṅgeśa that the treatment of the various fallacies (hetvābhāsas) is necessary for establishing the correct stand-point which is possible only by knowing the sources leading to the fallacious views (tattvanirṇaya)[3] and also for the purpose of getting victory over the opponents by the knowledge of 'Jalpa' and 'Vitaṇḍā'.[4] It is therefore, that after the 'Avayavas', Gaṅgeśa deals with the fallacies.[5] This portion of the work is also very popular and is very difficult. Small sub-sections of this section are being studied very critically even these days.

Aim of Pramāṇaśāstra is to get victory over opponents.

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1 *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. I.

2 *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anumāna, P. 689.

3 *Māthurī*, P. 763.

4 *Māthurī*, P. 763.

5 *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, PP. 762—997.

Lastly, we come to the most important problem of proving the existence of Īśvara through various inferences.[1] Though this is one of the most important problems in the whole history of the system, yet it is also a fact that Gaṅgeśa has not dealt with it so very successfully. But he should not be accused for this shortcoming, because the problem has been so comprehensively and critically discussed by Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* that there is not much to add to it. Gaṅgeśa by no means could make this Īśvarānumāna a better section of his work. It is therefore, that it has been commented upon very briefly even by Maithilas, like Pakṣadhara and Pragalbhācārya and not by those great commentators who have commented upon other portions of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. . It is somewhat neglected, because there is not much stuff in this part of the work.

Īśvarānumāna.

Thus, ends the Anumānakhaṇḍa of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which is the very essence of Neo-Logic of India. It shows the great achievements of critical brains of Maithila scholars and also of scholars of other parts at large. I am not aware of any field of Indian literature which has achieved so much hair-splitting subtleties as the science of Dialectics.

After 'Anumāna' comes the 'Upamāna' chapter which is the third part of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. It has not attracted many scholars. Rucidatta Miśra, the direct disciple of Pakṣadhara Miśra, has commented upon this portion. It was therefore, that Pragalbhācārya had to say in the beginning of his commentary on this portion—

Upamānakhaṇḍa.

upāyāḥ pratyakṣe caramamanumāne ca kṛtibhiḥ
kṛtā śabde citram navalikhanamastyeṣu kimapi/
na cocchvāso'pyatropamitikaraṇe'kāri gahane
nirālambe kiñcillikhati bhuvi yaḥ so'tra viralaḥ//

Translation—Scholars have devised best means in Pratyakṣa and Anumāna and have done wonderful in Śabda and there is left nothing to write on these. But in case of this difficult chapter on the Upamāna,

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[1] Īśvarānumāna, PP. 1—195.

not even a sigh has been drawn by any one, so there is very few scholars, of whom I am one, says Pragalbha, to write something on it, without any support.

Again, he further says as found in the same manuscript—

tatra pravṛttasya gurūpadeśa-
mātraikavittasya mamotsukasya[1].

Śabdakhaṇda. Śabda defined.

The last chapter is the 'Śabdakhaṇḍa' which deals with the verbal testimony. This is the biggest of the chapters. By *Śabda* Gaṅgeśa means verbal testimony, that is, śabda which is produced by the correct knowledge relating to an object which is the means of our expression of thought for the world-usage[2]. Gaṅgeśa begins the discussion about it by stating the objections raised against it and refuting them.

Process of Śābdabodha.

Then comes the section on the 'Śābdabodha', the process of conveying the thoughts through words in order to give a correct idea of the sentence uttered to the hearers. This leads him to deal with the requirements of the sentence, such as, expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) to other words in the sentence, competency (yogyatā) and contiguity (āsatti) and lastly, purport of the speaker (tātparya), all of which are essential for making out a correct meaning of a sentence. Next, he discusses the problem of the non-eternity of sound (Śabdānityatāvāda) followed by the discussion about the view that Śabda is destroyed and not concealed (Uacchanna-pracchanna-vāda).

Non-eternity of sound.

Vidhivāda

After this, Gaṅgeśa deals with the most important topics of Vedic injunctions (vidhivāda) and with the merits and demerits accruing from the deeds signified by the speech (Apūrva-vāda). After this, comes the problem of potentiality (śaktivāda) which is also an important section studied by the Mīmāṁsakas, Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas. Then follows the section on the implication of words (Lakṣaṇā).

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[1] Pragalbha's Upamānasaṅgraha, A. S. Ms. No. 7603 Introductory verse 2.

[2] PP. 1—7 along with the *Māthurī*, P. 7.

Next, he discusses various other topics, namely, samāsa (compound-words), ākhyāta (verbal suffixes), dhātu (verbal-roots), and upasargas (prefixes). Lastly, the author discusses the validity of the four means of right knowledge (pramāṇacatuṣṭayaprāmāṇyavāda) after having refuted the validity of other means of right knowledge, namely, aitihya (tradition), janaśruti (rumour) which are not different from the verbal testimony, and arthāpatti (presumption) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) both of which are included in inference.

Other topics discussed.

Thus, ends the fourth and the last chapter of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. This portion is more important and popular than even the Anumāna, as it is read not only by the Naiyāyikas, but also by the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṁsakas in Mithilā and also in Bengal.

After giving in brief the idea of the contents of this unique work, it will not be improper to give below a few peculiarities noticed in the book on different aspects.

Some peculiarities picked up from the book.

1. Like great scholars and jñānins of Mithilā, Gaṅgeśa invoked the favour of god Śiva who alone can bestow 'jñāna' which can help the author to get final emancipation (mukti). It must be kept in mind that thereby Gaṅgeśa does not become a Śaiva in the sense it is generally understood these days outside Mithilā.

2. Delusion (bhrama) is aggravated by the augmentation caused in the humours of physical organism, namely, Bile, phlegm, and wind.[1]

3. In the case of there being fallacies (bādha) in Pratyakṣa etc., it is not that there would not be any knowledge. What happens, on the other hand, is that the knowledge thus produced will be invalid. In the case of inference, however, if there be any fallacy(bādha) of the type of *savyabhicāra* (discrepant), *viruddha* (contrary), *satpratipakṣa* (counterbalanced reason), *asiddha* (unproved reason) and *bādhita* (contradictory), no knowledge will be produced at all.[2]

[1] Pratyakṣa, P. 325 [2] Anumāna, Hetvābhāsa, PP. 777—78.

4. As interpreted by Mathurānātha, Gaṅgeśa refutes the view of the Vaiśeṣikas according to whom there are only four types of fallacy, namely, Asiddha (unproved or inconclusive), Viruddha (contradictory), Savyabhicāra (uncertain or discrepant), and Anadhyavasita (asādhāraṇa, meaning void reasoning) and gives his own five-fold division of it.[1]

5. A section of the Vaiśeṣikas holds that *bhrama* (error) is always about a thing which is *asat* (asadviṣayakatvameva bhramatvamiti). This is not accepted by Gaṅgeśa. According to him error is not due to the object's being imaginary, because the objects of error do exist in reality. What happens is that something is wrongly imposed upon some other substratum (kintu vyadhikaraṇaprakārakatvena). In the wrong notion, as expressed in the expression *idam rajatam* (it-pearl—is silver), pearl, silverness, and everything else attributed to these are real.[2]

6. Vaiśeṣikas do not believe in śabda (verbal testimony) as a distinct means of right cognition. Gaṅgeśa criticizes the view from the Nyāya standpoint and says, as interpreted by the *Māthurī*, that knowledge of the words and their meaning is possible due to their being based on experience just after the words are heard even without the knowledge of expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) etc., because no inference is possible without the knowledge of expectancy etc., which are the attributes of the probans.[3]

7. Again, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that as the import of a sentence is found correct through inference, independent of any other means of knowledge, śabda is not a separate means of right knowledge. This view has been refuted by Gaṅgeśa.[4]

8. While discussing the question of *Hiṁsā*, Gaṅgeśa says that if one besmears his body with oil on the seventh day of a fortnight (saptamī tithi), his most beloved wife will perish.[5]

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[1] PP. 778—81.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi* along with the *Māthurī*, Śabda. Vol. I. PP. 42-44.

[3] Śabda Vol. I. P. 50. [4] Śabda. Vol. I. P. 151.

[5] Śabda. Vol. II. PP. 218-19.

9. Gaṅgeśa defines *Hiṁsā* as that action which immediately leads to death (anuniṣpādimaraṇaphalako vyāpāro hiṁsā, yadanantaraṁ maraṇaṁ bhavatyeva).[1] It is not that action which leads to an ordinary death, directly or indirectly. If that be so, then the falling of a cow in the well causing her death will also be regarded as *Hiṁsā* for the person who had dug the well. But it is not so. Similarly, in the case of the Śyena-Yāga, (according to the śruti *Śyenenābhicaran yajeta*), which is performed for the killing (māraṇa) of an opponent, it is to be understood that Śyena has nothing to do with the death. It is only the name of the particular sacrifice, the name being based upon the said eulogy which likens the sacrifice to the Śyena bird. In fact, the 'Hiṁsā' is the forcible contact of the sword with the prāṇa which causes the destruction of the contact of the body with the prāṇa (prāṇa-khaḍgābhighātādeva prāṇaśarīrasaṁyogadhvaṁsaḥ).[2] So *Hiṁsā* is that action which is performed for the purpose of causing death and which leads to death (maraṇānukūlavyāpāro maraṇoddeśenānuṣṭhīyamāno hiṁsā),[3] immediately after it.

10. While explaining the term—*Viṣaya*, Gaṅgeśa quotes—

> viśabdo hi viśeṣārthaḥ sinotirbandha ucyate/
> viśeṣeṇa sinotīti viṣayo'to niyāmakaḥ//

Mathurānātha explains this by saying that *viṣaya* means the substratum of the vyāvṛttajanakatā (the generality causing exclusion).[4]

11. Again, he gives an instance of knowing the significance of a word through *vākyaśeṣa* (from the left out unexplained portion of a sentence)—*Vārāhī copānat*, meaning thereby, that formerly a shoe used to be made out of the skin of a boar.[5]

12. While discussing the correctness of the word—*Viśrāma*, Gaṅgeśa says that there was a difference

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. II. PP. 211-12.

[2] *Māthurī*, Śabda. II. P. 213.

[3] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. P. 213.

[4] *Māthurī*, Śabda. II. P. 373,

[5] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. II. PP. 526—28.

of opinion between Pāṇini and Candragomin regarding the above mentioned word, but according to Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya—Vau śramervikalpa iṣyate iti*—both the words *Viśrāma* and *Viśrama* are correct.[1]

13. While discussing whether the meaning of words has been fixed by Īśvara, or by ordinary people, Gaṅgeśa says—that word which has been fixed by Īśvara in a particular sense, is alone capable of giving that particular meaning and is said to be correct. Others hold that there is a natural relation between the meaning and the word denoting that meaning, while we, says Gaṅgeśa, hold that whatever meaning has been fixed by Īśvara is the determining factor (niyāmakatvāt). Just as whatever herb has come in contact with the fang of a mungoose, it removes the posion of a snake; so, the words whose meanings are fixed by Īśvara alone are capable to be used for those objects. The knowledge of the meaning fixed by Īśvara is apprehended through usage, similarities, being in the same predicament with the words whose meanings are well-known, (prasiddhārthapadasāmānādhikaraṇyāt), authoritative statements of reliable persons or authority, remaining words of the sentence as in the case of words—yava, varāha, indra and others, lexicons, authoritative grammar composed by most qualified scholars, like Indra, Pāṇini, and others; because these alone can say what words are correct and what not. So he quotes the following authority.

abhiyuktāśca ye yatra yannibaddhaprayojanāḥ/
te tatra guṇadoṣāṇāṁ jñāne cādhikṛtā matāḥ//

Translation—Those who are learned and competent, they alone are capable of knowing the correctness, or otherwise of words.[2]

The above mentioned idea is also found in a very popular verse current among the scholars also quoted by the *Prakāśa* of Rucidatta—

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. II. P. 650.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. II. 649.

śaktigrahaṁ vyākaraṇopamāna-
koṣāptavākyādvyavahāratasca/
vākyasya śeṣādvivṛtervadanti
sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ//

Further on, Gaṅgeśa says that whichever word is correctly explained by grammar, that is, whichever word has been explained by grammar in whatever sense, it is corr ct, so the word *Gāvī* is correct in that sense in which it has been used correctly in grammar and incorrect in other sense[1].

Udayana and Gaṅgeśa compared.

Thus, in brief, the contents of Gaṅgeśa's *magnum opus*, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, have been given which make us acquainted with the great merits of the author whose influence over the entire later literature of Sanskrit exists even today. Indeed he was an epoch making scholar in the field of Sanskrit learning in India. But on critical examination of the various aspects of the writings of Udayanācārya compared with those of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the two Maithila scholars of extraordinary ability, we can say without any hesitation that the former has excelled the latter in more than one way. Gaṅgeśa has very often quoted the very lines from the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and the *Ātmatattvaviveka* and has always referred to him as *Ācāryāḥ*. The method of Gaṅgeśa, no doubt, is unique and his power of marshalling the facts is wonderful. But in substance and argumentation, Udayana is far superior to Gaṅgeśa. The *Īśvarānumāna* looks quite insipid before the arguments of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. The impressions of the theistic charm of Udayana's lines never become dim. It inspires an intelligent scholar to enter into the depths of the most critical and intricate problems of metaphysics, particularly, the problem of Īśvara, which would have been otherwise left unexplored. The Upamāna section of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* likewise, remained unattractive and a very few scholars have commented upon it. But it is to be noted that students study more, even for Upamāna, from the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*[2] and its commentaries which is much

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi* Śabda. II P. 653.

[2] Stavaka III. PP. 424—48, Bibliotheca Indica edition.

of opinion between Pāṇini and Candragomin regarding the above mentioned word, but according to Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya—Vau śramervikalpa iṣyate iti*—both the words *Viśrāma* and *Viśrama* are correct.[1]

13. While discussing whether the meaning of words has been fixed by Īśvara, or by ordinary people, Gaṅgeśa says—that word which has been fixed by Īśvara in a particular sense, is alone capable of giving that particular meaning and is said to be correct. Others hold that there is a natural relation between the meaning and the word denoting that meaning, while we, says Gaṅgeśa, hold that whatever meaning has been fixed by Īśvara is the determining factor (niyāmakatvāt). Just as whatever herb has come in contact with the fang of a mungoose, it removes the posion of a snake; so, the words whose meanings are fixed by Īśvara alone are capable to be used for those objects. The knowledge of the meaning fixed by Īśvara is apprehended through usage, similarities, being in the same predicament with the words whose meanings are well-known, (prasiddhārthapadasāmānādhikaraṇyāt), authoritative statements of reliable persons or authority, remaining words of the sentence as in the case of words—yava, varāha, indra and others, lexicons, authoritative grammar composed by most qualified scholars, like Indra, Pāṇini, and others; because these alone can say what words are correct and what not. So he quotes the following authority.

abhiyuktāśca ye yatra yannibaddhaprayojanāḥ/
te tatra guṇadoṣāṇāṁ jñāne cādhikṛtā matāḥ//

Translation—Those who are learned and competent, they alone are capable of knowing the correctness, or otherwise of words.[2]

The above mentioned idea is also found in a very popular verse current among the scholars also quoted by the *Prakāśa* of Rucidatta—

[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. II. P. 650.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda. II. 649.

Mādhava Miśra in his *Pratyakṣālokadipikā* as *Vaṭeśānāṁ matamupanyasyati*.[1]

Vaṭeśvara wrote works both on Nyāya and also on Dharmśāstra. His works were called *Darpaṇa*. On Nyāya his works are—

His works

(1) *Nyāyanibandha-darpaṇa*. Śaṅkara Miśra writes in the beginning of his *Trisūtrīnibandhavyākhyā*—

Prakāśa-Darpaṇodyota-kṛdbhirvyākhyā kṛtojjvalā
tathāpi yojanāmātramuddiśyāyaṁ mamodyamaḥ[2]

Here no doubt, *Prakāśa* is by Varddhamāna Upadhyāya, *Uddyota* by Divākara Upādhyāya and *Darpaṇa* by Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya. These are the three commentaries on the *Nibandha* of Udayana by three great Scholars of Mithilā. Of these, Divākara is the earliest coming in the 12th century, while Varddhamāna comes with his *Prakāśa* in the 14th century and the *Darpaṇa* comes between the two. So Vaṭeśvara may easily be placed in the 14th century a little earlier than Varddhamāna. Vaṭeśvara has criticized Gaṅgeśa.[3] (2) His other work known so far is the *Nyāyalīlāvatī-Darpaṇa* on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabha, a Vaiśeṣika work a reference to which is found in the *Dravyaviveka* of Pakṣadhara (different from Jayadeva) as *ata eva līlāvatīprakāśadarpaṇayoḥ*.[4] Pakṣadhara Upādhyāya was the name of one of his sons which is evident from the following lines of his *Tattvanirṇaya*, a Dharmaśāstra work—

nyāyārṇavapariśrāntasūritāraṇasetave
gurave śrīvaṭeśāya kharārkamataye namaḥ/

śrīmatpakṣadharaireṣa praṇamya pitaraṁ guruṁ
vaṭeśvaraṁ vimūḍhānāṁ kriyate tattvanirṇayaḥ[5]

As Vaṭeśvara has been often referred to by his son Pakṣadhara and also by Narahari in his *Dvaitanirṇaya*

[1] Manuscript in possession of the Kameshwara Singh Sanskrit University, Darbhanga Fol. 44b.

[2] H. P. Sastri, *Notices*, II, No. 136.

[3] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, P. 167.

[4] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, P. 166.

[5] Ms. belonging to the *Mithilā research Institute, Darbhanga.*

more important than the Upamāna of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Vyāsatīrtha, the great Mādhva Nyāya scholar, has distinctly supported Udayana in his *Tarkatāṇḍava* against Gaṅgeśa[1].

Considering all these aspects we can say without any hesitation and with great confidence that Udayana was a great genious, like whom we do not find any one else in Sanskrit philosophical literature. When we compare these two scholars we find that there is much originality in Udayana, while there are, not doubt, enough subtleties in Gaṅgeśa.

2. VAṬESVARA UPĀDHYĀYA

(14th century)

Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya was the great-great-grand-father of Narahari son of Yajñapati[2]. He belonged to the *Māṇḍara* family of Mithilā. He was a very great Naiyāyika and consequently a Dharmaśāstrin also. I came to know of this Vaṭeśvara while I was studying the *Dvaitanirṇaya* of Narahari and later when I was busy with the study of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its various commentaries and sub-commentaries. I found that Jayadeva Miśra *alias* Pakṣadhara Miśra has referred to a view of the *Darpaṇakāra* and has refuted it.[3] Then again, we find Narahari quoting his great-great-grand-father in his *Pṛtyakṣadūṣaṇoddhāra*[4]—

Tadāpi nāgṛhīteti/ atra vṛddhaprapitāmaha-Vaṭeśvaropādhyāyacaraṇāḥ yatra kalpanīyakalpanopapattiḥ etc. This very line is quoted in the *Pragalbhī* as—*atra vadanti*.[5] This very point has been referred to by

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[1] Vide *Tarkatāṇḍava*, Vol. I. PP. 148, 286, 377, Madras edition.

[2] *Dvaitanirṇaya*—atra asmadvṛddhaprapitāmahacaraṇāḥ p. 10.

[3] iha vighno mābhūdityatredamaṁśasyāpi viśeṣaṇatvānnyāyasāmyamiti tu *Darpaṇa*-dūṣaṇamayuktisambhavameva,—*Āloka*, Maṅgalavādasiddhānta, P. 43, Mithila Research institute edition.

[4] fol. 19a of a ms preserved in the India Office Library, London and quoted in the *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, p. 164.

[5] Page 162, *Sarasvati Bhavan Text series*, Varanasi.

Mādhava Miśra in his *Pratyakṣālokadipīkā* as *Vaṭesānāṁ matamupanyasyati.*[1]

Vaṭeśvara wrote works both on Nyāya and also on Dhatmśāstra. His works were called *Darpaṇa.* On Nyāya his works are—

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nyāyārṇavapariśrāntasūritāraṇasetave
gurave śrīvaṭeśāya kharārkamataye namaḥ/
śrīmatpakṣadharaireṣa praṇamya pitaraṁ guruṁ
vaṭeśvaram vimūḍhānāṁ kriyate tattvanirṇayaḥ[5]

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[1] Manuscript in possession of the Kameshwara Singh Sanskrit University, Darbhanga Fol. 44b.

[2] H. P. Sastri, *Notices*, II, No. 136.

[3] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, P. 167.

[4] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, P. 166.

[5] Ms. belonging to the *Mithilā research Institute, Darbhanga.*

in several places, it is evident that he wrote some works on Dharmaśāstra also and called them *Darpaṇa*.

3. PAKṢADHARA UPĀDHYĀYA

(14th century)

Pakṣadhara Upādhyāya was the son of Vaṭeśvara. He is the author of a work on the Dharmaśāstra, named *Tattvanirṇaya*.[1] He writes in the beginning—

avatu satataṁ śivāṅkaśāyī śiśuraphalīkṛtadānavāriyatnaḥ/
tadanu kamalabhūkṛtapraṇāmo giritanayārpitapādapada-mālā//

nyāyārṇavapariśrāntasūritāraṇasetave/
gurave śrīvaṭeśāya kharārkamataye namaḥ/
śrīmatpakṣadharaireṣa praṇamya pitaram gurum/
vaṭeśvaravimūḍhānāṁ kriyate tattvanirṇayaḥ/

We do not know anything more about him so far.

4. VARDDHAMĀNA UPĀDHYĀYA

(14th century)

After Gaṅgeśa, his own children and disciples along with their disciples kept the torch of learning of Navya-Nyāya burning through the ages. They founded a school of their own and wrote commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. I do not know of any other work in Sanskrit literature which has been commented upon by the author's children and disciples followed by their disciples for centuries. In fact, it can easily be found out that distant relations of Gaṅgeśa or his children, or direct and indirect disciples may still be living in Mithilā and writing some serious notes on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* even in the present generation. This is a unique speciality of this work alone.

Influence of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Again, the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* became so important that practically, it sealed itself against all the contributions of original writings for centuries. Scholars attached more importance

[1] Vide a ms. in the Darbhanga Sanskrit University Library.

on commenting, directly, or even indirectly, upon the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* than writing any original work. Perhaps Gaṅgeśa exhausted all the aspects of Navya-Nyāya and left no scope for any new and original contribution. This was a sort of drawback which we find during this period in the history of Navya-Nyāya. Host of scholars, like Varddhamāna, Yajñapati, Pakṣadhara, Vācaspati II, Bhagīratha, Jagadīśa, Gokulanātha and many others of great repute from Mithilā, Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Bhavānanda, Gadādhara and others from Bengāl and Rājacūḍāmaṇi, Gopīnātha, Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa, Mahādeva Puntāmakara and Raghunātha from the South, who would have contributed many original works to logic, are known to day as great commentators of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* only. I do not deny that they have shown enough subtleties and originality in the field of scholarship even in their commentaries, but after all they are commentators only. Their trend of mind became one-sided. We find that sometimes a single line of Gaṅgeśa has become the basis of a great contribution of Raghunātha, Mathurānātha and Gadādhara. In one aspect, this was a period of subtle hair-splitting treatment of the thoughts of great scholars, but in another sense it became a dull period for the advancement of scholarship on fresh and new original lines of thinking. This trend of thinking became so attractive and engrossing that all intelligent students of the śāstra became merged in the serious study of this branch of learning only. A student who did not offer to study this new science of dialectics was looked down as most dullard. Like the constant resounding of the chanting of the vedic mantras during the vedic age in every corner of the country, there was heard echo of the lines of Gaṅgeśa and his commentators discussed and debated upon in every corner of the country. This sort of single-minded study of scholars has continued even to the present century.

In Mithilā, it is held that the family line is considered on two-fold basis—birth and learning (vaṁśo dvidhā-janmanā vidyayā ca). That is, a disciple of the teacher is looked upon as much related to the teacher as his own children. So, like the offerings of hand-

full of water, or of *piṇḍas* to their dead *pitṛs* by their children, Gaṅgeśa's direct or indirect disciples considered the contribution to his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as their most sacred duty. Hence, every intelligent scholar wrote something or other on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Varddhamāna, the eldest son of Gaṅgeśa, was the first to offer his contribution to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Varddhamāna was a great scholar of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. His works are still regarded as of great merit by scholars all over the country. His style is not so complicated as that of the later scholars of this science.

Personal history.

Varddhamāna had studied under his own father. So, he writes in the beginning of his *Prakāśa*, on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Valabha—

nyāyāmbhojapataṅgāya mīmāṁsāpāradṛśvane/
gaṅgeśvarāya gurave pitre'trabhavate namaḥ//

and also at the end of the *trisūtrī-Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*—

yastarkatantraśatapatrasahasraraśmir-
gaṅgeśvaraḥ sukavikairavakānanenduḥ/
tasyātmajaḥ pituradhītya nibandhamitthaṁ
prākāśayat kṛtimude budha-varddhamānaḥ//.

Thus, Varddhamāna was both the eldest son and the pupil of Gaṅgeśa. It is therefore, that he quotes from or refers to Gaṅgeśa as 'asmatpitṛcaraṇāḥ' and also as 'guravaḥ'. About his personal history not much is known to us. It is believed on the basis of the *Pañjī* of Mithilā that he had no male issue. He had, however, a daughter whose descendants continued his line.

Date of Varddhamāna.

Gaṅgeśa must have lived towards the end of the 13th century and hence, it will not be improper to place Vardhamāna in the very beginning of the 14th century A. D. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, on the other hand, has placed his date as 1250 A. D. which seems to be untenable in the light of what has been said above in connection with the date of Gaṅgeśa.[1] Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa identifies him with the 'Mahopādhyāya'

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[1] Vide *Supra* PP. 235–38.

Varddhamāna who is mentioned in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*[1] by Mādhavācārya in the Pāṇini-darśana section. But this is not correct. He is different from the logician Varddhamāna and is the author of the *Gaṇa-ratnamahodadhi*. Moreover, the logician Varddhamāna is called 'Mahāmahopādhyāya' by Pakṣadhara Miśra in his *Āloka*,[2] while the grammarian is only a 'Mahopādhyāya'. Then again, he is also to be distinguished from another Varddhamāna, the author of several digests on Dharmaśāstra, all bearing the name '*Viveka*' and is the son of Bhaveśa and the younger brother of Gaṇḍaka Miśra. Both Śaṅkara Miśra and Vācaspati Miśra II were his teachers.[3]

It will not be out of place to mention that Varddhamāna was influenced by Vācaspati Mishra I and so, on occasions he almost imitates the latter. In the *Nyāya-nibandhaprakāśa*,[4] he quotes his father and adds—'itipitṛcaraṇonnītamārgānugamanonmukhairasmābhirukto' etc. This line is exactly the same as that of Vācaspatī in the *Tātparyaṭīkā*[5]—Trilocanagurūnnītamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ.

He wrote the following works on Nyāya:

His works.

1. *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha*. This is not yet published. It is a running and much more extensive commentary on the *Gotamasūtra*. A palmleaf manuscript of it on the first three sūtras of the *Nyāyasūtras*, called *trisūtrī*, of chapter one and Āhnika one, dated La. Sam. 392=1511 A.D. Māgha vadi pratipad ravau, is preserved in the manuscript section of the *Gangānātha Jhā Research Institute Library*, Allahabad. It was written during the reign of king Rāmabhadra, who had assumed the title (viruda) of 'Rūpanārāyaṇa', of Mithila.[6] The manuscript

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[1] P. 134 Poona edition.

[2] *Pariśiṣṭaprakāśe Mahāmahopādhyāyacaraṇāḥ*, Pratyaksa-*Āloka*, Anupalabdhya-Prāmāṇya—Vāda P. 674, *Bibliotheca Indica* series edition.

[3] Vide—*Daṇḍaviveka*, beginning verse 6.

[4] PP. 677—92 Bibliotheca Indica edition.

[5] P. 133 Chowkhamba Varanasi edition.

[6] samastaprakriyāvirājamānamahārājādhirāja-śrīmadrūpanārāyaṇa, Ms. Fol. 94, colophon.

originally belonged to one Paṇḍita Maṇinātha Miśra of Mithilā. The commentary on the fifth chapter exists in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit* library, Sanskrit University, Vārāṇasī. We have not yet seen the manuscripts of other portions but that there are manuscripts in the Government Sanskrit college, Calcutta and in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta, is found in their respective manuscript catalogues. According to the *trisūtrī* manuscript the work is called the *Anvīkṣātattvabodha.*[1] This name seems to have been based on a verse found in the beginning of the work—

gotamāya namastasmai duḥkhapaṅko...ṛṣayā/
śāstram yaḥ kṛpayā cakre jagatāmātmabodhakam//

where the word '*ātmabodhakaṁ*' occurs which most probably stands for '*tattvabodha*'. In the *Guṇakiraṇāvalī-Prakāśa* Varddhamāna also has called this work as the *Anvīkṣātattvabodha*[2], or only *Tattvabodha.*[3] The references to the *Prameyatattvabodha*[4] and *Pramāṇatattvabodha*[5] are references to the sections of this very work.

2. *Cintāmaṇiprakāsa*, a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of his father.[6] It is held by some scholars that Varddhamāna did not comment upon the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, for, no such commentary has been so far traced out.[7] Of course, Varddhamāna has not referred to this work of his in any of his works, nor have we found so far any reference to this *Maṇiprakāśa* in the works of contemporary writers. But it seems somewhat strange not to believe in its existence. He has written several works and had great regards for his father and his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which has been com-

[1] Vide—iti mahāmahopādhyāya-śrīvarddhamānaviracite anvīkṣātattvabodhe trisūtrī-colophon, Fol. 94.

[2] PP. 170, 195, 523, 540, 583.

[3] P. 220.

[4] Vide—*Makaranda on the Kusumāñjāliprakāśa* P. 384 *Bibliotheca Indica series*.

[5] Vide—*the Pandit*, Old series, Vol. VI. P. 128.

[6] *Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts*, Sarasvatī Bhavana, Vārāṇasī, P. 193.

[7] *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 111.

mented upon by so many scholars even from his own family. Again, it is difficult to say that because it has not been traced out so far, it does not exist at all. There are thousands of manuscripts in private collections even in Mithilā which have not been yet surveyed. So, my own contention is that further searches into these collections may help us to discover this lost commentary.

3. *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* is a running commentary on the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana. It has been partly published in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*[1]. Manuscripts of other portions of this work are available in the libraries of the *Government Sanskrit College*, Calcutta and the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta.

Gleanings from the *Nibandhaprakāśa*.

A study of this small portion of the *Nibandhaprakāśa* reveals several facts which are given below for interested *jijñāsus*—

(1) Following the old tradition of Mithilā, Varddhamāna as a seeker after the truth was a devotee of Śiva. So, he bows down to Śiva in the very beginning of his work. It is to be reminded that the scholars of Mithilā never forgot that the ultimate end of life and philosophy is the achievement of the last 'puruṣārtha' which is possible only through the grace of lord Śiva. So he says—

yam paśyanti nirantarāyamanasaḥ
saṁsāramohacchidam/
taṁ vande suravṛndavanditapada-
dvandvāravindaṁ śivam//

Translation—I bow down to that Śiva whom devotees perceive (realize) with singleminded and uninterrupted devotion as one who annihilates the delusion of mind towards the world and whose lotus like feet are bowed down by a host of gods.

(2) About the aim of his writing this commentary Varddhamāna says—

vipakṣadarśanoddāmadustarkatimirāvṛtāḥ/
varddhamānaprakāśenasantaḥpaśyantu paddhatīḥ.//

[1] Only upto I. i. 5 (incomplete, pages 672).

Translation—Surrounded by the ignorance (darkness) caused by the forcible wrong reasonings of the rival *Darśanas* let good people see the path of the truth through the growing light, that is, through the *Prakāśa* written by Varddhamāna.

This shows that the influence of the Buddhists was obvious among the scholars of Nyāya even during the days of Gaṅgeśa and Varddhamāna.

(3) According to Sāṅkhya, says Varddhamāna, bondage and release both belong to the conscious element (Puruṣa) and not to the Prakṛti and in support of this he quotes a kārikā[1] from the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.[2]

(4) Ārādhanā is that activity which leads to happiness.[3]

(5) There may be direct connection with the Ātman, but it cannot be called a 'saṁyoga' (contact) in ordinary sense.[4]

(6) It is not true to say that one who does an action is its Īśa (lord); as, it is not in cases, like ṛtvik, or a cook. Nor is it true to say that he who knows a thing does possess efficacy (śakti), nor is it true to say that he who destroys a thing, is its agent.[5]

(7) Ladies and śūdras are not fit to achieve final emancipation.[6]

(8) There are two types of knowledge, one which is produced by efforts and another which does not depend upon efforts.[7]

(9) The word 'niḥśreyas' means the non-manifestation of any type of pain again, which has once disappeared, in the particular Jīvātman[8].

(10) By the powers acquired through the practices of yoga, the yogins who possess knowledge of all things realize the nature of mokṣa even before it is actually realized (yogaprabhāvāt sarvaviṣayakajñānavadbhiryogibhiranāgatāyāḥ mukteḥ sākṣātkārāt)[9].

(11) One does not acquire direct perception of a paramāṇu simply because of its being a paramāṇu, nor because of its knowledge only, but acquires the knowledge through the knowledge of a paramāṇu.

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1 *Kārikā*, P. 57. 2 *Prakāśa*, P. 2. 3 *Prakāśa*, P. 3.
4 *Prakāśa*, P. 5. 5 *Prakāśa*, P. 5. 6 *Prakāśa*, PP. 18-19.
7 *Prakāśa*, P. 38. 8 *Prakāśa*, P. 73. 9 *Prakāśa*, P. 87.

So, through the extra-ordinary perception (jñānopanītattvena) he does acquire direct perception of a paramāṇu[1].

(12) He quotes the view of his father, Gaṅgeśa regarding 'memory' as that which is not in conformity with the reality (smṛtirayathārtheti)[2].

(13) He quotes his father who holds that that which is a 'pramā' is not everywhere 'Pramā', but only at certain places[3].

(14) He mentions that according to Śivāditya Miśra a 'karaṇa' is that which leads to action, but is not the cause of it (vyāpārājanakavyāpārahetutvam). So, sense-organs and sacrifices etc. are not 'karaṇas', but these are only 'kārakas'[4].

(15) He points out that according to the Digambaras besmearing one's body with dirts, putting one's foot upon a hot piece of stone or iron, eating while standing and sitting in the pose of 'vīrāsana' are types of religious austerity[5].

(16) He says that though existence after death (pretyabhāva) means to take birth after death and thus, it is positive, yet as death means negation of one's contact with the previous organism, it is not positive.[6]

(17) He quotes the following lines to show that whatever the gods and sages have done need not be taken to be worthy of imitation—

> kṛtāni yāni karmāṇi daivatairmunibhistathā/
> nācarettāni dharmātmā śrutvā cāpi na kutsayet//

Translation—Whatever the sages and the gods have done should not be imitated by virtuous persons, nor should they be abused.

(18) He gives various meanings of the expression —'*ābnenaibuka*' According to some it means the assumption of a paternal relation with the image of a deity made out of cow-dung after having worshipped it with dūrvā grass etc. It is, according to others, churning of curd on a Tuesday. The third view is

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[1] *Prakāśa*, P. 161.
[2] *Prakāśa*, P. 164.
[3] *Prakāśa*, P. 169.
[4] *Prakāśa*, P. 185.
[5] *Prakāśa*, P. 214.
[6] *Prakāśa*, P. 220.

that it is a sort of worship or offering to a deity with a particular kind of 'apūpa' (cake) prepared with boiled butter and mixed with a handful of rice placed in an earthen pot daily in course of one month[1].

(19) Varddhamāna explains the term 'nāstika' as one who does *not* believe *in anything*[2]. *With this*, explanation, Vaitaṇḍikas alone can be called 'nāstikas'.

(20) He says that the refutation of one's view is not due to any feeling of hatred against any one, but due to the propounding of the truth with some sort of compassion on him. Similarly, he says that the desire to achieve victory over any one is to propound the truth with compassion on him[3].

(21) In one place Varddhamāna writes—'*yathā viśvanāthāyatane viśvanāthamanubhavataḥ*'[4], from which it may be concluded that he wrote the *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, while he was at Vārāṇasī.

(22) He refers to the view of the author of the *Ratnakoṣa*, namely, Taraṇi Miśra, that 'vāda' is taken recourse to without having any gain (lābha), devotion (pūjā), fame (khyāti) in view. But this view has been refuted by Varddhamāna.[5]

He also refutes the view of Taraṇi Miśra that there are two kinds of generality (Sāmānyaṁ)—'jāti' and 'upādhi.' The former is 'samaveta' while the latter is 'asamaveta'[6].

(23) Again, he refutes the view of the author of the *Ratnakoṣa* that there are two types of contact, *sannikarṣa*, namely, 'saṁyoga' and 'viśeṣaṇatā' and not the generally recognized four types of contact, namely, inherence, etc.[7] He also mentions that according to the Buddhists, in fact, there is no contact of the type of 'viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva[8].

References to others.

In this work and also in almost every work of his, Varddhamāna quotes with great respect the views of his father, Gaṅgeśa. He also refers to several others without giving their names—as 'atrāhuḥ', 'anye' and so on. He quotes

[1] *Prakāśa*, PP. 279-80.
[2] *Prakāśa*, P. 291.
[3] *Prakāśa*, P. 362..
[4] *Prakāśa*, P. 496.
[5] *Prakāśa*, P. 341.
[6] *Prakāśa*, PP. 194-95
[7] *Prakāśa*, P. 468.
[8] *Prakāśa*, P. 589.

only once the view of Śivāditya Miśra[1] and once he refers to a Sāṅkhya work, called '*Sāṅkhyavārttika*'[2] which evidently refers to a kārikā found in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra I.[3] Here in this Kārikā, the seven types of Inference accepted by Sāṅhkya is mentioned. He also refers several times to the views of the author of the *Ratnakoṣa* and refutes them.[4]

3. *Nyāyapariśiṣṭaprakāśa*—This is a commentary on the *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa* of Udayana on the fifth chapter of the *Nyāyasūtra*. This has been published along with the *Nyāyapariśiṣta* from Calcutta in the *Calcutta Sanskrit series*.

On Vaiśeṣika he wrote :

4. *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*—On the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana. It has been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*.

5. *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*—This is published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series* and the *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts Series* in two parts. As it is a *Vaiśeṣika* work we shall discuss about it in the next chapter.

6. *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*—A commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabha. It has also been published from *Chowkhamba Sanskrit series* office, Vārāṇasī. It is also a Vaiśeṣika work and will be dealt with in the next chapter.

7. *Khaṇḍanaprakāśa*—It is a commentary on the *khaṇḍanakhaṇḍ khā ya* of Śrī Harṣa. This work was utilized by Pragalbhācārya in writing his own commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. Vācaspati Miśra II refers to this work under the name of the *Khaṇḍanaphakkikoddhāra* in his own *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*[5]. A manuscript of this work is preserved in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*[6].

[1] Vide—*Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*. P. 185.

[2] Vide—*Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, P. 671.

[3] Vide—Page 164. *Chowkhamba Sanskrit series* edition.

[4] Vide—*Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, PP. 161, 194, 341, 468.

[5] Vide—*Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III. P. 134; Reprint from the *Pandit*, P. 77.

[6] Vide—*A. S. B. Manuscript Catalogue.*

Besides these, Varddhamāna also wrote a commentary on the *Bauddhādhikāra* of Udayana on which Balabhadra Miśra, father of Padmanābha Misra, wrote a commentary[1].

Professor Dines Chandra Bhattacharya says that there is also a manuscript of Varddhamāna's commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra in a library at Ulwar[2].

It must also be mentioned here that this Varddhamāna is different from the great digest writers on Dharmaśāstra who have written the *Smṛtiparibhāṣā*, the *Śrāddhapradīpa* and the *Ācārapradīpa* and the *Vivekas* which are very much respected as authoritative works in Mithilā[3].

5. HARI MIŚRA

(14th century)

Hari Miśra must have been a great scholar of Nyāya in his time. He was the uncle of Jayadeva Miśra, *alias* Pakṣadhara Miśra, the author of the *Āloka* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Jayadeva Miśra also studied Nyāya at his feet. So he says in the beginning of his *Āloka*[4].

adhītya jayadevena harimiśrāt pitṛvyataḥ/
tattvacintāmaṇeritthamāloko'yam prakāśyate//

We have not yet come across any work attributed to Hari Miśra or referred to by any scholar, but Aufrecht mentions in his *Catalogue*[5], that Hari Miśra was the author of a work on Pramāṇa, called *Pramāṇapramoda*. Nothing more about him we know. We are also aware that the great Maithilī poet Vidyāpati Ṭhakkura

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[1] Vide—*Setu* by Padmanābha Miśra,—bauddhādhikāravarddhamānaṭīkāvyākhyāyāmasmatpitaraḥ, P. 378, Chowkhamba edition.

[2] Vide—*Ulwar Cat.*, P. 28. No. 653 with a sub-commentary on the same, *Cat* No. 654.

[3] P. V. Kane—*History of Dharmaśāstra* Vol. I, pp. 363, 401n, 404, 738.

[4] Vide—Pratyakṣāloka, beginning verse 2, P. 1 *Mithilā Research Institute* ed.

[5] Vol. 1 P. 354(b).

was also a student of Hari Miśra. He may be therefore, placed in the 14th century A.D.

6. TVANTOPĀDHYĀYA

(14th century)

Earliest references to Tvantopādhyāya.

While studying the *Āmoda*, a commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* by Śaṅkara Miśra, I came across the following line in the very beginning—

Makarande Prakāśe yā vyākhyā *Parimale*'thavā/
tato'dhikām piturvyākhyāmākhyātumayamudyamaḥ//

Translation—This is an effort to write a commentary on the commentary of my father (on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*) which is much more elaborate than what is found in the *Makaranda*, or the *Prakāśa*, or the *Parimala*.

These two lines definitely show that prior to Śaṅkara Miśra wrote his *Āmoda*, there were three or four commentaries on the *Kusumāñjali* including one of his own father, Bhavanātha. We know that this *Makaranda* cannot be identical with the small gloss of the same name by Rucidatta which is already published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series; for Rucidatta flourished later than Śaṅkara Miśra.

Prior to Śaṅkara Miśra, Jayadeva Miśra *alias* Pakṣadhara has referred to the *Makaranda* in his *Āloka* (ata eva *Makarande* anabhyāsadaśeti na pakṣaviśeṣaṇatayā vyākhyātamiti).[1] Naturally, Jayadeva cannot refer to Rucidatta's work on the *Kusumāñjali* of the same name as he was his pupil and came later.

Padmanābha Miśra, the author of the *Pakṣadharoddhāra*, while commenting upon the Vyāptisiddhāntalakṣaṇa, writes—

tathāpi vahnighaṭobhayavānasau dhūmādityatrātivyāptim vārayituṁ yadavacchinnādhikaraṇatvāvacchedena sādhyasāmānādhikaraṇasyāvaśyaṁ vaktavyatayā pūrvapratīkavaiyarthyasya *Tvanta*-mate dūṣaṇatvāditi vicārasaṁkṣepaḥ.[2]

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[1] Pratyakṣakhaṇḍaprāmāṇyavādaḥ, P. 115.

[2] Quoted from *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, P. 128.

Then again, a manuscript found in Bengal refers to a work named *Śabda—Tvanta*, which shows that Tvanta wrote on the Śabdakhaṇḍa of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Next, Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma, a Bengali scholar of the second quarter of the 16th century, quotes in his commentary called *Prasāriṇī* on the *Pratyakṣ āloka*—

atra *Tvantopādhyāyāḥ*-nanu anumānam pravartakaṁ vā pariśeṣānumānaviśeṣaṇībhūtasaphalatvasādhakaṁ vā/ādye...... pariśeṣānumānaviśeṣānumānaviśeṣyasādhakasyaiva prakṛtatvāt kṛtisādhyatvapakṣetyāpātatah dvitīye etāvatārambhasya vyarthatvāt maṅgalaṁ saphalaṁ samāptiphalakaṁ samāptyanyāphalakatve sati saphalatvādityasyaiva samyaktvāt iti dūsaṇamāhuḥ[1].

This quotation is obviously from Tvanta's commentary on the Maṅgalavāda of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and also on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* called *Makaranda*. We do not know of any other work of his so far.

No doubt, he is one of those scholars of Mithilā whose work and even whose very name are almost lost. But we hope further investigations in Mithilā and Bengal will reveal all our hidden treasures.

From all this it is evident that Tvantopādhyāya must have lived before Padmanābha and Kṛṣṇadāsa and must have been a very influential scholar on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Jayadeva Miśra flourished in the third quarter of the 15th century and so Tvanta must have lived earlier than him and hence, he may be placed in the 14th century A. D.

His works.

From the quotations given above we conclude that Tvanta wrote a commentary on the *Tāttvacintāmāṇi* and also on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, called *Makaranda*. We do not know of any other work of his so far.

It seems that *Tvantv ı* was not his real name. He might have become known by this *pseudonym*, because of his views which might have always contained or begun with *Tu* or *kintu*.

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[1] Quoted from *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā* 130.

7. GAṄGĀDITY UPĀDHYĀYA

(14th century)

We had practically forgotten even the name of Gaṅgāditya, but for a reference to his name as a writer on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* along with Varddhamāna Upādhyāya by Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya in his work *Cintāmaṇivivecana*, a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Government Sanskrit College, Sarasvati Bhavana*, Vārāṇasī[1]—

Bhaṭṭa-Murāri-Nyāya-mateṣu svagrāhyaprāmāṇyāprasiddhāpārthakamiti ca jñeyamiti naṅgarbhapāṭho Varddhamāna-*Gaṅgādityānumataḥ*.

As his name comes just after Varddhamāna, it may be presumed that he lived in the 14th century. He was evidently a Maithila as no non-Maithila had till this period written anything on Gaṅgeśa's work. We do not know anything more than this as yet about him.

8. GHAṬEŚOPĀDHYĀYA

(14th century)

From the *Cintāmaṇivivecana* of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya we also come to know of Gaṭeśopādhyāya, a great Naiyāyika of Mithilā who had most probably written on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. So he says 'ata eva Ghaṭeśopādhyāyo niyamametaṁ tucchīkṛtya doṣautkaṭyāt pītādibhrama iti svīcakre.'[2] He also must be placed before the 15th century as Vidyānivāsa is supposed to have written his commentary about 1490.[3] Professor Dinesh chandra Bhaṭṭacarya says 'It is not unlikely that this unknown scholar, evidently belonging to Mithilā, might have preceded Gaṅgeśa himself'. In that case, Ghaṭeśa may be placed in the 12th century A. D. Nothing more about him can be said at present.

By the way, it may also be suggested here that Ghaṭeśa appears to be his *pseudonym*. It might have

[1] Vide—Fol. 53a. [2] Fol. 47a.

[3] Vide—*History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 114.

been due to his being the master of only one pitcher-full of rice for his maintenance. He did not desire to possess anything more at one time. Thus, he could devote his whole time exclusively to studies and devotion.

9. NYĀYĀLOCANAKĀRA

(14th century)

We do not know the name of the author of the *Nyāyālocana* as yet. But it is certain that he must have been a scholar of great repute. He is referred to by several later writers. The earliest reference found so far of the work *Nyāyālocana* is by Śaṅkara Miśra in his *Vādivinoda* in connection with the definition of concomitant relation. Śaṅkara Miśra says—

sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvamavyabhicāraḥ / avyabhicāritvameva ca vyāptiḥ avṛttigaganādervyāptisattve'pi pakṣadharmatāyāḥ asattvāt na tallingateti *Nyāyālocanakṛtaḥ*.[1]

Similarly, there are two more references found in the *Śabdamaṇiparīkṣā*, a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Śabda, by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma of the 15th century A. D. where it is said—

dharmiṇa upasthitāvapi dvāratvasya tajjanyajanakatvarūpasya pramāṇāntareṇānupasthiteriti *Nyāyālocana*-dūṣanamatamapāstam.[2]

Another reference of this Nyāyālocanakāra is found in the *Śabdamaṇiprakāśa* of Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra who has refuted his view.[3]
It is said there—

evaṁ kīrtanakarmanāśādinā'dṛṣṭāntaraṁ jāyate tataḥ puṇyavināśaḥ / evaṁ rogādisthale duḥkhaviśeṣa eva saṁskāranāśakaḥ/ evaṁ namaskārādināpi pāpanāśāyādṛṣṭāntaraṁ jānyate iti *Nyāyālocanamatam*/ tattucchaṁ tādṛśaniyamasyāprayojakatvena dūraṁ nirastatvāt.

From these references and their language it is evident that the author of the *Nyāyālocana* has refuted the views of Gaṅgeśa on all the above mentioned

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[1] *Vādivinoda*, P. 57. [2] Fol. 20b and also in 85a.

[3] Vide—Fol. 91b, manuscript preserved in the *Anglo-Sanskrit Public Library*, Nawadvīpa.

problems. Lastly, we find a fairly big passage quoted by Vācaspati Miśra II from the *Nyāyālocana* in his *Tattvāloka*[1]—

Nyāyālocanakṛtastu na śaktatvaṁ padatvaṁ tadbuddhijanakatāvacchedakarūpavattvaṁ tacca rūpe yadyasti tadā tadeva lakṣaṇaṁ nocedidamapi akiñcitkaraṁ/ tathā ca yena rūpeṇa yatrānvayasya śabdasya īśvareṇāsādhāraṇī vyutpāttiḥ kṛtā tādṛśasādhāraṇavyutpattiviṣayatvameva padatvaṁ vyutpattistu kvacit saṅketaḥ kvacicchakyasambandhaḥ/ na ca vākye'tiprasaṅgaḥ tatrāsādhāraṇavyutpattyabhāvāt yathā ghaṭamānayetyādau...ityāhuḥ.

This passage also is in refutation of Gaṅgeśa's view. From all these references we conclude that he must have been a great author and that he flourished about the end of the 14th century.

10. JAYANĀTHA MIŚRA *ALIAS* JĪVANĀTHA MIŚRA

(15th century)

Jayanātha Miśra, also known as Jīvanātha Miśra, was the son of Ravinātha, grand-son of Viśvanātha and the eldest brother of Bhavanātha Miśra, the father of Śaṅkara Miśra, the author of the *Upaskāra*. Śaṅkara Miśra himself has identified these two names in his works, on the basis of which Shyam Narayan Singh in his *History* of *Tirabut*[2] has also indentified them. Śaṅkara Miśra also refers to his uncle Jayanātha as the elder brother of his father, Bhavanātha, whom Jayanātha had taught the *khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*—

References to Jīvanātha.

svabhrāturjayanāthasya vyākhyāmākhyātavān yataḥ/
matpitā bhavanātho'yam tāmihālikhamujjvalām//[3]

This very line occurs in Śaṅkara Miśra's *Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* also[4] with the name of Jīvanātha in place of Jayanātha—

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[1] Vide—on the *Nyāyasūtra*, II. ii. 58 ; Ms. Fol. 153a.

[2] P. 118.

[3] End of the *Śāṅkarī* on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa Miśra.

[4] End of his commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabha.

svabhrāturjīvanāthasya vyākhyāmākhyātavān yataḥ/
matpitī bhavanātho'yaṁ tāmihālikhamuttamām/
pitri yadbhavanāthena vyākhyātaṁ tadihālikham//

From these two references it is clear that Bhavanātha Miśra studied the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* from his brother Jīvanātha and that Śaṅkara Miśra has written his commentary based on what he was taught by Bhavanātha, his father.

Jīvanātha's definition of *Pakṣa*.

Śaṅkara Miśra has quoted Jīvanātha Miśra in his *Upaskāra* in connection with the definition of 'Pakṣa' (minor term), according to whom a minor term (pakṣa) is that in which there is non-existence determined by the being evidence preventive of the appearance of doubt terminable by the ascertainment of the possession of producible sādhya (utpādyasādhyavattānirṇayanivartyasaṁśayotpattipratibandhakamānatvāvacchinnābhāvo yatra sa pakṣaḥ).[1] This very definition has also been quoted by Śaṅkara in the *Vādivinoda*[2] with a slight change in the reading —'uddeśya' in place of 'utpādya' and is attributed to Jīvanātha Miśra. In the *Vādivinoda* Śaṅkara Miśra again, quotes Jīvanātha Miśra—

sādhyātyantābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ vyabhicāraḥ/ki ca gandhaprāgabhāvāvacchinnā pṛthivī gandhavatī pṛthivītvāt ityatra gandhaprāgabhāvāvacchinnāyāṁ pṛthivyāṁ gandhātyantābhāvavirahāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaghaṭitavyabhicārābhāvādatraiva bādhaḥ pṛthak ityeke/ sādhyābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyamātraṁ vyabhicāraḥ / kiñca gandhaprāgabhāvāvacchinnapṛthivyāṁ gandhātyantābhāva eva iti nāyam panthā iti Jīvanātha Miśrāḥ.[3]

This is in refutation of the view of Gaṅgeśa.[4]

That Jīvanātha was also a Dharmaśāstrī, like several Maithila Nyāya scholars, is proved from his references in the works on Dharmaśāstra.[5] It seems from the references that Jīvanātha was not living when

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[1] *Upaskāra* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, IX. ii. 1, P. 326 Gujarati Press edition.

[2] *Vādivinoda*, P. 61. [3] *Vādivinoda*, P. 61.

[4] Vide—*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anumāna, PP. 970-71.

[5] Vide—*Dvaitanirṇaya* of Narahari, P. 58, Darbhanga edition and also the *Pradīpa* on the *Dvaitanirṇaya* of Vācaspati Miśra II. p. 11 by Gokulanātha Upādhyāya-ata eva Jīvanāthaḥ *Dvaitanirṇaye*.

Śaṅkara Miśra reached the age fit for his study of the Nyāyaśāstra and so, he learnt at the feet of his father who had studied the śāstra from his elder brother, Jīvanātha Miśra. So, he may be placed towards the end of the 14th or the beginning of the 15th century A.D. We are not yet aware of any particular book from his pen.

11 VĀCASPATI MIŚRA II

(15th century)

Life history and family.

In the land hallowed by hoary traditions of learning from the days of vedic ṛṣis was born Vācaspati Miśra, the second, called *abhinava*, in the family of the Maithila Brāhmaṇas, called *Palivāḍasamaula*. His family formerly lived in the village, known *Pālī* or *Pallī*, and shifted to *Samaula* later on. It is also held by some that he lived in the village, called Sugaunā, where he might have further shifted. He was the son of Giripati, grand-son of Sose and great-grandson of Haladhara Miśra. He had two more brothers, Śrīpati and Kānha. He belonged to Vatsagotra. He flourished in the family of *karma-mīmāṁsakās*. He himself says—

vaṁśe jāte kaluṣarahite Karmamīmāṁsakānā-
manvīkṣāyām gurukaruṇayā labdhatattvāvabodhaḥ/
śrīmān Vācaspatirahamiha prītaye puṇyabhājām
natvā natvā kamalanayanaṁ kṛtyadipaṁ tanomi //[1]

He had four wives. The first wife was the daughter of a grand-son of Mahārāja Bhogīśvara of Mithilā. He had a son named Lakṣmīnāth from the first wife who was married to the daughter of Mahāmahopādhyāya Rudradhara Upādhyāya, one of the greatest digest writers on Dharmaśāstra of the 15th century. His second wife was the daughter of a *dauhitra* (daughter's son) of Mahārāja Bhaveśvara, also known as Bhavasiṁha or Bhaveśa, of Mithilā. His third wife belonged to the *śatalakhā* family and was the first

[1] *Mithila Mass. Cat.*, Vol. I. pp. 67-69.

cousin (*pitṛvyaputrī*) of Śaṅkara Miśra's third wife. His fourth wife belonged to the *sodarapura* family and was the cousin (*pitṛvyaputrī*) of Śaṅkara Miśra.

His youngest son by the third wife was Mahopādhyāya Hari Miśra whose daughter was married to Bhavanātha Miśra, son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Śucikara Upādhyāya of *Kujaulī* family. Mahāmahopādhyāya Keśava Miśra, the author of the *Dvaitapariśiṣṭa*, was his grand-son. He writes in his *Dvaitapariśiṣṭa*[1], ityasmatpitāmahacaraṇapavitrīkṛtaḥ panthāḥ. Keśava Miśra also refers to him several times as *paramaguravaḥ*[2]. His fourth wife was a cousin of Śaṅkara Miśra, the author of the *Upaskāra*.

Keśava Miśra was the son of Narahari. This shows that Narahari was the son of Vācaspati Miśra. II This Narahari is different from the author of the *Dvaitanirṇaya*. It is clear from the lines of the *Dvaitanirṇaya*[3]. Then he is also different from the author of the commentary of the *Svarodaya*, who belonged to the *Māṇḍara* family and was the son of Narasiṁha and grand-son of Gaṇeśa.[4] Narahari, the son of Vācaspati II had commented on the *Ātmatattvaviveka*. So he says—

sūktyā pitṛcaraṇānāṁavagatasandarbhasāreṇa //
kriyate śrīnarahariṇā vyākhyā bauddhādhikārasya //[5]

Vācaspti must have lived long and so he writes of himself as being in the *carame vayasi* while writing his last work *Pitṛbhaktitaraṅgiṇi* towards the end.

Contributions of Vācaspati II.

He was a great Naiyāyika and had written ten works on the *śāstra*. Like so many Naiyāyikas of Mithilā, he was at the same time a Dharmaśāstrin of great repute. In fact, it is very difficult to be a Dharmaśāstrin without being a Naiyāyika and a Mīmāṁsaka. He wrote thirty *nibandhas* on Dharmaśāstra besides

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[1] P. 81, Benares edition.

[2] *Dvaitapariśiṣṭa* P. 125.

[3] P. 69, Darbhanga edition.

[4] Umesha Mishra, *Introduction to the English translation of the Vivādacintāmaṇi of Vācaspati* II, by Dr Ganganatha Jha. p. xi.

[5] Vide—manuscript with the author.

ten works on the śāstras while he was young. His last and the thirty-first work which he wrote in old age is the *Pitṛbhakti-taragiṇi*—

śāstre daśa smṛtau triṁśannibandhā yena yauvane /
nirmitāsten carame vayasyeṣa vinirmame //

Before we discuss his works it is necessary to know that his works may be divided under three categories. Some are called *Nirṇaya*, while a large majority bears the title of *Cintāmaṇi*. The third type of works has been given names without any particular nomenclature. These may be regarded as Miscellaneous (prakīrṇaka). This is in adherence to old tradition of Mithilā, or of those who have written several works on different subjects.

The following are the ten works on the *śāstra* :

1. *Nyāyatattvāloka*—It is one of the best commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtra*. No complete manuscript of the work is yet known. One incomplete manuscript is present in the India Office Library and another manuscript, dated 449 la. saṁ. is found in the State Library, Kathmandu, Nepal. It is sometimes called only *Tattvāloka*, or even *Nayatattvāloka*. Vācaspati refers to the *Caturgranthikā*, that is, *Nyāyabhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparya-ṭīkā* and *Pariśuddhi* in this work—

yadapyatipaṭīyasī jayati sā caturgranthikā /
tathā yadapi bhāskaro yadapi tattvabodho'dhikaḥ //

Some of the more important references found in this work are given here: Ācārya (Udayana), Kandalīkāra, Kīrti (Dharmakīrti), Candra (Prabhākara school), Jayanta, Ṭīkākṛtaḥ (Vācaspati Miśra I), Taraṇi Miśra, Nyāyālocanakṛtaḥ, Prajñākara, Prabhākara Upādhyāya, Varddhamāna, Bhāgavṛtti, Bhāskara, Murāri Miśra (mīmāṁsaka), Vaṭeśvara, Śivāditya Miśra, Sānātani and Sondalopādhyāya.

References found in the work.

This seems to be one of the earliest works of Vācaspati on the Śāstra. The speciality of the work is that it gives from time to time a summarised view of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* in his *Tattvāloka*. It is fairly a big and elaborate commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*.

2. *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*—We already know that the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama became subject to serious criticizm at the hands of the Buddhists. They considered it to be a great enemy of their views. So they did their best to twist and distort the text and even to introduce interpolated readings in the text in order to deceive scholars about the genuineness of the text of the sūtras.

It was therefore, that the first Vācaspati had to write his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. It seems that some more corrections were left in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, or that some further mischief was done to the *Nyāyasūtra* after Vācaspati I. In order to remove all such defects Vācaspati Miśra II also, like his predecessor, made the second effort to place before the scholars the correct version of the work. So he wrote his *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. Most probably this was his first work. The reason may be that after having the correct yersion of the *Nyayāsūtra* before him he would have proceeded with his commentary, the *Tattvāloka*. It is said that the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* contained only 531 sūtras as against 528 of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.

3. *Nyāyaratnaprakāśa*. It is a commentary on the *Nyāyaratna*, a commentary on the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, or any other Nyāya work by Maṇikaṇṭha Miśra of the 13th century, earlier than Gaṅgeśa. There is a complete manuscript of this work in the Library of the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, ·Poona. Dr. D. C. Bhattacharyya has given a long quotation from this manuscript in his *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*. The pieces are very important. We know from these that Vācaspati wrote this commentary being requested by Śrī Padmāvatī, the queen of Mahārājādhirāja Śrī Pratāparudra of Pañcālabhūmi, of the Chauhāṇi family. Like so many scholars of Mithilā, he also went out and found patronage in the court of Pratāparudra in Pañcāla country. That this Vācaspati is identical with the Vācaspati of the *Pali-vāra-Samaula* of Mithilā is proved beyond doubt by the following verse quoted both in the beginning of the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra* and in the end of this work:

vibhūṣayati viśveṣāṁ viduṣāṁ hṛdayasthalīm
nyāyaratnaprakāśo yaṁ śrīvācaspatinā kṛtaḥ/

tarkakāntāracāriṇyaḥ skhalanti prāyaśo dhiyaḥ
tat samādadhati prājñā eṣa dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ//

4. *Pratyakṣanirṇaya*—No manuscript of it has been so far discovered. But a reference to this is found in the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*[1].

5. *Anumānanirṇaya*. This is also unpublished and a manuscript of this work is in the State library of Nepal. A reference to this work is also found in the *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*[2]. The following is an Introductory verse found in the palm-leaf manuscript of the work :

ārādhya yādavakiśoramatiprayatnāt
abhyasya Gotamamataṁ saha Jaiminīyam/
sāraṁ vivicya matayoranayoraśeṣaṁ
vācaspatirviśadayatyanumānamārgam//

6. *Śabdanirṇaya*—This is also an unpublished work of Vācaspati. No manuscript of it has been so far found. But a reference to this is found in the *Dvaitanirṇaya* (evamanṛtviktve dakṣiṇādānaṁ nāstyeva ṛtvigānatidvārā tasya kratvaṅgattvāt iti gurumataṁ tacca *Śabdanirṇaye* vistareṇa khaṇḍitamiti neha tanyate[3].

It appears that the above mentioned three works are parts of the same work. They have been written on the lines of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa omitting the Upamāna section which is not recognized so important by most of the Navya-Naiyāyikas. Any way, it is not correct to call these three works as running commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. These are independent works and not a commentary.

7. *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*—We know that earlier Śrīharṣa had criticized the Nyāya view-point in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* with the help of those very methods of criticizm which the *Gotamasūtra* had formulated to refute the arguments of the nāstikas. Therefore, later Naiyāyikas found it a kind of their bounden duty to present a bold stand against Śrīharṣa's polemical work, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. Vācaspati has shown his great dialectical skill in this work. The work abounds in references to previous writers some of the more important references may be given here :

[1] P. 139. [2] Pp. 72, 83-84, 90.

[3] P. 8, Darbhanga edition.

Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and *Ātmatattvaviveka*, his own *Tattvāloka*, Jarantaḥ Jayantādayaḥ, Narasiṁha, Bhūṣaṇa, Maṇikaṇṭha, *Mahārṇava*, *Ratnakoṣa*, Līlāvatīkṛtaḥ, Vaṭeśvara, Varddhamānopādhyāya and *Vivaraṇa*.

It seems that this was the period when dualistic systems took a bold stand to refute the Vedāntika stand-point. We know in this very period Śaṅkara Miśra, author of the *Upaskāra*, had written his *Bhedaratna*.

8. *Cintāmaṇiprakāśa*—It is also not yet published. It is a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A copy of the manuscript of this work is preserved in the library of the *Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit University*[1] In the colophon of this manuscript it is written—

iti mahāmahopādhyāya-sanmiśra-śrīvācaspatikṛtau cintāmaṇiprakāśe pratyakṣaparicchedaḥ.

Besides these, Vācaspati must have written some more works, at least two, as he himself says, on the *śāstra*. There are various suggestions[2] but they are not so convincing. It is hoped that future researches may bring them also to light. Then the manuscript catalogues say that Vācaspati also wrote a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa a reference to which is found in the commentaries of Dīkṣita Bhīmasena and Caṇḍīdāsa. This is all that we know so far on the *śāstra*.

Coming to the thirty or thirty-one works including the *Pitṛbhaktitaraṅgiṇī* which was perhaps the last work of Vācaspati, *Kṛtyacintāmaṇi*, *Śuddhicintāmaṇi*, *Tīrthacintāmaṇi*, *Gayāśrāddhapaddhati*, *Dvaitanirṇaya*, *Vivādacintāmaṇi* and *Śrāddhacintāmaṇi* are so far published while *Sārasaṅgraha*, *Śūdrācāracintāmaṇi*, *Mahādānanirṇaya*, *Chatrayogodbhūtadoṣaśāntividhiḥ*, *Śrāddhavidhiḥ*, *Tithinirṇaya*, *Ācāracintāmaṇi*, *Āhnikacintāmaṇi*, *Dvaitacintāmaṇi*, *Nīticintāmaṇi*, *Vyavahāracintāmaṇi*, *Vivādanirṇaya*, *Śuddhinirṇaya*, *Candanadhenu-pramāṇa*, *Dattakavidhi* also known as *Dattaka-putreṣṭi-yāgavidhi*, *Kṛtyapradīpa*, *Gayāpattalaka*, *Tīrthakalpalatā*, *Śrāddhakalpa*, *Tīrthalatā*, *Pitṛbhakti-*

[1] *Vide Ms. Catalogue Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, No. 282.

[2] Vide, D. C. Bhattacharya, *Hist. of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, pp. 152-53

taraṅgiṇi, *Kṛtyamahārṇava*, are still in manuscripts and have not been published. Their manuscripts are found in several libraries.[1]

A few interesting facts gleaned from these works.

Some of the more interesting and important facts from these nibandhas are given below for the information of scholars:

(1) In the *Śuddhicintāmaṇi* he refers to the suicidal act by falling down from the *vaṭa* tree in Prayāga and killing oneself as an act of merit and not an act of sin.

(2) In the *Tīrthacintāmaṇi* it is said that one who takes bath in the Gaṅgā in Prayāga, the area of which is limited by the three wells situated on the three sides of the river, namely, one in the Prayāga proper, second in the *Pratiṣṭhānanagara* (modern Jhusi) and the third in the *Alarkanagara* on the south of the Yamunā, just after one has entered the Tīrtha, casts off all his sins.

(3) Death by observing fasts, standing in the navel-deep water in the Gaṅgā, makes the man free from births and deaths.

(4) While dealing with Vārāṇasī he says that there is an Idol (liṅga) of the *Avimukteśvara*, which is ordinarily known as Viśvanātha, which has been consecrated by the Lord Śiva Himself in this place, which is called the *Avimuktakṣetra* and also *Śmaśānakṣetra*. That place itself is known as the *Kukkuṭamaṇḍapa* and one who enters that *maṇḍapa* from the southern gate never comes back to this world again. It is further stated there that in south of this *maṇḍapa* where the Lord is consecrated there is a well called *Vijñānavāpī* as it brings true knowledge to those who drink water from this well.

Demolition of Viśvanātha temple.

The most interesting point regarding this historical information is that according to Vācaspati the temple of the Lord Viśvanātha is situated on the *north* of the *Vijñānavāpī*. We know from history that under the instructions of some mohammadan ruler the old temple of Viśvanātha, which was really on the *north* of the well, was demolished and that the new temple which now exists came to be constructed to the *south* of the

[1] For details see Umesha Mishra, *Introduction to the English translation of the Vivādacintāmaṇi* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha.

well; and the re-consecration ceremony of the idol was performed by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa II in the middle of the sixteenth century.

(5) In the *Vivādacintāmaṇi* it is said that the *Smṛti* principles regulating the judicial cases (*vyavahāra*) are based on formulas evolved out of reasons and not śrutis (nyāyamūlā hi vyavahārasmṛtayaḥ na tu śrutimūlāḥ[1]).

(6) In this very book he says that there are two sorts of thieves—one visible, such as, a merchant, or a trader, or a shopkeeper, and the other invisible, namely, those who make openings in one's house.

(7) He further says that no part or a quantity of pure gold will be lost even if it is heated for the whole day and night. This is the view of Yājñavalkya also who says—agnau suvarṇamakṣīṇam[2].

He further notes that if one hundred *palas* of silver is heated in fire then only two *palas* will be destroyed; in case of 100 *palas* of glass only 8 *palas* will be lost; in case of 100 *palas* of copper only 5 *palas* are lost; and if a goldsmith or other trader says that more than what is said above is lost, he should be treated as a criminal and be punished accordingly.

Because of his being such an erudite scholar of philosophy and Dharmaśāstra, he was called *sakalapaṇḍita-maṇḍalī-śiromaṇi*, that is, he was regarded as the crest jewel of all the assemblies of Paṇḍitas, a very rare title conferred upon a scholar[3]. His views both in the Śāstra and *nibandhas* were regarded with great respects, so much so that even in Bengal today most of the families follow Vācaspati's nibandhas for all their household rites. This may also be due to the fact that most of these present day Bengalis originally belonged to Mithilā and so they call themselves Maithilas even at present.

It is very easy to fix the date of Vācaspati Miśra II.

Date of Vācaspati.

He was the court Paṇḍita of Bhairavasiṁha king of Mithilā, who had assumed the title of Harinārāyaṇa. He

[1] P. 59, Bombay edition.

[2] Quoted in the *vyavahārādhyāya*, verse 178.

[3] Vide a manuscript of the *Śūdrācāracintāmaṇi*, No. 2001 transcribed in 425 la. saṁ = 1544 A. D. while the author was the court Paṇḍita of Mahārājādhirāja Harināräyaṇa.

also adorned the court of Rāmabhadradeva, who had succeeded his father, Bhairavasiṁha. Then Varddhamāna Upādhyāya, son of Bhaveśa of the *Vilva-Pañcaka* family, the author of the *Daṇḍaviveka*, calls Vācaspati his *guru*. This Varddhamāna also had both Bhairavasiṁha and his son Rāmabhadradeva as his patrons. A *Ms* of his *Gaṅgākṛtyaviveka*, dated la. saṁ. 376 Pauṣa vadi 13 budhe is found, which proves that Varddhamāna must have lived before la. saṁ. 376, that is, 1495-96. On the basis of these facts, we may say that Vācaspati Miśra II must have lived before 1495. According to the history of Mithilā kings, Bhairava Siṁha had succeeded his elder brother, Dhīra Siṁha, who was occupying the throne of Mithilā about la. saṁ. 321 when a manuscript of the *Setudarpaṇī*, a commentary on the *Setubandha*, the Prākṛta poem, was transcribed[2]. So Bhairava Siṁha must have ruled after 1440 and before 1495. Hence, Vācaspati may be easily placed in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.

Vācaspati's religious belief.

Regarding the religious faith which Vācaspati had it may be pointed out that in the *maṅgala* verses of his works, he sometimes praises lord, Kṛṣṇa, or Viṣṇu, or Hari and also sometimes Śiva.

But this matters very little with Maithila scholars. They are naturally worshippers of Śakti and at the same time, they also worship with equal devotion and faith, Viṣṇu and Śiva. This peculiar *harmonic combination of the Trinity* is the natural religious belief of all Maithilas. They are fully convinced of the unity amidst diversity and there is never any misunderstanding in their mind about the real nature of all these three aspects of the *Absolute Reality*.

12. YAJÑAPATI UPĀDHYĀYA

(15th century A.D.)

Personal history.

In the Māṇḍara family of Mithilā there flourished Yajñapati Upādhyāya, son of Śivapati, grandson of Paśupati and great-grand-

[1] Vide *Daṇḍaviveka* and *Gaṅgākṛtyaviveka*.

[2] *History of Tirhut*, P. 74.

son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Vaṭeśvara who wrote a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, called *Darpaṇa*.[1] He was a great Naiyāyika of his time. He belonged to Kāśyapagotra. It is to be noted that the well-known Mīmāṁsaka Bhavanātha *alias* Ayācī and Dūve, father of Śaṅkara Miśra, was the grandson from daughter's side (dauhitra) of this very Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya.

Pakṣadhara was also related to Yajñapati. The great-great-grand-father (vṛddha-prapitāmaha) of Pakṣadhara, named Mahāmahopādhyāya Viśvanātha of the *Sodarapura* family of Mithilā was the father of the girl who was married to the grand-father (pitāmaha) of Yajñapati.

His contributions.

He was a Mahāmahopādhyāya. He is referred to generally as 'Upādhyāya' by Maheśa in the *Darpaṇa*.[2] He wrote a commentary called the *Prabhā* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. There is a manuscript of this commentary in the *Bibliotheque Nationable*, Paris[3] a rotograph copy of which is in the library of the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*. It is in Maithilī script and begins with the following lines—

kanakanikaṣabhāsā sītayā liṅgitāṅgo
navakuvalayadāmaśyāmavarṇo'bhirāmaḥ/
abhinava iva vidyunmaṇḍito meghakhaṇḍaḥ
śamayatu mama tāpam sarvato rāmacandraḥ//

tātagrantha pariprāptasiddhāntaśivamuṣṭinā/
kriyate *yajñapatinā tattvacintāmaṇeḥ Prabhā*//

There is also a manuscript of the anumāna section of the *Prabhā* in the Darbhanga Sanskrit University library[4] which has the following verse in the beginning—

anusṛtyamatam samyak pituḥ *śivapatermayā*/
anumānaparicchede *Prabhā* samprati tanyate//

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[1] *Tattvacintīmaṇi-Āloka*, Pratyakṣa, p. 43. Mithila Research Institute edition.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi-Āloka*, pp. 92, 201.

[3] A. Cabaton's *Catalogue of Mss.*, 1907, p. 150, No. 904, Fol. 100.

[4] fol. 125 dated śaka śrāvaṇa 1408, that is, 1486 A. D.

From these lines it is clear that most probably, he belonged to that part of Mithilā which is near Janakapur, because he has made salutations in both the sections to Rāmacandra. It is also clear that his father Śivapati was also a scholar of Nyāya and had written some work on Nyāya and that he had based his *Prabhā* on that work (tāta-grantha). No manuscript of his *Prabhā* on the Śabda section has been found out so far, but that he had written it is clear from a reference to it in the *Nayadīpa*, a commentary by Rāghavendratīrtha on the *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsatīrtha, a great Nyāya scholar of the Mādhva school, where Rāghavendra quotes Narahari, the son of Yajñapati, who had defended his father against the criticism of Pakṣadhara *in connection with the definition of* 'yogyatā'. The quotation runs like—

'naraharistu prametyādyanuktvā tādṛśapratiyogitvābhāvo yogyatetyevoktau yogyatāyā vākyārthamātraparyavasannatayā taddhīrvākyārthabodhātpūrvaṁ na bhavatīti śābdabodhe yogyatājñānasyāhetutvāpatteḥ tādṛśapramāviśeṣyatvābhāva ityuktamityāha.

The line of Vyāsatīrtha commented upon above is—

'nāpi maṇyuktarītyā ekapadārthasaṁsarge'parapadārthaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvapramāviśeṣyatvābhāvo vā.[1]

His view on the Śabda section has also been referred to in the *Śabda-Pragalbhī*. Again, a reference to a case of 'lakṣaṇā' in the instance—'raṅgaṁ rajataṁ jānāti,' Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has quoted the view of the followers of Yajñapati who held 'lakṣaṇā' in the identity (abheda) of the word *rajata* with the knowledge of rajata (rajatādipadasya rajatābhedajñānaviṣaye lakṣaṇā)[2] which also may be adduced to prove that Yajñapati had taught and written on the Śabda-khaṇḍa also.

Opinion on the Prabhā.

Yajñapati was a great scholar and his commentary was well received by more intelligent scholars all over the country. I quote here what a Bengali scholar of our own days has said about his work—

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[1] Vol. II. P. 35, Mysore edition.

[2] Vide—*Vyutpattivāda*, P. 222, Mm. Dr. U.Mishra's third edition.

'Yajñapati's *Prabhā* superseded all previous commentaries on Gaṅgeśa's work and laid, so to speak, the solid foundation upon which the latest phase of Navyanyāya studies upon Gaṅgeśa flourished and quickly attained almostin conceivable heights in subtlety. Some of the views of Upādhyāya are now permanently embodied in the current texts. The *Prabhā* created quite a sensation in the learned world'[1].

His own pupil Pakṣadhara Miśra did not always like to associate himself with the views of Yajñapati.[2] And later writers, like Pragalbhācārya, Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Maheśa Ṭhakkura and others have also profusely quoted and criticized his views. They very often refer to his views under the name *Upādhyāyāstu* and also by his very name. But it is also very clear from these very references that he was one of the greatest Naiyāyikas of his time whose views had created a great sensation amongst the Naiyāyikas of the period and were criticized by many with due respect.

Yajñapati has criticized the view of Vācaspati Miśra II in the following lines—

'anye tu Īśvarajñānena siddhasādhanavāraṇāya tadādāyāsambhavasya ca vāraṇāya tajjñānaviṣayasamānādhikaraṇajñānājanyasamānādhikaraṇajñānagrāhyamiti sādhyaṁ varṇayanti[3].'

That these lines refer to Vācaspati II is clear from Narahari's *Pratyakṣa-dūṣaṇoddhāra*[4] and also from the *Pratyakṣālokasāramañjarī* of Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa[5], where it has been quoted and refuted. So it may be said that Yajñapati flourished after Vācaspati Miśra II and before Pakṣadhara Miśra who had referred to him in his *Āloka*[6]. But they were not separated by many years. So Yajñapati may be easily placed in the early part of the 15th century.

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[1] *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 160.

[2] Vide—*Āloka*, Anumāna and śabda, Mss. with the author.

[3] Pratyakṣa-*Prabhā*, Paris copy, Fol. 23-24 copied from the *History of Navya Nyāya in Mithilā*, p. 155.

[4] Fol. 29.

[5] Fol. 31.

[6] *Tattvacintāmaṇi, Āloka*, pp. 91, 201, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga edition.

13. ŚAṄKARA MIŚRA

(15th century)

In the cultural history of Mithilā Śaṅkara Miśra's name occupies a unique place. It is certain that he wrote mostly commentaries on most difficult works, but they added to the glory of Mithilā which brought a new life amongst the scholars and revived the study of Prācīna-Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika once more. He was both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika. But with equal skill and merit he wrote also on Vedānta and defended the position of Naiyāyikas against the onslaught of the Advaitins.

Personal history.

Regarding his personal history we know that he was the son of Bhavanātha Miśra *alias* Dūve and Bhavānī. Bhavanātha Miśra was also popularly known by the name *Ayācī Miśra*, meaning, he who has not made any *yācanā* (demand) for any worldly wealth or prosperity from any human being throughout his life. He was a great Mīmāṁsaka and wrote the *Nayaviveka* which has been now published. He was also a great scholar of Nyāya as is clear from what Śaṅkara has said—

cintāmaṇeriha gabhīratare'mburāśā-
vāśāpi kasya taraṇāya gatatrapasya/
tīrṇo mayā paramayaṁ bhavanāthasūkti-
potādhirohaṇatiraskṛtasādhvasena//

Translation—Who is so self-conceited as to even imagine of going across (that is, fully studying) the deep ocean-like *Cintāmaṇi*, but having shaken off the terror and having taken my seat in a small boat in the form of the teachings of Bhavanātha, I have gone across the great ocean. Again,

nyāyārṇavasahākṛṣṭo maṇiranyasya durlabhaḥ/
vayaṁ tu potavaṇijo nijam manyāmahe maṇim//[1]

Translation—The jewel brought out from the ocean-like *Science of Reasoning* which is impossible for others

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[1] Verses at the end of his commentary called *Mayūkha* on the *Cintāmaṇi*.

to acquire, has been obtained by us as our own, since we are sea-faring traders.

This he says about his father from whom he had studied the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. He was well versed in Vaiśeṣika as has been mentioned by Śaṅkara Miśra in his various works. In fact, from the words-tātādadhītyākhilatantrasāram,[1] we can easily assume that Bhavanātha was an all round scholar versed in all the Śāstras.

He lived in the village named Sarisava only about 18 miles from Darbhanga. He belonged to the well-known Śrotriya family of Mithilā, called *Sodarapura*.

From the *Pañjī* of Mithilā we learn that there was a very old family of a very high class of Brāhmaṇas, called *Sibāsama*. Halāyudha Miśra is known to be the *Bījī-puruṣa* of this family.[2]

The great-great-great-great-grand-son (vṛddhātivṛddhaprapautra) of Halāyudha Miśra was Sureśvara Miśra who had obtained as a reward for his character and high learning the village called *Sodarapura*. It is so called because Sureśvara's two other brothers Haleśvara, the elder and Jīveśvara, the younger all three uterine brothers lived in the same village. After him his family came to be known as *Sodarapura family*[3]. The great-

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[1] Beginning verse of the *Śabdamaṇimayūkha*.

[2] It will be interesting to know that the grouping of families in Mithilā was purely based on karma (meritorious and dhārmika deeds). Those families, which have come down from a Brāhmaṇa father married legally with a Brāhmaṇī daughter, and have followed the regular Saṁskāras prescribed in the Śāstras and have also acquired high learning are called '*Śrotriya*.' So says the Smṛti—

janmanā *brāhmaṇo* jñeyaḥ saṁskārair *dvija* ucyate/
vidyayā yāti *vipratvaṁ* tribhiḥ śrotriya ucyate//

Similarly, such people who are less qualified are classed as '*Yogya*' and below in rank are those families which are registered as have been born in pure families and are called *Pañjībaddhas*. The fourth in rank are the rest of the brāhmana families of Mithilā who are classed as *Jayavāras*. Even among these there are many sections and sub-sections in accordance with their attainments in the field of purity of action, blood and learning.

[3] Fortunately, it is a great pleasure to me personally to mention that I also directly belong to the same family of *Sodarpura*.

grand-son of this Sureśvara Miśra was Bhavanātha Miśra, the father of Śaṅkara Miśra. It is said that Bhavanātha had taken a vow, like so many Maithila scholars of old, not to accept any gift or anything in any form from any person.

It may be mentioned that according to Śāstra we pray every day at the end of our daily prayers (*Pūjā*) to our departed pitṛs-'*mā ca yāciṣma kañcana*'. The entire prayer hymn is—

> dātāro no'bhivarddhantām vedāḥ santatireva ca
> śraddhā ca no mā 'vyagamad-bahudeyañca no astu/
> annañca no bahu bhavedatithīṁśca labhemahi
> *yācitāraśca naḥ santu mā ca yāciṣma kañcana/*

Translation—(O Pitṛs !), may our donors, vedas (vedic performances, performance of vedic scarifices) and issues be prosperous. Faith may not leave us, and may we become munificient. May we obtain eatables in large quantity and receive guests and solicitors in large number. May we *not beg or ask for anything* from any person.

Hence, he was known as *Ayācī*.

He lived in his village and taught at his own place Śāstras to his pupils. According to the convention and belief in the Śāstras, Bhavanātha Miśra came to Vaidyanāthadhāma[1] with his wife and performed penance at the feet of Lord Śiva, Vaidyanātha.[2] There Bhavanātha Miśra prayed to the Lord for a son, as he, being a Mīmāmsaka, had full faith in the Śāstra that one who did not get a son, obtained hell after death.

Birth of Śaṅkara.

After some days they were told in a dream that the Lord himself would take birth in the form of a son from his wife and fulfil his desires. So they returned home very happy and in course of time, Bhavanātha

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[1] Modern Devaghara, in the Santal Pragaana, Behar.

[2] It is known to all that the image of Vaidyanātha is a *Kāmyaliṅga* and one who performs a penance in his temple with some worldly aim in view, gets his desire fulfilled after the end of the penance. This is the *śraddhā* and tradition of Maithilas even today and they are successful in their attempts.

got a male child from Bhavānī. It is said that just before the child was about to come out of the womb of his mother, the drum of the *carmakāra* began to sound without being beaten by any stick. It is a custom in India that the wife of a *carmakāra* performs the first nursing at the time of the delivery of a child. The *carmakāra* (shoe-maker) told his wife that the particular event was a very auspicious one and it predicted that some great person was to take birth in that village that very day. Just after that she was called to attend to the case of a child birth in the Miśra-family. This is how the great Śaṅkara Miśra was born.

The wife of Bhavanātha Miśra was so poor that she could not give any reward to the shoe-maker's wife on that happy ocassion, but she made a promise to give to her all that the child would get as his first earning. The newly born babe began to grow like a very precocious child and learnt a good deal of Sanskrit even before he reached his fifth year.

It is said that once a Rājā of Mithilā while going on tour had to stay for a night near the house of Bhavanātha Miśra and saw the young child playing with other children near about. The Rājā became very much attracted towards the uncommon appearance of the child and sent for him. He asked the child his name and also made enquiry if he had learnt anything.[1] The child entered into a conversation with the Rājā very boldly. The child answered—yes, he had learnt verses in sanskrit. The Rājā thereupon asked him to recite some verses. The child asked the Rājā—should he recite verses of his own composition, or that of others? The Rājā was astonished to hear this and made an

Śaṅkara as a child.

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[1] It is to be noted here that it is a common practice in Mithilā to teach a few fine *maṅgala* verses in sanskrit, like

sā te bhavatu suprītā devī śikharavāsinī/
ugrena tapasā labdho yayā paśupatiḥ patiḥ//

and similar verses to a very young child just after he begins to speak out. So when any one comes to meet a child the first question that the child is asked to answer is if he has learnt any verse and if the answer is in the affirmative, as is always the case, he is then asked to recite some verses.

enquiry if he could compose himself any verse in sanskrit. Thereupon the child said—

bālo'haṁ jagadānanda na me bālā sarasvatī/
apūrṇe pañcame varṣe varṇayāmi jagatrayam//

Translation—O king! I am a young boy, but my learning is by no means inconsiderable. So I am ready to describe all the three worlds even before I have reached my fifth year in age.

The Rājā was very much astonished to hear all this and asked him to recite any verse which he liked. Thereafter, the young boy composed a verse the first half of which was a vedic line and the second half was his own new composition. The verse is—

calitaścakitaśchannaḥ prayāṇe tava bhūpate/
sahasraśīrṣā puruṣaḥ sahasrākṣaḥ sahasrapāt//

Translation—O Ruler of the earth! when you march (with your army against your enemy), the thousand hooded deity (that is, the *śeṣanāga* who is the support of the earth) moved from his place (because of the heavy burden of the march of the army), the thousand eyed Indra was surprised (to see such a great force of a king) and the sun who has thousand (infinite) rays was covered with dust.

The Rājā was very much pleased at his wonderful genious and ordered him to take away as much gold coins as he could carry from his treasury. The young boy Śaṅkara took as much as he could carry. It is said that he carried about five hundred gold coins. When he reached near the outerdoor of his house his father who was studying in a room in the outer-court-yard happened to see the boy and guessed some unusual event. So he asked the boy not to enter the house and called his wife to look into the matter. The mother came out and saw the boy with gold-coins in his possession. She also asked the boy not to enter the house and leave all the coins on ground there. Then she called the father and showed him everything.

Permitted by her husband she sent for the wife of the *carmakāra* who had been promised the gift of the

first earning of the boy as her auspicious reward. She came and was asked to carry away the entire amount. She showed her unwillingness to accept such a huge amount, but the mother of the boy insisted on fulfilling her promise and asked her to take away the whole amount. After a good deal of consideration she accepted the entire amount. But she spent a large part of it in getting a big tank dug in that very place. This tank exists even today though in a very very mutilated condition and is associated with the name of the wife of the *carmakāra*.

Thereafter the father left that house as it had become polluted because a gift (*dāna*-paradhana) had been brought in that place. He then constructed another house at a little distance from the old house. Thus, he retained his name Ayācī Miśra spotless.

His academic career.

He studied Śāstras at the feet of his father who had studied it under his (father's) elder brother Jīvanātha, also known as Jayanātha. So says Śaṅkara—

svabhrāturjayanāthasya vyākhyāmākhyātavān yataḥ
matpitā bhavanātho'yaṁ tāmihālikhamujjvalām/

bhavanāthasūktigumphanamiha khaṇḍanakhādyaṭikāyām/

śrīśaṅkareṇa viduṣā viduṣāmānandavardhanaṁ kriyate//

makarande prakāśe yā vyākhyā *parimale*'thavā/
tato'dhikāṁ piturvyākhyāmākhyātumayamudyamaḥ//

akṛta bhavānītaṇayo bhavanāthasuto bhavārcane vyagraḥ/

etam vādivinodam jagadupakārāya parikaraḥ śrīmān//

Translation—I am writing here that splendid explanation which my father Bhavanātha had taught me which he had learnt from his own brother Jayanātha.

Paṇḍita Śaṅkara writes the good thoughts of Bhavanātha in his commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* for the pleasure of the scholars.

Here is an effort, says Śaṅkara Miśra in his commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, to elaborate the explanations of my father which are much better than what is found in the *Makaranda*, or the *Prakāśa*, or the *Parimala*.

Śrīmān Śaṅkara, the son of Bhavanātha and Bhavānī and a devotee of lord Śiva, composed this *Vādivinoda* for the good of the scholarly world.

Śaṅkara Miśra further writes in the beginning of his *Mayūkha* on the Śabda section of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*—

tātādadhītyākhilatantrasāraṁ
mahārṇavādīn bahuśo nirūpya/
Śrīśaṅkareṇārcitaśaṅkareṇa
vitanyate śabdamaṇermayūkhaḥ//

Again, at the end he says in this very commentary—

pitrā yadbhavanāthena vyāhṛtantadihālikham/
vyākhyānaguṇadoṣābhyāṁ sambandho mat-piturna me//

Translation—Śrīśaṅkara, who has worshipped the lord Śiva, having studied the entire Śāstra under his father and having pondered over repeatedly the *Mahārṇava* and others, is elaborating his *Mayūkha* on the *Śabda-Maṇi*.

I have written all that Bhavanātha had said. Merit and defect whatever is found in this commentary belong to my father and not to me. He further says at the end of the same commentary—

cintāmaṇeriha gabhīratare'mburaśā-
vāśāpi kasya taraṇāya gatatrapasya/
tīrṇo mayā paramayaṁ bhavanāthasūkti-
potādhirohaṇatiraskṛtasādhvasena//

nyāyārṇavasamākṛṣṭo maṇiranyasya durlabhaḥ/
vayaṁ tu potavaṇijo nijam manyāmahe maṇim//

Translation—Who is that impudent who can ever hope to go across the deep ocean like (*Tatta-*) *cintāmani*? But I have crossed it having cast aside impudence in a sea-boat in the form of the teachings of Bhavanātha.

It is difficult for others to obtain jewels collected from the Nyāya-like ocean. But we, the sea-faring merchants, consider that the jewels are ours (so we can easily dip into the ocean and collect jewels).

Śaṅkara Miśra was indeed a very great scholar of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. But his inclination towards the realization of the reality at the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stage led him to write more on Vaiśeṣika. No doubt, the essence of thought about the ultimate reality at the stage represented by these two schools is found more in Vaiśeṣika and not in Nyāya.

His works.

On Nyāya, he wrote a commentary called *Mayūkha* or *Maṇimayūkha* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. It is still unpublished. A single manuscript found so far is mentioned in the *Jammu Catalogue* of Stein.[1] It consists of 55 folios only. It gives us some fresh information. It refers to a book named *Mahārṇava*. Dr. D. C. Bhaṭṭācārya thinks that this reference is to the *Mīmāṁsā-mahārṇava* of Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya. It may be so, but can it not be a different work of some old writer on Nyāya as the context requires? Then it is somewhat curious that Śaṅkara does not take any responsibility of the views expressed in this work. He throws the entire merit and the defect upon his father (vyākhyānaguṇadoṣābhyāṁ sambandho matpitur na me). This very idea is also indicated in the verse found at the end of his *Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*.

Śaṅkara refers to this *Mayūkha* in his *Upaskāra*[2], in *Vādivinoda* , in *Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*[4], in *Kaṇādarahasya*[5] and in *Kalpalat* .[6]

(2) *Trisūtrīnibandhavyākhyā*—a commentary on the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana which is also called *Nibandha*, on the first three sūtras of the *Nyāyasūtra*. It is unpublished and its single incomplete manuscript is

[1] No. 1537.

[2] *Mayūkhe* vistaro'nveṣṭavyaḥ, III. i. 14, 17 ; III. II. 18; VII. i. 20, 26 ; IX. II. 1.

[3] etadrahasya cānumāna-*mayūkhe*'nveṣaṇīyam, P. 59.

[4] nirastā ceyam maṇimayūkhe vistareṇa, P. 73.

[5] P. 103.

[6] P. 534, Bibliotheca Indica Edition.

noticed only by Mm. Haraprasad Śāstri[1] at Dinajpur. In the Introductory verse Śaṅkara refers to the three well-known previous commentaries on the *Nibandha*, namely, *Prakāśa, Darpaṇa and Uddyota* and adds that his own attempt[2] is only to bring out the plain meaning of the text. He says—

prakāśadarpaṇoddyotakṛdbhirvyākhyā kṛtojjvalā/
tathāpi yojanāmātramuddiśyāyam mamodyamaḥ//

Translation—No doubt, the authors of the *Prakāśa*, *Darpaṇa* and *Uddyota* have written illuminating commentaries, even then this attempt of mine is only to make the meaning clear.

Of these three, the *Prakāśa* is by Varddhamāna, son of Gaṅgeśa, but the other two are still to be identified. It may be pointed out that most probably *Darpaṇa* is a commentary by Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya, but I am not yet sure whether it is on the *Nibandha*. There is however, a reference to the *Darpaṇa* in the *Darpaṇa* of Maheśa Ṭhakkura, which is most likely a work of Vaṭeśvara. *Uddyota* is attributed to Divākara Upādhyāya.[3]

(3) *Ātmatattvaviveka-kalpalatā*—It is a commentary on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana. It has been published in the *Chowkhamba Sanskrit series*. It is, like other commentaries of the author, easy and lucid in bringing out the meaning of the text. It was written after the *Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* which he refers to in his *Kalpalatā*.[4] There are a few notable references, namely, Padārthacintācaturairvaiśeṣikaiḥ,[5] Kīrti, Diṅnāga and Jñānaśrī-Bauddhaviśeṣaḥ[6], *Guṇakiraṇāvallyāmācāryyaiḥ*.[7]

(4) *Āmoda* a commentary on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. It is not yet published. There is a complete palm-leaf manuscript of it in the Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit University. Some very wrongly attribute this *Āmoda* to Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma. The work contains the old expressions of Śaṅkara –

1 *Notices*, III. 136.

2 Śāstri, *Notices*, III. No. 136 pp. 88-89

3 D. C. Bhattacharya, *History of Navyanyāya*. P. 137.

4 P. 346. 5 PP. 18, 140, 142. 6 PP. 19, 344, 350. 7 346.

bhavānībhavanāthābhyām pitṛbhyām praṇamāmyaham/

and again,

yatprasādādidaṁ śāstram karakṣīropamaṁ kṛtam//
tato'dhikām piturvyākhyāmākhyātu-mayamudyamaḥ

Mm. H. P. Śāstrī is of opinion that on the basis of certain manuscripts where it is written-pramāṇāntarañca nāsmadabhimatam na vā sambhavati liṅgāderabhāvāditi. After this the manuscript reads—ityantaṁ Śaṅkaramiśrakṛtam, tataḥ Sārvabhaumīyam. If this version is taken to be genuine, the only possibility is that Śaṅkara Miśra could not finish the work and left it at some place. Beyond that Rāmabhadra wrote and finished the work. But Mm. Śrī Kavirāj does not agree with Śāstrī's view because there is a complete manuscript of it in the *Sarasvati Bhavan library*, where Sārvabhauma's name does not occur.

Another important information from this manuscript gleaned out is that there were three well-known commentaries on the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, namely, *Makaranda*, *Prakāśa* and *Parimala*.

(5) *Vādivinoda*—It has been published from Allahabad and edited by the late Mm. Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha. It is written in five small and big chapters. It is written for the benefit of the *vijigīṣūs* (desirous of victory) and to crush the egoism of opponents. Śaṅkara has written this *Vādivinoda* after having studied all the Śāstras. But the main purpose of writing this book, in the words of Śaṅkara, is—

kathātaḥ praśnataḥ praśnajnāñāt praśnaparāhateḥ/
praśnānuttarataḥ kvāpi parāhaṅkāraśātanam//

Translation—The aim of writing this book is to crush the egoistic nature of the opponents through the following five methods, namely, through (1) the process of Controversy (*kathātaḥ*) which includes, Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā. (2) By putting such a question that the opponent finds himself unable to defend himself and is thus defeated (*praśnataḥ*)—praśne kṛte tatrottaramajānatāmapyahaṅkāraśātanam. (3) The question being put to the opponent who is fully acquainted with the question and its answer, the

party putting the question becomes thus defeated and his egoism is crushed—vādinā praśne kṛte jhaṭiti praśnaviṣayajñāne sati praṣṭurahaṅkāraśātanaṁ. (4) When a question is put to an opponent, the latter so distorts the question that it becomes in a way, quite absurd. For instance, when a question like—*Īśvare kiṁ pramāṇaṁ?* is put, the prativādī (opponent) argues: The question is absurd; for if Īśvara is known through pramāṇa to the vādī, then there can be no such question, a question is possible when the object is unknown and is to be known. Again if it is not known, even then that cannot be put as a question. When a man is not known, the enquiry whether he is of fair or black complextion cannot be made. So in both ways the question is absurd. Thus, the questioner is defeated and his egoism is vanquished (*praśnaparābhateḥ*). The last (5) is *praśnānuttarataḥ*. The question being so difficult that it had to be set aside with contempt which leads to the fall of his vanity and thus, he becomes defeated. These are the five ways to defeat the *prativādi* in a discussion. The author has fully illustrated these in this book.

References to works and authors.

The following are the references found in this book—Sānātani[1], Ratnakoṣakāra[2], Cintāmaṇikṛtaḥ[3] Ācāryāḥ[4], Śivāditya Miśrāstu[5], Ācāryaikadeśīyaḥ[6], Maṇikaṇṭha[7], Udayanācāryāḥ[8], Līlāvatīkṛtaḥ[9]. Vallabhācāryānumatiḥ[10], Prābhākara[11], Tridaṇḍinaḥ[12], Śaṅkarācāryaḥ[13], Ṭīkākṛtaḥ[14], Khaṇḍanakāraḥ[15], Nibandhakṛtaḥ[16], Prabhākara, Candra, Murārimiśra, Mahārṇavakāra[17], Kīrti, Diṅnāga, Bhadanta Jñānaśrī[18], Somasiddhānta[19], Ekadeśī Maṇḍana[20], Śabarasvāminaḥ, Nyāyālocanakṛtaḥ,[21] Jīvanātha Miśrāḥ[22], Cintāmaṇikṛtaḥ, Ṭīkākṛtaḥ, Śābaramatam[2], Navīnamīmāṁsakamatam[24], Sondaḍopādhyāyāḥ[25], Maṇḍanamiśrāḥ, Vācaspatimiśra II[26]. Besides, there are several *kecit*, *apare*, *eke*, etc.

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[1] P. 2. [2] PP. 2, 71. [3] PP. 18. [4] PP. 20, 63.
[5] P. 30. [6] P. 35. [7] P. 35. [8] PP. 37, 61.
[9] P. 41. [10] P. 41. [11] P. 41. [12] P. 41.
[13] P. 41. [14] P. 44. [15] P. 52 [16] P. 52.
[17] P. 53. [18] P. 55. [19] P. 55. [20] P. 55.
[21] P. 57. [22] P. 61. [23] P. 62. [24] P. 62.
[25] P. 67. [26] PP. 71, 73.

On page 8, the author very clearly points out which *nigrahasthāna* is possible in Vāda and which not, and which though falls within it are still to be made out and those which are made out are to be seen whether they put an end to the Kathā.

Other notable facts.

There are very clear and in full details the rules and regulations to be followed in discussions, controversies, etc., which are fully illustrated.

(1) Destruction of pain which is not accompanied with pre-negation (prāgabhāva) in the same substratum (samānādhikaraṇaduḥkhaprāgabhāvāsahavṛttiḥ duḥkhadhvaṁsaḥ *mokṣaḥ*) is called liberation. (2) Again, *some* hold that liberation is the absolute negation of pain which is totally disconnected with *loṣṭa* (a clod of earth) etc. (3) The *followers of Prabhākara* hold that it is pre-negation of pain which is non-co-existent with pain. (4) *Vallabhācāryya* also supports this view. (5) *Bhaṭṭa* is of opinion that it is the manifestation of eternal happiness. (6) The *Tridaṇḍins* (*Bhāskara*) are of opinion that it is the merging of the Jīvātman into the Paramātman. (7) *Śaṅkarācārya* thinks it to be the direct realization of *Brahmādvaita*. (8) The *Mīmāṁsakas* and the author of the *Līlāvatī* do not believe in *sarva-mukti*[1].

Views regarding Mukti.

Regarding the different types of contact (*pratyāsatti*), Śaṅkara Miśra says that besides the usual six kinds of contact, the *yogaja* is an independent type of contact according to *some*. Yogaja-dharma (*merit accruing* from the yogic practices) is the helper of the manas of the yogins; so that the yogins perceive things even if they do not come in contact with them, is the view of others. In such cases of external cognition it is a mental cognition where the contact with the object does not take place.

Types of contact.

The *jñānalakṣaṇā* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* types of contact are not different from *viśeṣanatā*. Thus, in *jñānalakṣaṇā* it is *saṁyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*, because it produces direct knowledge about Paramāṇu etc. as it exists in the cognition expressed in the form *paramāṇumahaṁ jānāmi* (I know a paramāṇu).

[1] *Vādivinoda*, P. 41.

He further says that there are various types of *viśeṣaṇatā*, namely, (1) *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*, as for instance, the cognition of negation and inherence in a substance; (2) *saṁyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*, as in the cognition of the negation of yellowness etc. in redness etc.; (3) *saṁyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*, as in the cognition of the negation of tasteness etc. in colourness etc.; (4) *samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*, as in the cognition of the negation of *gakāratvādi* in the *kakārādi*; (5) *samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā*, as in the cognition of the negation of *gatvādi* in the *katvādi*; (6) Pure *Viśeṣaṇatā*, as in the cognition of the negation of *śabdādi*. It is further subdivided[1].

Views about Number of Categories.

About the number of categories, the author gives us various views : The schools of *Kaṇāda* and *Gotama* believe in the well-known seven categories; *tautātikas* accept only four, namely, dravya, guṇa, karman and sāmānya. The followers of *Prabhākara* believe in eight categories, namely, dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya, saṅkhyā, samavāya, sādṛśya (similarity), and śakti (a kind of potentiality inherent in a substance to produce a particular effect, or even to justify the very nature, or existence of that object). *Candra* admits eleven, namely, eight of the Prābhākaras and krama (succession), upakāra (assistance) and saṁskāra. The author of the *Mahārṇava*, that is, Vaṭeśvara, believes in twelve categories, namely eleven of Candra and *aupādānika* as his own. Prakṛti and Puruṣa are the only two categories according to *Sāṅkhya*. The *Pāśupatas* accept kārya (effect), kāraṇa (cause), yoga, vidhi and duḥkha. The *Vedāntins* and *Murāri Miśra* hold that there is only one category called Brahman, but for practical worldly purposes there are however, four more categories in the form of *dharma*, *dharmin*, *ādhāra* and *pradeśa*. The *Cārvākas* believe in four categories, like earth, water, tejas and air.[2]

Philosophical views of various schools.

Then the author proceeds to give in brief the philosophical views of various schools. As these are somewhat more peculiar and also important, I give them below .

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[1] *Vādivinoda*, PP. 51-52. [2] *Vādivinoda*, P. 53. *Nyāyamālā*, P. 171.

According to Gotama there are nine types of substance, such as, earth, water, tejas, air, ākāśa, ātman, kāla, dik (these two are missing in the printed text) and manas. There are six types of contact, namely, saṁyoga, saṁyukta-samavāya, saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya, samavāya, samaveta-samavāya and viśeṣaṇatā. They believe in seven categories, like dravya, guṇa, karman, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva.

Gotamamatam.

The Kāṇādas also believe that there are seven kinds of category like the Gotamīya's and also that there are nine substances, as held by their sister system Nyāya. The followers of Kaṇāda accept twentyfour kinds of guṇa. They also accept the six types of contact of the Gotamīyas.

Kanādamatam.

The Prābhākaras believe in nine types of substance, like the Kāṇādas and the Gotamīyas. The Prābhākaras do not believe in saṅkhyā, vibhāga, separateness and hatred as guṇas, like the Kāṇādas, but accept vega (velocity) in addition to the other twenty as guṇas. So there are only twentyone guṇas according to the Gurumata. They have only four types of contact, namely, saṁyoga, samavāya, saṁyukta-samavāya and sambandha-viśeṣaṇatā.

Prābhākaramatam.

According to the Bhāṭṭas there are four categories mentioned below' and eleven dravyas, namely, the nine dravyas of the Kāṇādas and śabda and andhakāra as the eleventh. Similarly, they believe in twentyfour types of guṇa of the Vaiśeṣikas, except śabda which they replace by *nāda*. They hold only one type of contact, namely, saṁyoga.

Bhāṭṭamatam.

Some hold twelve types of contact, namely, the six kinds of the Kāṇādas and yogaja, dharma, saṁskāra, utprekṣā, jñāna and jāti.

Twelve types of contact.

The Vedāntins believe in only one kind of category as mentioned above, and in only eight kinds of substance, such as, earth, water, air, tejas, ātman, manas, andhakāra and śabda. They do not hold ākāśa, kāla and dik as dravyas. According to them, there are only twenty guṇas, namely, the twentyfour guṇas of the Kāṇādas,

Vedāntamatam.

except paratva, aparatva, pṛthaktva, dharma, adharma, vibhāga and śabda. In their place the Vedāntins add three different guṇas, namely, tādātmya, vṛtti and nāda.

According to the Cārvākas, Pratyakṣa is the only means of right cognition. Consequently, the objects of knowledge also are only those which are cognized directly through direct perception, such as, earth, water, tejas and air. The physical organism is also made out of these four elements. This itself is the Ātman. This is evident from the expressions, *I* am going, *I* am bulky, *I* am of white complexion, etc. Even in the absence of impressions (*Saṁskāra*) of any previous birth, a child moves to suck the mother's breast like the manifestation of the desire of sexual enjoyments after attaining the proper mature age. Kāma and artha alone are the two values of life. There is no paraloka, no karman (to lead to paraloka, or yield any fruit afterwards) and no fruits of any meritorious deeds. Inference etc. are not the right means of cognition. That there is fire in the mountain and one should go to fetch it is simply based on probability and if by chance, one gets it, he takes it to be a pramāṇa. Based on the expressions, *I* see, *I* hear, it is assumed that the sense-organs, which are nothing but the eye-balls, etc., are conscious.

Cārvākamatam.

According to the Bauddhas, the universe consists of five skandhas (forms of mundane consciousness), namely, rūpaskandha, vedanāskandha, saṁjñāskandha, saṁskāraskandha and jñānaskandha. All those objects, which appear in the form of pot etc. represent rūpaskandha. Vedanāskandha is represented by pain and happiness. The names, like ghaṭa etc., given to the objects, represent saṁjñāskandha, rāga, dveṣa, moha and kleśas all constitute saṁskāraskandha. Cognition of objects is jñānaskandha. The universe constitutes the objects of the class of gandha, rūpa, rasa, sparśa and śabda. There is nothing beyond this. Earth is a collocation of gandha, rūpa, rasa, sparśa and śabda; water is the collocation (saṅghāta) of rūpa, rasa, sparśa and śabda; tejas constitutes the collocation of rūpa, sparśa

Bauddhamatam.

and śabda; and air is the collocation of sparśa and śabda. An avayavin (whole) is a collocation of paramāṇus of the type of rūpa etc. It is momentary.

There are only two means of right cognition, namely, pratyakṣa and anumāna. The objects of cognition are also of two types, grāhya and adhyavasāya. Cognition is identical with its object as both are obtained simultaneously together. The Saugatas are advaitavādins of the type of jñānādvaitavādins, like the Vedāntins who are Brahmādvaitavādins.

There are four main schools of the Bauddhas, namely, Vaibhāṣika Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika.

Main Schools of Buddhism—Vaibhāṣika.

Vaibhāṣikas believe that jñāna is nirākāra (formless), it depends upon the object which produces it. Both jñāna and its object are momentary.

Sautrāntika-matam.

According to the *Sautrāntikas*, vijñāna has a form, and because of the similarity in the form, the object is different from vijñāna. The object existing presents a form in the jñāna. Both jñāna and its objects are momentary.

Yogācāramatam.

Jñāna alone is momentary while the object outside the ideas are wholly illusory according to the *Yogācāras*.

Mādhyamika-matam.

According to the *Mādhyamikas*, on the other hand, there is neither jñāna, nor any reality outside. So there is no question of believing in any pramāṇa and prameya. Thus, the universe is nothing but *śūnya* (void).

Four states of Citta.

They believe from their own standpoint that there are four states of *Citta*, namely, duḥkha (pain), samudaya, mārga and nirodha. The upādānaskandha is the cause of pain, *samudaya* means nairātmya and momentariness, *mārga* means direct apprehension (sākṣātkāra) and absence of kleśa in the Citta is called *nirodha*. The impressions (vāsanās) inherited wrongly from time immemorial and existing only in their subtlest form, and the vijñāna in the form of *aham* (I) is the ātman which is not different from the continuous flow of the *Ālayavijñāna*.[1] Some others hold it

[1] It is an act of knowledge having ego selfconsciousness as its object.

to be the continuity of jñāna alone. Others are of opinion that the ātman is the *Ālayavijñāna* which falls within the *pravṛttivijñāna* (an ordinary act of cognition as distinguished from *ālayavijñāna*). According to *Vaibhāṣika*, final emancipation (mukti) is the continuous chain of citta which is free from vāsanās and kleśa for the purpose of recognition (pratisandhānārtham) and because of being of the nature of cause and effect due to the falling in within the single continuous chain of consciousness. The *Yogācāra* holds *citta-nirodha* as mukti, while the *Sautrāntikas* hold that mukti is the continuous chain of citta which is objectless.

Pramāna defined.

Self realization, which is also called *anubhava*, is alone a Pramāṇa. Savikalpaka is not a Pramāṇa. People take it to be a Pramāṇa, only because it establishes links between various objects, and also because it is in tune with the person who uses it.

Pākhaṇḍamatam.

Pākhaṇḍamatam is also called *Somasiddhānta* in Philosophy. Its views are to be understood just like those of the Cārvākas. For mokṣa they hold that *Freedom* is mukti, while dependence is bondage. Further, they hold that addicting to wine and sexual pleasure is mukti.

Digambaramatam.

Digambaras and Ārhatas are identical. They are called Digambara because of their being free from the *trayī-saṃvaraṇa*. They believe in seven categories, namely, Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Saṃvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa. *Jīva* is conscious. It is of the nature of a bird. It is the Ātman which experiences *bhukti* and *mukti*. Being wrapped within the physical organism the sense-organs do not cognize. Sometimes however, it does perceive, like a lamp placed in the room which does not generally enlighten a thing placed outside the room, but at times, it does throw some light even outside the room through a window.

Ajīva is non-conscious and *jaḍa* (without any consciousness). *Āsrava* means dharma and adharma (merits and demerits).[1] *Saṃvara* means samādhi[2].

[1] The text reads *Āśaya* which is not the correct form.

[2] According to the Jain text *Saṃvara* is the antigonistic principle of *Āsrava*. It is a sort of check of the causes of karman.

Nirjara means observance of vrata, niyama, etc., in the form of pulling out of hairs of the head, non-bathing, and carrying on dirty things with them, keeping mum, sitting in *Vīrāsana*, eating bitter (*tikta*) objects etc. *Bandha* is the worldly bondage and freedom from it is *mokṣa* which is the destruction of the covering in the form of organism. Then only a being becomes Omniscient. Kṣapaṇaka, Śvetāmbara, Ārhat, Nīlāmbara, Raktāmbara, skinclad, those who put on peacock's feathers as a wrapper, etc., are all the divisions of the Digambara sect of the Jainas. *Ahiṁsā* is their highest virtue. Drinking of wine is strictly prohibited.

Sub-divisions of Digambara.

The *Bhāṭṭas* believe in four categories, namely, dravya, guṇa, karman and generality (Sāmānya). Neither Viśeṣa, nor Samavāya are accepted as categories. *Śabda* is a substance which is ubiquitous and eternal. It is cognized through ears. *Nāda* is its extraordinary quality. *Tamas* is a separate dravya (substance). So it has been regarded as moving and possessing blue colour, and having para, apara, vibhāga as its qualities. As it possesses different qualities which are not found in other well-known dravyas, *tamas* is regarded as a separate category. It is cognized through the visual organ helped by the absence of light, or it is perceived by the *tāmasaindriya*, which is the substratum of eye-ball. This is the view of *Maṇḍana Miśra* who also belongs to the Bhāṭṭa school. *Ākāśa* possesses colour and is cognized through visual organ. *Manas* is ubiquitous. There is an eternal (aja) contact between the two ubiquitous categories, namely, Ātman and Manas. The physical organism is made of all the five bhūtas. The auditory organ is regarded as a part of Dik limited within the ear-cavity. It is not an Ākāśa as the Naiyāyikas hold.

Bhāṭṭasiddhānta.

There is both similarity and dissimilarity between a dravya and jāti, guṇa and karman. There are six pramāṇas, namely, pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. The manifestation of eternal and unsurpassed happiness (in Ātman) is called *Mukti*, as is supported by the śruti-*Ānandam Brahmaṇo rūpam*. *Veda* is not the creation of any human being. The Śākhās of the texts, like-*Holākāḥ kāryāḥ*, or the smṛtis,

like *Aṣṭakā kartavyā*, which are the original sources of the most blameless objects, are concealed in oblivion, simply because they are not taught in the country and not because they are lost.

The followers of the Prabhākara school hold pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda and arthāpatti as Pramāṇas. Pratyakṣa has as its object *miti, mātṛ and meya* (knowledge, knower and objects of knowledge). This is called *tripuṭī-pratyakṣa*, that is, all the three, namely, knowledge, knower and object of knowledge are simultaneously present in direct perception. In other words, in the judgement expressed in the form *ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmi* (I know a jar), all the three factors are present together, simply beause *jñāna* is self-illumined (svaprakāśa). The implements for the vision (bhāna) of the Ātman coloured by the jñāna are the same as the implements of jñāna (jñānasāmagrī). Even in the case of Inference etc., as far as its knower and knowledge are concerned, it is not different from Pratyakṣa. Pure inference is present only in inferential objects (meyāṁśa). Direct knowledge (sākṣād-dhīḥ) is Pratyakṣa.

Gurumatam.

The *validity of Pramāṇa* is realized through knowledge itself (jñānavittivedyam). This is what is called *svatastva*. This *svatastva* (self-valid) belongs to every jñāna. That is, according to Prabhākara, all jñānas are self-valid. Viśiṣṭa-jñāna is produced by viśeṣaṇa-jñāna, and the viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyajñāna is produced by a jñāna which is the attribute (prakāra) and is limited by *viśeṣaṇatā*. Hence, *nirvikalpaka* is not a separate knowledge. Anumāna is produced by the *vyāpti-jñāna* and *pakṣadharmatā-jñāna* taken together. It is not of the type of *tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*. They do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* in vyāpti.

Śabda is Veda itself, so it is self-valid. But the *laukika* śabda is not self-valid. It is doubtful.

This is in brief the gleanings from the *Vādivinoda* for the information of our readers.[1]

(6) *Bhedaprakāśa* also called *Bhedaratna*—It is a small work in refutation of the identity (abheda) between Jīva and Brahman. The author has refuted almost

[1] *Vādivinoda*, PP. 52-57.

all the arguments of the Vedāntins proving *abheda*. He says—

Bhedaratnaparitrāṇe tārkikā eva yāmikāḥ /
ato vedāntinastenānnirasyatyeṣa śaṅkaraḥ //

Translation—As tārkikas alone are the night-watchmen to protect the jewels in the form of *bheda* (difference), so this Śaṅkara wards them off against the vedāntin-thief.

He further says, there is no knowledge where difference does not appear, hence, there is no pramāṇa which does not prove difference.[1]

There is no clear evidence as to the time of this work, but from the writings it may be suggested that he wrote it after he had finished all the other works, particularly, his commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*.

In the body of the work there are the following references—Ācāryāḥ Kiraṇāvallyām,[2] quotation from the *Kusumāñjali*,[3] Śaṅkarācārya,[4] Bṛhaspati,[5] *Vyāsasūtra*[6] and Pākhaṇḍa.[7]

The book may be divided according to the topics into two sections—*Pāramārthika-bhedasiddhi* and *Ātmano nānātvasiddhi*. It has been published twice, once from the Benares Sanskrit College in the *Princess of Wales Sarasvatibhavana Series* and second time from the Gujarati Press, Bombay. It is to be noted here for the information of our readers that the well-known Sannyāsī vedāntin scholar Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has written his criticism of this work and has named it *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa* which also has been published along with the *Bhedaratna* and also the *Advaitasiddhi* from Bombay.

Besides these, Śaṅkara Miśra has written the following books and commentaries : (7) *Kiraṇāvalīnirukti-prakāśa*,[8] (8) *Kaṇādarahasya*, published from Benares, (9) *Upaskāra*, a commentary on the

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[1] *Bhedaratna*, P. 1. [2] P. 3. [3] P. 26. [4] P. 33.

[5] P. 19. But there seems to be some confusion in this reference as he says—tarhi Bṛhaspatiḥ katham nājñāsīdyena sarvaśūnyatāmasūtrayat.

[6] P. 19. [7] P. 19.

[8] Kaṇādarahasya, P. 177 kiraṇāvalīniruktiprakāśe ca kṛtavyutpādanametat.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, (10) *Līlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, a commentary on the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, published from Benares, (11) *Śāṅkarī*, a commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. Besides these works on philosophy, he also wrote some works on Kāvya—(12) *Gaurīdigambara-prahasana*, (13) *Kṛṣṇavinoda-nāṭaka*, (14) *Manobhavaparibhavanāṭaka* and (15) *Rasārṇava*. Of the philosophical works, most of them are on Vaiśeṣika and one on Vedānta. These will be dealt with in their respective places, while the last four are poetic works. I give below some information about these at this place.

(12) *Gaurīdigambaraprahasana*—It is perhaps the earliest work of Śaṅkara Miśra. The author himself says in the *Prastāvanā* that though the good qualities of a *Prahasana* are not at all found in this work, yet it was, unwillingly in a way, written by the author as he was asked to write it. To explain this the author says that my father, while I was playing, composed a Nāndī verse and knowing me to be quite capable of doing justice to it, asked me (his son) to compose a *Prahasana*, and as it was an order of the *Guru*, I had to do it. The Nāndī line is—

srdhvabaddhajaṭe nagne virūpākṣe viṣādini/
ūvayamāgatya himavān prāyacchat kinna kanyakām//

As already said there is not much of poetics in this *uparūpaka*. So it has no noteworthy comments to make. But however, there are certain points which I want to place before the scholars for information.

The theme of the *uparūpaka* is the marriage of Gaurī and Digambara Śiva. *According to the Smṛtis* and the practice followed in Mithilā, the brother goes to bring the bridegroom-designate to his home.[1]

Sugar is not given to a camel.[2] Difference between *svayaṁgrāha* and *vivāha* is made clear and it is further pointed out that there is no *svayaṁgrāha* for a brāhmaṇa.[3]

Then there is a very interesting fact to be noted-
janmāntarānuvṛttena rāgapāśena saṁyatau/
strīpuṁsāvanyathākartum na svātantryam vidherapi//

[1] *Gaurīdigambara Prahasana*, P. 13, Mm. Mukunda Jha Bakhśī's edition.

[2] P. 23. [3] P. 28.

Translation—A lady and a man both are bound together by the sacramental-tie or *love-string* coming down from previous births. Even the creator is not empowered to disturb it in (any future life).

This is a natural truth. There is no creation of anything, not to speak of human beings alone, without there being both a male and a female element in the seed. Everything is produced likewise both from a mingling of the male and female elements. In fact, nothing does exist which does not possess the two elements. Out of the two, that which comes to have more force becomes manifest and the other remains supressed. This is the reason why there are so many cases of sex-change in every country.

In every creation there are both male and female elements.

Then it is also a fact that there is no beginning of a creation. It is continued from generation to generation. This again, is not only true of human or non-human beings, but also of anything and everything that comes to exist in the universe. This being so, for the purpose of creation pairs of objects and their natural longing for not to be separated, their natural copulative energy to remain together ever also continue from generation to generation without being disturbed. In a pair of two elements, one element will remain unproductive so long the other element of the pair does not become mixed with it. Their natural copulative energy is so strong that it cannot be ever separated and be mixed with another which is not its own. If it ever becomes possible, it will destroy each other and will never assume another form, but in that form also they will come together and then only they can exist.

Pairs can never be separated even by death.

This is the reason why the above statement has been made by the author. It is again, the reason why there is always a great trouble and unusual delay to find out a suitable, rather her own, bridegroom of the previous births for the marriage of a girl. In other words, once a husband of a particular wife is always a husband of that very woman both in the past as well as in future generations. They are never separated. It is found that some man or girl remains

unmarried. This is due to the fact that the wife of the particular man of the previous life had fallen in such a trap of karman of the past life that she could not be easily brought to a position during the period of that man's present span of life in order to be married with him. So he remains unmarried for not being able to find out his own *Śakti*—counterpart and therefore, the particular pair of śakti and śaktimān could not join together in a particular birth. It may be possible in another birth or so. The same is true of a man. This is evident from the story of Śatadhanvan and his queen Śaivyā.

Then again, in an answer to the question, how then a man has more than one wife, it may be said that really speaking a man may, for some reason or the other, have more than one lady to accompany him as his wife, but all are not truly his wives. He has only one wife and it is the eldest, while others are *bhogyā* (concubines). So all the meritorious deeds to be performed along with a wife are to be done along with the eldest alone. This is what Yājñavalkya has said in his Smṛti and all other texts support it—

savarṇāsu vidhau dharmye jyeṣṭhayā na vinetarā//

The *Mitākṣarā* while commenting upon it says—dharmānuṣṭhāne jyeṣṭhayā vinā jyeṣṭhāṁ muktvā itarā madhyamā kaniṣṭhā vā na niyoktavyā[1].

So has been said by Kātyāyana also in his Smṛti—

Prathamā dharmapatnī syād-dvitīyā rativardhinī/
dṛṣṭameva phalam tatra nādṛṣṭamupapadyate//[2]

All this is supported by Śrutis. So says Śaṅkara Miśra—

rahasyam vedānāmanudinanamasya—, etc.

The author further refers to a truth that when the master misbehaves, people speak ill of him to his servants who alone are subject to all the repercussions.[3]

The last very interesting point which the author wants to tell us is the secret why Lord Śiva prefered to make cremation-ground as his abode and also why did he like to remain naked even during his marriage ceremony.

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[1] Ācārādhyāya, Verse 88.

[2] Quoted by Mitra Miśra in his *Vīramitrodaya*, Saṁskāraprakāśa, P. 875. [3] P. 33.

The author has supplied the answer. The lord says that as Satī, my wife, burnt herself, in the Dakṣa-prajāpati's yāga, I took a vow to remain in *citā* (Śmaśāna) and without any clothes till I get her back.[1]

Nothing is known of the two other dramas mentioned in the Prahasana, so one has to keep silent regarding their description.

(17) *Rasārṇava* is perhaps his last work. It is an anthology of verses. The author says—

tarkābhyāsapariśrāntasvāntaviśrāntihetave/
ye ślokā vihitāsteṣām saṅgrahoyam vidhīyate//

Translation—I am preparing this collection of those of my verses which I had composed during my recreation hours after I had become tired from the studies of the Tarka-Śāstra.

This anthology contains about 327 verses in small and big metres. It is just like so many other anthologies. There are however, a few verses which possess tinge of Mithilā's social customs. The verses are of high class merit full of alaṅkāras and other, poetic beauties.

From all this it is evident that Śaṅkara Miśra was indeed, an all round scholar. It was therefore that they say—

Śaṅkara-Vācaspatyoḥ sadṛśau Śaṅkara-Vācaspatī eva /
pakṣadharapratipakṣī lak ibhūto na ca kvāpi //

Date of Śaṅkara Miśra.

As regards his time I only refer to what has already been said by my teacher that there is a manuscript of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* in the *Varaṇaseya Sanskrit University* which bears saṁvat 1526 (=1473 A.D.) as the date of its transcription. There is a manuscript of the *Bhedaprakāśa* in the *Raghunatha temple library*, Jammu dated saṁvat 1519 (1462 A.D.) which is said to have been copied at Kāśī in the life time of ŚaṅkaraMiśra himself. So this may be taken to be the lower limit of his age. Śaṅkara must have lived after Varddhamāna Upādhyāya whose commentary on the *Kusumāñjali* is referred to in Śaṅkara's own commentary, *Āmoda*. Thus, it can easily be concluded that Śaṅkara lived in the second quarter of the 15th century A.D.

[1] P. 40.

14. PRAGALBHA MIŚRA

(15th century)

Pragalbha Miśra, son of Narapati Miśra, flourished in Mithilā in the 15th century. Jāhnavī was the name of his mother. So he writes[1]—

ācāryaśrīpragalbhena jāhnavīgarbhasambhuvā/
piturnarapatervyākhyām hṛdi kṛtvā nirucyate///

Again, at the end of the *Pratyakṣa-pragalbhī* the author writes in the colophon—

itiśrī-narapatimiśra-tanaya-jāhnavī-garbhasambhava-rukmiṇī-pati-śrīpragalbhācārya-kṛtau pratyakṣapariccheda*ḥ samāptaḥ*.

From the various references found in his commentary, it seems that Pragalbha was a devotee of Viṣṇu, in spite of the fact that every Maithila is a śākta as well. In the very first verse he bows down to Nārāyaṇa. In the colophon of the Prāmāṇya section he writes—*iti śrīhariharacaraṇaikaśaraṇa*. Again, in the beginning of the Anumāna section he says—nārāyaṇasya caraṇaṁ śaraṇam praṇamya.

At the end of the Kevalānvayī section he says—

kevalānvayigovindaṁ praṇamya śrīśubhaṅkaraḥ/
rukmiṇīkṛtanirvāha kaścidāha yathāmati//

From this three points are clear—that he was mainly a devotee of Viṣṇu, his wife's name was Rukmiṇī and that his another name was Śubhaṅkara. This name is also found mentioned at the end of the Upādhi section (Śubhaṅkara upādhīnām etc.). He again, in course of his commentary, says—taṁ bhaje devakīsutam. He also bows down to Rāma once—śrīmanrāmaḥ sakalajagatīnāyakaḥ prīyatām me. Again, further he says—sarvaśaktivinirmukto rāmaḥ prītostu tena me. Lastly, at the end of the work he says—

vande śrīnandaputrasya pādāmbhojamaharniśam
yatprasādādahaṁścaiva muktaḥ syāmbhavasāgare//
anekeṣāṁ lipim dṛṣṭvā svayam kiñcidvicārya ca/
likhitaṁ yat pragalbhena tena tuṣyati keśavaḥ//[2]

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[1] Beginning lines of his commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pt. Suryanarayana Śukla's edition, Benares, 1939.

[2] Quoted from *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*.

That he was a *Maithila* is clear from the fact that upto that time no non-Maithila had written anything upon the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* which has been accepted by all the Maithila and non-Maithila scholars, like Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj. I quote below what has been said by Śrīkavirājajī in this connection.—

"From Gaṅgeśa down to Pakṣadhara Navyanyāya had its sole home in Mithilā. The Pandits of that place, who had made it their monopoly and been so long its trusted guardians, took special care to see that this privilege of teaching the Śāstra did not pass away from them into what they perhaps thought unworthy hands. Students from various parts of India used to flock to Mithilā to draw inspiration from its far famed scholars; and when they completed their studies they returned home with the diploma which their guru had conferred upon them"[1]

Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma was the first Bengali scholar to go to Pakṣadhara Miśra in Mithilā to study Navyanyāya and bring the thoughts to Bengal. Prior to him there is no trace of any scholar to have done so. Nor is there any tradition of Pragalbha's being a non-Maithila amongst the Sanskrit scholars[2]. Then the manner in which the colophons quoted above are written shows that he was a Maithila. The term *gauḍa* was a common name for Northern India and not for Bengal alone, as adduced by Dr. Bhaṭṭācārya. Lastly, all the references found in his work are of Maithilas. From these it may be concluded that Pragalbha was also a Maithila and not a Bengali as Dr. Dinesha Chandra Bhattacharya says in his *Vange Navyanyāya-carcā*.[3] Dr. Bhattacharya's evidences are similar to those which used to be adduced for many years to prove that Udayana or Jagadīśa was a Bengali. The surname '*Miśra*' used against his own and his father's name also supports my view as stated above.

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[1] Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. II. P. 136.

[2] Vide Pt. Suryanarayana Śukla's Introduction to his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*; Mm. Pt. Vindhyeshwari Prasad's *Kroḍapatra-saṅgraha*, p. 1

[3] PP. 249, 253.

Date of Pragalbha.

About his date, it may be stated that his reference to *Miśrāstu* in so many places suggests that these references are to Vācaspati Miśra II as has been accepted by Dr. D. Bhattacarya also. Narahari and Vāsudeva Miśra have referred to Pragalbha in their works, which is therefore, the lower limit of his age. So he might have been a senior contemporary of Pakṣadhara, or even a little senior. This is further supported by the fact that Padmanābha Miśra says—ityasmad guru—Pragalbha-Pakṣadharādayaḥ etc. In that case, he must have lived after Vācaspati II, so it will not be improper to have him sometime in the second half of the 15th century

Like so many other scholars, Pragalbha was a Naiyāyika and also a Vaiśeṣika. He wrote a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* on all the four chapters. A portion of the Pratyakṣa is published in the *Saraswati Bhavana Text series*, Benares. He also wrote a commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udayana. Besides, he commented upon the *Nyāyalīlāvatī* of Vallabha. He also wrote on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*. That some Naiyāyikas also, such as, Śaṅkara Miśra, Pragalbha Miśra and some others, have written commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* is perhaps due to the fact that it has been written purely according to Navya-nyāya methodology and also that it is based on the *vitaṇḍāvāda* of Nyāya. Most of these works are still in manuscript form.

Merit of Pragalbha.

From the portion of the commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi* published it may be said that Pragalbha was really very bold in expressing his views and perhaps it is due to this that he became known by the name *Pragalbha* and that his writing was very elaborate. This is what appears to have been indicated in the maṅgala verse of his Upādhivāda—

prāgalbhyena pragalbhena yatkṛtam śaktikhaṇḍanam/

But his real name was Śubhaṅkara which is also a very common name amongst Maithilas.

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[1] Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā P. 251.

15. JAYADEVA MIŚRA *alias* PAKṢADHARA MIŚRA

(15th century)

We have seen above that in the History of Nyāya-Darśana, there flourished from time to time great luminous scholars in Mithilā. After Gaṅgeśa the most glorious name is that of Jayadeva Miśra, who was, later on, called Pakṣadhara Miśra by which name he became famous in later centuries. He was one of the greatest dialecticians of Mithilā. Like Udayana, he is also known to have maintained the superiority of whatever side he took in dialectical discussions. It was, therefore, that he was called '*Pakṣadhara*'. So, there is a proverbial line current in Mithilā about him—

'pakṣadharapratipakṣī lakṣībhūto na ca kvāpi'.

Translation—A dialectical rival of Pakṣadhara is not seen anywhere.

It may not be possible to agree to what my teacher Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍita Kavirājajī has said—"For a long time after the death of Varddhamāna there was no thinker in Mithilā to preserve, far less to enrich, the new philosophy of the country. Supposing that our assumption of Varddhamāna's date is practically right, we would find that during the long interval of over a century after his age, Mithilā was without any scholar with any pretention to philosophical renown.[1]"

In the light of what has been pointed out above, between the age of Varddhamāna and Pakṣadhara, it is also possible that with further researches, into the history of Mithilā's contribution to scholarship we may be able to come accross the names of many other glorious scholars who are almost forgotten but whom later scholars have referred to as *anye, pare, apare, kecit* and so on in their works. Following pages will also support it.

Pakṣadhara's reputation as a dialecticion.

Pakṣadhara Miśra gave impetus to the study of Navyanyāya in the country by writing a direct commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, called *Āloka*. His new interpretation to the subject roused the interest of scholars

[1] *Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III. P. 135.

and many of them wrote directly or indirectly on the *Āloka*, some even criticized the views 'of Pakṣadhara. He also became renowned by his career as a great dialectician. The story of his learned discussion with Vyāsatīrtha of Kārṇāṭa is too well-known amongst the scholars of Nyāya, which led the Kārṇāṭa-scholar utter in admiration of Pakaṣdhara's scholarship—

yadadhītaṁ tadadhītaṁ yadanadhītaṁ tadapyadhītam/
pakṣadharavipakṣo nāvekṣi vinā navīnavyāsena //

There is another story current amongst scholars about Pakṣadhara's scholarship. It is said that once there was a heated scholarly discussion between Pakṣadhara and Haṁsa Bhaṭṭa of the South at Vārāṇasī. The latter was very proud of his scholarship and so when he entered into the assembly of scholars, where Pakṣadhara was waiting for him, he boldly uttered the following verse—

palāyadhvam palāyadhvaṁ re re varvvara-tārkikāḥ /
haṁsabhaṭṭaḥ samāyāti vedāntavanakesarī //

It is evident from this verse that there was a discussion between a Naiyāyika, namely, Pakṣadhara Miśra and a Vedāntin, namely, Haṁsa Bhaṭṭa. So, the latter speaks of himself as a lion amongst the Vedāntins in whose presence the barbaric logicians cannot stay.

To this Pakṣadhara is said to have replied in the same tone—

bhinattu nityaṁ karirājakumbhaṁ
bibhartu vegaṁ pavanātirekam /
karotu vāsaṁ girirājaśṛṅge
tathāpi siṁhaḥ paśureva nānyah //

Translation—May the lion (*Kesarī*) ever tear off the forehead of big elephants, may it possess speed far greater than wind and may also it live on the high peaks of the Himālayas, but even then a lion is only a beast and not anything else, that is, not a human being.

With such mutual introduction the discussion began and after several days, Haṁsa Bhaṭṭa was defeated. It is therefore, that we find a tradition amongst the Maithila scholars—

'Pakṣadharapratipakṣī lakṣībhūto na ca kvāpi.'

—A rival of Pakṣadhara has not been found anywhere.

About Pakṣadhara's family history we know from the *Pañjī* that he belonged to one of the prominent Śrotriya families of Mithilā, named *Sodarapura* and was Śāṇḍilyagotra. He was the son of Guṇe Miśra and grandson of Vārāhanātha Miśra and great-grand-son of Rāmanātha, son of Viśvanātha. He lived in the village named *Yamasama*. He had a son named Mahāmahopādhyāya Mādhava. This Mādhava is said to have written a work in defence of his father's views against the attacks of Narahari[1]. The *Pañjī* records prove that Pakṣadhara's descendants are still living in Mithilā. From these very records we also know that Pakṣadhara had *Pākhū* (Maithilī from 'Pakṣa' is 'Pakkha', or 'Pākha') as his *pseudo-nym*[2]. From this it is also evident that he was the son of Gūṇe, that is, Guṇanidhi or some similar name.

Personal history.

It is a matter of great satisfaction that the well-known śrotriya family of Mithilā, called *Sodarapura* has produced great scholars. I was told once by a Pañjīkāra of Mithilā that there was no other family in Mithilā wherein so many scholars had flourished and that perhaps even today the near and distant members of that family were found generally very intelligent.

He had studied Nyāyaśāstra under his uncle Hari Miśra—

adhītya jayadevena harimiśrāt pitṛvyataḥ/
tattvacintāmaṇeritthamāloko'yam prakāśyate//[3]

This verse is also mentioned in the *Āloka* on the *Cintāmaṇi*-anumāna. According to the Pañjī, Hari-miśra had two younger brothers and was a Mahāmahopādhyāya. It is strange that we do not know of any of his contributions as yet. It must be remembered that this Hari Miśra is different from the grammarian of the same name.

But there is a tradition amongst Maithilas and other scholars that Jayadeva had studied the śāstra

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[1] Vide—*History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, pp. 124-25.

[2] Vide—Pañjī-miśra-gūṇe-sutau miśranāthū-Jayadevāparanāmaka-mahāmaho-miśra-pākhū-prasiddha-pakṣadharau.

[3] In the beginning of the *Āloka* on Pratyakṣa *Cintāmaṇi*.

at the feet of Yajñapati Upādhyāya, the author of the *Prabhā*, a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, the son of Śivapati, grandson of Paśupati and great-grandson of Mahāmahopādhyāya Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya of the Māṇḍala (Māndara) family of Mithilā[1]. Pakṣadhara has criticized very often the views of his *guru*-Yajñapati.[2]

His works.

The most important contribution of Jayadeva *alias* Pakṣadhara is his commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, called *Āloka*. The first appearance of this commentary created a great sensation amongst the Naiyāyikas. It was due most probably, to its somewhat being a new interpretation of the text. It was read widely and had a good reception amongst the scholars, some of whom criticized its views also. It is needless to repeat that the greatness of scholars in those days was based on giving a good interpretation of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. This attracted the attention of scholars from distant parts of the country as well. Serious students flocked together round about Pakṣadhara to study the secretes of the Navyanyāya.

Like other works of great Maithila scholars, the *Āloka* begins with a salutation to Śiva. The benedictory verse is—

vaktrāṇi pañca kucayoḥ pratibimbitāni
dṛṣṭvā daśānanasamāgamanabhrameṇa /
bhūyo'pi śailaparivṛttibhayena gāḍha-
māliṅgito girijayā giriśaḥ punātu//

Translation—May the lord of the hill (Himālaya), namely, Śiva, being closely embraced by the daughter of the Himālaya, namely, Pārvatī, due to her fear caused by her seeing the reflections of the five faces (of Śiva) on each of her two breasts, mistaking them for the arrival of the 'ten-headed (Rāvaṇa) and subsequently, to her fear of the Himālaya's being again, moved (by Rāvaṇa), purify.

It may be pointed out at this place that Pakṣadhara had in mind that Śiva without the association of Śakti

[1] Vide—Appendix to the *Dvaitanirṇaya* of Mahāmahopādhyāya Narahari, Published from Darbhanga.

[2] Vide—*History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, PP. 122, 160-62.

is unable to do anything, as has been said also by Śaṅkarācārya—

> śivaḥ śaktyā yukto yadi bhavati śaktaḥ prabhavitum/
> na cedevaṁ devo na khalu kuśalaḥ spanditumapi//

so, in this benedictory verse also Pakṣadhara mentions them jointly even for purifying.

But this also should be kept in mind that Pakṣadhara had no disregard for Viṣṇu. In the Śabdakhaṇḍa section of this very *Āloka* he makes salutations to Viṣṇu in the benedictory verse. Thus, he was, like other scholars of Mithilā, a worshipper of Śiva, Śakti and Viṣṇu, without having any disregard towards any one. This is a peculiarity of India and subsequently, of Mithilā.

This commentary is only partly published. So it is difficult to give any account about it in detail at present. However, from the portions so far published I give below a few notable facts.

He refers to Vaṭeśvara, the author of the *Mahārṇava*,[1] the *Trisūtrīprakāśa* by Varddhamāna,[2] and *Darpaṇa*.[3]

References to authors and their works.

This *Darpaṇa* is a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya, the grand-father of Yajñapati Upādhyāya of the 15th century A.D. Pakṣadhara has criticized the view of the Darpaṇakāra. He writes—'iha vighno mā bhūdityatredamaṁśasyāpi viśeṣaṇatvānnyāyasāmyamiti tu *Darpaṇa*—dūaṣaṇamayuktisambhavameva.[4] It should not be confused with the *Darpaṇa* on the *Āloka* by Maheśa Ṭhakkura. So says Maheśa Ṭhakkura in his *Darpaṇa*—'Ālokamuddīpayituṁ *navīnam* sa *darpaṇaṁ* vyātanute maheśaḥ.[5] He also quotes from Sondaḍopādhyāya,[6] refers to the *Makaranda* of Tvantvopādhyāya, on the *Kusumāñjali*,[7] *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa* for which he had great regards,[8] and the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.[9] He mentions the view of Murāri Miśra.[10]

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[1] *Mahārṇave* Vaṭeśvaraḥ, P. 10., taduktaṁ Vaṭeśvareṇa, PP. 22, 26.

[2] ata eva *trisūtrīprakāśādau* tathaiva likhitam, PP. 43, 154.

[3] P. 43. [4] P. 43, Mithilā Research Institute edition.

[5] Beginning verse 6. [6] P. 105.

[7] P. 115. [8] P. 130. [9] P. 224. [10] P. 174.

His other works are believed to be a commentary on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara, a manuscript of which is in the Sarasvatībhavana library, Vārāṇasī; on the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna and also on the *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna. This is called *Viveka*, or *Līlāvatīviveka*. Besides, there is a manuscript in the Banaras Government Sanskrit College (now the Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit University), of a commentary called *Ṭippaṇī* which is also believed to be a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by Paksadhara Miśra himself. If this is a fact, then we will have to assume that Pakṣadhara wrote two commentaries on the *Cintāmani*, one a running commentary and the other a brief *ṭippaṇī*, most probably, on important points only. The manuscript is dated Saṁ 1667 = 1610 A. D.

His other works.

There is another problem regarding the works of Jayadeva *alias* Pakṣadhara. We find that both the commentaries on the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* and the *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa* are named *Viveka*. The manuscripts bearing the title of *Viveka* are attributed to Pakṣadhara, such as, *Dravyaviveka*, *Kusumāñjaliviveka*. But it is to be kept in mind that there is no verse found either in the beginning or at the end and nor is found the mention of the name of the author in the manuscripts except that the superscripts on the leaves are *Pākhū*, *Pakṣa* and *Pakṣadhara*. Besides, in the manuscripts of the *Dravyaprakāśaviveka* the author refers to a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* as *Viveka*.[1] It is also referred to in foll. 60a, 76a, 79b, 101b. Again, *Anumānaviveka* is also mentioned in foll. 14a, 15b, 83a-b. From all these references it is evident that Pakṣadhara also wrote another commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and named it *Viveka*. Prof. D. C. Bhattacharya says that the superscripts on the leaves are *pākhū*, the *Pseudo-nym* of Pakṣadhara Miśra, and *Pakṣadhara* or only *Pakṣa*; and so the author of the *Viveka* is also the same Pakṣadhara Miśra, the author of the *Āloka*[2].

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[1] Śeṣañca *Pratyakṣaviveke* prapañcitamitihopekṣitam-Manuscript belonging to the India Office, fol. 7a.

[2] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*. PP. 116-19.

But we should not forget that except these references there is no other proof available in Mithilā or even in Bengal that Pakṣadhara wrote two commentaries under two different names *Āloka* and *Viveka*. Then again, we should also keep in mind that there is no sense in writing two commentaries on the same book in the same form under two different names when there are so many other important works to comment upon. Paksadhara, if he had so desired, could have written several independent works of high standard. Why should he had wasted so much of his time and energy in this duplication of work? To me it seems that even taking things as they are, it is not impossible to believe that there were two Pakṣadharas and both had their *pseudo-nym* as *Pākhū*, one imitating the other. This may be supported by the oft-quoted line-*Pakṣadharapratipakṣī lakṣībhūto na ca kvāpi*, which refers to only one Pakṣadhara as the tradition goes. Thus, all those commentaries named after *Viveka* are by Pakṣadhara, the second, while the *Āloka* is by the most reputed Pakṣadhara, the first.

Again, believing that Vāsudeva Miśra was the nephew of Jayadeva Miśra[1] *alias* Pakṣadhara and that he was also his (Jayadeva's) disciple, we find Vāsudeva writing in his commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*[2]—'ata eva *Pramāṇapallave*'pi anyonyābhāvamarmaiva heturiti siddhāntitaṁ gurucaraṇenāpiti'. From this it is concluded that *Pramāṇapallava* was another work of Pakṣadhara Miśra. We cannot have any doubt about the authenticity of this work. So this may be taken to be Pakṣadhara's next work.

Again, we find that there was another Pakṣadhara son of Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya, the author of the old *Darpaṇa*. But he is also quite different from Jayadeva Miśra, *author of the Āloka*. So we may hold that Jayadeva Miśra *alias* Pakṣadhara Miśra was the author of the *Āloka* and *Pramāṇapallava*. The author of

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[1] Vide—iti Śrīnyāyasiddhāntasārābhijñamiśravarya-Pakṣadharamiśrabhrātṛputra-nyāyasiddhāntasārābhijña-Vāsudevamiśraviracitāyām cintāmaṇiṭīkāyām—Ms. India Office, London, no. 786, PP. 631-2.

[2] Vide—Manuscript fol. 31b India Office.

the *Vivekas* was most probably a distinct scholar who was also called Pakṣadhara, but not Jayadeva.

In the galaxy of the Naiyāyikas of Mithilā, Pakṣadhara, like his predecessors Gotama, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa, was a brilliant product. He taught hundreds of brilliant scholars of Mithilā and Bengal. His name and fame spread all over the country and students from every corner began to flock round him. Amongst his brilliant disciples Narahari (son of his guru Yajñapati), Mādhava (his own son)[1], Vāsudeva Miśra (his nephew), Śucikara Upādhyāya[2], Rucidatta, popularly called *Bhaktu* and Bhagīratha *alias* Megha Ṭhākura from amongst Maithilas and from Bengal we may mention the names of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi[3].

Pakṣadhara's reputation.

As regards Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's being a pupil of Pakṣadhara, some Bengali scholars have now come to a conclusion that it is not correct.[4] Professor D.C. Bhaṭṭāchārya even denies Vāsudeva's being the pupil of Pakṣadhara in his history. But in the face of so many direct and traditional proofs it is not possible to agree with Bhaṭṭāchārya. Again, Professor Bhaṭṭāchārya got a curious information in Mithilā, as he says, that Pakṣadhara left Mithilā and went to Bengal in his old age. I have not heard any such curious information even being an inhabitant of Mithilā and belonging to a scholarly family of the same *Sodarapura* family to which Pakṣadhara himself belonged.

It has already been said that the appearance of the *Āloka* not only brought name and fame to Pakṣadhara for its new and most reasonable interpretations, but also invited criticism from various quarters. His *Āloka* was

Reputation outside Mithilā.

[1] Vide—*History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 171.

[2] *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 126.

[3] Mm. G. N. Kaviraj, *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. IV, P. 62; Vol. V, P. 131; R. N. Ghose—*Introduction to the Vyāptipañcaka*, PP. 36-37 ; Dr. S. C. Vidyābhusana, *Indian Logic*, P. 463.

[4] *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, P. 126; *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, PP. 36-37, 40.

taught in every school of Navya-Nyāya and great scholars wrote commentaries on it. Ratnākara, younger brother of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma wrote a commentary on the *Āloka*[1]. Janeśvara Vāhinīpati, son of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma of Bengal wrote a commentary on the *Āloka* and named it *Uddyota*. That Vāhinīpati preferred to comment upon the *Āloka* and not upon the commentary of his father is itself a great appreciation of Pakṣadhara Miśra. A manuscript of the *Uddyota* on the Śabda-khaṇḍa of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is preserved in the library of the Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit University which is dated Samvat 1642, that is, 1585 A.D. The manuscript ends with 'iti śrī-Mahāmahopādhyāya - Bhaṭṭācārya - śrīmadvāhinīpati-mahāpātraviracitaḥ Śabdālokoddyotaḥ paripūrṇaḥ'.

There are two words in this colophon 'Bhaṭṭācārya' and 'Mahāpātra' which require a little note at this place. Nowhere in the manuscript it is mentioned that he was the son of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, but the author here and there has mentioned the view of his father as—'pitṛcaraṇāḥ' and 'asmākam paitṛkaḥ panthāḥ', and also has paid his homage to Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma in the beginning of his commentary. All these indicate that Janeśvara might have been his son and that he was a Bengalī is further proved by the fact that Janeśvara has added in this colophon 'Bhaṭṭācārya' to his name. So Janeśvara is said to be the earliest commentator on the *Āloka* from Bengal[2].

As against this view it may be pointed out that the title *Mahāpātra* was a title of honour in Orissa, as we have in the case of the father of Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*[3]. So he might have been an *utkala* and had come to study under Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma in Bengal. As for the honorific title of 'Bhaṭṭācārya', though at present it is generally used by Bengalis as their surname, yet it may be pointed out that in earlier centuries and

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[1] *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. IV. P. 68.

[2] Vide—*Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. IV P. 70.

[3] mama tātapādānām mahāpātracaturdaśabhāṣāvilāsinī etc. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, II. 14.

even in the twentieth century it has been also used as an honorific title by Maithilas and even by others. So it is not necessary that because of the use of that title added to one's name a scholar must be a Bengali. Hence, it is not quite convincing to accept him as a Bengali as has been done by Bengali scholars[1].

Commentaries on the Aloka.

Haridāsa Nyāyalaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya of the 16th century wrote a commentary on the *Āloka*[2]. Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma, the teacher of Bhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśa, of the 16th century[3], had also written a commentary, called *Prasāriṇī* on the *Āloka* which has been mentioned by the author himself in his work *Anumānadīdhitiprasāriṇī*[4] Next, we find that Bhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśa of the end of the 16th century wrote a commentary on the *Āloka*, called *Ālokasāramañjarī*[5]. Mathurānātha, the direct pupil of Raghunātha, also had written a commentary on the *Āloka* and called it *Rahasya* like all his other commentaries. Several manuscripts of this are found in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library, India Office Library, London and Vangīya Sāhitya Pariṣad, Calcutta. Mathurānātha flourished in the latter half of the 16th century. Then we come to Guṇānandavidyāvāgīśa Bhaṭṭācārya of the end of the 16th, or the beginning of the 17th century who also wrote a commentary on the *Āloka* and called it *Ālokaviveka*[6]. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the well-known last scholar of Navadvīpa of the middle of the 17th century, also wrote a commentary on the *Āloka*. Its incomplete manuscripts are found mentioned in the *Tanjore Manuscript Catalogue*[7]. Jayarāma

[1] *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. IV. p. 70 ; *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 43.

[2] Vide—R. L. Mitra's *Notices*, Nos. 2850-52 ; *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. V. P. 130; *Vaṅge Navya-Nyāyacarcā*, p. 112.

[3] *Vaṅge Navya-Nyāyacarcā*, pp. 120, 123.

[4] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 116.

[5] *Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. V. p. 138.

[6] *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. V. p. 139.

[7] pp. 4525-27 on the *Śabdamaṇyāloka* ; on the *Pratyakṣāloka* in the *Vangīya Sahityapariṣad* (No. 2119) and on the *Anumānāloka* which is very rare—*Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 179.

Nyāyapañcānana of the end of the 17th century has also commented upon the *Āloka* and named it *Viveka* which he himself has referred to as *Ālokarahasya* in his commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*[1] and which is probably its real name. So he says—ityasmatkṛtaśabdālokarahasye vistaraḥ.[2] This is how the *Āloka* became so popular in Bengal and it seems that almost all the great scholars of Bengal considered it a mark of honour and scholarship to comment upon the *Āloka*.

Even in the extreme South the reputation of the *Āloka* had enough influence. The famous author of the *Tarkasaṅgraha*, Annambhaṭṭa, of the beginning of the 17th century, has also commented upon the *Āloka* and called it *Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka-siddhāñjana* a manuscript of which is preserved in the Tanjore manuscript library . Besides, in the same library we find a work by a modern scholar named Agnihotra Bhaṭṭa called *Sphūrti* on the *Āloka*[4]. It was due to the reputation of Rucidatta Upādhyāya, a well-known pupil of Pakṣadhara that a sub-school of Navyanyāya came to be established in the extreme South and many scholars wrote on his *Cintāmaṇiprakāśa*. Besides, we know that the great Mādhva scholar Vyāsatīrtha of the 17th century had to discuss the views of Pakṣadhara in his *Tarkatāṇḍava* and found him a formidable opponent.

Then again, Padmanābha Miśra, the well-known Maithila scholar, of the 16th century also wrote a work on the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara and called it *Pakṣadharoddhāra* a manuscript of which is in the Baroda manuscript library[5] and also in the manuscript library of Poona[6]. So Padmanābha himself says in the beginning of the manuscript preserved in Poona—

> gaurīvallabhanatitatidūrīkṛtavighnajālena/
> śrīpadmanābhakṛtinā pakṣadharāṇām prakāśyate bhāvaḥ//

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[1] *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. V. p. 150.

[2] P. 22 ft. note 2. Introduction to the *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* of Jayarāma.

[3] No. 1536-7; *Introduction to the Tarkasaṅgraha* by M. R. Bodas, p. Lxvi and *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 22.

[4] Nos. 6095-97. [5] No. 11968. [6] No. 35 of 1887-91.

As has already been mentioned before there were criticisms against the *Āloka's* interpretations. So Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura of the end of the 15th century or the early part of the 16th took up the self imposed task of defending Pakṣadhara's views and wrote a work mainly in defence, called *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*, or *Pakṣadharoddhāra*. In this work, a manuscript of which is very common, he calls himself 'Mīmāṁsānyāyapāragena' (master of Mīmāṁsā and Nyāyaśāstra).

Devanātha Ṭhakkura also known as Tarkapañcānana, son of Govinda Ṭhakkura, the famous author of the *Kāvyapradīpa*, and grandson of Keśava Ṭhakkura, and author of seven works ending in *Kaumudī*, *Adhikaraṇakaumudī*, *Kālakaumudī*, *Kāvyakaumudī* (a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa*), *Tantrakaumudī*, *Mantrakaumudī*, *Siddhāntakaumudī* and *Smṛtikaumudī*, also has written a note on the *Āloka*, called *Ālokapariśiṣṭa*. A copy of this rare work was found at Dinajpur in Bengal[1]. It was transcribed at the very desire of the author himself (mahāmahāṭhakkura-śrīdevanātha-mahāśayānuśāsanāt) in 443 La. Saṁ (=1562 A.D.), Caitravadi ekādaśyāṁ candre. A copy of this manuscript is also preserved in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.[2]

Our search after manuscripts is still very incomplete and so we cannot do full justice to our topic at present.

Pakṣadhara's place amongst scholars.

From all these it is concluded that Pakṣadhara occupied a very high place amongst the scholars even of Mithilā. His reputation as a profound scholar of Nyāya spread far and wide beyond his own native province. He was regarded as the greatest scholar of his time.

It seems that from time to time at certain intervals Mithilā has produced most brilliant scholars to maintain the high standard of scholarship and the supremacy of Mithilā over Nyāyaśāstra all over the country. We may start with the great Akṣapāda Gotama in the early 5th century B. C. followed by, at intervals, Uddyotakara, Vṛddha-Vācaspati Miśra, Udayanācārya, Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, Jayadeva *alias* Pakṣadhara, Vācaspati II, Keśava

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[1] Vide—H. P. Sāstri, *Notices*, III, pp. 74-5.

[2] No. 310 of 1880-81.

Miśra, Maheśa Ṭhakkura, Gokulanātha Upādhyāya, Dharmadatta Jhā *alias* Baccājhā and Jayadeva Miśra, the last few will be dealt with in their proper place.

From the above given brief survey of the importance of Jayadeva's *alias* Pakṣadhara's contribution to Navyanyāya, we conclude that Mithilā occupied the highest position in the then world of scholarship, specially in Nyāyaśāstra. While realizing the unique position of Mithilā, Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍita Gopinatha Kaviraja has said—

"From Gaṅgeśa down to Pakṣadhara Navyanyāya had its sole home in Mithilā. The pandits of that place, who had made it their monopoly and been so long its trusted guardians, took special care to see that this privilege of teaching the Śāstra did not pass away from them into what they perhaps thought unworthy hands. This cautiousness was pushed to its utmost limit. Thus, we are told that manuscripts of Nyāya work which existed in Mithilā, having been left there by authors, were not allowed to be copied, lest they should be borne away and the prestige of Mithila for ever destroyed. Students had to commit the texts to memory, and before returning homes had to be very carefully examined by their teachers. It was in this way that the Kārikās of Kusumāñjali were brought to Bengal for the first time, according to tradition, by Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra."[1]

'Student from various parts of India used to flock to Mithilā to draw inspiration from its far-famed scholars, and when they completed their studies they returned home with the diploma which their Guru had conferred upon them. This diploma was very highly prized, since to secure such a certificate from Mithilā the centre of the current philosophical thought and activities, was not quite an easy affair. And if a man could once manage to win for himself a diploma of

[1] But according to *Navadvīpamahimā*, pp. 35-36, it was brought by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma for the first time.

this kind his scholarship was recognised all over the country without a note of gruding criticism."[1]

[1] *Princess* of *Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III. pp. 136-37.

It will not be out of place to copy out a text of this type of diploma which will give an exact idea of it to our modern readers. This is a copy of the diploma which was given to my father, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍita Jayadeva Miśra of Mithilā.

Mithilā-maṇḍalāntargata-*Darbhangā*-bhidha-nagaranikaṭavarti-*Gajabarā*-bhidha-grāmābhijano Miśropapadasya *Citranāthaśarmaṇaḥ* sudhiyastanujanmā *Jayadevaśarmā Maithilaḥ* svadeśa evādhītavyutpādakara-Raghuvaṁśādikāvya-siddhāntakaumudīprabhṛti-katipaya-vyākaranagrantho bhūyasyai vyutpattaye spṛhayan pañcasaptatyuttarāṣṭādaśaśatatame khrīṣṭahāyane Vārāṇaseya-sārvabhaumapāṭhālayam praviṣṭo Vyākaraṇe Manoramā-śabdaratna-Paribhāṣenduśekhara-Śabdenduśekharān Bhūṣaṇaṁ sapradīpam Mahābhāṣyasyāhnikanavakaṁ Nyāye Muktāvalyādikaṁ Śabdakhaṇḍe Vyutpattivāda-śaktivādaviṣayatāvādān Sāṅkhye Tattvakaumudīṁ Dharmaśāstre Mitākṣarāprabhṛtikatipayagranthān Naiṣadhacaritaparyantakāvyānāṁ katipayān sargān kuvalayānandaṁ Sāhitye Chandograntheṣu ca vṛttaratnākaraṁ sādhvadhyagīṣṭa/ tathā cābhyastavān yathā prativarṣaṁ dattottamaparīkṣaḥ prāptavānutkṛṣṭaṁ pāritoṣikam/ So'yaṁ sumedhā āsāditapraśaṁsanīyaprāṇnirūpitaśāstravyutpattikaḥ śaknoti sopapatti pāṭhayituṁ toṣayituṁ ca vipaścito nijavacobhiriti vijñāyedaṁ patramasmai vinayaśāline viracitādhyāpakapariśramasāphalyāya vikhyāpitapratibhāya sapramodaṁ vitaranti—

Sd. Pt. Vecanarāma Tripāṭhī	Śivakumāra Miśra
Sd. Bālaśāstrī	Devakriṣṇa Śarmā
Sd. Vāpūdeva Śāstrī	Bhavānīprasāda Tripāṭhī
Sd. Pt. Vastīrāma Śarmā	Rāmamiśraśāstrī
Sd. Kailāśacandraśiromṇi	Pt. Venkateśaśarmaṇaḥ
Sd. Kālīprasādaśiromaṇi	Vāmanācārya

Pt. Śītalāprasāda Tripāṭhī

It may also be pointed out here that in Mithilā, a great centre of learning from very early days, there was a tradition from earlier centuries to entertain great Paṇḍitas and after having been fully convinced of their scholarship through various processes. the Mahārāja of Mithilā used to present him something like a *certificate of Honour*. The Mahārājā was really a great patron of Sanskrit learning. Here is a copy of such a diploma given to my father the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Padṇita Jayadeva Miśra, a renowned scholar of the 19th century.

Śrīdurgā-Śrīmādhava-Śrīgaṇeśāḥ

svasti. vividhavirudāvalīvirājamānamānonnatamahārājādhirājamithilādhīśa-Śrīśrīśrīśrīmad-rameśvarsiṁhabahāduradevadevasadāsamaravijayibhiḥ

16. GOPĪNĀTHA ṬHAKKURA

(15th century)

Gopīnātha Ṭhakkura was the son of Bhavanātha Ṭhakkura of the Bhauāla family of Mithilā. He had written a commentary on the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara which has been referred to in the *Maṇisāra*,[1] a work by Gopīnātha himself on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A manuscript of this is also in the Varanaseya Sanskrit University, Varanasi, and also in the Tanjore Mss. Library[2]. His commentary on the *Āloka* is called *Āloka-bhāṣaṇa*[3]. The Anumāna section of the *Maṇisāra* is published from Trivandrum. It is also believed that he had commented upon the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. A manuscript of it is also present in the Tanjore Mss. Library.

From the various references it is felt that Gopinātha lived towards the end of the 15th century. Nothing more is known about him at present.

17. NARAHARI UPĀDHYĀYA

(15th century)

Narahari was the son of Yajñapati Upādhyāya, grandson of Śivapati, great-grand-son of Paśupati and great-great-grand-son of the well-known scholar Vaṭeśvara Upādhyāya of the Māṇḍara family of Mithilā. Raghupati Upādhyāya, the author of the *Maṇiparīkṣā* was the younger brother of his great-grand-father Paśupati.

Narahari had studied Nyāyaśāstra under his father and also under Pakṣadhara Miśra. We know that Pakṣadhara had criticized Yajñapati in his works.

śrījayadevaśarmaṇaḥ miśropāhvasya Gajahaḍīgrāmavāstavyasya Vyākarṇa-śāstre'dhyāpana-śiṣyabodhasampādanavādajalpapramukhakathīprastutavicārakauśalaiḥ pāṇḍityannirṇīya tadbodhakamidampratiṣṭhāpatramasmai vitīrnamiti śam//

[1] Trivandrum edition, p. 98.

[2] *Catalogue*, pp. 4615-19, 4655-60.

[3] Vide—*Manisāra*, R. 1548, Vide—*Valge Narjanyāyutarā*. P. 21.

Narahari, therefore wrote a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, called *Dūṣaṇoddhāra*, wherein the purpose of the author was to defend his father's views as expressed in his *Prabhā* against Pakṣadhara and also criticize Pakṣadhara. This is clear in his own words—

Sūktyā pitṛcaraṇānāmadhigatasiddhāntasāreṇa/
Śrī-naraharinā kriyate tātamate *Dūṣaṇoddhāraḥ*//

Narahari had also written a *Dvaitanirṇaya*. It is a standard work on Dharmaśāstra which has been published from Darbhanga. In this work Narahari refers to his father's views on Dharmaśāstra as well[1]. He also was devoted to Viṣṇu though a śākta by being a Maithila[2]. In this work Narahari tells us that his great-great-grand-father Vaṭeśvara was the author of a work, most probably on Dharmaśāstra, named *Darpaṇa*[3]. In one place he refers to one Vāsudeva along with Harihara and *Gosavapaddhati*[4]. This Vāsudeva may be his own contemporary, the nephew of Pakṣadhara, or some one else is very difficult to say.

He had also commented on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana, a manuscript of which is with the author. He says in the beginning of the commentary—

Sūktyā pitṛcaraṇānām-
avagatasandarbhasāreṇa/
kriyate srīnáraharinā
vyākhyā bauddhādhikārasya//

There is one very important information in this work. He says that no *pārvaṇa śrāddha* of ladies is to be performed. They are satisfied with the offerings given to their husbands[5]. Another equally important point of Hindu law he mentions is that *kṣetraja* etc. are not legal sons. In other words, aurasa (legitimate)

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[1] Page 7.

[2] Cf. Muhurnatvā tattvāvagatiśaranaṁ tātacaranaṁ / harerbhaktyā— *Dvaitanirṇaya*, P. 1.

[3] *Darpaṇe* tallikhitaṁ, pp. 11-12.

[4] P. 94.

[5] strīṇāṁ na pārvanaṁ/ svabhartṛpiṇḍamātrābhyaḥ tṛptirāsāṁ yataḥ smṛtā, p. 142.

son (or daughter) alone is the son, while the other eleven types of so-called sons are only *pratinidhis*, just as wheat is to be used only when there is no *yava* or oil is to be used when there is no cow-*ghṛta*[1].

He flourished in the 15th century.

18. MĀDHAVA MIŚRA

(15th century)

Mādhava Miśra was the son of Pakṣadhara Miśra, the author of the *Āloka* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. He was also a Mahāmahopādhyāya.

That he wrote on the *Cintāmaṇi* in defence of his father's views as against the criticisms of Narahari, the son of Yajñapati whom Pakṣadhara had criticized in many places is clear from the following lines of Professor D. Bhaṭṭācāryya—

"The following passage in the *Maṇiṭīkā* of Jayadeva's nephew Vāsudeva refers to the long-lost work of Jayadeva's son. In the section on Kevalānvayī[2] Jayadeva's views[3] are refuted by Narahari[4]. Vāsudeva begins his long note here thus[5]—

nanu tadā rūpābhāvavati vāyau rūpasamavāyo na syādabhāvābhāva-rūpatvāttasya/ na ceṣṭāpattiḥ sparśasamavāyo'pi tadā syādekatvāditi cet (these are Narahari's words in a nut-shell)—na, tatra viśeṣaṇatā-vacchinnarūpābhāvasadbhāvāt rūpaviśeṣaṇatā ca nāstyeva/ iyān paraṁ viśeṣaḥ—sā viśeṣaṇatā vāyutaivāsmanmate/ tanmate samavāyena phalato na kaścidviśeṣa iti/ so'yaṁ *pitṛvacanānavabodhanibandhanaḥ*[6].

It is evident from the above that Mādhava wrote earlier than Vāsudeva and later than Narahari. So he may be placed in the 15th century as their contemporary.

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[1] ājyaṁ vinā yathā tailaṁ sadbhiḥ pratinidhīkṛtam/ tathaikādaśa putrāḥ syuḥ putrikaurasayorvinā-*Bṛhaspati*, P. 144

[2] B. I. ed, R. 566.

[3] fol. 93 a.

[4] fol. 83 b. [5] fol. 58a.

[6] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, p. 124.

19. VĀSUDEVA MIŚRA

(15th century)

Pakṣadhara Miśra was indeed a great genious of his age. He attracted students from far and wide. In Mithilā proper Vāsudeva Miśra (nephew of Pakṣadhara), Rucidatta Miśra, Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura and many others, in Bengal Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi etc. were some of his brilliant products. His fame, as has already been said above, spread even in South. Annambhaṭṭa, the well-known author of the *Tarkasaṅgraha* is said to have written a commentary on the *Āloka*[1].

So it will not be out of place to deal with them at this place as much as can be gathered from the references.

Vāsudeva Miśra was the son of Pakṣadhara's brother.[2] It is held that there was a good deal of agitation at the appearance of Pakṣadhara's commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi* and many began to criticize it. It was Vāsudeva who came forward to defend his uncle's position, as is clear from the following lines—

jayadevagurorvāci ye kecid doṣadarśinaḥ/
prabodhāya mayā teṣaṁ dīptirbhūyo'bhidīpyate//

He further says in his commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, named *Nyāyasiddhāntasāra*—

tarkamadhīte sarvaḥ kati na bhavantīha paṇḍitam-manyāḥ./
vācā vicāradakṣā viralāḥ punaratra vidvāṁsaḥ//

Translation—For those who find any defect in the works of my teacher Jayadeva, I am burning the light again, so that they may realize the truth.

All study Tarkaśāstra and many become proud of their learning, but there are very few scholars who command real wisdom.

Nothing more we know of him at present.

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[1] Vide—*Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 22, R. 1536-7 *Siddhāñjana Ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*.

[2] Vide India Office Cata. No. 786. pp. 631-2. -Colophon -iti śrinyāyasiddhāntasārābhijñamiśravarya-pakṣadharamiśra-bhrātṛputra-nyāyasiddhāntasārābhijña-vāsudevamiśraviracitāyām cintāmaṇiṭīkāyām etc.

20. ŚŪLAPĀṆI MIŚRA

(15th century)

Śulapāṇi is an old author. He is quoted by Raghunātha in his *Padārtharatnamālā*[1] where it is said—ātmaviśeṣaguṇamātrepi-ātmamanoḥ saṁyogo'-samavāyikāraṇam / Śarīramanasoḥ saṁyoga-śarīraprāṇa-saṁyogau nimitte prāṇamanaḥsaṁyogo'pi nimittamiti śūlapāṇiḥ. He has also been referred to by Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācāryya-Cūḍāmaṇi in his work *Ānvīkṣikī-tattva-vivaraṇa*[2] and also by the author of the *Tarkakaumudi*.[3] From these references, I am inclined to place Śūlapāṇi in the 15th century A.D.

It is possible to identify this Śūlapāṇi with the Dharmaśāstrī Śūlapāṇi author of the *Viveka* called *Prāyaścittaviveka*. Professor D. C. Bhaṭṭācārya is inclimed to identify the two. It is but natural that a Dharmaśāstrin is also a Nāiyāyika and a Mīmāṁsaka.

21. RUCIDATTA MIŚRA

(16th century)

Personal history

Of the several pupils of Jayadeva *alias* Pakṣadhara, Rucidatta was perhaps the most widely known. His parents were Devadatta and Reṇukā. So he says.

adhītya Rucidattena Jayadevājjagadguroḥ/
cintāmaṇau granthamaṇau prakāśo'yam prakāśyate[4]//

śrīdevadattatanayo vinayopagūḍhaḥ
śrīreṇukāviralagarbhapuṭopajātaḥ/
śrīśaktidatta-matidatta-sahodaro yaḥ
so'muṁ cakāra rucidattakṛtī prakāśam[5]//

He was born in the well-known scholarly family of *Sodarapura* of Mithilā to which Pakṣadhara his teacher also belonged, so he says—

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[1] P. 39. [2] Vide *Varige Navyanyāyacarcā* P. 107.

[3] *Nyāyakośa*, p. 271, ftn. 1.

[4] Commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, beginning verse 2.

[5] *Cintāmaṇiprakāśa*, Śabda, verse 2 an the end.

iti śrīsodarapurakulasamudbhūta-mahāmahopādhyāya-śrīrucidattaviracite Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśe.[1]

He was also known ordinarily by his *pseudonym Bhaktū*. Śaktidhara and Matidatta were his own two *sahodara* brothers.

Rucidatta's works.

His works are: (1) a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, called *Prakāśa*. In this work he says that he has studied śāstras under several teachers—niśamya sakalaṁ śāstraṁ nānāgurumukhāmbujāt.[2]

(2) A commentary on the *Kusumāñjali* of Udayana, called *Makaranda* a manuscript copy of which is in the Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit Library, Varaṇasī.

(3) A commentary on the Dravya section of the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* called *Vivṛti*.[3]

(4) A commentary on the *Tarkaprakāśa* by Varddhamāna on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra.[4]

Date of Rucidatta.

About the date of Rucidatta the following points may be adduced : (1) There is a manuscript of his *Makaranda* in the Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Library, Varaṇasī which had been transcribed in 423 (*akṣi-pakṣa-nigama*), or 422 which corresponds to 1542 or 1543. So he must be placed earlier. (2) Then there is another manuscript of the *Āloka* which had been transcribed by Rucidatta himself which is dated la. saṁ. 386, Caitra śukla pratipad budhavāra corresponding to the year 1505 A. D. So he says—

rasavasuharanetre caitrike śuklapakṣe
pratipadi budhavāre vatsare lākṣmaṇe ca/
vibudhabudhavinodaṁ kārayantīṁ supustī-
malikhadamalapāṇiḥ śrīruciḥ śrīsametām//[5]

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[1] Colophon of the *Cintāmaṇiprakāśa*, Pratyakṣa. Ms. belonging to the India Office Library, No. 632, pp. 1940-47.

[2] Ms. in possession of the Government of India, Calcutta.

[3] Peterson's Ulwar Catalogue, No. 606 P. 26., ext. no. 146, p. 53 ; Sarasvati bhavana Sanskrit Library, Varanasi, dated Samvat 1600 = 1543 A. D.

[4] Peterson's Ulwar Cat. Ms. No. 653.

[5] Vide Mm. Pt. Vindhyeswari Prasad's *Introduction to the Vaiśeṣika-darśana* with *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 28.

This gives us the exact date for Rucidatta. It must be pointed out here that the date given by Dr. Vidyabhusan on the basis of Peterson's sixth Report seems to be a misprint. This is supported by Rucidatta's being a contemporary of Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura of the 15th century.

It is to be noted here that besides Gaṅgeśa, almost all the scholars from Pakṣadhara down to his disciples have met good reception even in the south as is clear from the *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsatīrtha. It is also to be noted that the *Cintāmaṇiprakāśa* of Rucidatta was much more popular in the South and several commentaries on it were written by the Southerners.[1]

He had also written on Vaiśeṣika on the *Prakāśa* of Varddhamāna on Dravya, called, *Dravyaprakāśa-Vivṛti*.

22. RAGHUPATI MIŚRA

(16th century)

Raghupati was the son of Rucidatta Miśra. He had also commented upon the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of which two manuscripts, one on the Śabda-khaṇḍa, called *śabdamaṇiparīkṣā*, dated Saṁ 1664=1587 A.D. and the other on the Anumānakhaṇḍa are preserved in the Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit Library, Banaras.[2]

23. MĀDHAVA MIŚRA

(16th century)

Mādhava Miśra son of Gadādhara Miśra and Śrīmatī flourished in the well-known *Sodarapura* family of Mithilā. His *Bījīpuruṣa* can be traced from Haleśvara, the eldest of the three *sodara* brothers after whom the *Sodarapura* family is named. The line is indicated in the *Sodarapura Pañjī* as Haleśvara-Rājū-Yogīśvara-Vārāha—Hari followed by Gadādhara, the father of

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[1] *Hist. of Navyanyāya in Mithilā* p. 127.

[2] Vide Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. III. P. 139.

Mādhava Miśra. They belong to the *Hāṭī* branch of the family and lived in the village called Hāṭī. He has written a work named *Bhedadīpikā*, a manuscript of which is present in the family of Choṭī Jhā of Maṅgaraunī, Darbhanga. He has criticized the Vedāntins in it and has supported the *bhedavāda* of the Naiyāyikas. He has referred to the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, *Bhāmatī* and *Citsukhī*. The manuscript is dated la. saṁ. 502=1621 A. D. He writes in the beginning of his work—

yaṁ śrīmatī śrīraparā gadādharā-
dasūta śāstrāmbudhipāradṛśvanaḥ/
śrīmādhavo nyāyamahāṭavītaṭe
praviśya siddhāntapathe sa khelati//

mādhavena haribhaktibhañjitā-
śeṣakilviṣabhareṇa tanyate/
bhedavartmani vivekadīpikā
māyimohatimirāpanuttaye//

These lines also make it clear that Mādhava was well versed in Nyāya and that his father, Gadādhara was also a great scholar. He was a devotee of Viṣṇu though also a śākta by being a Maithila.

As the manuscript under reference is a transcription of Mādhava's original work, he must have lived earlier than the date of the manuscript. So I place him towards the end of the 16th century.

24. BHAGĪRATHA ṬHAKKURA

(16th century)

Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura *alias* Megha Ṭhākura, was another great pupil of Pakṣadhara Miśra. He was the son of Candrapati and Dhīrā. He was the second son of his father. His other brothers, namely, Mahādeva was the eldest and Dāmodara and Maheśa were the two younger brothers.[1]

[1] Vide-Jyeṣṭhā mahādevabhagīratha-dāmodara yasya vayoguṇābhyām/ sa *darpaṇaṁ* nirmitavānamīṣāṁ sahodaro viṣṇuparo maheśaḥ// —*Āloka-Darpaṇa* on Anumāna, verse 2 at the end.

He had studied Nyāya under Pakṣadhara Miśra and it is said that Bhagīratha had finished his studies at the age of 20. So it is said—

viṁśābde jayadevapaṇḍitakavestarkābdhipāraṁ gataḥ śrīmāneṣa bhagīrathaḥ samajani śrīcandrapatyātmajaḥ/
śrīdhīrātanayena tena racitā śrīmanmaheśāgraja-śrīdāmodarapūrvajena jayatādācandrameṣā kṛtiḥ//[1]

Bhagīratha's *pseudonym* was *Megha* (cloud), so all his works are called by the title-*Jalada*.

yaḥ kaiśore viśvavikhyātakarmā
dharmācāryaḥ śrīmahādevaśarmā/
tatsodaryo varddhamānasya sūktau
bhāvaṁ meghaḥ samyagāviṣkaroti-//[2]

That Mahādeva was his elder brother is also evident from the lines of his commentary on the *Kusumāñjaliprakāśikā*—

āsīdanujo yaḥ ko'pi mahādevaḥ kulāgrajaḥ/
anujastasya kṛtavānimāṁ vyākhyāṁ bhagīrathaḥ//

His works. We know of the following works of Bhagīratha :

(1) A commentary on the *Prakāśa* of Varddhamāna on the *Kiraṇāvalī*, called *Prakāśikā*, manuscripts of which dated śaka 1511 (śaśidvayayutasmarabāṇacandra=1511 śaka)=1588 A.D. and Saṁ. 1654=1597 A.D., are in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit Library*, Varanasi.

(2) *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśaprakāśikā*[3].

25. JAGADĪŚA MIŚRA (TARKĀLAṄKĀRA)

(16th century)

Jagadīśa Miśra, generally called Tarkālaṅkāra, was the second son of Yādava Vidyāvāgīśa, grand-son of Mādhava Miśra, great-grand-son of Sanātana Miśra

[1] Bhagīratha's commentary on the dravya section of the *Kiraṇāvalī*, called *Prakāśa*.

[2] Beginning verse of his commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī*.

[3] Both these are published from the Varanaseya Sanskrit University.

and great-great-grand-son of Vaṭeśvara Miśra. He had four more brothers, namely, Rāmacandra the eldest,[1] Ṣaṣṭhīdāsa the third, Lakṣmaṇa the fourth and Vāṇīnātha the fifth brother. Jagadīśa had two sons, namely, Raghunātha and Rudreśvara.

Personal history.

śrīmatā raghunāthena tarkālaṅkārasūnunā/
pakṣatāparamūlasya nigūḍhārthaḥ prakāśyate//

Rudreśvara had a son named Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa, who is said to have written a commentary on the *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā* of his grand-father, Jagadīśa.

Jagadīśa was a Maithila and *not a Bengali* as some have taken him to be. Even Professor D. C. Bhattacarya is silent about his home province, but writes that Jagadīśa belonged to the Kāśyapagotra, and consequently, was a Yajurvedin and that his household ceremonies were performed according to the *Maithila traditions*[2]. It might have been possible that Jagadīśa would have gone to Navadvīpa to study and had lived there for sometimes. The surnames of the old Maithila scholars were replaced by the scholarly surnames given by their teachers in Mithilā itself and later also in Bengal. But even then their own surnames were retained.

Jagadīśa had studied under the well-known Bengalī scholar of the time, named Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa. This has been mentioned by Jayacandrasiddhāntabhūṣaṇa Bhaṭṭācārya in his short introduction to the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*. We learn from it that Jagadīśa spent his earlier days amongst his illiterate friends. But due to the advice and blessings of a *Sannyāsin* he turned to be a great scholar. There is a verse current amongst the Paṇḍitas—

ādau Jagā jaguḥ paścāt jagājagu tataḥ param/
adhunā jñānasampatyāṁ Jagadīśāyate jagā//

Translation—Formerly, he was called by his nicknames, Jagu and Jagā, but when he became a great scholar, then every one called him by his real name Jagadīśa.

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[1] Jagadīśa the second. [2] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 167.

Jagadīśa himself says—

sārvabhaumasya guroḥ padāmbujaṁ
vidyārthināṁ kalpataroḥ praṇamya/
vinirmitaḥ śrījagadīśavijñair-
vidyotatāmādyamaṇermayūkhaḥ[1]//

From the *Nyāyarahasya* we learn that Jagadīśa was also a student of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma who was a great scholar, so says Jagadīśa in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*[2]—iti punarnyāyarahasye asmad-gurucaraṇāḥ. So Jagadīśa had two teachers.

His works.

He is the author of the following works :

(1) A commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, and also on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's (2) *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti*, called *Prakāśikā*. (3) A primer on Nyāya, called *Tarkāmṛta*, very useful for the beginners. On Vaiśeṣika he has written a commentary, called, (4) *Sūkti*, on the Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. But this extends upto *dravya* section only. He has also written a commentary on the (5) *Dīdhiti* of the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. It is said that Jagadīśa would have achieved the reputation even without all these works, only with his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* about which it is said—Jagadīśasya sarvasvaṁ *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*. Of these, his *Jāgadīśī* on the *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti* and the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśika* are being widely read even today and have added much to his reputation.

The following are the references found in his *Jāgadīśī* :—

Sārvabhauma[3]; Vācaspati Miśrāḥ[4], Upādhyāyamatam (most probably it refers to Yajñapati Upādhyāyamatam)[5], Yajñapati Upādhyāya,[6] Ṭīkākṛtaḥ[7], Miśrāḥ (most probably it refers to Pakṣadhara Miśrāḥ)[8],

1 Ms. of the *Maṇimayūkha*, *Calcutta Sanskrit College Cat.* III. p. 324, No. 575. Introductory verse. 2.

2 Calcutta edition, P. 25; Dr. Vidyabhusan, *Indian Logic*, P. 469n. 4.

3 PP. 11, 89, 91, 151, 153, 159, 164, 246, 354.

4 P. 12.

5 P. 15.

6 PP. 341, 670.

7 PP. 18, 571, 604.

8 PP. 20, 24, 68, 127, 134, 144, 147, 175, 224-25, 290, 334, 336, 396, 407, 490, 500, 546, 557, 629, 637, 724, 762, 770, 785, 808, 841, 1095.

Ācāryamatam (most probably it refers to Udayana)[1], Cakravartī[2], Guravaḥ, Gurucaraṇāḥ[3], Pragalbhamatam[4], Sondaḍamatam[5], Līlāvatīkṛt[6] and *Līlāvatī-prakāśa*[7], *Kubjaśaktivādī Śrīkara.*[8]

References in the Jāgadīśī.

From these references we gather that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi had criticized Pakṣadhara, Yajñapati and Pragalbha in several places. He has also elucidated Pakṣadhara's view in several places. Jagadīśa does not always agree with Sārvabhauma[9]. Raghunātha has also criticized Sārvabhauma[10].

Jagadīśa has tried to remove the weakness of Gaṅgeśa with his own explanation[11].

Jagadīsa mentions the five subdivisions of Tarka : ātmāśraya, anyonyāśraya, cakraka, anavasthā, and pramāṇa-bādhitārthaka. This however, he attributes to the Ācārya[12].

Śiromaṇi throws off the arguments of Śrīkara, who is called *Kubjaśaktivādī*[13].

26. RAGHUNĀTHA

(16th century)

Raghunātha, the author of a Nyāya work, the *Padārtharatnamālā*, appears to be an old writer. The author does not give any information about himself. But he refers to his *guru* (*asmadguravaḥ*) twice in this book.[14] Nothing more is gathered from this book. But the references which he gives are almost all quite old. I refer to those here :

References in the book.

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[1] PP. 43, 71. [2] PP. 67, 123.

[3] PP. 93, 127, 164, 237, 464, 529, 1019.

[4] PP. 130, 133, 492, 509, 532, 561.

[5] P. 124. [6] P. 337. [7] P. 380.

[8] P. 448. [9] P. 164. [10] P. 246.

[11] Vide—*Mūlasya nyūnatāmapākartum etc.* P. 197.

[12] P. 397.

[13] P. 448. All these references are from chowkhamba edition of the *Jāgadīśī.*

[14] PP. 11-12.

Ācāryyāḥ, Ācāryyaiḥ,[1] *Maṇiparīkṣāyām*[2], Prajñākara,[3] Maṇikṛtaḥ[4], Cintāmaṇikṛtaḥ[5], Upāyakṛtaḥ[6], *Vārttikam*[7], *Ṭīkāyām*[8], Ratnakośakṛtaḥ[9], *Nibandha*[10], Ṭīkākāracaraṇāḥ[11]. Diṅnāga[12], Asmadguravaḥ[13], Gaṅgeśopādhyāyāḥ[14], Prakāśakṛtaḥ[15], Līlāvatīkāra[16], Maṇḍanamiśrāḥ[17], Kandalīkāraḥ[18], Śūlapāṇiḥ[19], Padārthapraveśakṛt,[20] *Vārttikaguṇa*-Padārthapraveśānusārī panthāḥ[21], Divākara Upādhyāya[22], Varddhamāna Upādhyāya[23], *Amaranātha Bhaṭṭācāryyāḥ*[24], Ṭīkāvyākhyānanibandhakṛtaḥ[25], Bhṭṭācāryacaraṇāḥ[26], *Kusumāñjalyupāya*-svarasāt.[27]

From these references it may be concluded that the author belongs to not later than the 16th century. So I place him in the 16th century till some definite proof to establish his earlier date is found.

The author seems to be devoted to Viṣṇu, for both the beginning and ending verses refer to *aravindanābha* and *kamalānātha*. Though the book contains only 58 pages in print, yet it is a very good book full of substantial matter well utilized.

It may be pointed out that there are two Raghunāthas in this period. One, the son of Jagadīśa who was also a scholar and had written a *Nigūḍhārtha* on the *Pakṣatā* of *Cintāmaṇi*[28]. The second is Raghu-

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1 PP. 4, 5, 10, 12, 19, 26, 31, 34, 37, 56.

2 P. 3. Some are of opinion that this is the work of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma though he himself refers to this work in his *Sārāvalī—Saraswati Bhavan Studies* Vol. IV. P. 63.

3 P. 3. 4 PP. 3, 4, 7, 16, 17, 29, 37, 55. 5 P. 19

6 PP. 4, 5, 11, 21. *Upāya* is the name given to the *Prakāśa* of Varddhamāna on the *Kusumāñjali*, P. 38.

7 PP. 4, 7, 12, 17, 22, 49, 50.

8 PP. 6, 8, 10, 12, 29, 30, 38, 40. 9 PP. 10, 47, 57.

10 PP. 8, 20, 59. 11 PP. 10, 19, 26, 37, 50.

12 PP. 11, 12, 21. 13 PP. 11, 12.

14 P. 12. 15 P. 21. 16 PP. 31, 50, 55.

17 P. 26. 18 P. 33. 19 P. 39.

20 P. 40. 21 P. 9. 22 45. 23 P. 45.

24 P. 46. *This is a new name not heard so far in this connection.*

25 P. 53. Naturally this refers to Vācaspati and Udayana.

26 P. 54. This refers to Kumārila. 27 P. 38.

28 see *Supra Jāgadīśī*, P. 351.

nātha Vidyālaṅkāra, a manuscript of his *anumānadīdhitipratibimba* is preserved in the *Sarasvatībhavana library*, Benares. This work, *Padārtharatnamālā*, was first published in the *Pandit* which was based on the manuscript of the *Sarasvatī Bhavana*. So it is just possible that this may be also of the same Raghunātha Vidyālaṅkāra.

27. RĀMABHADRA SIDDĀNTAVĀGĪŚA
(16th century)

Rāmabhadra was the son of Rudre-wara and grandson of Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya. There is a manuscript noted in the *Calcutta Sanskrit College mss. Cataloge*[1] where the following verse is found in the beginning of a commentary on the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* of Jagadīśa—

gurumiva gurumiha natvā
tatkṛtaśabdaśaktiprakāśikāyām/
Śrīrāmabhadrasukṛtī
kurute ṭīkāṁ mude sudhiyām//

It is to be *noted* here that this work has been wrongly attributed to Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma by Mm. V. P. Dvivedin in his Introduction to the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.

28. MAHEŚA ṬHAKKURA
(16th century)

Maheśa Ṭhākura flourished in Mithilā in the 16th century. After the *Oiniwāra dynasty*, the rule of Mithilā was handed over to Mahārāja Maheśa Ṭhakkura, the founder of the present Darbanga Rāja family, called, *khaṇḍavalākula* family. The *Sanad* for the rule was given by the emperor Akbar Shah through the pupil of Paṇḍita Maheśa Ṭhakkura, named Raghunandana Jhā, to the former. There is a line in Hindī which indicates the exact year when the *sanad* was given to Maheśa Ṭhakkura by emperor Akbar:

vasunagavedavasundharā (1478) śaka me Akabarshāh/
maithila subudha maheśa ko kīnhõ mithilā nāha//[2]

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[1] No. 460 P. 265.

[2] Quoted from the *Mithilābhāṣāmaya itihāsa* of Mm. Mukunda Jhā Bakhshi, p. 55.

His date.


This comes to 1557 A.D. Mahāmahopādhyāya Paṇḍita Parameśvara Jhā writes that Maheśa composed his commentary, named *Darpaṇa*, on the *Cintāmaṇi* in *Samvat* 1669 =1612 A. D. for the study of the latter work by his son Gopāla Ṭhākura—

vidhāya viduṣām prītyai pratyakṣālokadarpaṇam/
śrīgopāle maheśena tasyākāri samarpaṇam//[1]

From these it is evident that Maheśa lived in the last quarter of the 16th century and also in the beginning of the 17th century.

Family history.


Maheśa flourished in the family of Gaṅgādhara Jhā of *Gaṅgaulī* family. He was the *Bījī-Puruṣa* of that family. I give below a chart to show the genealogy of Maheśa:



[1] Vide—*Mithilātattvavimarśa*, Part II, p. 5. It is to be pointed out here that there is a śleṣa in the use of the word *Gopāla*, meaning lord Kṛṣṇa and his son Gopāla.

[2] The Mithilā historians say that Saṅkarṣaṇa was a great Tāntric and also a scholar of other śāstras. He acquired a village, named *Khaṇḍavalā* somewhere we do not know. But there is another tradition that *Khaṇḍavalā* is the same as *Khaṇḍawā* in Madhya Pradesha. The last interpretation appears to me a correct view. Since he acquired a village of that name, he became a land-lord (*prabhu*) and consequently, he changed his *surname Jhā* or *upādhyāya* to *Ṭhakkura or Ṭhākura*, meaning one who lords over a portion of land. So his family surname since then became *Ṭhākura* instead of *Jhā* from that generation onwards.

By the way, it may also be pointed out that the same is true of the surnames *Rāya* and *Chaudhaurī*. Again, it is also to be pointed out that surnames, like *Maḍara* or *Maṇḍala*, *Kumāra* or *Kumara*, *Sadāya* or *Sadī* and even *Khān*, used against the names of high brāhmaṇa family, belong to the same source. Then again, Saṅkarṣaṇa called himself as belonging to the *Khaṇḍawalā=Khaḍorī*



family, and the family till the present day is called by this very name. But it is also to be noted here that all those who received any share from that gift were called *khadorê* and Ṭhākura, but others who could not get any share in it had retained the old traditions and were called by the surname *Jhā* or *Upādhyāya* vide *Mithilābhāṣāmaya itihāsa*, PP. 11-12n.

[1] It is also to be added here that the Rājās of this dynasty changed their surname again, from the time of Rājā Rāghava Siṁha. Rāghava Siṁha was the eldest son of Rājā Narapati Ṭhakkura. So when the former took charge of the throne of Mithilā and extended his lordship over a fairly bigger state, he changed his surname *Ṭhākura into Siṁha* and since then upto the present day this dynasty has maintained this surname.

His works.

Maheśa Ṭhākura had studied the Śāstra under Mahāmahopādhyāya Śucikara Jhā of the *Kujauli* family who was a disciple of Pakṣadhara Miśra. He lived in the village, called *Bhaura* and taught students at his own place. Raghunandana Jhā and his own son Gopāla Ṭhākura were amongst his students.[1]

The first work he wrote was the commentary on the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara Miśra, on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, called *Darpaṇa*.

He writes in the very beginning of his *Darpaṇa*—

gauryā giriśādiva kārttikeyo
yo dhīrayā candrapateralambhi/
ālokamuddīpayituṁ *navīnaṁ*
sa *darpaṇaṁ* tanute maheśaḥ//[2]

This work not only explains the lines of Pakṣadhara, but also explains the lines of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, generally left out from commenting by the author of the *Āloka*. The commentary of Maheśa is very easy and lucid. Though he flourished during the time when Navya-Nyāya was at its zenith in Mithilā and Navadvīpa, yet he avoided its intricate terminology which was so common with some of his senior contemporaries. This commentary, therefore, displays his great acumen. One of the main objects which Maheśa seems to have in writing this commentary, is, as in the case of Vāsudeva Miśra, or Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura, which will be clear in the following pages, to criticize Pakṣadhara's opponents and defend his *guru's* position in the scholarly world. In this connection his expression *pramathitakhaladarpaḥ* in his *Darpaṇa* seems to be very suggestive. Similarly the term *uddīpayītuṁ*

even of Mithilā, that Maheśa Ṭhākura could not continue it after the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa, but this is not correct. I secured a complete manuscript of this *Darpaṇa* from the *India Office library*, London, through the courtesy of the then librarian and also my colleague Dr. Randle. This manuscript was purchased by some foreign agency from Khandwa where it had been transcribed.

References found in the work.

He refers to Vaṭeśvara's *Darpaṇa*.[1] Besides, he refers to Pragalbha Miśra's view which he refutes[2] to *Dūṣaṇoddhāra*[3], Ṭīkākṛt[4], *Ṭippaṇī*[5], criticizes the views of Upādhyāya-Yajñapati[6], Ācāryacaraṇaiḥ[7], Soṇḍalopādhyāya[8], Līlāvatīkāraiḥ[9]. It is also to be noted here that in the Prāmāṇyavāda he criticizes even the view of the Ālokakāra[10]. We do not know about any other work of his on Nyāya. But he has written some works on the various aspects of Dharmaśāstra, namely, (2) *Dāyasāra*—it deals with miscellaneous topics like malamāsa, kṣayamāsa, inheritence, etc. This is still unpublished and a manuscript of this work is present in the library of the Sanskrit University, Darbhanga. (3) *Tithitattvacintāmaṇi*—In the beginning he says—

vāṇīprasādamāsādya smārtasūktīrvilokya ca/
māsi māsi tithestattvaṁ maheśena vivicyate.//[11]

Some are of opinion that this is not written by Maheśa as it contains certain views which are not in tune with the traditions of Mithilā. Then some hold that as Maheśa lived for many years in Khandwa, he included in this work certain practices of the southerners also. So they do not see any objection in holding that this book has been written by Maheśa[12].

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[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Darpaṇa*, Maṅgalavāda, P. 43 Mithila Institute edition.

[2] P. 63. [3] P. 72.

[4] PP. 82, 119, 121.

[5] PP. 91, 117.

[6] PP. 92, 201.

[7] P. 101. [8] P. 109. [9] P. 207. [10] P. 118.

[11] Beginning verse 3.

[12] *Mithilātattvavimarśa*, uttarārdha, P. 5.

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This commentary is not yet completely published. I had taken up the task to edit and publish it from the *Mithilā Research Institute*, Darbhanga, but it is still incomplete. There was a feeling amongst the Paṇḍitas,

[1] *Mithilātattvavimarśa*, Mm. Parameśvara Jhā, Part II, P. 4 Hariścandra Jhā's edition.

[2] Here the word *Navīnam* is significant. Most likely, he refers to his work as new, for there was already one *Darpaṇa* on the *Cintāmaṇi* by Vaṭeśvara.

even of Mithilā, that Maheśa Ṭhākura could not continue it after the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa, but this is not correct. I secured a complete manuscript of this *Darpaṇa* from the *India Office library*, London, through the courtesy of the then librarian and also my colleague Dr. Randle. This manuscript was purchased by some foreign agency from Khandwa where it had been transcribed.

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[2] P. 63. [3] P. 72.

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[7] P. 101. [8] P. 109. [9] P. 207. [10] P. 118.

[11] Beginning verse 3.

[12] *Mithilātattvavimarśa*, uttarārdha, P. 5.

But this is not correct. That it is the work of Maheśa Ṭhakkura is not to be doubted. As usual we find here mention of the practices found in Bengal and also in the South. He disagrees with almost all the views simply because of there being different traditions amongst the Maithilas.

Other information from the work.

There are certain peculiarities which deserve mentioning. For general information I give them below:

(1) He says that the year starts with the month of Śrāvaṇa which is the first month of the Yavana era, which is prevelent in Mithilā[1].

(2) In the *navarātra*, worship of the goddess Durgā is the most important function; keeping fast etc. are to be taken as forms of worship and not something independently[2].

(4) *Aticārādinirṇaya*—This is a very small booklet dealing with the accelerated motion of planets, specially of the jupitor.

Besides these, Maheśa has written one more (5) book, named, *Sarvadeśavṛttānta*. This is somewhat historical and a photostat copy of it is preserved in the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad. He has also composed some devotional songs in his own language, Maithilī.

Mahārāja Maheśa Ṭhakkura started a sort of competitive examination in Mithilā for the Paṇḍitas (*Paṇḍitānām Parīkṣā*), called *Dhautaparīkṣā*. It was chiefly meant for great and experienced Paṇḍitas only and he, who succeeded in this examination, received a *Certificate of Honour* and some presents in the from of a pair of loin cloth and a woollen shawl with social honour. In Mithilā and even outside, these scholars were always looked upon with great respect even by a layman.

Introduction of highest Academic test.

It is also to be noted here that Maheśa passed his last days at Kāsī where most likely he spent his time in the study of Vedānta under a Deccani Paṇḍita Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa(?). It is perhaps due to this inclination of his towards Vedānta that he wrote in his *Anu-*

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[1] P. 4. [2] P. 32.

māna-Darpaṇa-tadetat saṅkṣepeṇa vedāntimataṁ na dūṣitaṁ śruti-purāṇasmṛtiśiṣṭānuśiṣṭatvāt.

It will not be out of place to mention here that while at Kāśī, Maheśa had met Gosvāmī Tulasīdāsajī.

His meeting with Goswāmī Tulasīdāsa.

He was then either composing his *Rāmacaritamānasa*, or had by that time completed it. It is said that Maheśa had asked him why did he compose his work in vernacular and not in the language of the cultured class, that is, Sanskrit? To this Gosvāmījī had replied, it is said, that he preferred to write in *Hindi*, because that would better serve the needs of the country and that thereby the position of *dharma* would be strengthened. This fact also supports our estimate of the time of Maheśa Ṭhākura to be in the first half of the 16th century.

29. MADHUSŪDANA ṬHAKKURA

(16th century)

Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura was the son of Govinda Ṭhakkura, the well-known author of the *Kāvyapradīpa* on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and *Pūjāpradīpa*,

Family relations.

grand-son of Keśava Ṭhakkura and Sonodevī, great-grand-son of Buddhikara Ṭhakkura, and great-great-grand-son of Ravikara Ṭhakkura of the *Ghusauṭé-Nagawāra Vatsagotra* family of Mithilā. Govinda had eight sons, namely, Lakṣmīnātha, Vidyāpati, Dāmodara, Rāmanātha, Āgamācārya Gopīnātha, Tarkapañcānana Devanātha, *Madhusūdana* and Janārdana. Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura was the seventh son. All the brothers were great scholars as is evident from the records wherein they are mentioned as *Mahāmahopādhyāyas*. Vidyāpati, the second son, is different from the well-known Maithilī poet of the same name. We already know Govinda Ṭhakkura as the author of the *Kāvyapradīpa* and *Pūjāpradīpa*. Devanātha, the author of seven works, their names ending in *Kaumudī*, such as, *Adhikaraṇakaumudī* on Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra, *Kāvyakaumudī* on *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *Tantrakaumudī*, *Smṛtikaumudī*, *Kālakaumudī* and *Siddhāntakaumudī*. Some of these are still unpublished and some again, are untraceable so far.

Madhusūdana was indeed a very great scholor of his period. He also, like Vāsudeva Miśra, took up the task of defending the views of Pakṣadhara's *Āloka* and so he wrote a commentary, fairly elaborate, on the *Āloka* and called it *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*. He says—

His works.

madhusūdanasadyuktisamutsāritakaṇṭakāḥ
ālokavyaktamārgeṇa maṇiṁ gṛhṇantu paṇḍitāḥ/

Translation—Let the Paṇḍitas obtain the jewel (understand the *Cintāmaṇi*) through the passage indicated by the *Āloka*, whose thorns (obscurities) have been removed (from the path) by the correct arguments of Madhusūdana.

The *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* is a running commentary on the *Āloka* and *Cintāmaṇi*. But unfortunately, only a very little portion, upto the end of the Maṅgalavāda of the commentary has been published so far from the *Varanaseya Sanskrit University* in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Texts series*. But its manuscripts are available in various places.

I give below certain references from the published portion. Asmatpitṛcaraṇāḥ[1], Upādhyāyavyākhyānaṁ dūṣayati[2], Vaṭeśvara[3], Śrīdattaḥ[4] *Nyāyamahārṇava*[5], Mahābhāṣyakāravacana[6], *Dravyaprakāśa*[7], Upādhyāyaiḥ[8], Tāntrikāḥ[9], Rahasyavidaḥ[10], quotes a Kārikā from Bhaṭṭa[11], Prābhākarāḥ[12], *Śāvarabhāṣya*[13], *Vāmāgama*[14], *Triśūtrīprakāśa*[15], *Nibandhoddyota*[16] and *Uddyota*[17].

References found in the Kaṇṭakoddhāra.

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[1] PP. 34, 37, 76, 183.

[2] Here by Upādhyāya he means Yajñapati whom the *Āloka* has criticized, Pratyakṣa, P. 51.

[3] PP. 37, 39, 67, 175.

[4] A great digest writer, P. 40.

[5] P. 41.

[6] P. 42.

[7] PP. 60, 127.

[8] P. 76.

[9] P. 94.

[10] P. 97.

[11] P. 98.

[12] P. 98.

[13] P. 100.

[14] P. 113.

[15] P. 132.

[16] P. 119.

[17] PP. 67, 119.

Besides, what has been said above, we find Madhusūdana speaking of himself in the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*—

His Scholarship.

yastarke jaiminīye phaṇipatibhaṇitau brahmavidyāvicāre
kāṇāde kāvyaśāstre paṭuviśadamatirdharmatantre'tha mantre/
duṣprāpaṁ prāpa tīvraṁ guruparicaraṇakleśamasyākhilasya
prekṣantām puṇyabhājaḥ phalatatimuditāmatra santaḥ kiyantaḥ//[1]

Translation—Endowed with a sharp and clear vision he has achieved that which is difficult to attain in the shape of proficiency, in the study of Tarka, Jaiminīya, Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya, Brahmavidyā, Vaiśeṣika, Kāvyaśāstra, Dhrmaśāstra and Mantraśāstra, at the feet of his teacher, may good and virtuous people look at the good fruits obtained by this person.

Then again, he says about his own self-confidence in the śāstra—

vādīndramānamātaṅgasūdane madhusūdane/
vādinyādīyatānnaiva mudhā pakṣāntaraṁ budhāḥ//[2]

The following verses also speak of the great scholarship of Madhusūdana—

iti kalyāṇamastu me/
ālokamuktaiḥ sumaṇau nibaddhaiḥ
śuddhaiḥ suvarṇairanurañjitā yā
sā *Rāmabhūpasya* budhottamānā—
mākalpamākalpatu kīrtireṣā//
madhusūdanena yatnān-mīmāṁsānyāyapāragena kṛtaḥ/
suciram sukhayatu sujanānāloke kaṇṭakoddhāraḥ//
kṛtimetāmanabhyasya madīyāmanasūyayā/
maṇau yaḥ paṇḍitammanyaḥ sa śocyaḥ paśupālavat//
itiśrī-mahārājādhirāja-kārṇāṭacakravartibhujabala-bhīma-samasta-digvijayārjitasampatsantoṣitanikhilabhūmaṇḍala-śrī-*Rāmarājakāritā*yām mahāmahopādhyāya-saṭṭhakkura-śrīmadhusūdanakṛtau anumānālokakaṇṭa-

[1] Beginning of the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*, *verse* 4.

[2] A palm-leaf ms. of the Pratyakṣa, found in the *Darbhanga Sanskrit University Library*, No. 321, Fol. 94, verse 2.

koddhāraḥ sampūrṇaḥ iti// la. saṁ. 529 phālguna-śuklāṣṭamyāmadhyayanaśālinā śrībhavadevaśarmaṇā bhauragrāme'pūrīdamiti.//[1]

The importance of this manuscript is enhanced by the fact that it is written in the hand of the grand-son of Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura, the elder brother of Mahārāja Maheśa Ṭhakkura. So it gives us the correct date of Madhusūdana.

Madhusūdana also wrote a digest called *Jīrṇoddhāra* both on the *Samayapradīpa* of Śrīdattopādhyāya and also on the *Dvaitanirṇaya* of Vācaspati Miśra II. All these manuscripts are preserved in the Darbhanga Sanskrit University Library. In the *Jīrṇoddhāra* manuscript[2] he refers to his own *Sāradāṭīkā* which is still untraced.

His date.

About his date it may be pointed out that there are several dated manuscripts of his works in various libraries from which we come to the following conclusion:

He must have lived earlier than la. saṁ. 459= 1578 A. D. when a manuscript of the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* was copied[3]. Another manuscript of the same work dated samvat 1667=1610 A.D. is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit Library*, Banaras. Where it is written in the colophon—

cakre rāmakanīyaso'vanipateḥ śītāṁśunandāmbu-dhau/

aṅke phālgunasaptamī ravidine gaṅgāgaṇeśārcakaḥ//

That is, it was copied in 491 la. saṁ=1610[4]. Prof. D. Bhattacharya has found a manuscript of the *Pūjāpradīpa*, dated la. saṁ 432=1551 transcribed at the request of Madhusūdana himself. This is preserved in the library of the *Sanskrit University*, Darbhanga. From all these it is concluded that Madhusūdana lived towards the end of the 16th century.

It may also be pointed out that, like Maṇikaṇṭha

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1 Manuscript belonging to *the Darbhanga Sanskrit University*.

2 fol. 15a.

3 Vide. R. Mitra, Notices, Ms. 1909.

4 R. Mitra has wrongly taken this to be 431, taking *nanda*= 3, which is untenable.

Miśra[1], Madhusūdana also has been referred to by Jayarāma Bhaṭṭāchārya in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*[2]. He has also been referred to by Viśveśvara in his *Vyākaraṇasiddhāntasudhānidhi*[3]. Besides, Professor D. Bhattacharya conjectures that Guṇānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, one of the greatest scholars of Bengal, was a student of this very Madhusūdana. In a manuscript preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan*, Benares[4] there is a verse in the beginning of his *Śabdālokaviveka*—

madhusūdanasadvyākhyāsudhākṣālitacetasā/
guṇānandena kṛtinā śabdāloko vivicyate//[5]

This fact further suggests that Bengali scholars used to flock in Mithilā even after Pakṣadhara, that is, towards the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century, when Guṇānanda lived.

A Kārnātaka ruler in Mithilā in the 17th century.

There is one more point to be placed before our readers at this stage. It has been said above that Madhusūdana, composed his *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* under the patronage of the *Kārṇāṭaka* king Rāmarāja. This presents a new problem for our historians. It is a fact that Mithilā has been ruled from time to time by Kārṇāṭaka kings, but we had not heard so far that one of them, named Rāmarāja, ruled over Mithilā, or even on a portion of it, in 1648 A.D., when the manuscript of the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra* was copied out in the village called Bhaura, near Darbhanga, by a grand-son of Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura, the elder brother of Mahārāja Maheśa Ṭhakkura.

Mahāmhopādhyāya Paṇḍita Mukunda Jhā Bakhśī writes in his *Mithilābhāṣāmaya itihāsa*[6]—while giving us the condition prevailing during the period previous to Maheśa's coming to the throne—

jāhi meṁ dūve nāme prasiddha vaidika tathā karmmaṭha paṇḍitaprakāṇḍa śrīpati Ṭhākura hoita bhelāha, je *bharajātīya kṣatriya* mithilāvāsīka alpakālika (17 varṣamātraka) kevalalabdha mithilāka rajyaśāsanakālame okarāsaṁ smmānita bhae apanā tīnū putrakāṁbhaura grāma meṁ basāola.

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[1] P. 165. [2] P. 161.

[3] Benares ed. PP. 58, 69. [4] No. 366.

[5] *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*, P. 182. [6] P. 14.

This clearly indicates that there was some confusion in Mithilā in that period for sometime when a kṣatriya ruler was placed on the Mithilā throne. A group of *Bhara* class of kṣatriya must have been present in Mithilā at that time and it is quite possible that they might have been a scion of the old Kārṇāṭa family. Mm. Bakhśī says that the particular kṣatriya was put in charge at Bhaura where the manuscript also was copied out. This is also quite significant.

Professor D. C. Bhattacharya also says something like the above. I quote him below—"For sometime at least a scion of the long lost 'Kārṇāṭa' family might have taken the reins of Government in Mithilā and under this monarch named Rāmarāja Madhusūdana wrote his monumental work somewhere within 1525-50 A.D. If it were written in a 'foreign' land Madhusūdana would not have failed to refer to his Maithila origin in the colophon"[1].

30. MĀDHAVA MIŚRA

(16th century)

Mādhava Miśra was the son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Khāntara, of the well-known *Sodarapura* family, *Kaṭakā* branch, of Mithilā. It is to be noted that the *Kaṭakā* branch runs like this—Mm. Sureśvara, (second of the three *sodara* brothers of Sodarapura village, son of Ratneśvara), Mm. Viśvanātha-Ratinātha-Ḍālū-Aphela-Mm. Divākara (Prabhākarāparanāmaka)—Mm. Khāntara-Mm. Mādhava. Khāntara, who had studied under Śrīgopāla, was also his teacher. This is evident from a verse written in the beginning of his Dharmaśāstra work, *Divyadīpikā*.[2] The verse runs as—

> śrīgopālagurorgiro gurutarā muktā ivāmbhonidhe—
> rādāya dvijabhūṣaṇena guruṇā śrī-*Khāntareṇārpitāḥ*/
> labdhā divyarasāyaṇādhikarasāḥ prāptaprabodhodayai-
> rdivyānām vidhayo vidheyacaturaiḥ śrī-Mādhavairuddhṛtāḥ//

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[1] *Hist. of Navyanyāya*, P. 180.

[2] Manuscript in possession of the Darbhanga Sanskrit University.

He wrote a running and elaborate commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi-Āloka* of Pakṣadhara. This is clear from a verse written by the well-known Naiyāyika of the South named Annam Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Tarkasaṅgraha* living at Kāśī, in the beginning of his commentary on the *Āloka*, named *Siddhāñjana*—[1]

His works.

Maighīṁ Maheśa-Madhusūdana-Mādhavāde-
rvyākhyāṁ *śiromaṇi*-girāmavasāyasāram/
siddhāñjanaṁ maṇi-vilokanalālasānā-
mālokamārgagaminamahamātaniṣye//

This verse shows that he had studied the commentaries, one after another, of Megha Ṭhakkura (Bhagīratha Ṭhākura), Maheśa Ṭhākura, Madhusūdana Ṭhākura and lastly, of Mādhava Miśra, on the *Āloka*, and then wrote his *Siddhāñjana*. Of course, he had also studied the works of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. The first four names are given in chronological order. A palm-leaf manuscript of Mādhava's commentary, though incomplete, is preserved in the *Darbhanga Sanskrit University library*.

This manuscript contains a verse which is important in more than one way. The verse runs like this—

*śrīgopālā*dadhigatadṛḍhanyāyasiddhāntasāro
vidyodāro *dinakaragurau* jyāyasi prauḍhabhaktiḥ/
śāstā vidvatpaṭalamukuṭa*śrīkaraśrīhariṇāṁ*
nyāyāmbhodhau gururiva guruḥ *Khāntaraḥ* karṇa-dhāraḥ//

Further he says—

devakīcaraṇāmbhojabhramarībhūtamaulinā/
śrīmādhavena kṛyate pratyakṣālokadīpikā//

Translation—Guru Khāntara, like Bṛhaspati, is the helmsman in the ocean in the form of Nyāya, who has studied the essence of the correct conclusions of Nyāya from Śrīgopāla, who is very dignified in his learning, who is very devoted to his elder brother *guru* Dinakara and who is the teacher of Śrīkara and Śrīhari who are the crown of the assembly of the learned. Śrī-Mādhava,

[1] Madras copy, R. 1536, verse 5.

whose head is buzzing over the lotus-like feet of Devakī, is writing the *Pratyakṣāloka-dipikā*.

From the second verse it is clear that his mother's name was Devakī, as there is evidently a *śleṣa* in Devaki and Mādhava.

There is a complete copy of the *anumāna* section of the *Dīpikā*, though it bears the caption, *Ālokaprakāśa*, in the *Sarasvati Mahal library of Tanjore*[1]. It is dated Vikrama Sam 1632, āṣāḍhasūdi 6 some which corresponds to June 13, 1575 A.D. This manuscript ends with a verse which is also quite significant to establish his date. The verse runs as—

His date.

ye vāñchanti *mukundasindhurapate*ruddāmavidvadgaṇa-
prauḍhāhaṅkṛtisātanena kadalīkoṣānukāraṁ yaśaḥ/
śrīmanmādhavasatkaverharapadāmbhojaikatānātman-
stasyeyaṁ kṛtirujjvalā vijayatāmācandratārodayam//

It is evident from the above verse that Mādhava had vanquished the scholarship of the great scholars living in the court of Gajapati Mukunda, the king of Orissa, of about 1552 A.D. Thus, it is concluded that he lived sometimes in the second half of the 16th century.

31. KEŚAVA MIŚRA

(16th century)

Keśava Miśra was the son of Mahopādhyāya Viśvadhara (*Viso*)[2]. He belonged to the *Kaṭakā* branch of the *Sodarapura* family of Mithilā[3]. According to the genealogical records of the *Sodarapura* family, his *vaṁśaparamparā* is as follows—Viśvanātha—Ratinātha—Ḍālū—Gadādhara-*Viso*—Keśava. He had four sons and his wife's name was Śobhā.

Family history.

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[1] Vide—*Descriptive Catalogue*, PP. 4523-24.

[2] Vide—umāpatisagarbhasya Śrīviśvadharajanmanaḥ/
śrīmat-Keśavamiśrasya kṛtirvijayatetarām//

[3] Vide—iti Mahāmahopādhyāya Kaṭakāvāsi-sodarapura-kamaladivākara-miśra- śrīkeśavakṛtasaṅkhyāparimāṇapustakaṁ samāptam-Colophon of his *Saṅkhyāparimāṇa*.

He again, says in the colophon of his *Prakāśa*—

umāpatisagarbhasya śrīviśveśvarajanmanaḥ/
śrīmatkeśavamiśrasya kṛtirvijayatetarām//

This also shows that he had a uterine brother named Umāpati.

Keśava lived in the court of the king of Tīrabhukti as he says—

Tīrabhuktimahīpālapariṣanmukhyasūriṇā/
śrīkeśavakavīndreṇa nibandho'yam vidhīyate[1]//

From the *Pañjī* records also, it is evident that he lived in the 16th century.

He is perhaps the last Maithila scholar of traditional type, who wrote a running commentary on the *Gotamasūtra*. The commentary is known as the *Sūtraprakāśikā*. He writes at the end of the first Adhyāya—

His works.

tīrabhuktimahīpāla-pariṣanmukhyasūriṇā/
śrīkeśavakavīndreṇa kṛtā sūtraprakāśikā//

It has the following colophon—iti mahāmahopādhyāya-vedāntavyāsa-śrīkeśavamiśrakṛte Gotamasūtraprakāśe prathamo'dhyāyaḥ la. saṁ 424=1543 A.D. Again, at the end of the second Adhyāya, first āhnika, he writes—

sukhenādhyāpayan kāśyām nyāyavedāntadarśane/
śrīkeśavakaviścakre nyāyasūtraprakāśanam//

That is, he lived towards the end of his life at Kāśī, teaching students Nyāya and Vedānta and wrote the *Nyāyasūtraprakāśa*. It is in this very connection that he wrote at the end of his *Prakāśa*—

śrīkeśavena vyaraci prabandhaḥ
pūrṇāni viśvānyapi yadyaśobhiḥ/
śiṣyairyadīyaiśca paraḥsahasraiḥ
pāre samudrānapi bhūṣitā bhūḥ//

It is evident from the above quoted verse that he taught thousands of pupils and that his fame and reputation spread even beyond the ocean. He was called *Vedāntavyāsa*, so he writes in the colophon of his *Prakāśa*. This *Sūtra-prakāśa* records the total number of Gotama-sūtras as follows—

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[1] Beginning of the *Saṅkhyāparimāṇa*.

I. 40+20=60/II. 68+68=136/III.69+73=142/IV. 68+49=117/V. 43+24=67. The total number of the sūtras therefore, comes to 522 which is lesser than the other versions of the Sūtrapāṭha.

Towards the end of the commentary on chapter V there are two statements—

anādhikyañca tatsarvaṁ darśitam *Tarkatāṇḍave*[1]. Again, yatha ca saṅkarajātyanantarbhāvī tathā prapañcitaṁ *Tarkatāṇḍave*.

From this it appears that he wrote a work named *Tarkatāṇḍava*. This is for the first time that we have come across this fact. So far we knew of the *Tarkatāṇḍavaa* of Vyāsatīrtha alone. However, this is a new discovery and further researches in the field of Nyāyaśāstra will unfold this mystery.

32. DEVANĀTHA ṬHAKKURA

(16th century)

Devanātha Ṭhakkura was known as *Tarkapañcānana*. He was the son of Govinda Ṭhakkura, the author of *Kāvyaprakāśapradīpa*, grand-son of Keśava Miśra (Ṭhakkura) of the *Ghusouté-Nagawāra* family of Mithilā. He was the elder brother of Madhusūdana Ṭhakkura, the author of the *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*. He speaks very highly of his father who was a great scholar of Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta and Nyāya. He says in one of his works, *Ālokapariśiṣṭa*—

Family history.

mīmāṁsāmavatārya yaḥ sadasatāmaddhā viveke guruḥ
yo vedāntavicāracārucarite siddhāntavācaspatiḥ /
ācāryo'pi vicāryate yadavadhirnaiyāyiko vā na vā
govindo'yamakhaṇḍamaṇḍalayaśaścandro jagatprāptavān//

Further he says—yastarkatantraramaṇīkamaṇīyakānto
govinda eṣa bhuvane viditaḥ sukīrtiḥ/

It is therefore, evident that Devanātha studied the śāstra

[1] Palm-leaf ms. in possession of the *Sanskrit University*, Darbhanga, fol. 123a.

under his father. But at the end of his *Adhikaraṇakaumudī* he says—

somabhaṭṭopadiṣṭena pathā sañcarato'dhunā/
mīmāṁsāviśamāraṇye saraṇaṁ mama bhāratī//

That is, his father was his guru for Nyāya and Vedānta, while he studied Mīmāṁsā under Soma Bhaṭṭa. It is also possible that he might have gone to Vārāṇasī and had studied Vedānta there.

His works.

He has written a small commentary on the *Āloka*, called (1) *Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa*. A manuscript of this work has been found at Dinājpur in Bengal[1]. The following is written in this manuscript—mahāmahāṭhakkuraśrīdevanāthamahāśayānuśāsanāt-which shows that in la. saṁ. 443 (=1562 A.D.) when it was written, Devanātha was living, under whose order it was transcribed. There is another manuscript of it available in the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona[2]. It begins as—

devanāthena govindacaraṇāmbujasevinā/
cintāmaṇau yadāloke Pariśiṣṭaṁ taducyate//

Again, in the Anumāna and Upamāna sections of the manuscript, we find a verse to the same effect. It runs—

pakṣapātamanālambya vilambya gurugauravam/
devanātho yathāvastu pariśiṣṭamacintayat//

iti śrītattvacintāmaṇāvālokapariśiṣṭe anumānopamānaparicchedaḥ. (2) Besides, he is the celebrated author of the well-known seven *kaumudīs* on different śāstras, namely *Kāvyakaumudī* on Sāhitya[3]. (3) *Kālakaumudī*—It is a Dharmaśāstra work[4]. (4) *Siddhāntakaumudī*. This was written before the (5) *Adhikaraṇakaumudī*, wherein it has been referred to.[5]. The fifth work is on Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. It refers to the *Saṅkhyāparimāṇam* of Keśava Miśra[6]. (6) *Smṛtikaumudī*—It is published from Darbhanga

[1] Haraprasad Shastri, *Notices*, III. PP. 74-5. Fol. 143.

[2] No. 310 of 1880-81 fol. 1-42, 48-105.

[3] Vide—*Peterson's 3rd report*.

[4] Vide—*Mithila manuscript Cat*. Vol. I. P. 54, fol. 70.

[5] Page 10.

[6] P. 58, Darbhanga edition.

though incomplete[1]. It deals with our religious rites and rituals performed day to day. (7) *Tantrakaumudī*. It was written in 1486 śaka=1564 A.D. (8) *Mantrakaumudī*. It was written in 400 la. saṁ=1519 A.D. At the end of the *Tantrakaumudī* Devanātha says of himself—

> mīmāṁsāsmṛtitarkatantrakavitālaṅkārakośāgama-
> jyotirvedapurāṇabhāratamatiryastarkapañcānanaḥ/
> devo'sau kamateśvaraḥ kṣitipatistaṁ devanāthaṁ cirāt
> samprāpya svayamādareṇa vidadhe vidvanmude kaumudīm//

In this verse he also speaks of his patron King Kamateśvara, a ruler of Kamatā which is identified with the present Kūcavihār. It was at his request that the *Tantrakaumudī* was written. In the colophon it is written—iti samastaprakriyāvirājamānamahārājādhirājaśrīmalladeva-Naranārāyaṇa-kāritāyām mahāmahopādhyāya-tarkapañcānana-śrīdevanāthakṛtāyāṁ tantrakauṁudyām paddhatiparicchedaḥ samāptaḥ/śaka 1486=1564 A.D.

From historical sources it is found that King Naranārāyaṇa was ruling over Kamatā during 1564 A.D., the date of the composition of this book. So Devanātha can easily be placed in the second half of the 16th century. This is also to be noted here that in this very work Devanātha says—

> rājā govindadevo gajapatiradita
> svarṇasiṁhāsanārddhaṁ
> datvā mudrāḥ sahasrāṇyapi nava daśa vā
> cārupaṭṭāmbarāṇi/
> arvāgarvānamekaṁ kavivaramaparaṁ
> durlabhaṁ bhūpatīnām
> palyaṅkaṁ niṣkalaṅkam maṇimukuṭavaram
> tarkapañcānaneṣu//

It is certain that this king Gajapati Govindadeva belongs to Orissa. So it seems that Devanātha left Mithilā, like many other scholars of Mithilā, and received patronage from various other kings. It is to be pointed out, by the way, that he lived long and his field of work was not confined to one śāstra but to many. Like other

[1] Pages 1-144.

Maithila scholars, he was a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṁsaka and also a Dharmaśāstrin. It seems to me from his works that he was more practical in his writings and that he had explained the points of various problems very intelligently from their respective angles of vision.

33. GOPĪNĀTHA ṬHAKKURA

(16th century)

GopīnāthaṬhakkura was the son of Mm. Bhavanātha Ṭhakkura of the *Ghusauta* family of Maithila Brāhamaṇas. He wrote a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, named *Bhāvaprakāśikā* in which he refers to Maṇikṛt,[1], Pakṣadharamiśrāḥ[2], Ratnakośakāraḥ[3], Upādhyāyāḥ[4]. He is also the author of a work, may be a commentary, or only a short summary, on the *Cintāmaṇi*, called *Cintāmaṇisāraḥ* or *maṇisāraḥ*. Nothing more we know so far about him.

34. GOKULANĀTHA UPĀDHYĀYA

(17th century)

Gokulanātha Upādhyāya was born in the *phaṇadaha* (=*phanewāra*) family of Maithila Brāhmaṇas of Mithilā. As to the meaning and origin of this family, Gokulanātha says in his *Amṛtodaya-nāṭaka* and *Ekāvalī*—

Family history.

subhāṣiterṣyākaluṣasulocanaviṣānalaiḥ/
phaṇaṁ dahanti śeṣasya tataḥ phaṇadahā matā//

He belonged to the *Vatsa-gotra*[5]—and was an inhabitant of Maṅgalavanī (*Maṅgarauni*), once a very famous village of *Tāntrikas* and scholars of Mithilā. This family was known throughout Mithilā as the family of the *Upādhyāyas*, meaning, *Tāntrika scholars*. In fact,

[1]Vide, Ms. belonging to the *Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit library*, Varaṇasī, Fols. 7b, 20a, 22b, 23a.

[2] fols. 7b, 23a. [3] fol. 23b. [4] fol. 23b.

[5] teṣāmapi madhye mādhyandinacaraṇaguravo Vatsavaṁśavarddhanāḥ phaṇadahadvijā eva jānate.

that was the age when Tāntrika practices were living in Mithilā. It is said that through the grace of Goddess Kālikā the male members of the family became great Paṇḍitas even without studying any śāstra as regular ordinary students. *It is further said that a Bīja-Mantra* used to be written with honey on the tounge of the newly born babe in the night of the *Ṣaṣṭhīpūjā* by virtue of which the child used to become a great scholar even without proper study of the śāstra. This boon was exclusively restricted to that family alone. But this practice was once misused by being used for a member of another family and consequently, the efficacy of the *Bījamantra* was lost. Even then from my personal experience, I can say that the direct and the indirect members of the family have been quite intelligent by their very nature for over two centuries.

He was the son of *Vidyānidhi* Mahāmahopādhyāya Pītāmbara Upādhyāya. Umā was the name of his mother. His family genealogy is as follows:


Gondhī Jhā (*Bījīpuruṣa*)
|
(Mahāmahopādhyāya) Rucipati (Rāmendra Sannyāsin)

Mukunda	Kośī	Horila	Harihara *alias* (*prasiddha*)Nikāra
			(*Sadupādhyāya*)Rāmacandra

Sons of (*Sadupādhyāya*)Rāmacandra:

(Paṇḍitarāja Mahāmahopādhyāya) *Madhusūdana*	(*Vidyānidhi*, Mahāmahopādhyāya) *Pītāmbara*	(Mahopādhyāya) Umānanda	(Mahopādhyāya) Vāgīśa	(Vidyāsindhu, Tridaṇḍi-Sannyāsi) Ratiśa
Madana*[1]	|		Lālī	
			Dhīrendra	

[1] Madana Upādhyāya who was also a great Tāntrika and had with his *tapasyā* pleased goddess Sarasvatī who obeyed him like a *Vaśyā*-maidservant. It is said that it was due to Madana's ill-*treatment that the goddess left not only his family*, but the village itself. A very old stone-made triangular image of the goddess which was formerly in possession of Madana upādhyāya is now in possession of Śrī Garīvanātha Jhā of Khojapura, son-in-law of my younger brother even today. It is said that another image *of the goddess is still present in Maṅgaraunī*, south tol, which *was also installed by Madana Upādhyāya*.



It has already been said that Gokulanātha studied the śāstra at the feet of his father. Besides, he had also the blessings of the Goddess Kālikā and gradually rose to great eminence and became an all-round scholar. He was specially interested in Nyāya, Sāhitya, Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra.

About his father, Gokulanātha says in his *Amṛtodaya*[2]—

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[1] Dug a tank in his village. It is called *Navī-Pokhari*. He also built a temple of Śiva called Datteśvaranātha in Maṅgaraunī.

[2] Act. V. 19—20.

prakṛtigahane tantre *vaiśeṣike vivṛtiṁ vyadhā*—
dakuruta caturvarga*vyākhyā*mṛtāni ca *bhārate*/
bharatavacasāṁ tattvakhyātyai *nibandha*mabhāṣata
vyatanuta tathā tisro vāṇīvilāsakaviḥ kathāḥ//

Sarasvatī-devi ! muṣitā vayamamunā madhyamaṁ bhuvanamapajahatā vatsena vatsavaṁśavarddhanena vidyānidhinā.

Translation—The poet, in whom the goddess of learning used to get delight, (*Vidyānidhi* Pītāmbara), wrote a commentary (*vivṛti*) on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* which is by its very nature very difficult, commented upon the *Mahābhārata*, wrote a *nibandha* on the *Nāṭya-śāstra* in order to illucidate its truth and lastly, wrote on the three forms of Kathā, namely, vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā.

This shows that Pītāmbara was a scholar of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Epics and Sāhitya.

Sarasvatī says—O Śrutis ! we are lost by Vidyānidhi's leaving this earth and going to the other world.

He further says—

aśaraṇamabhūdbrāhmaṁ varcco nirindhanamaidhata
jvara iva bhuvo devyā duḥsaṁvaraḥ kalisaṁjvaraḥ/
abhajata kathāśeṣo dharmaḥ parairupahāsyatām
akuruta yadā vidvān vidyānidhirdviguruṁ divam//

Translation—Since the *Vidyānidhi* left for heaven where there was already a *guru* (Bṛhaspati), the spiritual tejas of Brāhmaṇas has no shelter, the miseries of the Kali age like the troubles of the earth, have become intolerable and are burning without any fuel and *Dharma* now exists only in talks and is laughed at.

Further he continues—

avitathavacobandhe cintāvaśaṁ vada vāṅmaye
vidati nikhilā vidyā vidyānidhau divamīyuṣi//
iyamaśaraṇā vācāṁ devī labheta kamāśrayam
viditamathavā kṛṣṇadvaipāyano bhuvi jīvati//

Translation—Since the *Vidyānidhi* has gone to the heaven this entire learning has become shelterless and in whom should she now take a shelter ?

Further on, Gokulanātha pays high tributes to the learning of his father—*Vidyānidhi* Pītāmbara—

na dhutasamayā na grāmyā na cyutakramasaṁskriti—
rna rasarahitā nāślīlā na prasiddhivirodhinī/
na janitaparodvegā na stokamapyanṛte sthitā
prakṛtigaditā'pyāsīd vidyānidhervibudhasya vak//

Translation—The Vāk (speech or composition) of *Vidyānidhi* was but natural and even then it was not free from poetic conventions, nor was it vulgar, nor was it beset with such defects of composition as *cyuta-krama* and *cyutasaṁskṛti*, nor was it devoid of poetic sentiments, nor was it indecent, nor was it opposed to common usage (*lokaprasiddhi*), nor did it ever create confusion in the mind of its readers, and nor did it ever contain falsity.

He further says that all the good and virtuous qualities also do not now, after the Vidyānidhi has gone to the other world, find a place of common shelter.[1]

His studies.

He had studied under his father *Vidyānidhi* Pītāmbara. So he says in his *Amṛtodaya*[2]—

adhigatamupādhyāyādvidyānidheranucintitam
viralaviṣayagrāhiṇyāpi svayā'jaḍayā dhiyā/
bahulamathavā stokaṁ yadyanmayā śrutamarjitam
pariṇatiriyaṁ tasya prītastayāstu paraḥ pumān//

Translation—I learnt śāstra from my teacher (upādhyāya) Vidyānidhi and meditated upon it through my non-dullard intelligence which was capable of grasping subtle facts. Whatever more or little I learnt and fully realized, the result of all this is this drama-*Amṛtodaya* through which the highest *Pumān* (Lord) may be pleased.

Pītāmbara might have been the pupil of Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāmadeva Upādhyāya whom Gokulanātha refers to as his *paramaguru*. After having studied several śāstras, he himself says towards the end of his *Kādambarīpradīpa*,—

ā bālyādekamanasā mayā yūyamupāsitāḥ/
yūṣmābhiḥ sarvavidyābhiḥ kṛtaṁ sāhāyakam mama//

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1 *Amṛtodaya*, V. 2 Act V. 25

Translation—O Goddesses! I have served you all since my very childhood with singleminded devotion and you have all given me great help.

It may be however, pointed out that there is a *śleṣa* in the word *sarvavidyābhiḥ*. As the family, or the invironment in which Gokulanātha lived, was a *Trāntika* one, it is just possible that by *sarvavidyā*, he might have meant all the ten *mahāvidyās*, kālī, Tārā etc. However, even if that be so, it will have to be admitted that Gokulanātha had the assistance of all the *Vidyās*-(*Tāntrika*) goddesses, (or the sciences) whom he had served from his very childhood. It was due to this that he was really and equally qualified in several śāstras.

His achievements.

Like great scholars of Mithilā, equally blessed with learning and spiritual achievements, Gokulanātha desired to leave Mithilā, being invited by various courts in different parts of the country.

Śarayantra test.

But before he did so, it was very likely that he himself announced to appear for the highest type of scholarly test then current in Mithilā, called *śarayantra*. Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gangānātha Jhā writes about this test—that the meaning of this term is not known, but the tradition is still very current in Mithilā even today. Some two hundred years back there lived a very great scholar named Gokulanātha Upādhyāya, who had written works on Nyāya, Vedānta, Sāhitya, Kāvya, Jyotiṣ and Karmakāṇḍa, which are all available at present. He had written even a lexicon, called *Pārasīprakāśa* where he had given sanskrit synonyms of Persian words. He had appeared in the *Śarayantra* test. Dr. Jhā writes that one of the questions put to him in the test was—What is the taste of night-soil? The answer given by Gokulanātha was that it was bitter (*kaṭu*) which was evident from the fact that when a village boar (*grāmya*-śūkara) tasted it, water came out of its eyes, which was a clear sign of the bitter taste of the food it had taken. The questioner was satisfied.[1]

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1 Hindi—*Kavirahasya*, Page 74, Allahabad edition.

Paṇḍita Ramānātha Jha of Darbhanga, in an article submitted to the *All India Oriental Conference*, Twelfth Session, held at the Banaras Hindu University in 1943, says on the basis of *M. William's Dictionary* that the term means string on which the palm-leaves of a manuscript are filed.

I however, think that it may mean something like *on point of arrow*, or as difficult as *śarayantra* which might be a technical term used for a particular mystical Tāntrika contrivance. That is, the candidate has to face an examiner, or a big group of examiners, who appeared to the examinee as dreadful as an arrow or the tāntrika contrivance. The entire process of this test was something like this—When a person had finished his studies of all the śāstras and felt full confidence within himself about his knowledge of those śāstras, he used to announce to the leading members of the locality that he would like to appear for the *śarayantra* test. The local people used to announce the news to the public at large that so and so had fully qualified himself in the śāstras and that he now would appear for the *Śarayantra* test to which all were invited. Accordingly, the date, time and avenue of the meeting were fixed and arrangements were made for the purpose.

Every one present in the assembly was permitted to put any question and get full satisfaction by the reply from the scholar, who only then was announced a great scholar. Then only he was declared to have passed in the test. The questions put were not necessarily from the śāstras alone. They were also on worldly subjects even on most vulgar topics, as pointed out above. After the test was over and the result was declared, many presents were presented to the scholar and he was recognized an all-round Paṇḍita. This was the highest test and it was because of this that the particular Paṇḍita had all-round recognition and respect in publci also. I quote below a document from a Palm-leaf manuscript which would give an idea of the type of presents given to the scholar—

iti mahāmahopādhyāya-śrīgaṅgeśa-viracitatattvacintāmaṇāvupamāna-paricchedaḥ/la. saṁ 401 phālguna-śukla-

navamyāṁ śanau bhauālagrāme Vidyāvāgīśa-bhaṭṭācāryya-śrī-Yadunandana-mahānubhāvebhyaḥ *śarayantre* dattamidam pustakaṁ likhitvā śrī-Ratnapāṇiśarmaṇeti śubhamastu sarvajagatām parahitaniratā bhavantu bhūtagaṇāḥ śubhamastu[1].

This note gives us two new points: (1) that the *śarayantra* test was current from a pretty old time in Mithilā, where this was perhaps the highest test prescribed for scholars. It is certain that in la. saṁ. 401 = 1520 A. D. it was a very common thing. (2) Another point that we are to note from this document is that the surnames, like *Vidyāvāgīśa*, *Bhaṭṭācāryya* etc., were also prevelent in Mithilā long long before they were brought to Bengal. They were scholarly honorific surnames given by teachers to their disciples. They were not confined to Bengal alone. It is this misunderstanding which has perhaps led many Bengali scholars to wrongly identify several renowned Maithilas with Bengalis. For instance, Bengalis think that Padmanābha Miśra, Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācāryya, Pragalbha Bhaṭṭācāryya, Pradyotana Bhaṭṭācāryya and even Raghunātha Śiromaṇi are all Bengali scholars. But there are sufficient proofs to show that they were Maithilas.

There are many other things to decide this problem. It has been admitted even by some Bengali modern scholars, like Mm. Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraj, Professor Dinesh Chandra Battacharyya and others that "from Gaṅgeśa down to Pakṣadhara Navyanyāya had its sole home in Mithilā. The pandits of that place who had made it their monopoly and been so long its trusted guardians." etc.[2]

In the case of Gokulanātha, Paṇḍita Ramānātha Jhā of Darbhanga has given us two very important documents in connection with this *Śarayantra* test. I quote below from his article submitted to the twelfth session of the *All India Oriental Conference*:

List of some Śarayantris.

[1] P. 126. This is a note taken from a Palm-leaf manuscript of the *Anumāna* and *Upamāna cintāmaṇi* in possession of Paṇḍita-śrī-Goptṛnātha Miśra a scholar of the *Sodarapura* family of village named Ujāna (Udyāna).

[2] *Sarasvati Bhavan Studies*, Vol. III P. 136.

1. iyamānvīkṣikī vidyā dakṣiṇāmūrteḥ prasādāt mahāmahopādhyāya-*gondī*-śarmaṇā alambhi

2. tatrātulaṁ sukhamanubhavantī sā tacchiṣyaṁ mahāmahopādhyāya-*mādhava*-śarmāṇamāśritavatī bahukālamavyagrai—

3. -rvyavatiṣṭhata mādhavaśarmaṇā ca nāmataścārthataśca svasadṛśeṣu śiṣyeṣu mahāmahopādhyāya-*adiyāmā*—

4. -*dhavamiśreṣu* samarpitā tacchiṣyeṇa mahāmahopādhyāya-*śaṅkaraśarmaṇā yajñapatyupādhyāye* samāropi—

5. -tā tena ca mahāmahopādhyāya-*paraśurāmaśarmasu* sthāpitā tato'pi mahāmahopādhyāya-*rāma*—

-*devaśarmaṇā* śiṣyeṇa samāsāditā tato'pi *vidyānidhi*—

6. -padāṅkitena mādhyandinamūrdhanye—

7. -na mahāmahopādhyāya-*pītāmbaraśarmaṇā* prāptā tenāpīyamānvīkṣikī teṣu mahāmahopādhyā—

8. -ya-*gokulanāthaśarmasu* sthāpitā ye hi sakalasiddhāntayuktyā khaṇḍayataśśiromaṇermānamapane—

9. -tum siddhāntatattvaprabhṛtīn nibandhān bahuśaḥ praṇītavantaḥ sarvasiddhāntadīkṣā—

-guravo bhūmau vya-

10. -rājan tato'pi mahāmahopādhyāya-jagannāthadvitīyena *jagannāthaśarmaṇā* samā-sāditā tata—

11. -śca mahāmahopādhyāya-*vaṁśadharaśarmaṇā*'-lambhi tatopi dānasantānavinirjitakarṇena mahāma—

(*overleaf*)

1. -hopādhyāyena *śrīraghunatha*śarmaṇā prāptā itthmparamparāyātāḥ sarve guravo gṛhīta—

2. -śarayantrāḥ prasiddhanāmāna eva teṣāmparokṣepi mādṛśā yadyapyatra śarayantra—

3. -karmmaṇi na yogyastathāpi amukādya (nma?) mayā śarayantragrahaṇaṅkriyate tatra teṣāṁ vidyamā—

4. -nasajjanānāñcānugraha eva śaraṇamiti śubham bhūyāt

Mahāmahopādhyāya
Dattaśarmaṇa iyaṁ
(vi?) jñaptiḥ

This document has been supported by another of the same nature in possession of a *Pañjīkāra* Modānanda Jhā of śivanagar (Purnea in Bihar).

It is to be noted here that of these thirteen scholars passing through the *Śarayantra* test, one after the other, the last six, namely, Pītāmbara (vidyānidhi), Gokulanātha, Jagannātha, Vaṁśadhara, Raghunātha and Datta belonged to Gokulanātha's family directly. Goṇḍī is the *Bījī puruṣa* of Gokulanātha and most likely, Vāmadeva Upādhyāya is also connected with this very family. It is very rare to find such an illustrious family. This might have been possible because of the blessings of the Goddess, *Dakṣiṇāmūrti.*

After having passed through the *Śarayantra* test, Gokulanātha left for the court of Fate Sāh of Garhwal towards the end of the 17th century. While at Garhwal he wrote many works. This is evident from a manuscript of his *Ekāvalī*, a work on Chandas, where at the end of the first chapter it is written—

iti candraśekharasundarīcaraṇāravindamakarandendīvarāṇāmindirāvilāsamandirāṇāmarātijaladhimathanamandarāṇāṁ Mahārājādhirājaśrī-Fatesāhavarmaṇāṁ karṇabhūṣaṇaikāvalyāṁ prathamaṁ ratnam.

This Fate Sāhavarman passed away in 1699 A. D. So he left Garhwal and came back to Mithilā and became the court Paṇḍita of Mahārāja Mādhava Siṁha (1700-1739). He spent the rest of his life in Mithilā court. It is said that he left for Kāśī towards the end of his life. He might have died about 1739 or 1740 A. D. at Kāśī.

His contributions.

He wrote on many śāstras. His works known so far are: (1) *Cakraraśmi*—a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, (2) *Dikkālanirūpaṇa*[1], (3) *Dīdhitividyota*, a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti* of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, (4) *Kusumāñjaliṭippaṇa*, a commentary on

[1] Ms. preserved in the *library, Sanskrit University*, Darbhanga.

the *Kusumāñjali*, (5) *Khaṇḍanakuṭhāra*, a commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*[1], (7) *Mithyāttvanirukti*, (8) *Lāghavagauravarahasya*, (9) *Nyāyasiddhāntatattva*[2], (10) *Padavākyaratnākara*, which has been commented upon and (published recently) by Yadunātha Miśra of the *Sodarapura* family. The commentary is called *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*, (10) *Śaktivāda*. It is different from Gadādhara's *Śaktivāda*, (11) *Bauddhādhikāravivaraṇa*[3], (12) *Muktivāda* (different from Gadādhara's work of the same name) and *Ālokavivaraṇa*, a commentary on the *Āloka*. These are all on Darśana.

Besides these, he has written several works on Dharmaśāstra, Kāvya and Sāhitya. Some of them are given here : (1) *Kāvyaprakāśavivaraṇa* (published from *Sarasvati Bhavana library*, Vārāṇasī), (2) *Rasamahārṇava*, (3) *Kuṇḍakādambarī*[4], (4) *Kādambarī*, (5) *Kādambarī-Praśnottarāṇi*, (6) *Kādambarī-kīrtiślokāḥ*, (7) *Ekāvalī* (a work on Prosody, written under the patronage of Fate Shah), (8) *Vṛttataraṅgiṇī*, (9) *Śuddhiviveka*, (10) *Aśaucanirṇaya*, (11) *Śivastuti* or *Śivaśataka*, (12) *Māsamīmāṁsā*, (13) *Sūktimuktāvalī* and (14) *Amṛtodaya*. Gokulanātha had one daughter named Kādambarī. Unfortunately, she died in the river Gaṅgā. Gokulanātha loved her very much and consequently, he felt much for the loss. He wrote many verses and works in her name. Some of the verses are given below :

atipāvanena nāmnā kevalamavaśiṣyamāṇāyāḥ/
vatse kādambari tava kīrtiḥ kalpāvadhi prathatām//

(from *Kādambarīpradīpa*) which is a commentary on the *Dvaitanirṇaya* of Vācaspati II. Again, he writes in the *Kuṇḍakādambarī*—

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[1] Ms. in the *Sanskrit University library*, Darbhanga.

[2] In the list of scholars given above in connection with the *Śarayantra*, against the name of Gokulanātha it is written -ye hi sakalasiddhāntayuktyā khaṇḍayataḥ Śiromaneḥ mānamapanetuṁ *Siddhāntatattvaprabhṛtīn nyāyanibandhān* bahuśaḥ praṇitavantaḥ. It is clear from this that Gokulanātha had vehemently criticized the views of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of Bengal.

[3] This has been referred to by Gokulanātha himself in his *Padavākyaratnākara*, page 533 *Sarasvati Bhavana series*, Varanasi.

[4] This has been referred to by the author himself in the alaṅkāra section, dvitīyāvivaraṇa of the *Padavākyaratnākara*.

dṛṣṭā dṛṣṭim sukhayati guṇaiḥ kīrtitā karṇayugmam
prīṇātisma prathayati sadā svāntavṛttau pramodam/
saivedanīṁ smṛtimupagatā siṣyamāṇena nāmnā
nirdiṣṭā vā dahati duhitā hanta kādambarī mām//

ārāmbāva prakṛtikṛpaṇā bādhibhirbādhyamānaiḥ
vikrośāraḥ karuṇavacanaṁ putri kādambarīti/
ko'yam lokaḥ ka iva viṣayaḥ kim puraṁ ko nivāsaḥ
yasminnasmadvimukhahṛdayā tvaṁ nilīya sthitāsi//

Kuṇḍakādambarīnāmnā grantho'yaṁ tava kīrtaye/
mayā gokulanāthena sopapattirnibadhyate//

The *Amṛtodaya* is one of the best allegorical dramas written in Sanskrit. For the recreation of our readers, I quote below some of the lines :

prasarati viṣayeṣu rāgaḥ
pariṇamate virateṣu teṣu śokaḥ/
tvayi rucirucitā nitāntakānte
rucipariṗākaśucāmagocaro'si//[1]

Translation—O Exceedingly charming one! it is proper to have affection for you as you are beyond the feelings of pangs which await the fruition of affection or desire. (It is but natural that) feelings of affection or love move towards the objects of the world, but it leads to feelings of pang when those objects of love disappear. Those objects in which there is *rāga* (love), when destroyed, the love (rāga) changes into grief (*śoka*). So O extremely charming! it is proper to love you, because you are beyond the reach of the feelings of pain due to the fruition of that love. In other words, my love in you will not produce any grief when you are gone, as you are beyond its reach.[1]

na khalu vighaṭitāḥ punarghaṭante
na ca ghaṭitāḥ sthirasaṅgataṁ śrayante/
pipatiṣumavaśam rujanti vaṁśyā-
tarutaṭamāpa ivāpagāgaṇasya//

Translation—That which is separated or dead is not joined again, that which is joined together does

[1]*Amṛtodaya*, I. 6.

not necessarily remain together for a long time. The *family members finding him on the point of falling* or dying and unable to have control over himself feel disgusted with him, (and desire his end sooner), like the waters of a river after having reached the root of the tree (which want to uproot the tree).

What a fine idea has been expressed in the following verse?

janani tava pumarthā eva pādāḥ śrayante
prathamacaraṇabaddho nirbharaṁ raumi vatsaḥ/
caramacaraṇamūlāt prasnutām stanyadhārā-
mamaragavi kadā te muktabandhaḥ piveyam//

Translation—O Mother, O Divine Cow, the four values of life, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa, have taken shelter in your four legs. I as a calf, being tied down to your first fore-leg, am excessively crying, when shall I be free from the bondage to drink the milk flowing from the source of the last leg (that is, when shall I achieve Mokṣa).

The estimate of his scholarship and the respect he commanded in the scholarly world can be gathered from the following lines written by a disciple of his after his death :

mātargokulanāthanāmakagurorvāgdevi tubhyam namaḥ
pṛcchāmo bhavatīṁ mahītalamidaṁ tyaktvaiva yadgacchasi/
bhūloke vasatiḥ kṛtā mama gurau svarge tathā gīṣpatau
pātāle phaṇināyake bhagavati prauḍhiḥ kva labdhā-dhikā//

Translation—O mother! O Goddess of learning of my guru named Gokulanātha! I bow down to you. Since you are now leaving this world and going to the other world, I want to know from you that you had made my guru your abode, while you were in this world, while you were in the *Svarga* you lived in the lord of learning (Bṛhaspati) and while you were in the lower region you had lived in the lord of snakes (*Śeṣanāga*). O Goddess! tell me where did you reach your maturity, that is of the three who was the greatest scholar?

With all these tributes, it may be said that Gokulanātha was the greatest genious of the period and his versatile scholarship had no match in Mithilā at that time. Perhaps he was the last, as the tradition says, who had the Divine blessings for keeping the torch of learning burning undisturbed.

One thing has to be noted that in spite of the fact that Gokulanātha was a very great scholar and had blessings of the Goddess and was therefore, a *Siddha-puruṣa* in the Tāntrika sense, when he lost his only daughter, he could not escape the influence of delusion. This shows that as long as a being is in the universe and possesses some mortal form, he has to be under the clutches of *Māyā.* So has been said in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*[1].

jñāninām api cetāṁsi devī bhagavatī hi sā
balādākṛṣya mohāya mahāmāyā prayacchati/

tayā visṛjyate viśvaṁ jagadetaccarācaram
saiṣā prasannā varadā nṛṇām bhavati muktaye/

sā vidyā paramā mukterhetubhūtā sanātanī
saṁsārabandhahetuśca saiva sarveśvareśvarī//

Translation—That all-powerful luminous devī, the *Mahāmāyā,* takes away with full force the *cetāṁsi* (consciousness or wisdom) of even the wise and puts over it a veil and wraps it with *Moha.* That *Mahāmāyā,* which manifests this whole universe containing moveable and immoveable objects, when pleased, bestows *mukti* upon people. That *Paramā Vidyā,* the highest Divinity, is the eternal cause of *mukti* and She the mistress of all our fortunes, alone is also the cause of the universal bondage.

It is therefore that Gokulanātha and many others like him have fallen in *moha* at times. Hence, we find in his *Amṛtodaya* both the aspects fully depicted.

35. GIRIDHARA UPĀDHYĀYA

(17th century)

Giridhara Upādhyāya belonged to the family of Gokulanātha of Maṅgaraunī. He is the *pitṛvyaputra*

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[1] Adhyāya 81, verses 42-44.

(nephew) of Gokulanātha and the son of Mahopādhyāya Vāgīśa from Jayantī Devī, who was also a scholar well-versed in Tarka-Śāstra, Mīmāṁsā and also in Vyākaraṇa.[1]—Like other Maithila scholars, he was also a devotee of Śiva.[2] Giridhara refers to Gokulanātha as *anvīkṣānalinīpramodanaraviḥ*.[3] Giridhara studied under Gokulanātha whom he refers to in his work—*Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya*—

pāthodhiḥ prathitor'thikalpaviṭapī *Vagiśa*nāmā sudhīḥ/

gaurītulyaguṇā videhaviṣaye devī *Jayantī* ca yaṁ
prāsūta prahatainasaṁ *giridharaṁ* tasyeyamāsītkṛtiḥ//

His only complete work is the *Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya* which has been published in the *Chowkhamba Sanskrit series* and was edited by Naiyāyika Jīvanātha Miśra of Sugaunā, Darbhanga, who belonged to the *Sodarapura* family of Mithilā.

Importance of Śabdakhanda of Navyanyāya.

It is to be noted at this stage that though Maithilas and also others studied Navya-Nyāya as before and became specialists in *Anumānakhaṇḍa*, yet during the 19th and the 20th centuries scholars gave more attention to the study of *Śabdakhaṇḍa* which might have been due to the influence of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya of Bengal. The study of *Śabdakhaṇḍa* became more popular because both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas took keen interest in its study. I feel that in this direction most likely, the Vaiyākaraṇas were much better and could produce better works.

References to authors and works.

Giridhara Upādhyāya has referred to authors and works from different śāstras in this work. I give below a few important references from the book :

Ākhyātavāda Dīdhitikṛdbhiḥ[4] *Vākyapadīye* Hariḥ[5],

[1] Beginning verses of the *Vibhaktyarthanirṇaya*.

[2] End of the Book.

[3] Anvīkṣīnalinīpramodanaravisttrayyādivādyāpagā.

[4] Pages 24, 114.

[5] PP. 30, 65, 118, 128, 129, 130, 153, 319.

Kusumāñjali[1], *Pratyakṣāloke* miśraiḥ[2], *Padavākyaratnākare* gurucaraṇāḥ[3], *Niruktam*[4], *Kāśikā* which has been profusely quoted[5], Phaṇibhāṣyakṛt[6], quotations from *Durgā-Saptaśatī* and *Rāmāyaṇa*, very often[7], *Veṇīsaṁhāra*[8], Kālidāsa and his works, *Raghuvaṁśa*, *Meghadūtam*, *Kumāra*[9], *Māgha*[10], *Kirāta*[11], *Haradatta*[12], *Kāvyaprakāśa*[13], *Tātparyaṭīkāyām miśrāḥ*[14], Maṇḍana Miśra[15], *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* quoted[16], *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*[17], Soḍaṇḍopādhyāya[18], *Sabdakaustubhe* vistare darśitaḥ[19], *Ātmatattvaviveka*,[20], *Dīdhiti* on *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Vivaraṇa*[21], Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa[22], *Bhaṭṭikāvya*[23], *Maṇi*, Maṇikṛdanuyāyinaḥ,[24] *Darpaṇe* Ṭhakkurāḥ[25], Śrīharṣa quoted[26], *Ghaṭakharpara*, verse quoted[27], Kalāpairuktam[28].

There are a few points to be noted for the information of scholars : While explaining the *puṁstva* and *strītva*, the author says, śoṇitādhikaśukrasamavetaprāṇitvam strītvam and śukrādhikaśoṇitasamavetaprāṇitvaṁ puṁstvam, and samaśukraśoṇitobhayasamavetaprāṇitvam klīvatvam. In support of this he quotes *Nirukta*, śukrātireke pumān bhavati, śoṇitātireke strī bhavati, dvābhyām samena ṣaṛḍho bhavatīti[29].

(2) Patnyām patisāgotravyapadeśo gauṇadharmaśāstrātideśāt pitṛsāgotryavyapadeśanivṛttirapi tata eva at eva kanyādānavākyam pitṛgotraghaṭitameva[30].

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[1] P. 31.

[2] PP. 37, 202, 251, 253.

[3] PP. 37, 40, 45, 58, 119, 126, 142, 130, 183, 207, 312, 315, 378, 393, 421, 438, 443.

[4] PP. 44, 76.

[5] PP. 53, 54, 188, 220, 221, 243, 256, 262, 264, 272, 279-80, 283, 285, 286-87.

[6] PP. 53, 65, 67, 109, 140.

[7] P. 55. [8] P. 63. [9] PP. 63, 160, 364.

[10] PP. 74, 180. [11] PP. 98, 152, 283. [12] PP. 286, 449.

[13] PP. 289, 135. [14] P. 117. [15] PP. 121-122, 124.

[16] P. 117. [17] P. 137. [18] P. 161.

[19] P. 173. [20] P. 194. [21] P. 194.

[22] P. 200. [23] P. 231, 431.

[24] PP. 161, 162, 252, 292. [25] P. 256.

[26] P. 267. [27] P. 282. [28] P. 454.

[29] P. 44. [30] P. 210

(3) By the term *svadhā*, 'giving away' is indicated, but not in the case of śūdra who is not permitted to use that word. *Svadhā* means vihitastyāgaḥ. Similarly, the meaning of the terms *namaḥ*, *svāhā*, *svadhā* is vihitastyāgaḥ. Śūdra should use the term *namaḥ* in *śrāddha*, etc. The terms like *hanta*, *namaḥ*, *svāhā*, *svadhā*, *vaṣaṭ*, *vauṣaṭ*, *phaṭ* and *hum*, all denote happiness and blessings[1].

(4) Just as a scorpion is produced from cowdung, so a frog is produced out of stone[2].

This is the only work which he wrote. The various references found in this book shows the wide scope of Giridhara's studies. Nothing more we know of him at present. He is placed in the 17th century.

36. BHĪṢMA MIŚRA

(18th century)

Bhīṣma Miśra flourished in Mithilā in the 18th century . He was a scholar well versed in Sāhitya. But he also had studied Tarkaśāstra like so many other Maithila scholars. At the end of his *Vṛttadarpaṇa*, in the colophon, he writes—iti śrīmaithila-bhīṣmamiśra-viracite Vṛttadarpaṇaḥ samāptaḥ[3]. He is the author of a Mahākāvya, *Gītaśaṅkara*[4]. He is at the same time the author of a small work, called *Prāmāṇyavādavicāra*, a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad. It seems from this small book that Bhīṣma Miśra might have written something more on Navyanyāya.

References in the work.

There are a few references only in the work such as, Murāri Miśra[5], *Durmila*[6], Śrīdhara's commentary on the *Gītā*[7], quotes a Kārikā from the *Sāṅkhyasaptati*[8], *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Of these, the most

[1] PP. 316-17. [2] P. 351.

[3] *Mithilā Mss. Cat.* Vol. II. p. 17.

[4] Vide—*Mithila Mss. Cat.* Vol. II. P. 53.

[5] Fol. 3.

[6] Fol. 4.

[7] Fol. 7.

[8] Fol. 7.

important reference is that of a forgotten author named *Durmila*. Bhīṣma Miśra says—tathaiva viśiṣṭajñānameva vā viśiṣṭapadārthasya viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi *daurmilyapakṣe* viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhyeva jñānam etc. This Durmila must have been a reputed scholar of his period and had lived earlier.

Durmila a reputed scholar of the 17th century.

So far we do not know more about these two writers.

37. KAVIRATNA (KHAGEŚA)

(18th century)

Kaviratna, also known as Khageśa, flourished in Mithilā during the reign of Narendra Siṁha (1743-70) king of Mithilā. Narendra Siṁha was the son of Viṣṇu Siṁha and grandson of Mahārāja Rāghava Siṁha of Mithilā. Mādhava Siṁha was his grandson. So says the well-known Maithilī poet Caṇḍā Jhā in his *Kāśīśivastuti* referred to in the *History of Tirhut*[1].

indrapurohitatulyā *gokulanāthāśca* ye khyātāḥ/
teṣāṁ śiṣyā āsan paṇḍitavareṣu *vāgīśāḥ*'/
tacchātraḥ *kaviratnaṁ* jane *khageśeti* vikhyātaḥ/
yau tau narendrasimhānmithilesāt satkṛtau yugapat/
guruśiṣyau guruvidhau sadavasare mālyasadvastraiḥ//

From the above verses it is clear that Kaviratna was the pupil of Vāgīśa, most probably the uncle of Gokulanātha. Both Vāgīśa and his disciple Kaviratna were honoured at the hands of the king of Mithilā, Narendra Siṁha, with garland and a pair of *dhautavastra* (*loin-cloth*) which was the usual gift awarded by the Mithileśa to scholars. Khageśa lived in a village named Ṭabhakā (Darbhanga). He was patronized by the Narhan Court (Subdivision Samastipura).

Kaviratna wrote a commentary on the Pratyakṣa of the *Cintāmaṇi* as is clear from he following lines found in a manuscript preserved in the *Darbhanga Sanskrit University Library*—

pratyakṣe'pi prapaśyadbhiḥ pratyakṣe dūṣaṇaṁ muhuḥ

atha śrīkaviratnena kṣīre nīraṁ nirūpyate//

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[1] P. 144.

As he was present in the court of Narendra Siṁha, Kaviratna must have lived in the last quarter of the 18th century.

38. RŪPANĀTHA ṬHĀKURA
(19th century)

Rūpanātha Ṭhākura was related to Mahārāja Mādhava Siṁha of Mithilā who came to the throne in Śaka 1183=1776 A.D. and ruled for 33 years. He was a Tārkika and wrote a sub-commentary on the *Āloka-darpaṇa* of Maheśa Ṭhakkura and called it *Bhāvaprakāśa*. It is clear from a verse in the beginning of the work—

śrīmaṭṭhakkuranirmitasya sukṛtivyākhyāvihīnasya vai/
durbodhasya ca *Darpaṇasya* racituṁ *bhāvaprakāśābhidhām*//

Rūpanātha wrote his *Bhāvaprakāśa* under the orders of Mahārāja Mādhava Siṁha as is evident from a verse in the beginning of the *Prakāśa*—

śrīmān Mādhavasiṁhabhūpatikulālaṅkāracūḍāmaṇirdattājñaḥ khalu darpaṇam sphuṭayitum Śrīrūpanātham prati/

Rūpanātha studied under Mahāmahopādhyāya Subodha who was a very great scholar of the time. The colophon of the *Prakāśa* reads as—iti Mahāmahopādhyāya-śrīsubodhaśarmādhyetṛ-Mahāmahopādhyāya—*śrīmadrūpanāthaviracitā Siddhāntalakṣaṇīya-Darpaṇabhāvaprakāśaṭīkā* samāptā. He has also written some notes, called *Vivecanā*, on Navyanyāya topics. Besides, he wrote a note on the *Sāmānya-nirukti* of Gadādhara. Rūpanātha died about 1828 A.D.

A document, dated 1221 Sāla = 1814 A. D. has been found in possession of one Kiśora Miśra of Pāhīṭola where it is written that Rūpanātha Ṭhākura had given 11 Bighās of land as gift in the Śrāddha ceremony of his father. From this we conclude that Rūpanātha lived in the 19th century A.D.[1]

[1] Vide—Pt. Jīvānanda Ṭhākura—*Candrapati—Kulapraśasti.* PP. 29-30.

Two of his sons, namely, Acyuta Ṭhākura and Mukunda Ṭhakkura were also scholars. But we have not seen any of their contributions.

39. VIŚVANĀTHA JHA

(19th century)

Viśvanātha Jhā belonged to the *Sodarapura* family of Mithilā. He was the son of Tārāpati, grand-son of Bhavānīpati of the *Mahiyā* branch of the *Sodarapura* family. He lived in the village Ṭhāḍhī where Vācaspati Miśra I is believed to have lived. He had studied under Ṛddhinātha Jhā a renowned Naiyāyika of the period, of Village Cakautī, Darbhanga.

After having finished his studies in Mithilā, he left for further studies and went to Navadvīpa which had by that time some luminaries of Navyanyāya. He studied under Goloka Nyāyaratna and later on, after the latter's death, under Prasanna Tarkaratna. Having finished his studies there, he returned home and like other scholars of Mithilā, began to teach at his own place which later on, came to be called *tol*. This was sometime about 1890 A.D.

His works.

Amongst his contributions, we know that he wrote a commentary on the *Vyadhikaraṇa* section of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, called *Siddhānta-sāra*. He also commented upon the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana and named it *Prakāśa*. It has been published from the Chowkhamba, Varaṇasī. Towards the end of this work, he gives his own account, from which we learn that he wrote his *Prakāśa* at the suggestion of the Mithileśa Mahārāja Lakṣmīśvara Siṁha who had received the kingdom of Mithilā from the British hands in san 1287 sāla = 1880 A.D. (mithilāmahīśasyājñāmavāpyaudayaniprakāśam). In the colophon the author writes—iti maithilarāja-paṇḍita—naiyāyikavaropādhyāyopanāmakaśrīmadviśvanāthaśarmakṛto lakṣaṇāvalīprakāśaḥ samāptaḥ. From this we also know that he was the court Paṇḍita of Mahārāja Lakṣmīśwara Siṁgh of Darbhanga.

It is to be noted at this place that though the glories of

Navadvīpa, which began with Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma just in the beginning of the 15th century A.D. and were continued by the luminaries, like Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa, Guṇānanda, Rāmarudra and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya who passed away in 1709 A.D., could flourish a little beyond one single century. Again, Mithilā with a host of scholars, such as, Maheśa, Jagadīśa, Madhusūdana, Mādhava, Keśava, Devanātha and the Upādhyāyas, like Gokulanātha of Maṅgaraunī, revived her almost faded glories.

Glories, and centres of scholarship in modern period.

Revival of learning in Mithilā.

But it is also to be noted that after Gokulanātha, no doubt, scholars who were great teachers and also quite bold in the so-called *śāstrārtha*, flourished in Mithilā, but their scholarship could never match with that of the old ones. Their learning became narrow and one-sided. They began to give more time to active teaching and to acquire cheap reputation by boldly facing the arguments in *śāstrārtha* assemblies. Real learning began to disappear fast. Interest in producing scholarly works faded away. The little they could do was to write what was, in common parlance, called *khaḍarā* or *vivecanā*, short or long notes. I have seen myself teachers and intelligent students studying these notes and becoming successful in their profession. Real scholarship was almost lost. Even then Mithilā, as will be clear from the following pages, could continue her scholarship and attract students from far and near through some of the scholars whose reputation had still kept the old torch of learning burning though with somewhat dim light. It was therefore, that many students went to Bengal or to Kāśī to study under Bengali and Deccani scholars.

Kāśī was for a pretty long time, till our own days, a great cosmopolitan centre of Sanskrit learning. I would go a step further and say that after the fall of Mithilā and Navadvīpa, Kāśī became the chief centre of all-round scholarship. Kāśī had attracted by that time all good scholars from South, Mithilā and Bengal and also from other parts of the country. Even at Kāśī the supremacy in scholarship was kept by the

Vārāṇasī a great centre of learning.

Southerners first and then it came into the hands of Maithilas.

It is to be noted that Kāśī had its position as a great *tīrtha*—the place of achieving *Mokṣa*. Perhaps great *jñānins* and *sannyāsins* alone adorned the place. Due to lack of convenient transport, scholars did not easily venture to come to Kāśī. So scholarship flourished in other places. But as soon as some facility became available they began to come to Kāśī and lived there. Thus, it has become at last a great centre of learning.

In support for my statement made above I would like to quote from *the History of navyanyāya in Mithilā*[1]—"When Giridhara wrote, say, about 1720 A.D. the most glorious period of Navadvīpa had definitely ended with the death of Gadādhara in 1709 A. D. and the signs of a distinct revival of the ancient glory of Mithilā were discernible at Maṅgroni."

40. DHARMADATTA JHĀ ALIAS BACCĀ JHĀ

(1860-1918)

Personal history.

Dharmadatta Jhā, ordinarily known as Baccā Jhā, was the son of Durgādatta Jhā and grandson of Ratnapāṇi Jhā. He was born in 1860 in Navānī (Darbhanga). He studied in Mithilā under the then well-known Naiyāyikas, namely, Jaṭādhara Jhā of Pilakhawār (Darbhanga), Viśvanātha Jhā of Ṭhāḍhī and Babujana *alias* Babuā Jhā of Pilakhawār. As was the practice in those days, serious students of Mithilā used to come to Kāśī which had by that time become the main centre of learning in Nothern India, to give a finishing touch to their studies under expert guidance of most senior teachers. So Baccā Jhā came to Kāśī and studied Vedānta and other Śāstras under Mahāmahopādhyāya Bālaśāstrī Rānāḍe who was then occupying the post of Professor of Sāṅkhya in the *Government Sanskrit College* (now the *Sanskrit University*) and Viśuddhānanda Sarasvatī, the well-known yogin and Sannyāsin

[1] Page 197.

and a Vedāntin of great repute. Having finished his further studies at Kāśī, he went back to Mithilā and following the past traditions of Mithilā taught students at his own place. After sometime he spent most of his time at Bombay with some of his Sannyāsin students. With their assistance he had started a vidyālaya in his own home village. Sureśvarānanda was his most favourite disciple, in academic field, who used to live for some days in Mithilā along with Baccā Jhā.

Baccā Jhā was indeed a versatile scholar of his time specialized in Navya-Nyāya. He had wonderful control over Sanskrit language and it was therefore, that he wrote works on Kāvya-Sāhitya as well.

His works.

He has written mainly on Navya-Nyāya and all his commentaries are known by the name *gūḍhārthatattvāloka*. So he writes in his commentary on the *Vyutpattivāda*—

maithilānvayajātena dharmadattena dhīmatā/
vyutpattivādagūḍhārthatattvāloko vitanyate// [1]

His works are : commentaries on the *Sāmānyanirukti*, *Avacchedakatvanirukti*, *Vyāptipañcaka*, and *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa*. These are the sub-commentaries on the commentaries of Jagadiśa. They are published from Vārāṇasī. He has also commented upon the *Sāmānyanirukti* of Gadādhara and also on his *Vyutpattivāda*. These are also published. Besides, his commentary on the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on the *Bhagavadgītā* has been published from Bombay. Most probably, his selection of the name of his commentaries was due to the name of the commentary of Madhusūdana.

He has, it seems, followed Jagadīśa's commentary on the various problems of Navya-Nyāya and has accordingly, commented upon them. Some of his commentaries are still unpublished. He has also written a commentary on the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* and *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*. After having written enough on the Navya-Nyāya his attention was drawn towards Prācīna-Nyāya. But it was too late and he could not write more. His commentaries on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Tātparyaṭīkā* could not make much

[1] Beginning verse of his commentary on the *Vyutpattivāda*.

progress. Beside these, he wrote a Campū, named *Sulocanā-Mādhava* which is still unpublished.

He was undoubtedly a very great Naiyāyika of the period. He had the genius to produce great works. But to my mind, it seems that his method of expression is most difficult. He seems to have given more attention to the Navy-Nyāya phraseology and higher dialectics than to the *tattvas*, like so many Navya-Naiyāyikas. So his works are very difficult not because of the subtleties of the subject matter but because of the mode of expression.

He taught students at his own place and did not accept any post till the opening of the *Dharmasamāja Sanskrit College* at Muzaffarpura. He became the first principal of the college. He was a very unassuming scholar and had imbibed the Vedāntic spirit within himself. He passed away in 1918 at a premature age of 59 only.

Amongst his well-known students Mahāmahopādhyāya Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra, Jagadīśa Jhā his eldest son, Vidyāvācaspati Śaśinātha Jhā of Rāṇṭī and Lakṣmīnātha Jhā of Sīmā (Darbhanga) were great scholars who also contributed to scholarship. His grandson Ratīśa Jha is also a good Naiyāyika.

41. JAYADEVA MIŚRA

(1854-1926)

Personal history.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Jayadeva Miśra was born in 1854 on the Full-moon day of Kārttika in the village Gajaharā, Darbhanga in the *Sodarpura family* of Śrotriya Brāhmaṇas of Mithilā. Citranātha *alias* Bakheḍī Miśra was his father and Śacī was the name of his mother. He was the eldest son of his father. He had five younger brothers, namely, Vāsudeva, Janārdana, Madhusūdana, Mukunda and Keśava. Of these, Madhusūdana was a great scholar well-versed in Vyākaraṇa Dharmaśāstra, Sāhitya and Nyāya. He had studied the Śāstras under his eldest brother. The second and the sixth brothers, Vāsudeva and Keśava were great Jyotiṣīs and Dharmaśāstrins. Jayadeva Miśra's eldest uncle, Poṣaṇa Miśra was well-versed in Vyākaraṇa and Śabdakhaṇḍa. His

other two uncles, Bhagavāndatta and Gaṇeśadatta were Jyotiṣīs of great repute. His grand-father Kālikādatta Miśra was a Vaiyākaraṇa and a Dharmaśāstrī.

Jayadeva Miśra married thrice. The first wife died very young and did not leave any issue. The second wife named *Sūgā*, was the second daughter of Janaka Jhā of village *Binbī*, in the territory of Nepal, near Janakapura, the capital of Videha. She died at an young age of 24 and left two sons. The eldest is Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Miśra, the author of the present work and the younger is Ramesha Mishra.

His career as a student.

He studied in his own house under his uncle. Due to certain obstacles at home, he left his village and came to study under Haladhara Jhā, more known as Hallī Jhā, of Harinagar (Darbhanga). He studied there Vyākaraṇa, Dharmaśāstra and Tantra. He did not stay there for long and soon came to the village Gandhawāri and lived there for a few years under the patronage of Rāmakāśī devī, the maternal grand-mother of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Sir Gangānātha Jhā and studied there under Mahāmahopādhyāya Rājanātha Miśra, ordinarily known as Raje Miśra. He finished his study of the śāstras there and came to Kāśī in 1872-73 along with his patron and *guru*, Rājanātha Miśra. They came to Kāśī on boat. It was at Gandhawāri where the late Dr. Gangānātha Jhā was put under the tutorship of Mahāmahopādhyāya Jayadeva Miśra. So when he came to Kāśī for further higher studies, he was admitted to the *Government Sanskrit College* in 1875.

He studied there under Mahāmahopādhyāya Bālaśāstrī Rānāḍe, who was well-known as *Bālasarasvatī*. Jayadeva Miśra found himself quite happy amongst the other senior pupils of the Śāstrī, namely, Dāmodara Śāstrī, Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī, Śivakumāra Miśra who were senior to him, and Rāmakṛṣṇa Śāstrī *alias* Tātiyā Śāstrī as his junior class-mate. All of them were great savants of Sanskrit learning of the period. Under Bālaśāstrī he studied Vyākaraṇa. Śivakumāra Miśra was his senior class-mate and so Jayadeva Miśra looked upon him as his *guru*. They studied more deeply all the Śāstras jointly, mutually helping each other. Jaya-

deva Miśra studied Navya-Nyāya under Mahāmahopādhyāya Kailāśacandraśiromaṇi and Vedānta under Viśuddhānanda Sarasvatī. By this time he had studied all the other Śāstras and had become reputed for his deep learning at Kāśī.

In about 1880, the late Mahārāja Lakṣmīśvara Siṁha of Darbhanga founded a Sanskrit Vidyālaya at Kāśī under the supervision of Viśuddhānanda Sarasvatī. Along with the great veterans of Sanskritic studies, like Śivakumāra Miśra, Sudhākara Dvivedī, Duḥkhabhañjana Kavi, Kailāśacandraśiromaṇi and others Jayadeva Miśra was also appointed a teacher of Vyākaraṇa.

His reputation as a scholar.

In course of a few years after the death of Paṇḍita Śivakumāra Miśra, he became the leading scholar not only of Vyākaraṇa but of almost all the śāstras at Kāśī. He was offered several posts outside Kāśī by the Mahārāja of Darbhanga, of Jammu and Kashmir and similar other personages, but he did not leave Kāśī which had continued to be the centre of learning. Later on, when the Benares Hindu University was founded in 1916, at the request of Paṇḍita Madanamohana Mālavīya he joined the Oriental College where he continued till his last days.

He passed away at Kāśī, according to the old traditions of India, on the bank of Gaṅgā at *Maṇikarṇikā Ghāṭa*, half merged in the water of the Gaṅgā, on the 7th day of the śuklapakṣa of Phālguna, 1926 A.D. at the age of 72.

He was awarded the best prize for students in his college by Mr. J. Neisfield, the then Principal of the College, in 1879. He was awarded the *certificate of Honour* (Pratiṣṭhāpatram) by the Mahārāja of Darbhanga in 1957 saṁvat = 1900 A. D. He was awarded, as a personal distinction, the title of Mahāmahopādhyāya in 1919. By this time he had achieved the reputation of being the greatest Sanskrit *Vidvān* in India.

His contributions.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Jayadeva Miśra performed a *Cātuścarṇa-yāga* based on the four vedas, of a big tank constructed by him in his home village, *Gajaharā*. He wrote three very important works–(1) *Vijayā*, a commentary influenced by Navyanāyaya, on the *Paribhāṣendu-*

khara of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa. This is read and studied by scholars of Vyākaraṇa as a text book. No scholar considers himself a full-fledged Vaiyākaraṇa today without having studied this *Vijayā*. His second book is the *Śāstrārtharatnāvalī* an independent work based on *Pāṇinisūtras* and the *Vyākaraṇaparibhāṣās*. This is also fully influenced by his studies of Mīmāṁsā and Navyanyāya. The last work was his commentary on Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vyutpattivāda*, named *Jayā*. Here we find a glimpse of his deep knowledge of Nyāyaśāstra. It was believed in scholarly circles that Mm. Miśra alone knows the secrets of the problems of *Śabdakhaṇḍa*. Unfortunately, he could not finish it. Even today all these works are studied by scholars with great respect and interest.

His method of explaining problems.

The secret of the scholarship of Mm. Miśra was that he had mastered the Śāstras and possessed a unique way of explaining the most intricate problems of Śāstras in so simple a way that even less intelligent students could very easily grasp the problems. This clarity of expression is always found in all his works. As one who had the opportunity to study the Śāstras at his feet, I have no hesitation to write that his method of teaching and writing on the problems of the Śāstras was so easy and clear that even an ordinary student could understand them with great ease. His language and methodology of expression are very simple and intelligible. This has won great admiration for him in the world of scholars.


He was a great devotee of Lord Śiva (Viśvanātha) and Gaṅgā. He was, as people used to say, a very great advocate of Indian Culture both in theory and in practice.


I quote below a verse of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Sir Gaṅgānātha Jhā written at the death of his great teacher—

jayaḥ kule jayo'bhyāse jayaḥ paṇḍitamaṇḍale/
jayo mṛtyau jayo mokṣe jayadevaḥ sadā jayaḥ//

I give below an extract from the genealogical table of the *Sodarpura family* to trace his genealogy from the *Bījī-Puruṣa*, as given by the late Nirasū Jha, the greatest *Pañjīkāra* of Mithilā in the 20th century—

An Extract from the *Genealogical table of the Sodarapura family of Mithilā*—





42. LOKANĀTHA JHĀ
(20th century)

In the present century also, Mithilā has maintained the study of Navyanyāya on traditional lines. Lokanātha Jhā was one of the best Naiyāyikas of this period. He was the disciple of Baccā Jhā. He lived in the village named Gaṅgaulī. He taught several brilliant students, of whom Mahāmahopādhyāya Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra of Navaṭola (Darbhanga), was the well known professor in the Sanskrit College, Benares Hindu University. Lokanātha Jhā has written a critical work on Navyanyāya, named *Ubhayābhāvanirūpaṇa* and *Jātībādhakapariṣkāra*.

43. YADUNĀTHA MIŚRA
(1885-1928)

Yadunātha Miśra, son of Paṇḍita Jayanātha Miśra and grand-son of Nyāyopādhyāya Maṇinātha Miśra, was born in Lālagañja, Darbhanga, in the *Sodarapura* family of Maithila śrotriya Brāhmaṇas in 1885. He studied Śabdakhaṇḍa under *Mahāvaiyākaraṇa* Juḍāna Jhā and then studied proper Nyāya (*Anumānakhaṇḍa*) under Lokanātha Jhā of Gangaulī, Darbhanga. After he finished his studies in Nyāya, he was appointed a teacher in the Lakṣmīpura Vidyālaya where he taught students for many years. He was a very unassuming scholar.

He has written *Vyañjanāvāda*, *Samāsaśaktivāda* and a commentary on the *Padavākyaratnākara* of Gokula-

nātha, named *Gūḍhārthadīpikā.* He has also written a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, called *Pradīpa*, a beginning verse of which is—

His contributions.

Jagadviditavaiduṣyaśaṅkarānvayajanmanā/
nyāyasūtrapradīpo'yaṁ yadunāthena tanyate//

Unfortunately, he could not finish this *Pradīpa* and passed away in 1928.

44. ŚAŚINĀTHA JHĀ
(1878-1963)

Vidyāvācaspati Śaśinātha Jhā was born in Rāṇṭi, a village in the District of Darbhanga, in about 1878. He was the son of Hirāmaṇi Jhā and grandson of Gṛhamaṇi Jhā of the *Daribarā* family of Kāsyapagotra. His father was a great Jyotiṣī who had received a *Certificate of Honour* from the Mahārāja of Darbhanga. He had studied Navyanyāya under Dharmadatta Jhā *alias* Baccā Jhā. After having finished his studies at home, Śaśinātha Jhā got a job in Gujrat under the Jaina Sādhus who were keen to study Navyanyāya. He passed three-fourth of his life in Gujrat in teaching the various schools of Indian philosophy, particularly, Navyanyāya.

He wrote many small and big books on Nyāya for the Sādhus who published them in their own name without ever acknowledging the help taken from Paṇḍita Jhā. As the Paṇḍitas were paid for these works they did not object to this practice which is so common even today amongst the Jaina Sādhus. This is not a new practice. It was prevelent even in old days when the court Paṇḍitas wrote works which were published in the name of their patrons.

He has got to his credit some small philosophical poems in his own mother tounge *Maithili* and also in Sanskrit which are published. He returned from Gujrat in about 1949 or so. In 1951 the state Government of Bihar established the *Mithilā Institute of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning* at Darbhanga, with a big donation of Dr. Kameśwara Singh Bahādur, Mahārājādhirāja of Darbhanga,

under the Directorship of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Mishra, as its first Director. Along with other experienced experts of Sanskrit learning in different branches, Śaśinātha Jhā was also appointed as a *viśiṣṭavidvāna* in Darśana. He stayed there till November 1963 and passed away at his home village. He has left three sons.

While he was in the *Mithila Research Institute*, at my suggestion he wrote, in a way, a very difficult work, named *Tritalāvacchedakatāvāda*, which has been published by the Institute. There is very little substance *tattva* in this work. It is written only to show how the dialectical phraseology of Navyanyāya can be multiplicated. In other words, he has shown how the terms *avacchedakatā* and *prakāratā* which are the very life of Navyanyāya, can be expressed one after the other in order to confuse the opponents in a discussion and disputation.

The author says that all the discussions of a Navyatārkikas are conducted with the use of *avacchedakatā* alone, so is the case with the *vyāptivāda* also for the navyatārkikas. This *avacchedakatā* again, is always determined (nirūpita) with the dialectical phrases, like *prakāratā*, *viśeṣyatā*, *pratiyogitā*, *anuyogitā*, *etc*. It is to be kept in mind that an *avacchedakatā* may be determined with another *avacchedakatā* but a *prakāratā* and others cannot be determined with another *prakāratā* and others. These however, can be determined with determined alone.

It will not be out of place to explain certain more common navyanyāya terms here, like *viśeṣyatā* and *avacchedakatā* etc. (*Avacchedaka* = it is defined as that which may be considered as an essential constitutive attribute or predicate-viśeṣaṇībhūto dharmo'vacchedakaḥ tasmin avacchedake avacchedakatā varttate). It is to be kept in mind that in such cases the term *dharma* means anything which as predicate will serve to define a subject, of course, the term does include any guṇas also. So in the expression, *daṇḍavānayam puruṣaḥ*, daṇḍa is a dharma and so an *avacchedaka*. An *avacchedaka* has a dharma called *avacchedakatā*. Now this is a case of *svarūpasambandha*, which is defined as—*sambandhāntareṇa*

Common Navyanyāya terms explained.

viśiṣṭapratītijananāyogyatvam or *sambandhāntaramantareṇa viśiṣṭapratītijanakatvam*; that is, it is the relation which must be held to exist in a case where a determinate knowledge or judgement (*viśiṣṭapratīti* or *viśiṣṭajñāna*) could not have been effected by any other relation, like *samavāya and saṁyoga*. In other words, this relation must be either the subject itself (anuyogin), or the predicate (pratiyogin) of the said judgement, as has been mentioned in the *Nyāyakośa*,[1]—*anuyogi pratiyogyanyatarasvarūpaḥ sambandhaviśeṣaḥ*.

In order to explain the above let us take an example, *ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi*, where there are three factors *ghaṭa*, *jñāna* which has ghaṭa as its object (ghaṭaviṣayakajñāna), and the knower (*jñātā*) which is the substratum of that jñāna. Here, there is the relation of *samavāya* between jñāna and jñātā. Now, what is the relation between ghaṭa and jñāna in order to justify the above judgement? This cannot be *samavāya* or *saṁyoga* for obvious reasons. Hence, the only possible determining factor (niyāmaka) is the *ghaṭasvarūpa* itself. This whole thing thus can be expressed as—*ghaṭaṁ jānāmi ityākāraviśiṣṭabuddhiniyāmako ghaṭaḥ*, or *ghaṭe jñānagataghaṭavaiśiṣṭyaniyāmakatā varttate*.

In order to fully illustrate the above I quote below a note from Dr. A. Venis's translation of the *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, *Index* :

All instances of *avacchedakatā* may be brought under either *viṣayatā* or *pratiyogitā* : under the former, if the relation considered be that of knowledge, *sc.* of the relation between subject and predicate in a judgement, in which case the *avacchedaka* may be *atiprasakta*; thus, in *ghaṭam jānāmi*, *ghaṭatva*, the *avacchedaka* is not definitely limited in its application (*anati-prasakta*); for *ghaṭatva* is found in *ghaṭas* other than the particular *ghaṭa* now perceived : under the latter, if determination by negation (abhāva) be under consideration, in which case the *avacchedaka* must be of duly limited application, *anyūnānati-prasakta*:—(*avacchedakatvam dvividham-svarūpasambandhatvarūpamanyūnānatirikta-prasaktarūpam ca, ādyaṁ viṣayatānirūpitaṁ dvitīyam pratiyogitānirūpitam*). The effect of this word in a long *samāsa* is usually nothing

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[1] P. 913. 3n.

more than to convert the immediately preceding word into the genetive case.

To illustrate *viṣayatā* take again, *ghaṭaṁ jānāmi*. This judgment may be expressed thus—(1) *ghaṭavṛttiviṣayatānirūpakaṁ* (jñānaṁ). Here, in *ghaṭa* exist both *ghaṭatva* which is *avacchedaka* and the *viṣayatā* which is represented by the termination *am* of *ghaṭam*. Between *ghaṭa* and *viṣayatā*, the *vṛttitvasambandha* holds (*amarthaviṣayatāyām ghaṭasya vṛttitvasambandhena anvayaḥ*). Between *viṣayatā* and *jñāna*, the *nirūpakatvasambandha* holds (*viṣayatāyāḥ jñāne nirūpakatvasambandhena anvayaḥ. nirūpaka = Prakāśa*. Or (2) the judgment may be expressed thus : *gaṭatvāvacchinnā ghaṭavṛttiḥ yā viṣayatā tannirūpakaṁ jñānam*. Since in this case, the *viṣayatā* is dependent on its locus, the *ghaṭa* and the *ghaṭa*, in its turn, is essentially constituted by (*avacchinna*) *ghaṭatva*, the relation between *ghaṭatva* and *viṣayatā* is termed *avacchinnatvasambandha* (*ghaṭaviśeṣaṇībhūtaghaṭatvasya viṣayatāyām dharmipāratantryeṇa avacchinnatvasambandhena anvayaḥ*). Since also *ghaṭatva* is *avacchedaka* and therefore, possesses *avacchedakatā ghaṭatvāvacchinnā* may be expressed by *ghaṭatvaniṣṭhāvacchedakatānirūpikā*, where *nirūpikā* qualifies *viṣayatā*.

It may be added that Gadādhara in his *Viṣayatāvāda* declares the modern view to be that *viṣayatā* is not a form of *svarūpasambandha* but a distinct *sambandha*. The modern school of Nyāya in denying that *viṣayatā* is a *svarūpasambandha* distinguishes it from *viṣayitā*; the former is a *dharma* pertaining to object known, (*viṣaya*); the latter is a *dharma* pertaining to cognition (*jñāna*), or to desire (*icchā*), or to volition (*kṛti*).

Pratiyogitā or determination by negation (*yasyābhāvaḥ sa pratiyogī*), is the relation between positive entities (*bhāva*) and their negations (*abhāva*). The *dharma* which serves to exclude any particular *bhāva* from another is termed *pratiyogitāvacchedaka*; and the *pratiyogitā* is said to be *taddharmāvacchinnā*. Thus, the negation, *ghaṭo nāsti*, may be expressed by *ghaṭatvāvacchinnapratiyogitāko'bhāvaḥ*. Under *prtiyogitā* may be brought the causal relation, *kāryakāraṇabhāva*. Thus, *kāryāvyavahitapūrvakṣaṇavṛttyatyantābhāvāpratiyogitā kāraṇatā*, the being a cause consists in not being the

counter-entity to any absolute non-existence which might find place in the moment of time immediately preceding the existence of the effect, that is, a cause is that which must precede the effect: and *prāgabhāvapratiyogitā kāryatā*, the effect is the counter-entity to its own precedent non-existence. And the *avacchedaka* of both *kāraṇa* and *kārya* is *anyūnānatiprasakta*, as was shown above, to be necessary:—*yathā ghaṭakāraṇatāvacchedakam daṇḍatvameva na tu dravyatvam nīladaṇḍatvam vā evam daṇḍakāryatāvacchedakamapi ghaṭatvameva na tu nīlaghaṭatvam dravyatvam vā ādyasya nyūnavṛttitvāt antyasya atiprasaktatvāt.*

The precise usage of *avacchedakāvacchinna* remains to be noted. The ungainly compound is employed to include all possible cases of any *sambandha*. Thus, if we wish to turn the maxim, from negation of cause to negation of effect, (*kārṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ*), into the current coin of the Nyāya, we must define it more closely in terms of certain *sambandhas*, without depriving it of its universality by the mention of any special cause, namely, *tantu*, or any special effect, *paṭa*; and this may be effected by using the above compound, thus—*Kāraṇatāvacchedakāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāvaprayojyaḥ kāryatāvacchedakāvacchinnābhāvaḥ* (*prayojyaḥ*=*janitaḥ*). But if the *avacchedaka* is specially named in any case, namely, *tantutva* or *paṭatva* (in the above example), the word *avacchedaka* is omitted as unnecessary.

As has already been said in various places, there is not much stuff in such books. It is only an instance to show the subtleties of brain and also to confuse the less equipped opponents. In a way, it is a waste of energy for a real student eager to learn the śāstra.

There is one more work attributed to Śaśinātha Jhā. He has written a philosophical drama, named *Ācāryavijaya* in six acts in his mother tongue *Maithilī*. The drama deals with the criticism of Udayana against Buddhist view. It is still unpublished.

45. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ
(1871—1941)

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Sir Gaṅgānātha Jhā was born on September 25, 1871, in a village, called

Gandhavāri in the District of Darbhanga, in Mithilā. He was the third son of Śri Tīrthanātha Jhā and Rāmakāśī Devī. He was a versatile scholar and had studied almost all the śāstras except Jyotiṣa under the expert guidance of his teachers, amongst whom the names of Mahāmahopādhyāyas Jayadeva Mishra, Citradhara Mishra, Shivakumāra Mishra and Gangādhara Śāstrī of Vārāṇasī deserve mention. He came to Benares and studied there for several years. He studied the Śāstra both on traditional and modern critical lines.

After having finished his studies on modern lines, he became the Librarian of the Mahārājādhirāja of Darbhanga's Library. As a Librarian he had ample opportunity to study even modern sciences through popular writings. He became thus, fully equiped with both ancient and modern sciences. He was then appointed the Professor of Sanskrit in the *Muir Central College, Allahabad* in 1902. He obtained the *degree of Doctor of Letters* on his thesis on the *Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*. It is also to be noted here that he was the first scholar to obtain the D. Litt. degree from the Allahabad University. Formerly, the degree used to be awarded to a Sanskrit scholar alone. The title of *Mahāmahopādhyāya*, a, personal distinction, was then conferred on him in 1910 by the British Government.

He served the old *Muir Central College* till 1919 when he was appointed the Principal of the *Government Sanskrit College*, Benares. He introduced several reforms in Sanskrit education and also in the activities of the College. Later on, he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the re-organised Allahabad University in 1923 which post he adorned till 1932.

Though engaged in multifarious administrative duties, he was able to find ample time to continue his higher studies and translations of most difficult works of Indian Philosophy. He was an authority in Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and also in other branches of philosophy. Indeed he was a versatile scholar.

The only contribution of his to Nyāya is his small *ṭippaṇī*, called *Khadyota* on the *Nyāyasūtra*. It is a brief note mostly based on the *Tātparyyaṭīkā* and the *Pariśuddhi*. It has been written in easy style and is quite

intelligible. It has been included in his editions of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.

Besides, he has translated into English the entire texts of the *Nyāya-Sūtra*, *Bhāṣyā* and the *Vārttika*. He has also edited the commentary of Raghūttama called *Bhāṣyacandra* on the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*. It runs upto the 17th Sūtra of the third chapter, second Āhnika. The only incomplete manuscript found by Dr. Jhā was written on Palm-leaf in Maithilī script. We have not heard of any other copy of it. It has been published in the Chaukhamba Sanskrit series.

He passed away on November 17, 1941 at Prayāga. In the memory of this great Savant of Sanskrit learning his students and admirers founded a *Research Institute* at Allahabad for higher researches in Sanskrit.

This is in brief a survey of the development of Nyāya literature from Gotama down to the present day in Mithilā, the home of Nyāya. I have collected material from various sources and having studied them have now presented the summary to the scholars for their use. There were many more scholars whose works are referred to in various manuscripts, but as they could not be traced so far, I stop here and leave the work to be continued in future with fresh researches to follow.

Besides, I know there were great scholars, like Babujana Jhā of Pilakhawāḍa, Jīvanātha Miśra of Sugounā, Bechana Jha of Sahoḍawā, Sade Jhā of Mangaraunī, Jaṭādhara Jhā, Viṣṇupati, son of Mahāmahopādhyāya Ramāpati, who had written a commentary called *Tattvadīpana* on the Śabdakhaṇḍa of the *Cintāmaṇi*, Ṛddhinātha Jhā, Mahāmahopādhyāya Bālakṛṣṇa Miśra of Navaṭola, and so on, but as I could not get any written work of these scholars it was not possible for me to include their name in this place. I reserve it for future edition.

This is what Mithilā, the home of Nyāya, both Navya and Prācīna has contributed to our knowledge of the śāstra. I now pass on to the contributions made by Bengal to this science.

BENGAL SCHOOL

1. VĀSUDEVA SĀRVABHAUMA

(15th century)

About the middle of the fifteenth century scholars in Bengal became fully aware of the learning, name and fame of Mithilā in the advancement of Navya-nyāya. Mithilā had been a centre of learning even from the vedic days. The *Śata-patha Brāhmaṇa* says that scholars from far off places used to flock at the court of Janaka for spiritual knowledge. It seems that since the vedic days Mithilā has been a most flourishing centre of learning, particularly, in Darśana-śāstra, which is a means to acquire visualization of the Ātman, so says the śruti-*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*. Later history also shows that the torch of learning continued to burn in Mithilā even in later centuries.

Tradition of Scholarship in Mithilā

This being the back-ground of scholarship in Mithilā, no wonder, it continued to attract enthusiastic scholars even in mediaeval and modern periods. Thus, it was about the middle of the fiteenth century when scholars from Bengal began to come to Mithilā, the home of Nyāyaśāstra, for studies in Navyanyāya. History tells us that it was Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma who first came to the seminary (*Caupāḍi*) of Pakṣadhara Miśra. He studied there for some years and committed to memory all that was taught to him at the seminary. Prof. Bhattācārya is of opinion that Sārvabhauma did not go to Mithilā for study. He learnt Nyāya under his father.[1] But as Mithilā was the only centre of Navya-nyāya at that time and as there was no tradition in Bengal, so if Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma did not go to Mithilā, then his father might have gone to Mithilā for the study of Nyāya; who could have otherwise brought *navyanyāya* from Mithilā to Bengal?

After having finished his studies there when he wanted to leave the āśrama of his *guru*, he was subjected

[1] *Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 40.

to a very difficult test, called *śalākāparīkṣā*, which meant that the examinee would be required to explain all the points contained in any line written in the manuscript on which a *śalākā*, pointer, or a small stick, was placed by the examiner. It seems that along with the *Śarayantra-Parīkṣā*, *Śalākā-parīkṣā* was also prevelent in Mithilā. The former appears to be far superior and dreadful. Vāsudeva was successful at this test and it is said that he was given the title of *Sārvabhauma* by his *guru*.[1] Finding that the teachers of Mithilā did not allow any outsider to carry home, outside Mithilā, any written book or notes, Vāsudeva committed to memory the entire *Tattvacintāmaṇi* along with its notes of his teacher and also the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* and then only he was allowed to leave the place.

Navya-Nyāya school founded at Navadvīpa

He came to Navadvīpa and there founded a school of Nyāya and taught students in his own *ṭol*. Raghunātha śiromaṇi, Raghunandana and Krishnānanda were some of his well-known pupils. Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma had also studied Vedānta at Kāśī and it is said that towards the end of his life he became more interested in Vaiṣṇavaism.

Caitanyadeva was also his pupil and it was therefore, that he became devoted to the vaiṣṇava cult and went to Jagannātha-Purī and passed his days there under the patronage of king Gajapati Pratāparudra of Orissa.[2]

His contribution

About his contribution to Navyanyāya so far we know only of a commentary, called *Sārāvalī* on the *Cintāmaṇi*[3]. Sārvabhauma had written some more works, on different subjects.

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[1] *Indian Logic*, p. 462.

[2] I have got before me books like *Indian Logic*, by Dr S. C. Vidyabhusan, *History and bibliography of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature*, published in the *Sarsvati Bhavan Studies*, *Volumes*, 3, 4, 5, 7, and *Vaṅge navyanyāyacarcā* by Dineshacandra Bhattacharya. All these works contain profuse historical and social facts in connection with the Nyāya scholars of Bengal. As interested scholars can easily read these from the above books, I will not go into those details. I will however, confine myself to those aspects only which are necessary for the History of Indian Philosophy.

[3] A Manuscript of it is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit library*, Benares, No. 184.

References to the following authorities are found there : Yajñapati[1], Varddhamāna[2], Narasiṁha[3], Ācārya sammati[4], Ācāryamatam[5], *Pratyakṣa-maṇiprakāśikā*[6], *Śabdamaṇiparīkṣā*[7]. But according to Prof. D. C. Bhaṭṭācārya, the name of Sārvabhauma's commentary was *Maṇiparīkṣā* for which he had found important references in a manuscript. Some of the references are : Ācārya[8], *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*[9], *Khaṇḍana*[10], gurucaraṇa[11], ṭīkākāra[12], tattvabodhakāra[13], *Darpaṇa*[14], *Dravya-Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*[15], Narasiṁha,[16] *Nibandha*[17], *Parimala*[18] and so on.[19]

Reference found in his works

2—VĀHINĪPATI

(15th century)

Vāhinīpati is a name which is so very common in Orissa. So, as Vāsudeva lived in Purī, he named his son Vāhinīpati. He is the son of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and his full name was Janeśvara Vāhinīpati. He has written a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi* and *Āloka* also which is called *Uddyota*. A manuscript of it is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit Library*, Varāṇasī. In the beginning, the author pays homage to Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. As he had studied the śāstra under Sārvabhauma, he was both a pupil and a son. In the manuscript under reference there are constant references to *pitṛcaraṇāḥ*[20] and also in one

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[1] fols. 45b, 47a, 47b, 93b, 111a, 117a, 133b.

[2] fols. 45b, 133b, *Līlāvatīprakāśa*.

[3] fol. 53a.

[4] This is the opinion of Ācārya, most likely Udayana, 53b.

[5] fol. 161a. [6] fol. 154a. [7] fol. 168a.

[8] Fol. 162/2. [9] Fol. 39/2. [10] Fol. 4/1.

[11] Fol. 8/2. [12] Fols. 8/1, 10/2. [13] Fol. 100/1.

[14] Fol. 50/1 [15] Fol. 179/1. [16] Fols. 53/1, 57/2.

[17] Fols. 110/2, 187/8, 192/2. [18] Fol. 26/1.

[19] *Navyanyāyacarcā* p. 39.

[20] vide—fols. 3a, 4a, etc.

place he says *ityasmākam paitṛkaḥ panthāḥ*, which cannot but refer to Sārvabhauma for the simple reason that before Vāhinīpati, Sārvabhauma was the only Bengali scholar of navyanyāya whom he could refer. This is further supported by the colophon of the manuscript where the term *Bhaṭṭācārya* is prefixed to his name.[1]

Though the term *Bhaṭṭācārya* is found to have been used in case of many Maithila scholars also, but in the present context it seems to have been definitely used for a Bengali scholar.

3. RAGHUNĀTHA ŚIROMAṆI

(15th century)

Family history

Raghunātha was born in a very humble family of Maithila Brāhmaṇas living in Sylhet (Assam) where his ancestor Śrīdharācārya had migrated[2] from Mithilā in 53 *Tripura era* (=643 A.D.) and had settled there. He was the son of Govinda Cakravartī who died at a very young age, leaving Raghunātha in a helpless condition. He was brought up by his mother, Sītā Devī. Finding herself not able to support her only son and give him requisite education, she came to Navadvīpa and stayed with Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma who had by that time established a *ṭol* in Navadvīpa and had established his reputation as a Nyāya teacher. Raghunātha became a very favourite student of Vāsudeva and began his studies in right earnest.

By that time the reputation of learning of Mithilā, specially in Navyanyāya, had spread all over India

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[1] iti śrīmahāmahopādhyāyabhaṭṭācāryaśrīmadvāhinīpatimahāpātraviracitaḥ sabdālokoddyotaḥ paripūrṇaḥ.

[2] Vide, *Sarasvati Bhavan Studies*, Vol. V, p. 131. It has to be pointed out here that there are many villages in eastern Districts of the old Bengal, now in east Bengal, where Maithilas had settled in earlier centuries. They still call themselves Maithilas and their social and religious rites and ceremonies are performed even today according to Mithilā *nibandhas*.

and the glamour of Maithila scholarship attracted scholars from different parts of the country, particularly, from Bengal which was quite close to it. Raghunātha also had heard about these and after having studied for sometime under Sārvabhauma, left for Mithilā to study under Pakṣadhara Miśra.

Raghunātha left for Mithilā to study Nyāya

It was the practice in those old days, not only in Mithilā, but also at Kāśī, that students before deciding to study under a particular teacher, attended classes of different teachers and carried free discussions with the teachers concerned. When, after realising the method and depth of teaching of various teachers, they found themselves fully satisfied with a particular teacher, then they declared to study under him. This practice had continued at Kāśī even in our own days.

Raghunātha in Mithilā.

So when Raghunātha approached Pakṣadhara Miśra, the very first question which Pakṣadhara asked him was—

ākhaṇḍalaḥ sahasrākṣaḥ virūpākṣas trilocanaḥ /
anye dvilocanāḥ sarve ko bhavānekalocanaḥ //

At this it is said that Raghunātha was a little perturbed, but being bold enough, he at once replied—

yo'ndham karotyakṣimantam yaśca bālam prabodhayet/
tamevādhyāpakaṁ manye tadanye nāmadhāriṇaḥ //

Translation—He who is capable of giving an eye (power of vision into the śāstra) (Raghunātha was one-eyed) to an eyeless, and gives knowledge to the ignorant is alone to be considered as a teacher, while the rest are so called simply for name-sake.

After this very first exchange of words, Pakṣadhara admitted him to his class. As said before, Raghunātha, like so many other students, wanted to satisfy himself as to his being admitted to a right teacher's class, and might have further entered into

some discussion[1] with Pakṣadhara and as a reply to that Pakṣadhara had said—

> vakṣojapānakṛt kāṇa saṁaśaye jāgrati sphuṭam /
> sāmānyalakṣaṇā kasmādakasmādavalupyate //

Translation.—O child (ignorant of the śāstra) and blind, when there appears a clear doubt, how can without any reason the (consideration of) *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* be neglected ?

This requires a little explanation. According to Nyāya under *alaukika-sannikarṣa*, there is one variety, called *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, meaning a knowledge of the genus (sāmānya) of a substance leading to the *pratyakṣa-jñāna* of the entire class. That is, from the knowledge of *dhūmatva* (smokeness), for instance, one gets direct perception of all the cases of smoke past, future and present. It is to be noted here that according to Gaṅgeśa, doubt does not arise about the existence of smoke at its very first sight, except in the case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Pakṣadhara raised that very question to Raghunātha saying when doubt becomes obvious, how can *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* be over-looked. It is said that Raghunātha later on, in his commentry, called *Dīdhiti*, on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, has declared that doubts arise even where there is no case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

Sāmānyalakṣaṇā explained.

In the perception of all the objects of a class, the knowledge of the generic nature of the object constitutes the *sannikarṣa*. It is an extra-ordinary (*asādhāraṇa or alaukika*) type of contact, whose *svarūpa* is general (*sāmānya*). In case of the contact of our eyes with a case of smoke, for instance, we get the perception of smoke of all times, present, past and future as well. It is called *alaukika*, simply because we get the perception of all the cases of smoke even without actually coming in contact with all of them. In fact, it is the smokeness (*dhūmatva*) which is perceived along with the

[1] In this connection there are several stories about the achievements of Raghunātha which became so common in Bengal. All this has been recorded in several books written by Bengali scholars. I therefore, resist myself from repeating them at this place.

smoke itself and which brings to us the perception of all the smokes. Such is its nature.

On his return from Mithilā with the literary title of *śiromaṇi* conferred on him by his teacher, he established a permanent seminary of Navyanyāya in Navadvīpa. He attracted a large number of students and taught them the new Science of Reasoning with great success. He thus, founded a school of his own which continued till the time of Gadādhara in the 17th century.

His works and their merit.

His first and most important work is a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. It is to be kept in mind that Raghunātha did not write a running commentary like others from the beginning of the *Cintāmaṇi* to the end of the work. He commented upon only those topics or problems which were found most difficult. Thus, to begin with the *Dīdhiti*, as it is called, on Pratyakṣa, there is no commentary on the *Maṅgalavāda*. The *Dīdhiti* on the *Prāmāṇyavāda* also is only on its three subsections, namely, *Jñaptivāda*, *Utpattivāda* and *Prāmāṇyasvarūpa*. That is, the commentary is like big elucidatory comments on the most difficult and knotty points of the well-known *Prāmāṇyavāda*. Even the commentary on the whole of the *Prāmāṇyavāda* is not complete. The comments also are very brief and it was therefore, that Gadādhara referring to Raghunātha says—*saṅkṣiptoktyatidakṣa*, great expert in his speech which is so brief. That is, he was a great expert in brevity of speech. Again, a similar expression is found in Rudratarkavāgīśa, a later write on the *Cintāmaṇi-Pakṣatā*, *likhanasaṅkṣepanirbandhino dīdhitikārasya*.

The *maṅgalācaraṇa* of the *Pratyakṣa-dīdhiti* does not begin with his usual *maṅgalācaraṇa* (Om namaḥ sarvabhūtāni), but it has the following in this portion of the work—

giraṁ gurūṇāṁ hṛdaye nidhāya
vidhāya siddhāntasaro'vagāḥ /
saṅkṣepataḥ śrīraghunāthanāmā
cintāmaṇerdīdhitimātanomi//

Translation—Having kept the speech of the *guru* in the heart and having taken a bath in the lake of

the *siddhānta*, I, named Raghunātha, elucidate the lustre (*Dīdhiti*) of the *Cintāmaṇi*, in brief.

There is only one reference of the *Līlāvatyupāya*, that is, the *Līlāvatīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna Upādhyāya, in this section of the *Dīdhiti*. It is to be noted that there are only few references to the views of others in the *Dīdhiti*. In several places we, however, find *anye*, *kecittu*, etc.

Raghunātha became bold and assertive after the *Pratyakṣadīdhiti*. He changed his outlook and became much more self-confident in the field of philosophical thought. So the *Maṅgalācaraṇa* in other sections of his *Dīdhiti* became more philosophical, as is clear from the following *maṅgalācaraṇa* of the *anumāna* section of the *Dīdhiti*—

oṁ namaḥ sarvabhūtāni viṣṭabhya paritiṣṭhate/
akhaṇḍānandabodhāya pūrṇāya paramātmane//

adhyayanabhāvanābhyāṁ sāraṁ nirṇīya nikhilatantrāṇām/
dīdhitimadhicintāmaṇi tanute tārkikaśiromaṇiḥ śrīmān//

parajuṣṭanayānnivartamānā mananāsvādyarasā viśuddhabodhaiḥ/
raghunāthakaverapetadoṣā kṛtireṣā viduṣāṁ tanotu modam//

nyāyamadhīte sarvastanute kutukānnibandhamapyatra/
asya tu kimapi rahasyaṁ kecana vijñātumiṣate sudhiyaḥ/

mānyān praṇamya vihitāñjalireṣa bhūyo-
bhūyo vidhāya vinayam vinivedayāmi/

dūṣyaṁ vaco mama paraṁ nipuṇam vibhāvya
bhāvāvabodhavihito na dunoti doṣaḥ//

Translation—Salutations to that highest *reality* (*Praṇava*) which is the source of creation, existence and destruction of the universe, which is full (*pūrṇa*), and possesses eternal bliss (*ānanda*) and consciousness (*bodha*) and which exists after having engaged all the beings in their respective work.

Having decided the substance of all the śāstras through study and proper meditation, Śrīmān Raghunātha is writing the *Dīdhiti* on the *Cintāmaṇi*.

May this composition of *kavi* (wise) Raghunātha which is free from partaking the remnants of others, where delicious taste is found through meditation with pure knowledge and hence, free from all defects, confer bliss to the wise.

All persons study Nyāya (śāstra) and write books also on it out of curiosity, but there are very few learned scholars who are capable of understanding its secrets.

Having bowed down to the (feet of) superiors with folded hands, I repeatedly submit with due respects to them that one should find fault with my works only after having pondered over them with great care, for accusations, when made with proper knowledge of the sense of the works, do not give any pain.

These lines are found in the beginning of his commentary on other chapters. It is the *Dīdhiti* on the *anumāna* chapter which has brought great name and fame to Raghunātha and has established the reputation of Navadvīpa after Mithilā for sometime. The study of Navyanyāya meant in his days the study of the *Dīdhiti*. Scholars almost forgot the name of the *Cintāmaṇi* and its author Gaṅgeśa.

His *Dīdhiti* on the anumāna section is also not a running commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*. It extends upto the *Bādha* item of the *Hetvābhāsa* section. According to Jagadīśa, Raghunātha has referred to in his *Anumāna-Dīdhiti* to the following: Sārvabhaumamatam[1], Yajñapati Upādhyāya[2], Miśra[3], Ācāryamata[4], Cakravartī[5], Guravaḥ and Gurucaraṇāḥ[6], Pragalbha[7], Sondaḍa[8], Līlāvatīkṛt[9], *Līlāvatīprakāśa*[10], *Kubjaśaktivādinaḥ* Śrīkara[11], *Jalpāka-sampradāya*[12], *Ṭīkākṛt*[13], *Ratnakoṣakṛt*[14], *Tattvabodha*[15].

[1] PP. 11, 89, 91, 151, 153, 159, 164, 246, 354.

[2] PP. 15, 670.

[3] Pakṣadhara Miśra. PP. 20, 24, 68, 127, 134, 144, 147, 175, 224, 225, 290, 334, 336, 396, 407, 490, 500, 546, 557, 629, 637, 762, 770, 786, 808, 841, 1095.

[4] PP. 43, 71. [5] PP. 67, 123.

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[7] PP. 130, 133, 492, 509, 532, 561.

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[12] P. 539. [13] PP. 571, 604. [14] P. 543. [15] P. 11.

It is held amongst scholars that Raghunātha did not write any commentary on the Śabdakhaṇḍa section. But there are certain references found in the *Dīdhiti* itself which indicate that he had at least in mind to write a commentary on the Śabda also—nipuṇataramupapādayiṣyate cedaṁ *Śabdamaṇidīdhitau*[1], svargakāmo yajetetyādāvanvayabodhaṁ *Śabdamaṇidīdhitau* vivecayiṣyāmaḥ[2].

Beside his commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, he wrote two small *nibandhas* on the *Ākhyātaśaktivāda* and *Nañvāda* which have been published at the end of the *Cintāmaṇi* published from the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*, along with the commentaries by Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, called *Vivṛti* and Rāmacandranyāyavāgīśa, called *Ṭippaṇī*, along with the *Ṭippaṇī* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya.

These two *nibandhas* also are parts of Raghunātha's commentary on the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* which has been clearly mentioned by the editors in the foot-notes.

Besides, he has written an independent small work called *Padārtha-tattvanirūpaṇa*, also called *Padārthakhaṇḍana*, or only *Padārthatattva*. This is a work on Vaiśeṣika. It has been published and we shall deal with it in the next volume. Similarly, he has written commentaries on the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, *Ātmatattvaviveka* and *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*. The *Dīdhiti* on the *Ātmatattvaviveka* is a running commentary. It is not so difficult as those on the Navyanyāya. It has been published from *Chowkhamba*, Varanasi. Here also the author has not referred to any author or work except the *Pramāṇaṭīkā*.[3] There are however, some *kecit* and *pare*, or *anye* in his work. He has also commented on Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*.

About himself Raghunātha says very boldly in his *Dīdhiti*—

> Viduṣāṁ nivahairyadaikamatyād-
> yadaduṣṭaṁ niraṭanki yacca duṣṭaṁ /
> mayi jalpati kalpanādhināthe
> raghunāthe manutaṁ tadanyathaiva//

[1] *Anumānadīdhiti*, p. 501.

[2] *Parāmarśa*, P. 762.

[3] P. 384.

Translation—(In the anumāna section, as it is in a verse at the end of it,) whatever has been written unanimously by the scholars, right or wrong, when I Raghunātha, the best amongst the interpreters, explain it, take all just otherwise.

It is something like the utterances of his *guru*, Pakṣadhara, who was so called, because whatever side (*pakṣa*) the latter upheld was proved to be correct. It is to be noted that he did not comment fully on the entire text of *anumāna-cintāmaṇi* like others, so he says at the end of his *Śabdadīdhiti-adhikantu Ālokādāvūhyam.*[1] This shows that he had great regards for his *guru*, Pakṣadhara and his works. Raghunātha, like so many Maithila scholars, also wrote a small work on Dharmaśāstra, called *Malinmucaviveka* where he has dealt with the intercalary month.

About his time, scholars are of opinion that Raghunātha lived towards the end of the 15th century.

4. HARIDĀSA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

(16th century)

Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācārya must have lived after Pakṣadhara on whose *Āloka* he wrote a commentary called *Ṭippaṇī*. He also wrote a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Both these are still unpublished and their complete manuscript is still to be searched out. But the most important commentary of his is on the *Kusumāñjali-kārikās* which has made him immortal. Today it is the *Haridāsī*, as it is generally called, alone which is read and it has become so popular that even the Nyāya scholars have forgotten that Udayana wrote his *Kusumāñjali* both in prose and poetry. Haridāsa has very briefly summarized only the Kārikās of Udayana in his commentary.

The tradition as recorded by Mm. Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, in the preface of his commentary, is that Haridāsa had gone to Mithilā for the study of Nyāya. He studied there for sometime and returned

[1] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 82.

home with the entire *Kusumāñjali* on his lips. It seems from this that just as Raghunātha brought the knowledge of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to Bengal from Mithilā, so Haridāsa brought the knowledge of *Kusumāñjali* to Bengal for the first time and then taught it to his students in Navadvīpa and wrote a brief commentary on it.

His date.

Mm. Kavirāja is of opinion that he was the student of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and as a manuscript of his commentary on the *Āloka* is found transcribed in Śāke 1521=1599 A.D., it is evident that he must have lived earlier. So I have placed him in the 16th century.

5. JĀNAKĪNĀTHA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYYA-CŪḌĀMAṆI

(16th century)

Jānakīnātha Bhaṭṭācārya, also known as Bhaṭṭācārya-cūḍāmaṇi, is a well-known Naiyāyika of Bengal. The only work of his which is published is the *Nyāyasiddāntamañjarī*. It is a small book dealing with only the four Pramāṇas of Nyāya. Like the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, the work though very small, yet it has been commented upon by a large number of scholars. There are references in this commentary to Śivāditya Miśra[1], Cintāmaṇikṛt[2], Nyāyabhāskarakṛt[3] and Murāri Miśra.[4] He has also mentioned his earlier two works, namely *Maṇimarīcinibandha*[5], a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi* and *Tātparyadīpaka*.[6] Other references are—Ṭīkākṛtaḥ[7], Ācāryāḥ[8], Miśraiḥ[9], Jaran-naiyāyikāḥ[10], *Kusumāñjali-Prakāśe* Varddhamānopādhyāyaḥ,[11] Sārvabhaumānām matam.[12]

He is the author of the *Ānvīkṣitattvavivaraṇa*, a manuscript of which has been discovered in the *Saras-*

1 P. 14. 2 P. 217. 3 P. 272
4 P. 345. 5 PP. 25, 212. 6 P. 212
7 P. 34. 8 P. 128. 9 P. 185.
10 P. 302. 11 P. 4. 12 P. 21.

vati Bhavan, Benares.[1] References in his *Vivaraṇa* are, as found by Prof. D. C. Bhattacarya, to Śivāditya Miśra, Śūlapāṇi, Bhāṣkarakṛt, Divākara, and Maṇikaṇṭha Miśra. From these references it is concluded that he may be placed in the 16th century.

His eldest son Rāghava Pañcānana refers to his father's *Ātmatattvadīpikā* in his *Ātmatattvaprabodha*. According to Prof. D.C. Bhattacārya, Rāghava criticizes Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's views on *kṣaṇikatva* and speaks of him as *Navya*. So both Bhaṭṭācārya-Cūḍāmaṇi and his son Rāghava lived just a little later than Śiromaṇi.

6. KṚṢṆADĀSA SĀRVABHAUMA

(16th century)

It is said that Kṛṣṇadāsa, like Bhavānanda, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara, is an important commentator on Śiromaṇi's works. According to Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana Kṛṣṇadāsa was the senior most of these. It has been established that Kṛṣṇadāsa was really the teacher of Bhavānanda Siddhānta- vāgīśa.[2]

He was a great Naiyāyika. He wrote on the *Dīdhiti* and the *Āloka*. His commentaries are called *Prasāriṇī*.

His works

These are not published. No trace is found of the *Pratyakṣa Dīdhiti-Prasāriṇī*. But it has been noticed by Mm. H. P. Shastri in his *Notices*.[3] About the manuscripts of *Anumānadīdhitiprasāriṇī* and the *Ākhyātadīdhitiprasāriṇī*, we find them preserved in the *India Office Library* and the *Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal*. *Stein's Cat.* of the Jammu-Kashmir Raghunātha Mandira library, notes of another commentary of Kṛṣṇadāsa, called *Nañvādaṭippaṇa*.[4] Besides, his *Guṇadīdhitiṭīkā* is also traced to have existed from a reference to it in a Ms. of the *Kusumāñjaliṭīkā*, found in the *Sarasvati*

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[1] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 106.

[2] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 120.

[3] I. P. 226. [4] P. 147.

Bhavan, Benares library. He has himself referred to his *Anumānāloka-Prasāriṇī* in his *Anumānadīdhiti-Prasāriṇī* which must have been, therefore, written earlier.

Kṛṣṇadāsa author of *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* and *Nyāyamuktāvalī*

But the most startling discovery about Kṛṣṇadāsa is that the *Bhāṣā-Pariccheda* and its commentary *Nyāyamuktāvalī* which have been known for centuries to have been written by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, son of Vidyānivāsa, the author of the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, have been now totally disproved to have been written by Viśvanātha. In fact, both these were written by Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma. Professor D. C. Bhattacaryya has collected several old manuscripts of the two works and has found in them the name of Mm. Kṛṣṇadāsa as their author. In place of the current reading of the *Maṅgalācaraṇa* of the *Muktāvalī*, '*viṣṇorvakṣasi viśvanātha-kṛtinā*,' the reading is '*kṛṣṇadāsakṛtinā*.' This was noticed even by Mm. H. P. Shastri in the manuscript of the *Asiatic Society*, though some one from amongst the modern scholars had corrected it according to the current reading. A stronger proof is that the earliest commentary known so far on the *Muktāvalī* is the *Ullāsa* by some scholar named Viśvanātha[2]. A manuscript copy of it transcribed in 1533 śaka = 1611 A.D. is preserved in the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute library*.[3] On the other hand, we know that Viśvanātha composed his *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* in Vṛndāvana in 1576 Śaka=1654 A.D. So the *Ullāsa* whose transcription is dated 1611 A.D. must have been composed earlier, when Viśvanātha would have been too young to write the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and the *Muktāvalī*. It seems from the above that people wrongly assigned the name Viśvanātha, the author of the *Ullāsa*, to the authorship of the *Muktāvalī* later on. This seems to be the origin of this confusion which has persisted all these centuries.[4]

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[1] No. 10799. [2] Vide *B.O.R.I. Poona*, Ms.

[3] No. 301 of 1895-1902, 1925, P. 11.

[4] For the details of the proofs, vide *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, pp. 117-20.

7. RĀMABHADRA SĀRVABHAUMA

(16th century)

About the personal history of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma nothing can be said authentically at present. But that he was a great Naiyāyika and a son of another great Naiyāyika, Bhaṭṭācārya Cūḍāmaṇi (Jānakīnātha) is certain. He writes in the beginning verse of his commentary on the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*—

tātasya tarkasarasīruhakānaneṣu
Cūḍāmaṇerdinamaṇeścaraṇam praṇamya /

In the colophon of his work *Nyāyarahasya*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*, it is said—

Śrībhaṭṭācāryyacūḍāmaṇitanaya idaṁ *rāmabhadrastanoti.*
Again, in his *Guṇarahasya*, Rāmabhadra writes—

cūḍamaṇestārkikānām putrairguṇarahasyakam /
rāmabhadrasārvabhaumabhaṭṭācāryyairvidhīyate //

Similarly, in the beginning of his *Samayarahasya*, a Dharmasāśtra work, he writes—

hariharacaraṇau pitaraṁ tārkikacūḍāmaṇiṁ natvā
kriyate samayarahasyaṁ śrāddhānāṁ Sārvabhaumena //

About his contributions we know of the following :—

His works

(1) *Nyāyarahasya*—It is a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*. This commentary extends only upto the end of the fourth Adhyāya of the *Sūtra* work. At the end of this commentary it is written in the colophon—

samāptaṁ tattvajñānaparipālanaprakaraṇaṁ dvitīyamāhnikaṁ ca/iti mahāmahopādhyāya-śrībhaṭṭācāryyacūḍāmaṇi-tanaya-śrībhaṭṭācāryya-sārvabhauma-Rāmabhadravinirmitaṁ nyāyarahasye caturtho'dhyāyaḥ.[1]

(2) *Guṇarahasya* is his second work. It seems to be a work on Vaiśeṣika. It has been commented upon by Mādhava Paṇḍita, a Deccani Naiyāyika who

[1] Vide, *Nyāyavārttikasya bhūmikā* by Mm. Vindhyeshvari Prasad, Benares, P. 133.

has referred to it in his *Nyāyasāra*—vistarastu asmat-kṛta-guṇarahasya-ṭippaṇyām[1].

(3) *Siddhāntasāra*—It is a collection of so many Vādas, of which so far only *Mokṣavāda* has been discovered.[2] (4) *Samayarahasya*—This is a work on Dharmaśāstra already referred to above. (5) *Samāsa-vāda*—It is a work on Samāsaśakti of the Śabdakhaṇḍa. It begins as—

bhaṭṭācāryasārvabhaumarāmabhadreṇa dhīmatā /
samāsena samāsānāṁ tattvamatra nirūpyate//

(6) *Śabdānityatāvāda*—a manuscript of it is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana*, Benares. (7) *Suvarṇataijasa-vāda*[3]. It is just possible that all these Vādas might have been included in the *Siddhāntasāra* itself instead of forming separate books. (8) *Padārthatattvaviveca-naprakāśa*. There is a reference in this work as -na cāpasiddhāntaḥ prameyavārttike sphuṭattvāt iti(tu) *Śabdamaṇimarīcau*[4] *tātacaraṇāḥ*. Here is also a reference to his *Pitāmahacaraṇāḥ*.[5] From this it is concluded that Rāmabhadra is the son of Bhaṭṭācārya-Cūḍāmaṇi. (9) *Siddhāntarahasya*—asmatkṛtasiddhāntarahasye—a commentary on the *Padārthatattvavivecana*.[6] (10) A commentary on the *Nañvāda*, a manuscript of it is preserved in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*.[7] (11) A commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*. In this connection there is a good deal of confusion amongst scholars of Bengal. A manuscript has been noticed by Mitra[8] and also by Mm. G. N. Kaviraj where it is written

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[1] PP. 116, 208, Reprint from the Pandit.

[2] Vide, Tanjore Cat. pp. 4774-76.

[3] An incomplete manuscript is in the *Asiatic Society* of Bengal, No. 9268; Hultzsch, P. 133.

[4] Here in the printed text the reading is *Śabdamaṇidīdhitau* which is a mistake for *maṇimarīcau* which is the work of his father Cūḍāmani Bhaṭṭācārya.

[5] P. 111.

[6] P. 96.

[7] III. G. 148.

[8] No. 525.

—ityantam śaṅkaramiśrakṛtaṁ tataḥ sārvabhaumīyaṁ, on the basis of an old manuscript in possession of the late Pt. Harihar Shastri of Benares[1], wherein the *maṅgala* verse bears the name of the parents, Bhavanātha and Bhavānī. These are the names of the parents of Śaṅkara Miśra, the author of the *Upaskāra* also. So there was a feeling that it is a commentary written by Rāmabhadra; later, the question was solved by upholding the view that it was a joint product. But since, there is a complete manuscript of the commentary, called *Āmoda*, written on Palm-leaves, in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Library*, Benares, the confusion should be cast off for ever. It is just possible that Rāmabhadra might have also written a commentary separately on the *Kusumāñjali*.

Rāmabhadra was certainly a great Naiyāyika. He taught many students of whom Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Jagadīśa, Gaurīkānta Sārvabhauma and Jayarāma Nyāya-pañcānana, were the well-known scholars of Nyāya.

From all these, it is concluded that Rāmabhadra must have lived in the 16th century.

8. RĀMA TARKĀLAṄKĀRA

(16th century)

In the Maṅgalācaraṇa of the *Anumānarahasya*, Mathurānātha writes—

nyāyāmbudhikṛtasetuṁ hetuṁ śrīrāmamakhilasampatteḥ /
tātaṁ tribhuvanagītaṁ tarkālaṅkāramādarānnatvā //

The same is the *Maṅgalācaraṇa* of the *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍarahasya*. From this it is evident that Rāma was also a Naiyāyika. He has also written a commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, anumāna section, a manuscript

[1] fol. 6a.

of which is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana library*, Benares. It begins as—

śrīgovindapadadvandvaṁ praṇamya paramādarāt /
hṛdi kṛtvā ca nikhilaṁ sārvabhaumasya sadvacaḥ //
anumānaparicchede vyākhyāṁ dīdhitikṛtkṛtām /
prakāśayati yatnena *śrīrāmaḥ* sudhiyām mude //

From the above quoted verses it is also evident that Śrīrāma was the pupil of a Sārvabhauma. Now who is this Sārvabhauma is a problem before us. Mm. Kavirajaji thinks that he is the Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma.[1] There are others who do not agree with this view and they think that Śrīrāma's *guru* might have been either Kṛṣṇadāsa or Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma.[2]

He has also written a commentary, called *Ṭippaṇī* on the *Ātmatattvavivekadīdhiti*.

It is to be noted here that since Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* came to be written, it became the most popular commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, the *Kusumāñjaliprakāśa*, the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, and the *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*. Not only in Bengal but even in Mithilā students began to study Raghunātha's commentary till Jagadīśa came into the field. So scholars also did not like to comment on the texts of old works of Gaṅgeśa, Varddhamāna, Pakṣadhara, Vācaspati II, and so on. They all studied *Dīdhiti*. This might have been due to the fact that after Pakṣadhara, the school of Navadvīpa became more and more famous with Raghunātha; and the scholarship in Mithilā became neglected. So even the Maithila scholars used to go to Navadvīpa for the study of Navyanyāya where the Bengali teachers did not teach any other work except the works or commentaries written by them. Hence, even scholars from Mithilā forgot the contributions of their own Maithila scholars.

9. BHAVĀNANDA SIDDHĀNTAVĀGĪŚA (16th century)

It is held that Bhavānanda Siddhānta-vāgīśa was one of the best pupils of Raghunātha śiromaṇi. But

[1] *Sarasvati Bhavan Studies*, Vol. V. P. 135.

[2] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 131.

there are some who think that Bhavānanda was the pupil of Kṛṣṇadāsa. In fact, his commentary on the *Dīdhiti* was considered to be an authority. There is a verse prevelent amongst scholars that—

> guṇopari guṇānandī bhavānandī ca dīdhitau /
> sarvatra mathurānāthī jāgadīśī kvacit kvacit //

Whosoever may be the *guru*, it is a fact that Bhavānanda was a great Naiyāyika and that his commentary on the *Dīdhiti* occupies a very high position amongst the works on the *Dīdhiti* as is clear from the above verse.

His works

His more important commentary is the *Bhavānandī* on the *Dīdhiti*. It is called *Ṭippaṇī* from which we infer that it is not very elaborate. It is also quite natural. The *Dīdhiti* itself is not so elaborate, nor is it a running commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*. So commentaries on it may not necessarily be elaborate. Manuscripts on the Pratyakṣa and Anumāna have been traced.[1] An incomplete manuscript is preserved there in the Sanskrit College Library, Calcutta, whose colophon is—iti Mahāmahopādhyāya śrī-Bhavānanda-siddhāntavāgīśabhaṭṭācāryaviracitā pratyakṣadīdhitiṭippaṇī samāptaḥ (?). A portion of the Anumāna section of the *Bhavānandī* was published by the *Asiatic Society of Bengal.* It is possible that a complete manuscript also may be found there. Mahādeva Puntamakar, a Deccani scholar living in Benares, has written two commentaries on it. One very elaborate and the other a little brief and easier. The latter is called *Sarvopakāriṇī.* A manuscript transcribed in Sam. 1792 = 1735 A. D. is preserved in the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute library, Allahabad.*

Bhavānanda has also commented upon the *Ākhyātavāda.* A manuscript dated 1658 Śaka is preserved in the library of the Calcutta *Sanskrit Sahitya Pariṣad.* It is called *Sāramañjarī.* Similarly, he wrote a commentary on the *Nañvāda.* It is also a *Ṭippaṇī* type of commentary. Bhavānanda not only commented on the *Dīdhiti*, but he also wrote a commentary on

[1] Vide—the *manuscript catalogue, Calcutta Sanskrit College* library.

the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara. The commentary is called *Sāramañjarī* or *Pratyakṣāloka-Sāramañjarī*. The manuscripts of this work are in the library of the *Asiatic Society of Bengal* and also in the *Raghunāthamandira* library, Jammu. It ends as—

Śrībhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśena vinirmitā/
alaṅkarotu kaṁsāreścaraṇau Sāramañjarī//

iti śrīmahāmahopādhyāyaśrībhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśa-bhaṭṭācāryaviracitā Pratyakṣālokasāramañjarī samāptā.

Anumānālokasāramañjarī—an incomplete manuscript of it is in the *Benares Sarasvati Bhavan* Library. It begins as—

navanīlāmbujaruciraṁ caraṇaraṇatkiṅkiṇījālam/
haiyaṅgavīnacoraṁ nandakiśoraṁ namasyāmaḥ//

anumānamaṇausāramālokīyam prayatnataḥ/
śrībhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśena prakāśyate//

Śabdālokamañjarīsāra—An incomplete manuscript of it is noticed in the *India Office Catalogue*. It begins as—

namskṛtya gurūn mūrdhnā śabdālokasya phakkikā/
śrībhavānandasiddhāntavāgīśena prakāśyate//

Śabdamaṇisāramañjarī—A reference to this has been traced in his commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, anumāna, satpratipakṣa section. It runs as -etena śābdabodhādikamapi vyākhyātam/ adhikañca śabdamaṇisāramañjaryyām vivecitamasmābhiḥ.[1]

Śabdārthasāramañjarī. This seems to be an independent work of Bhavānanda. There is one manuscript in possession of the *Bhandarkar Research Institute*, Poona named *Kāraṇatāvicāra* by Bhavānanda. Besides, he has written some more works, namely *Kārakacakra*, *Daśalakāravivecana*, *Ākhyātavicāra* and *Ṣaṭsamāsavivecana*, on Vyākaraṇa.

His date

About his time we cannot give any exact date. But considering the dates of his teacher and his pupils it can be said that he lived towards the end of the 16th century.

One thing is to be noted that Bhavānanda's work was not at all liked in Bengal. There were severe

[1] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 137.

criticizms against his work.[1] It was left, it seems, for Mahādeva Puntamkar to appreciate the merits of Bhavānanda by writing two commentaries on his *Bhavānandī*, called the *Dīdhitigūḍhārthaprakāśikā*, or only *Bhavānandīprakāśa* and the *Sarvopakāriṇī*. Mahādeva writes in the beginning of his *Bhavānandī-Prakāśa*—

analocyasiddhāntavāgīśavāṇyām
vṛthāsūyitaiḥ paṇḍitair gauḍajātaiḥ/
yadudbhāvitaṁ dūṣaṇābhāsavṛndaṁ
taduddhāraṇārtho mamodyoga eṣaḥ//

Translation.—This effort of mine is only to remove the so-called mistakes which have been pointed out in the work of Bhavānanda by the zealous Gauḍa Paṇḍitas (of Bengal) without having given any thought over it.

But it is clear from the two commentaries of Mahādeva, one to remove the criticizms of Bengal scholars and another to explain the text, that Bhavānanda's work was of great value.

He had two sons, Śrīkṛṣṇa and Rāma. The latter was also a Naiyāyika. The latter had two sons, Madhusūdana and Rudra Tarkavāgīśa. Rudra has written a commentary called *Raudrī* on the *anumānadīdhiti*.

10. GUṆĀNANDA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA

(16th century)

Guṇānandá, ordinarily known as Vidyāvāgīśa Bhaṭṭācāryya, was a pupil of Madhusūdana. He wrote a large number of commentaries, like other Paṇḍitas of Bengal, on the *Dīdhiti*, *Āloka* and on the work of Udayana and Vallabha. These were more important works to be commented upon by scholars of this period. His works are: (1) *Nyāyakusumāñjaliviveka*. It is a commentary on the whole *Nyāyakusmāñjali* and not only on the Kārikās. There is a manuscript of this work in the Varanasi *Sarasvati Bhavan Library*, wherein the name of

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[1] *Oooert*, 2025, 5278; II. 9408, mentions a work written by Vajraṭanka Śāstrin wherein Bhavānanda's work has been criticized.

the commentary is given as the *Tātparyaviveka*. (2) *Guṇavivṛtiviveka*, also called *Tātparyasandarbha*, on the *Guṇakiraṇāvalīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna. (3) *Śabdālokaviveka*, on Pakṣadhara's *Śabda-Āloka*. He has also commented on the *Dīdhitis* of Raghunātha on the *Cintāmaṇi-anumāna*, *Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa*, and *Ātmatattvaviveka*. He has also written on the *Pratyakṣamaṇi* a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan*, Varanasi.

His date

His time is not known for certain. Mm. Kavirāj however, says, "His time is unknown, but it may be surmised that he lived about the end of the 16th century. This is proved by the fact that there exists in the India Office Library a ms. of his *Guṇavivṛtiviveka* with 1534 Śaka[1] (*vedabāṇāgniyute śakābde*) or A. D. 1612 as the date of its transcription. Besides, as his tutor cannot be identical with the famous author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, the time here proposed for him would not seem incompatible. The fact that he was criticised by the Jain Logician Yaśovijayagaṇi (A.D. 1608-1688) in the latter's *Nyāyakhaṇḍanakhādya* presents no chronological difficulty."[2]

That he was a great Naiyāyika is obvious from the verse current amongst the Paṇḍitas of that period—
Guṇopari guṇānandī, etc. quoted before.

11. MATHURĀNĀTHA TARKAVAGĪŚA

(16th century)

As indicated before, there were six great Maithila scholars, namely, Udayana, Gaṅgeśa, Vallabha, Varddhamāna, Pakṣadhara and Raghunātha, whose works, *Kiraṇāvalī*, *Ātmatattvaviveka*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Nyāyalīlāvatī—Prakāśa*, *Āloka and Dīdhiti* were mostly studied by students of Navyanyāya and commented upon, in that period. There were perhaps no other works which attracted the attention of intelligent

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[1] Not A. D. 1622 as stated by Dr. Vidyabhusan in his *Indian Logic*, p. 468).

[2] Saraswati Bhavan Library, Varanasi, Vol. V. p. 139.

students. If any one could attempt beyond these, he took *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa for study and this also simply because the neo-logicians had enough of navyanyāya in it. In fact, it illustrates only one of the *Prameyas*, namely, *Vitaṇḍā* of Nyāyaśāstra. So every great scholar of Navya-Nyāya tried to write something according to his capacity and time on these works.

Mathurānātha Bhaṭṭācārya Tarkavāgīśa was one of those scholars who wrote commentaries on all these works. His scope of work was perhaps the widest. He wrote regular running commentaries. His method of writing was easier and elaborate. He tried to explain the most difficult portions of the texts easily. This was a peculiarity which was not found in his teacher's writings. So says Mathurānātha himself—

yadyapi bahubhirbahuṣu bahudhā carvvitaṁ, jñāyate ca kaiścit sāmānyato hetvābhāsāntam, tathāpi tannānāsthānavitatamaśeṣāprakāśakam bahutarakutarkasambalitamasāmpradāyikañca vyāmohāyaiva kevalam sarveṣāmbhavatīti sarvārthajighṛkṣayā sattarkamāmūlavyākhyāya vaiśadyāya ca mamātra param nirbandhaḥ.[1]

Translation.—Though many have in many ways tasted and expressed it (the text of the *Cintāmaṇi*) and some others (referring to Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti*) ordinarily understood it upto the *hetvābhāsa* section only, yet all these have not thrown sufficient light on all the topics, which are widely extended, and (whatever they have said) are full of wrong arguments and are not in accordance with the traditions of the school, so they are only to confuse all the readers. Hence, in order to bring out all the thoughts, here is my great pertinacity to clarify all the topics after having explained everything including the text with the help of correct reasonings.

It was therefore, that *Mathurānāthī* became more popular than the *Dīdhiti*. It is hence, the verse quoted above-*Sarvatra Mathurānāthī*, holds good. His works are generally named *Rahasya*.

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[1] *Anumānarahasya*, beginning lines pp. 1-2.

He has commented upon the whole of the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi.* His comment is called *Rahasya. Pratyakṣarahasya* is complete in print. Anumāna is also in print upto *Bādha* section. So far, the *Rahasya* on the *Īśvarānumāna* has not been published. Its manuscript is also not so common. *Anumāna-cintāmaṇi* is the best test for the intelligence of the Naiyāyikas. So is the case with the commentaries on the *anumāna. Śabdarahasya* also is not yet completely printed. *Rahasya* is available upto *Kāryānvita-śaktivāda*, so it has been published; beyond that it is not published.

His works

Mathurānātha also wrote his *Rahasya* on the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara. But it is not available completely. Portions available have been published in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series.* Manuscripts in parts are found in various libraries of India and also a few are in the *India Office library.*

Other works are—*Guṇadīdhiti-Māthurī*, *Bauddhādhikāra-Dīdhiti-Māthurī*, *Līlāvatī-Dīdhiti-Māthurī*, *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā.* So far all these are Mathurānātha's commentary on the *Dīdhiti.* But he has also written commentary directly on some texts, namely *Kiraṇāvalī*, *Bauddhā-dhikāra, called Vivṛti* which has been partly published by the *Asiatic Society of Bengal* and *Līlāvatī.* Again, on Vaiśeṣika also he has written commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* and *Līlāvatīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna. Besides, he says in his commentary on the *Ākhyāta-śaktivāda*[1]—*śeṣamasmatkṛtasupśaktivāde anusandheyam.* Mm. Kavirajajī mentions a work named *Siddhāntarahasya* of Mathurānātha.

He flourished towards the end of the 16th century.

12. RUDRA NYĀYAVĀCASPATI

(17th century)

Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was the eldest son of Vidyānivāsa. He lived at Kāśī. Like other great Naiyāyikas, he commented upon the works of Pakṣadhara's *Āloka*, Raghunātha's *Dīdhiti* on the *Cintāmaṇi* and the

[1] P. 954.

Kiraṇāvalī. He also wrote on the *Kusumāñjali-Kārikā*. His commentaries are known as *Parīkṣā*. Besides, he has written *Nañvāda-ṭīkā*, *Padārtha-khaṇḍana-ṭīkā*, *Līlāvatīprakāśaṭīkā and Vādapariccheda*.[1] He is placed in the beginning of the 17th century.

13. HARIRĀMA TARKAVĀGĪŚA

(17th century)

Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa was the teacher of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya. He lived in Navadvīpa and was a very honoured Naiyāyika. He wrote several works. Most of them are not available at present. There is one manuscript of his work, named *Parāmarśarahasya* in the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* library.[2] In the colophon it is written—*iti mahāmahopādhyāya Harirāmaviracitam parāmarśarahasyam*. There are references to Śrīpakṣadharamiśra and Dīdhitikāra[3] in this manuscript.

There are several small works attributed to him noted by Mm. Kavirāj in the *Sarasvati Bhavana studies*,[4] which I quote here :

An adaptation from the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, a commentary on the *Sapta-padārthī* of Śivāditya Miśra. *Ācāryamatarahasya* vindicating Udayana's theory of *anumiti*. *Nyāyanavyamatavicāra*, *Ratnakośavicāra*, *Viṣayatāvāda*, *Pratyāsattivicāra*, *Maṅgalavāda*, *Pramāṇapramoda*, *Anumitiparāmarśabādhabuddhi*, *Pratibandhakatāvicāra*, *Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyabodhavicāra*, *Navyadharmitāvacchedakatā*. His *Jñānalakṣaṇavicārarahasya*, *Manastvavicāra*, *Muktivādavicāra*, *Prāmāṇyavāda* have been published.[5]

He died at a very old age. Gadādhara and Raghudeva were his reputed students.[6] He is therefore, placed in the first quarter of the 17th century.

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[1] *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, PP. 273-75.

[2] No. 124/3027.

[3] Foll. 8-9. [4] Vol. V., pp. 147-49

[5] Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta Publications.

[6] Hall. P. 55; Peterson, VI, PP. 15-16.

14. GAURĪKĀNTA SĀRVABHAUMA
(17th century)

Gaurīkānta Sārvabhauma flourished in the early part of the 17th century. He is the author of a commentary, called *Bhāvārthadīpikā*, on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. Besides, he is the author of a *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣyavivaraṇa*, which according to Mm. Kavirājajī, is a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* and which has been referred to in the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*.[1] He has also commented upon the *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti*. It is referred to as the *Maṇidīdhitivivecana* in the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*. He is also said to have written a commentary on the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa and *Sadyuktimuktāvalī*. He writes of himself as *Kavitārkika-cakravartī* in the *Bhāvārthadīpikā*.

15. VIŚVANĀTHA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA
(17th century)

Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, also known as Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, was the son of Vidyānivāsa Bhaṭṭācārya. In the beginning of the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti*, his most important work, he writes—

vidyānivāsasūnoḥ kṛtireṣā viśvanāthasya /
viduṣāmatisūkṣmadhiyāmamatsarāṇām mude bhavitā //

He was the youngest son of his father. Rudra Nyāyavācaspati was his eldest brother. Mm. Kaviraj however, writes that Viśvanātha was the eldest son of Vidyānivāsa.[2] About Vidyānivāsa Mm. Kavirajaji writes—His younger brother was Nārāyaṇa and his father was the son of the younger brother of the great Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and is said to have been highly honoured by Rājā Mānasimha of Amber, and had defeated in a public scholarly assembly, at the court of Ṭodaramala, the great scholar Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Benares.

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1 Varanaseya Skt. Unvi. Ms. No. 156, Fol. 3b.

2 *Sarasvati Bhavan studies*, Vol. V. p. 156.

He was a Vaiṣṇava by faith and so he retired to Vṛndāvana in his last days.

But it does not mean that Viśvanātha had no faith in Śiva or Bhavānī. In the beginning of his *Nyāya-sūtra-Vṛtti* itself he writes—

saṁyuktāṁ yuktarūpamabhinavanihitā-
laktakāraktabhāsā
sandhyāpīyūkhabhānoratiruciratarām-
cūrṇayantīmabhikhyām /
mānavyāmokanamratripuraharaśiro-
ramyabhūṣā viśeṣam,
bhūyo bhavyam vidhātuṁ caraṇanakharucam
bhāvayāmo bhavānyāḥ //

It was at Vṛndāvana that he wrote his *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* in 1556 śaka, that is, 1634 A.D. Mm. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda, in his *Nyāyavārttikabhūmikā*, quotes from an edition of the *Vṛtti*—

rasabāṇatithau (1556) śakendrakāle
bahule kāmatithau śucau sitāhe /
akaronmunisūtravṛttimetam
nanu vṛndāvanavipine sa eṣa viśvanāthaḥ //

From this it is evident that Viśvanātha wrote this *Vṛtti* in 1556 Śaka=1634 A.D., at Vṛndāvana. This work of his is most popular and in fact, Viśvanātha is known to the scholarly world by this work. So he may be placed in the latter half of the 17th century. Mm. Kavirājajī, however, thinks that the date is 1576 Śaka or 1654 A.D.[1]

His works

He composed a small but very useful work for understanding the *Nyāyasūtra*, a *Vṛtti* in Vṛndāvana.

About its merits, the author himself says at the end of his work—

eṣā munipravaragotamasūtravṛttiḥ
śrīviśvanātha kṛtinā sugamālpavarṇā /
śrīkṛṣṇacandracaraṇāmbujacañcarīka—
śrīmacchiromaṇivacaḥ pracayairakāri//[2]

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[1] Vide *Saraswati Bhavana studies*, Vol. V, p. 156.

[2] Vide the beginning verse of the *Vṛtti*.

Translation.—This *sūtravṛtti*, on the *Gotamasūtra*, written by the greatest of the munis, by śrīviśvanātha, the wise, is very easy and is brief. It has been composed in pursuance of the interpretation of Śiromaṇi, who is a devotee of the lotus like feet of the Lord Śrīkṛṣṇa. Viśvanātha's aim in writing this *Vṛtti* is that as the Nyāyaśāstra is very wide, an intelligent student may know it easily without much effort.

Nyāyamuktāvalī, not his work.

About the mistake of attributing the authorship of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* to Viśvanātha, it has been already pointed out above that Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma was their author and the name of some other Viśvanātha, an author of a commentary called *Ullāsa* on it, due to some reason not known so far, came to be associated with these works as their author. This has been variously now proved and so I do not add them to the list of the works written by Viśvanātha. Mm. Vindhyeshwari Prasad in his *Nyāyavārttika-Bhūmikā*[1] writes that Viśvanātha was also the author of the *Nyāyāloka*, a commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*. But it is to be explained why did the same author write two commentaries on the same text? Of course, there are such instances in our literature like, the *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyakalikā* both by Jayanta, but here there is neither any reference found in any work, nor is there any such tradition. It is said that the *Nyāyāloka* is a very big commentary. No other reference of this book is found anywhere so far.

His other works are—*Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, a commentary on the *Padārtha-tattvanirūpaṇa* of Raghunātha, *Nañvādaṭīkā*, *Padārthatattvāloka*, *Subarthatattvāloka*, *Nyāyatantrabodhinī*, *Alaṅkārapariṣkāra*, *Bhedasiddhi*, *Māṁsatattva-viveka* which has been published now in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Text series*, and *Prākṛtapiṅgalaṭīkā* which has been published by the *Asiatic Society* of Bengal. He has also written a work named *Sūktimuktāvalī* containing 122 good verses on diffirent subjects.

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[1] P. 145.

16. JAYARĀMA NYĀYAPAÑCĀNANA
(17th century)

Jayarāma Nyāyapañcānana was the pupil of Rāmabhadra. He himself says in his commentary, called *Gūḍhārthavidyotana*, on he *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti*—

> śrīviśveśamaśeṣamaṅgalabhuvaṁ
> bhūyo'bhivādyādarān
>
> mūrdhnyādhāya ca rāmabhadracaraṇa-
> dvandvāravindadvayam/
>
> gūḍhājñānaghanāvṛtā na viṣayaprodbodhinī dīdhitis-
> tasmācchrījayarāma eṣa tanute gūḍhārthavidyotanam//

But who is this Rāmabhadra? Dr. Vidyabhusan identifies him with Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma.[1] Mm. Kavirajaji however, thinks that he was Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa, the pupil of Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra.[2] The Sārvabhauma was the *guru* of Jagadīśa who must have lived in the last quarter of the 16th century. Jayarāma, who, on the other hand, flourished long after Jagadīśa, cannot be the pupil of the *guru* of Jagadīśa. Moreover, from a documentary evidence we know that Jayarāma was a signatory to a document (*vyavasthā*) of the Paṇḍitas of Kāśī, dated 1714 Samvat, that is, 1657 A.D., which has been published by R. S. Pimputkar in a book called *Citale Bhaṭṭaprakaraṇa*.[3] This shows that Jayarāma was living at Benares in 1657 A.D. So Jayarāma could not have been the pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma. This is what Mm. Kavirājaji has written. Dr. Mangal Deva Shastri, the editor of the work, has also accepted this view.[4] But Professor D.C. Bhattacārya is of opinion that as the references to *guravastu* found in the *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* are all found in the *Nyāyasāra* of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma, there is no reason why Jayarāma should

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1 *Indian Logic*, P. 477.

2 *Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. V, p. 149.

3 1926, PP. 78-81. Sarasvati Bhawan Studies, vol. V. p. 149.

4 Vide, his *Introduction to the Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*, PP. 17-19.

not be the pupil of the Sārvabhauma. Further, Professor Bhattacaryya says that it was the Sārvabhauma who alone could have said on a different reading of the *Dīdhiti*[1] suggested by his *guru* Jagadīśa in the following words—*gurucaraṇā ittham pāṭham kalpayanti*.[2] From these references, it is concluded that Jayarāma was the pupil of Rāmabhadra Sārvabhauma and *not* of the Siddhāntavāgīśa. It is also clear from the above that Jayarāma lived long and that he was living in 1657 A.D. So he may be placed towards the end of the 17th century. Then there is another evidence in its support. Dr. Vidyabhusan says that Jayarāma composed his *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā* in Samvat 1750, that is, 1693 A.D.[3]

His works.

Jayarāma has written following works known to me so far :

(1) *Guḍhārthavidyotana* on the *Cintāmaṇidīdhiti*—It is unpublished. Its manuscripts are available in several libraries of India and also in the *India office*, London. (2) *Tattvacintāmaṇyālokaviveka* referred to as *Ālokarahasyam* in his commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*. (3) *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*—It has been published in two parts in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Text series*. It contains a brief commentary on the following *Nyāyasūtras*—I. i.9-12, 14-41; I. ii. 1—19; V. ii. 1, 4, 12-14, 18, 20-22, 24-25. It is clear from this that the work is not complete, nor is it a running commentary on all the sūtras.

References to authors and works

Ākare[4], *Ācāryyāḥ*[5], Ācāryamatam[6], Ācāryānusāriṇaḥ[7], Uktam upādhivāde[8], Upādhyāyāḥ[9], Umāpatiḥ[10], Kīrttiḥ[11], Guravaḥ[12], Candraḥ[13], Carmāmbara[14], Jñānaśrī[15], Ṭīkāyām,

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1 Vide, Chauwkhamba edition, P. 1184.

2 *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 98.

3 *Indian Logic*, P. 478.

4 PP. 128, 139.

5 PP. 10, 41, 43, 44, 48, 112, 120, 163, 170, 178.

6 P. 41. 7 P. 32 8 P. 170. 9 PP. 27, 37.

10 P. 4. 11 Dharmakīrttiḥ, PP. 144, 176.

12 P. 62. 13 P. 171. 14 Jaina, P. 176.

15 P. 176.

Ṭīkākṛtaḥ, Ṭīkākāra[1], *Tattvabodha*, *Tattvabodhe*, *Tattvabodha-kṛtaḥ*[2], Tāntrikāḥ[3], Digambarabhedāḥ[4], Diṅnāga[5], Dīdhitikṛtaḥ[6], *Nibandhe*[7], *Nibandha*, Ṭīkākārādi,[8], *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*[9], Nyāsakāra[10], *Padārthamālā*[11], Pāśupata[12], Pāṣaṇḍāḥ[13], Bhāṭṭaikadeśī Maṇḍanaḥ[14], *Bhāṣyam*[15], Bhāskaraḥ[16], Maṇikaṇṭhaḥ[17], *Maṇi*, Maṇikṛt[18], Mahārṇavakāraḥ[19], Miśrāḥ[20], Murāri Miśrāḥ[21], Ratnakoṣakṛtaḥ[22], Varddhamānaḥ[23], Vāgīśaḥ[24], *Vārttika*, Vārttikakāra[25], Vṛttikṛtā,[26] Śaṅkara Miśrādayaḥ[27], Śūnyavādino Digambarasya[28], Sānātaniḥ[29], and Somasiddhānta, that is, Pāṣaṇḍamata[30].

From the nature of this portion of the work it appears as if the author had written some more work on Nyāya in its continuation.

It ends with the following two verses—

nānāgrantha vṛthā vacovivaraṇaistattāratamyārthina-
mājīvābhyasane'pi gūḍhaviṣayairvyutpitsavo vyākulāḥ/
matvaivaṁ jayarāma eṣa viśadaiḥ sattarkaśuddhākṣaraiḥ
munyuktaṁ nijagāda tatkaruṇayā vijñairanujñāyatām//

sannyāyapratipāditā pratipadaṁ sadyuktimuktānvitā
dustarkoddhatavādidarpadamanī vijñaikavedyāśayā/
nirvāṇādhvavivecikā sumanasāmantastamonāśinī
śrīviśvesapadāmbujapraṇayanī siddhāntamālāstu me//

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1 PP. 19, 27. 2 PP. 4-5, 15, 48. 3 P. 168.

4 kṣapaṇaka, Śvetāmbara, Nīlāmbara, Carmāmbara, Raktāmbara, Barhāmbara etc., P. 178.

5 PP. 139, 170.

6 PP. 41, 81, 82, 90, 97, 103, 105, 170.

7 PP. 22, 103. 8 P. 27. 9 P. 16. 10 P. 37.

11 PP. 4, 7, 9. 12 P. 17. 13 PP. 46, 175

14 P. 176. 15 PP. 3, 7, 13, 17, 20, 21, 56,,62.

16 P. 162. 17 P. 165.

18 PP. 16, 36-37, 44, 90, 94, 97, 103, 105.

19 P. 171. 20 PP. 37, 60, 82. 21 P. 171.

22 P. 100. 23 PP. 5, 10, 12, 13, 22, 122.

24 P. 113. 25 PP. 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 17, 20,

26 =Kāśikākāreṇa, P. 37. 27 PP. 65, 161.

28 P. 46. 29 P. 54. 30 P. 175.

From these verses it appears as if Jayarāma was living at Benares when he composed this work. In order to justify the name *Siddhāntamālā*, the authar adds a section at the end of this work—*Atha prasaṅgāt siddhāntabhedā ucyante*. This whole section appears, as if, it is based on a similar section of the *Vādivinoda* of Śaṅkara Miśra or any other similar work. Comparing versions of both the works it seems as if Jayarāma had copied a portion of the *Vādivinoda* with slight variations in the readings in two or three places. This book was composed in Saṁ, 1750=1693 A. D.

Besides, he is the author of a commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*, called *Vivṛtti*. It is referred to in the *Padārthamālā*[1]. (5) *Śabdālokarahasya* referred to in his own *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*. (6) *Padārthamālā* a work on Vaiśeṣika. (7) *Anyathākhyātivāda*. (8) *Laghusannikarṣavāda*, (9) *Nyāyamālā* (10) *Nañvādavyākhyā*. Besides *Kārakavāda and Samāsavāda* and a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* which has in the beginning—

> śrījayarāmaḥ sukṛtī natvā śambhoḥ padāmbujam/
> kāvyaprakāśaṭīkām tanute vidvadvinodāya//

Janārdana Vyāsa and Laugākṣi-Bhāskara were his students who also wrote a commentary on the *Mañjarī* and *Padārthamālā* respectively.

17. GADĀDHARA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA

(17th century)

Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, the son of Jīvācārya and a younger contemporary of Jagadīśa, was a Vārendra Brāhmaṇa of Bengal. He was the last of the great Navadvīpa scholars. The scholarship which was brought by Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi from Mithilā in the 15th century and which raised the name of Navadvīpa or Bengal in the scholarly world and produced brillient scholars and contributed great works of repute which had been honoured

Rise and fall of Navadvīpa

1 adhikaṁ kārikāvyākhyāyāmanusandheyam, Fol. 74b ms. belonging to the *Saraswati Bhavan*.

and studied all these centuries, came to an end with Gadādhara. So says Professor D. C. Bhaṭṭācārya also in his *History of Navyanyāya in Mithilā*,—"*The most glorious period of Navadvīpa has definitely ended with the death of Gadādhara in* 1709 *A. D. and signs of distinct revival of the ancient glory of Mithilā were discernible at Mangarauni*"[1]. Even Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa says—

Revival of Scholarship in Mithilā

gadādharai navyanyāyera carama avatāra.[2]

Gadādhara was the pupil of Mahāmahopādhyāya Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. So he writes about him in the beginning of his commentary on the *Pratyakṣadīdhiti*—

natvā nandatanūjasundarapadaṁ smṛtvā gurorādarāt/
urvīmaṇḍalamaṇḍanāyitayaśorāśeraśeṣā giraḥ//

It may also be pointed out here that at this period, scholars from Mithilā, Bengal and South all used to assemble at Kāśī which had become the most important centre of learning in all the śāstras. I do not think that after the 17th century scholars had more attraction towards any other centre of learning. In fact, they considered for various other reasons to go to Kāśī and study there. It was also felt that at Kāśī, a regular pious bath in the Gaṅgā and the worship of Viśvanātha and other gods and goddesses would also add to the purification of their *antaḥkaraṇa* which would purify their intelligence and make their scholarship shine like anything. So they prefered to go to Kāśī than to any other place for study.

Rise of Kāśī-a great centre of learning

Gadādhara was undoubtedly, the best student of Harirāma. It was a great problem as to who would succeed Harirāma as a teacher in the *ṭol*, when the latter fell seriously ill and there was no hope of his recovery. So Harirāma also, in order that his *ṭol* could maintain past traditions and reputations of Navadvīpa, had expressed his desire that after his death Gadādhara should become the *guru* of that *ṭol*. Gadādhara out of shyness did not consider himself fit for the job, but he could not, at the same time, disregard the desire of his *guru*. So he had to accept it.

Gadādhara, successor of Harirāma

[1] P. 197. [2] *Nyāyaparicaya*, P. 33.

But he did not get any student to teach. They refused to be taught by him as he was so junior. Then it is said that Gadādhara was not dejected with this affair. He left the abode of his *guru* and founded a seminary of his own on the wayside of the main road leading to Gaṅgā. No student turned up even there. So he found out a way and attended his seminary at the right time every day as it was the practice in his *guru's* seminary and began to teach loudly the texts addressing it to the garden, trees and creepers in the absence of students. Learned Paṇḍitas and students passing that way came to hear his teachings and found them to be of high order. Thus, they became attracted towards Gadādhara and gradually came to him to study. In a very short time his reputation spread all over the locality and he came to be respected like his *guru.*[1]

His works

Like so many other scholars, he wrote on the works of Udayana, Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara and Raghunāth. Thus, on Udayana he commented upon the *Kusumāñjali*, a manuscript of which is noticed by Keilhorn[2]; on Gaṅgeśa, he wrote a commentary on the *anumāna* section, a manuscript of which, though incomplete, was in possession of Professor D. C. Bhattacarya.[3] He also wrote on the *Śabdakhaṇḍa*. His *Śaktivāda* and *Vyutpattivāda* are two well-known works read widely by scholars. In fact, no study of Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa is considered to be complete without a thorough knowledge of these two works. On Pakṣadhara, he has written commentary on *Pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *Śabdakhaṇḍa* of the *Āloka*. In the beginning of a manuscript of *Śabda*, it is written—

praṇamya gīrvāṇagaṇaikavandyaṁ
pādāravindam puruṣottamasya /
nigūḍhamāviṣkurute prayatnāt
gadādharaḥ pakṣadharasya bhāvam//[4]

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1 *Navadvīpamahimā*, PP. 82—84.

2 His *search of mass. central provinces*, 1874, P. 144.

3 *Vaṅge Navyanyāyacarcā*, P. 178.

4 *Tanjore mass. Catalogue*, PP. 4525—27.

Then on Raghunātha, he has written commentaries on the *Pratyakṣadīdhiti*, *Anumānadīdhiti*, *Bauddhādhikāra-Dīdhiti*. Besides, Gadādhara wrote many small works called *Vādas* which number 64 as they say. Of these, we have not found all the *vādas* so far, but those which are more important and studied are—*Viśayatāvāda*, *Muktivāda*, *Sādṛśyavāda*, *Ratnakośavāda*, *Kāraṇatāvāda*, *Vidhisvarūpavāda*, *Anumitimānasavāda*, *Navyamatavāda*, *Śaktivāda and Vyutpattivāda*, already mentioned above. Besides these, he has also written one work *Brahmanirṇaya* and also a commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. A manuscript of the latter is found in the library of the *Government Sanskrit College*, Calcutta and also in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal*. He has also commented upon the *Durgāsaptaśatī*, a manuscript of which is preserved in my own private library written by my grand-father.

With all these works to his credit, Gadādhara lived a pretty long life. He was born according to Bengali scholars' calculation on the basis of certain records found in Gadādhara's family, in 1604 A.D. and passed away at a ripe age in 1709 A.D. So, he lived for about 104 years.

Thus, came to an end the glory of Navadvīpa with the death of Gadādhara. It does not mean that there were no scholars in Bengal after Gadādhara; what it means is that no more great savants of Navya-nyāya flourished in Bengal thereafter.

18. RAGHUDEVA NYĀYĀLAṄKĀRA

(17th century)

Raghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra was one of the disciples of Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa. Dr. Vidyābhusan quotes from the *Madras Catalouge*[1] a verse of his *Nañvāda-vyākhyā*—

śivam praṇamya tatpaścāt Tarkavāgīśvaram gurum/
kriyate raghudevena nañvāde suvecanam//

[1] No. 4254, *Indian Logic*, p. 481.

which supports the above statement. So says Mm. Kavirājaji also. But Professor D. C. Bhattacarya in his *Vange navyanyāyacarcā* holds that Raghudeva was the pupil of Ciranjīva Bhaṭṭācārya[1] and he refers to a line in the printed edition of *Kāvyavilāsa* from Benares.

His works

Tattvadīpikā—is a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. A portion of its *anumāna* section is preserved in the *Madras Oriental library*[2]. It is called *Raghudevī* or *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*. He also commented upon the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*, a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana Library*, dated Saṁ. 1739=1682 A. D. It was transcribed by the great Naiyāyika Mahādeva Puntāmakra. He has also commented upon the works of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, such as, *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*. It has been published in the *Pandit* series from Benares. Raghudeva has expressed his own views on several points in this work against Śiromaṇi's views. So he says at the end of his commentary—

Śrīmaddīdhitikārakalpitaghaṭīkolāhalavyākule
mārge sañcaraṇāya yannigaditaṁ siddhāntasiddhetarat/
daivāt tena bhavedyadīha sahasā prauḍhāparādho mama
kṣantavyaḥ kṛtibhiḥ śruto yadi bhaved yakṣānurūpo balih//

Besides, he has also written the following books—*niruktiprkāśa*.[3] This is a work on some commentary on the *Āloka*. In the beginning of the *Pratyakṣa* he says—

pratyakṣatastadālokāt tadīyaṭippaṇādapi /
arthā saṅgṛhya likhyante raghudevena yuktibhiḥ //

Similarly, in the beginning of the *Anumāna* he writes—

ayatnataḥ paṇḍitamaṇḍalīnāṁ
gūḍhārthatattvapratipattihetoḥ /
saṅkṣepataḥ śrīraghudevaśarmā
navīnanirmāṇamidaṁ tanoti[4] //

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[1] Vide P. 280. [2] No. D. 3999.

[3] ms. preserved in *the Benares Sarasvati Bhavana Library*. No. 334.

[4] *Tanjore Cat.* P. 4792.

(4) *Dravyasārasaṅgraha*—It is a Vaiśeṣika work. Its manuscript is available in the *Asiatic Society of Bengal Library*.[1] It has a verse in the beginning—

raghudevakṛtadravyasārasaṅgrahalokanaiḥ /
santaścarantu niśśaṅkam siddhāntasiddhavartmasu //

(5) *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, (6) *Nañvādaṭīkā*. Both these manuscripts are in the *Tanjore manuscript library*.[2] He has also written another work (7) *Viṣayatāvicāra*, which he has referred to in his commentary on the *Padārthanirūpaṇa*[3]—adhikaṁ viṣayatāvicāre'nusandheyam. Besides, he is said to have written small tracts, such as—*Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyabodha-vicāra*, *Anumitiparāmarśavicāra*, *Sāmagrīvāda*, *Pratiyogijñānakāraṇatāvicāra*, and so on.[4]

About his time it may be said that there is a manuscript of his commentary on the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*, dated Saṁ. 1739=1682 A.D. copied by Mahādeva Puntamakar, in *the Sarasvati Bhavana Library* and the *Vyavasthā* written by the Paṇḍitas of Benares contains his signature also. Both these evidences prove that he must have lived before 1682 and that as the date of the *Vyavasthā* is Saṁvat 1714=1657 A.D.,[5] it is concluded that he was living in 1657. So he may be placed in the third quarter of the 17th century.

His date

19. RĀMAKṚṢṆA BHAṬṬĀCĀRYA CAKRAVARTĪ
(17th century)

Professor D. C. Bhattacarya holds that Rāmakṛṣṇa was the direct pupil of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. He was a great devotee of Śiromaṇi as the former wrote all his works on the *Dīdhitis* of Raghunātha known till then. This is true, but all who wrote on the *Dīdhiti* need not be Śiromaṇi's direct pupils. Of course, Rāmakṛṣṇa commented upon the *Dīdhitis* on the

[1] III A. 9.
[2] Tanjore cat. pp. 4568, 4787.
[3] page 78.
[4] *Vaṅge navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 279.
[5] Saraswati Bhowd Steeds, vol. v.

Cintāmaṇi, Anumāna and Pratyakṣa, where in the very beginning of the Pratyakṣa he says—

śaraṇīkṛtaviśveśacaraṇo'vanato gurūn
Śrī-rāmakṛṣṇo vyācaṣṭe pratyakṣamaṇidīdhitim /
Again, in the (anumāna section) he says—

praṇamya vāṇīmunnītaḥ sadbhiḥ samanugṛhyatām /
adhidīdhitibhāvārtho rāmakṛṣṇaprakāśitaḥ //

These manuscripts are found in the libraries of the *Sarasvati Bhavana*, Benares and the *Asiatic society of Bengal*, Calcutta. Besides, he wrote a commentary on the *Līlāvatīdīdhiti* and also on the *Guṇadīdhiti-prakāśa*, whose manuscripts are preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana* and India Office Libraries and also in the *Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal* library. He has also commented upon the *Ākhyātavāda* and the *Nañvāda*.

The beginning verses are—

mukundacaraṇadvandvamādāya hṛdayāmbuje /
ākhyātavādasadvyākhyā rāmakṛṣṇena tanyate //

kṛtvā hariharacaraṇau śaraṇe śrīrāmakṛṣṇena /
atha nañvicārabhāvo dīdhitikartuḥ prakāśyate ko'pi//

kṛtvā hariharacaraṇam śaraṇam śrīrāmakṛṣṇena/
adhilīlāvatibhāvo dīdhitikartuḥ prakāśyate ko'pi//

Mahāmahopādhyāya Kavirājajī adds *Nyāyadīpikā, Tarkāmṛta* and certain number of *Vādārthas* to the list of his works. He also holds that as his great-grandson Kṛṣṇakānta lived in 1801, Rāmakṛṣṇa's time may be assigned, with some probability, to the last quarter of the 17th century (śāke rāmākṣiśailakṣitipariganite—1723 Śaka=1801 A.D.)[1] Kṛṣṇakānta gives the list of his great-grand-father's works in the following verse—

20. KṚṢṆAKĀNTA VIDYĀVĀGĪŚA

(19th century)

Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa was the son of Kālīcaraṇa Nyāyālaṅkāra and Tāriṇī Devī and the great-grandson of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya-Cakravartī. He was the pupil of Rāmanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana.

So he writes in the beginning of his commentary on the *Śabda-śaktiprakāśikā* of Maithila Jagadīsa Bhaṭṭācārya—

nyāyālaṅkārayuktaṁ tribhuvanajanakaṁ śrīpatīśena-juṣṭaṁ
tuṣṭaṁ dhīreṣu ruṣṭaṁ *satatamaviduṣāṁ śyāmalaṁ* sāmagītam/
khyātaṁ tātaṁ nitāntaṁ sadayamasadṛśaṁ mādṛśāṁ sādhusaṁjñaṁ//
Śrīyoktaṁ cātra kālīcaraṇamaracayaṁ granthamādau *praṇamya*//
brahmaśrīkṛṣṇakāntātmakasutayajanaprollasatpādapadmā
sānandānandamandasmitamilitavacobhāṣaṇādhvas-tapāpā//
kiñcitkrodhotthatāpāhataripukalitāniṣṭaceṣṭādidoṣā
śiṣṭā kharvā viśiṣṭā prabhavatu jananī tāriṇī me namasyā/

nyāyasaṁsārapāthodhi-magnopāsakatārakam/
rāmanārāyaṇam vande tarkapañcānanam gurum//

About his date, we find that Kṛṣṇakānta wrote his commentary on the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* in 1732 Śaka, that is, 1810 A.D. He writes at the end of it—

His date

śāke rāmākṣiśailakṣitiparigaṇite (1732) karkaṭe yāti bhānau
viṁśāhe viśvanāthārccitapadayugalaṁ śyāmalaṁ mokṣabījam/
dhyāyannadhyāpakānāṁ nikhilapadapadārthādicintā-pahantrīm
tene śrīkṛṣṇakāntāhvaya iha sukṛtī ṭippaṇī gūḍhabhāvām//

From this verse we can also gather the information that he lived and wrote this commentary in Benares. So he lived in the first quarter of the 19th century.

(1) *Śaktisandīpanī*, his commentary on the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* of Jagadīśa, is his well-known work. There are references to the following in this commentary : (*Nyāya*) *līlāvatī*[1], *Guṇaprakāśa*,[2] *Rabhasa* (this seems to be either the name of a lexicon or its author),[3] Devīputra[4], and Śrīpatidatta[5]. There are some other old references. (2) *Nyāyaratnāvalī*.—Professor Bhattacarya says that a copy of its manuscript was preserved in the library of Rājā Rādhākānta Deva. It is written both in prose and poetry. It deals with certain *Vādas*. It has a verse in the beginning—

His' works

navya-prācīna-tārkīna-sarvārthādhīnadhīmatā/
tanyate kṛṣṇakāntena nyāyaratnāvalī matā//

It has a commentary also of his own, called (3) *Nyāyaratnaprakāśikā*, which was also in the library of the Rājā. Its beginning verse is—

nyāyaratnāvalīṭikāṁ tanūṁ natvā ca nīlikām/
tanoti Śrīkṛṣṇakāntaḥ nyāyaratnaprakāśikām//[6]

(4) *Tṛtīyamaṇidīpinī*—This is a commentary on the Upamānakhaṇḍa of the *Cintāmaṇi*. (5) *Sautrasandīpinī*—It is a commentary on the *Gotamasūtra*. The following are some of the beginning verses—

anvīkṣānayaveśmamadhyavilasatsaṅguptaratnāvalīm
śrīmadgautamatāpasena nihitāmākṛṣya sadgrāhake/
sarvasmin vitarītumeva niyataṁ tenehamānvīṣikī-
ṭikāṁ vaidikavaṁśajaḥ sulalitāṁ śrīkṛṣṇakāntaḥ sudhīḥ/

ṭīkākṛtāṁ vṛttikṛtāñca bhāvaṁ
sūtrotthitaṁ gūḍhamabhīpsavo ye/
dhīrā mamaitā sakalā hi sautra-
sandīpinīṁ sādhu vivecayantu//

The colophon at the end of the fifth chapter reads as—

itiśrī kṛṣṇakāntavidyāvāgīśabhaṭṭācāryaviracitāyām sautrasandīpinyāmānvīkṣikīṭikāyāṁ pañcamādhyāyavyākhyā.

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[1] P. 7. [2] P. 86. [3] P. 119.
[4] P. 150. [5] P. 209. [6] *Navyanyāyacarcā*, p. 214.

Though the author has praised this commentary like anything, yet on scrutiny it is found that it is very brief and not of any considerable merit. There is a reference to his *Nyāyaratnāvalī* in this commentary. (6) *Tarkāmṛtataraṅgiṇī*—As mentioned by the author, the *Taraṅgiṇī* is his commentary on the *Tarkāmṛta* which should be different from the *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa his great-grand-father. From this it may be said that there is some relation between Kṛiṣṇakānta and Jagadīśa. So perhaps Kṛṣṇakānta might have been the great-grand-son of Jagadīśa. He says—

asmatpitāmahapiturvacanāmṛtena
tarkārthasārthasukhabodharasānvitena /
śrīkṛṣṇakāntaracitā tu taraṅgiṇī yā
tatrādimaḥ parisamāptataraṅga eṣaḥ //

(7) A commentary on the *Padārthakhaṇḍana* of Raghunātha. A manuscript of it has been noticed by Mm. H. P. Shastri.[1]

About his time, he himself writes at the end

His date

of his *Sautrasandīpanī*—..

śāke nabhovedamunīndumāne
pakṣe'valakṣe śucisañjñamāse /
ṭīkā kṛtā gotamasūtrasandī—
panī mayā dhīrahitāya kācit //

which shows that this work was written in Śaka 1740 = 1818 A.D. From this it is concluded that he lived in the first quarter of the 19th century.

Nineteenth century Naiyāyikas

In the 19th century there flourished several good Nyāya scholars in Bengal. Some of them wrote one or two commentaries either on some commentary of the *Cintāmaṇi*, or the *Kiraṇāvalī*, or the *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. For instance, Rāmacandra Siddhāntavāgīśa wrote a commentary on the *Pratyakṣa-Dīdhiti* a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavana*, Benares; Jayakṛṣṇa Tarkācārya wrote *Nyāyavādārthamañjarī*; Mādhavacandra Tarkasiddhānta wrote *Padārthakhaṇḍanavivṛti* and a commentary on the *Śaktivāda* of Gadā-

[1] Report, 1901-02 to 1905-06, P. 9.

dhara and some other works on other śāstras and passed away in 1865 A.D.; Goswāmī Bhaṭṭācārya (of Shantipura) wrote amongst other works, *Tattvadīpikā* on Nyāya and also a *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* which has been published in the *Pandit* paper issued from Benares, and *Vyākhyāprakāśa* a commentary on the *Haridāsī* on the *Kusumāñjali-kārikā*; Raghunātha Vidyālaṅkāra, author of *Anumānadīdhiti-Pratibimba*[1] and *Ākhyātavādaṭīkā*, a manuscript of which written in Sam. 1746 = 1824 A.D. is preserved in the *Asiatic Society* of Bengal which has a verse at the end as—

śiromaṇikṛtākhyātavādavyākhyānakaitavāt /
raghunāthena vihita ākhyātārthavinirṇayaḥ //

and *Pramāṇaratna* (a mīmāṁsā work). These are some of the more important writers on Nyāya. Besides, there were many more scholars who, for some reason or other, could not produce any work, but were great teachers. They used to write their own notes on different topics almost every day which later on, came to be known, if really they were found useful, by the name of their authors, like the *Golokīya* of Golokanātha Nyāyaratna; the *Kālīkiṅkarī* of Kālīśaṅkara Siddhāntavāgīśa, *Jagannāthīya* of Jagannātha Tarkapañcānana and others, or came to be known as *Vivecanā* (for Nyāya) or *Khaḍarā* (mostly common amongst Vaiyākaraṇas). With the help of these *Vivecanās* they used to teach their students and the students also used to utilize these notes for their studies.

Twentieth century Naiyāyikas

Kāśī became the best and the most flourishing centre of learning in all the śāstras in the eighteenth century. Scholars from every part of India assembled here and carried on their studies. There were several scholarly gatherings from time to time where scholars were invited to discuss the various problems of Śāstras, mostly on Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa. They came in contact with scholars of different parts of the country and in their mutual contact and discussions scholar-

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[1] A *ms*, is preserved in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Varanasi.

ship developed. It was really on the lines of *Vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ*.

But in course of time, degeneration came in and gradually, in the gatherings, *Jaya and Parājaya* became the chief aim of scholars instead of enriching their learning by mutual contact. This grew from bad to worse in course of time, and has now led to the downfall of real scholarship in this twentieth century.

But even then there were, however, great scholars in this century also. I give below a few names of whom I have known so far: Mahāmahopādhyāya Kailāśacandra śiromaṇi, Mm. Rākhāladāsa Bhaṭṭācārya Nyāyaratna of village Bhaṭṭapallī n Bengal, born in 1751 Śaka=1829A.D., author of *Nyūnatāvāda* on the Dīdhitikāra (*Dīdhitikṛnnyūnatāvāda*), *Advaitavādakhaṇḍana*, *Muktivicāra*, *Brahmavicāra*, *Upaniṣanmīmāṁsā*, *Paramāṇutattvanirūpaṇa*, *Sākāropāsanā*. His other works are—*Jīvatattvanirūpaṇa*, *Tattvasāra*, *Śaktivādarahasyaprakāśa*. He was also a good Sāhityika. He wrote several poems which are included in his *Rasaratna*. He was the son of Sītānātha Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Vimalā Devī.

He was the pupil of Yadurāma Sārvabhauma of Bhaṭṭapallī in Bengal. He was awarded the title of Mahāmahopādhyāya in 1887 A.D. by the British Government. Mahāmahopādhyāya Śivacandra Sārvabhauma was one of his students. He came to live at Kāśī in Śaka 1815 = 1893 A.D. He died at Kāśī.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Pramathanātha Tarkabhūṣaṇa was the youngest son of Tārācaraṇa Tarkaratna, a younger brother of Mm. Rākhāladāsanyāyaratna. He lived at Kāśī and was a *sabhāpaṇḍita* of Kāśirāja Mahārāja of Benares. His only work known to me is the *Vyāptipañcakaṭīkārahasya-vivṛti*. After sometime he left for Calcutta where he was a Professor in the Government Sanskrit College. He has written some works and has translated some Vedānta works, like *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* of Vidyāraṇya into Bengali.

At this very time there lived in Calcutta Mahāmahopādhyāya Kāmākhyānātha Bhaṭṭācārya a very great Naiyāyika and a dilectician. He wrote many works of which, I am aware of his commentary on the *Haridāsī-vyākhyā* called *Vivṛti* on the *Kusumāñjalikārikā*.

His commentary is very lucid and easy to understand Udayana's *Kārikās*.

At Benares there were others, like Śrīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya (an expert in *hetvābhāsa*), Mm. Pañcānana Tarkaratna, author of *Śaktibhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, of Bhaṭṭapallī in Bengal, and father of Śrījīva Nyāyatīrtha of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta; Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Professor of Nyāya in the Government Sanskrit College, Benares, who were very successful teachers and authors of some Nyāya works.

Along with these, there was Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, a Professor of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika at the *Ṭīkamaṇi Sanskrit College*, Benares. During that period he was the only scholar known to have studied Prācīna-Nyāya and written books on the *Nyāyasūtra*. He had translated the *Nyāyasūtra* along with the Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* in Bengali alongwith copious critical notes.

We know that the text of the *Nyāyasūtra* was, rather is, even to day to a certain extent, not free from defects. It has been a headache to our Naiyāyikas of the present day. It was Mm. Tarkavāgīśa who worked hard to restore the correct version. His translation and *Ṭippaṇī* on the same have made the text easier to understand. It is very elaborate and lucid. He was no doubt, an old type of traditional Naiyāyika of the *ṭol*, but his critical outlook and approach to the various problems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Buddhism were wonderful. He was a very successful teacher and taught hundreds of students. Even modern University students were very satisfied with his teachings and critical outlook. He has written one independent book, called *Nyāya-paricaya* in Bengali, which is very useful for the beginners. It gives me a great satisfaction to say that I had the unique fortune to sit at the feet of Mm. Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya and Mm. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa and study some texts of Nyāya. Mm. Tarkavāgīśa left Kāśī and went to Calcutta, perhaps due to financial difficulties, in his old age and became a Professor of Nyāya in the Government Sanskrit Col-

lege and died at Calcutta. His son Śrī Ahibhūṣaṇa Bhaṭṭācārya is a Professor in the Anglo-Bengali College, Vārāṇasī.

GOPĪNĀTHA (BĀGCHĪ) KAVIRĀJA
(born on September 7, 1887—)

Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Gopīnātha (Bāgchī) Kavirāja was born in village Dhāmarāi, District Dacca, East Bengal, on September 7, 1887. He lost his father and mother at a very young age. His father Vaikuṇṭhanātha (Bāgchī) Kavirāja was also a scholar. Due to reasons of health Kavirājajī had to come to Jaipur in Rajasthāna for his studies and graduated from the Maharaja's College, Jaipur in 1910. Later on, he came to Benares and joined the Queen's College under Dr. A. Venis and took his Master's degree in Epigraphy in 1913 and was placed in first division. He studied Nyāya on traditional lines under Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Professor of Nyāya, Government Sanskrit College, Benares.

Śrī Kavirājajī joined Government service as the Librarian of the Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Library under Dr. Venis in 1914. He also used to take some classes for the post-graduate students reading Sanskrit in the Queen's College. Later on, he became the Principal of the college and the Superintendent of *Sanskrit Studies, U. P. He retired from service* earlier in 1937. The title of Mahāmahopādhyāya was conferred on him in 1934 and the Doctor of Letters degree in 1947 by the Allahabad University.

He is a yogin of very high rank. His *gurudeva* Śrī Viśuddhānanda Sarasvatī, a very great and reputed Yogin of *Sūryavijñāna* had initiated Śrī Kavirājajī into yoga. Thus, he studied philosophy both in theory and practice and to day he is the greatest living scholar of Sanskrit, specially in all the branches of philosophy, Āgama and Tantra. He has contributed more than a thousand research articles written in English, Sanskrit, Bengali and Hindi. The *Bihar Rastrabhasa Parisad*, Patna has recently published two volumes

containing his articles and some more volumes are ready for publication from other sources.

I, the writer of this book, have the rare fortune to study under him since 1918 and all that I know is simply due to his blessings. He has achieved the perfect realization of the highest reality and perhaps there is nothing under heavens which is not within the scope of his *jñāna*. In spite of all these, he is a perfect *jñānin* without any self praise in any form. As a disciple of this great *yogin-scholar* I should not have said anything about him, but still in order to guide the future students I think it necessary to say a few words about my *guru*. He is still hale and hearty helping the *jijñāsus* to proceed on the path towards God-realization.

His contribution to Nyāya is not in any book form written in Sanskrit. But his *History and Bibliography of Nyāya literature* which appeared in the *Sarasvati Bhavan studies series*, Benares, Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and his critical introduction to the English translation of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Vārttika* by Dr. Ganganatha Jha are sufficient proof to show how deep is his scholarship in this direction.

Again, at Calcutta we have even at present great Naiyāyikas, like Mahāmahopādhyāya Kālipada Tarkācārya, retired Professor, Government Sanskrit College and author of several works, like *Nyāyaparibhāṣā*. He has been a great teacher and has to day hundreds of students to follow him. He is at the same time a great Sāhityika. He has written several poems.

Besides, there is Dr. Gaurīnātha Śāstrī, M.A., D. Litt., Principal of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta who is also a good Nyāya scholar. There are still many more whom I have not known, but it can be said with great confidence that the country is not devoid of great Nyāya scholars even to day. They pursue their studies with the same zeal and spirit as before. The only defect which has now come up in this academic pursuit is that students have made *Artha* (earning and amassing wealth for worldly purposes) as their ultimate end of life and study, so the standard has gone down and is still further deteriorating day after day and we do not find scholarship of the present day

so flourishing as before independent of every other consideration.

Southern Contribution

Coming to the contribution of the *Deccani Paṇḍitas*, it has to be noted that perhaps due to their being far away from Mithilā, the home of *Prācīna* and *Navya* Nyāya, and there being no easy journey to the south in those old days, scholarship could not travel to that part so easily as in northern India. Moreover, it appears that from very early times, Southern India was influenced by Vaiṣṇava cult and also by Śaiva cult. Of these two cults, it is also to be considered that ordinarily, the longings of a human heart are not as much satisfied with the tasteless śaiva cult as it is with the Vaiṣṇava cult. It is therefore, that Southern India became the abode of almost all Vaiṣṇava cults except the Caitanya movement of Bengal. The followers of the Vaiṣṇava schools found more congenial feelings in that cult. No doubt, there is *rasa* in it, and for persons of tender heart and emotional feelings and hence, of lower standard, *rasa* is more attractive than *Jnāña*. It was perhaps due to this very fact that the Southern scholars had no intention to enter into the logical quarrels leading to the most insipid and impracticable *Advaita of Śaṅkara from the worldly point of view*. Ordinarily, people do not rise to that standard which Śaṅkara expects of his followers. So the attention of Southern scholars could not be drawn towards the growing logical literature in northern India. Then again, it also might be said that the growth and development of logic and dialectics were mainly due to there being clash with the early Buddhists and the Jainas to a certain extent. This clash was from the very beginning of the Nyāya system in the North. Hence, in the south we do not find much contribution to Nyāyadarśana, at least in its earlier centuries.

There was however, another type of clash in the South. It was amongst the Vaiṣṇavites themselves where also there was some logic and dialectics. In fact, every academic quarrel grows and develops with

logic when misused leading to dialectics. There can be no quarrel, academic or social, without going astray which involves wrong arguments, that is, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna. However, we are at present concerned with logical contributions of the Southern traditional scholars to Nyāya School alone.

1. BHAṬṬA VĀDĪNDRA

(13th century)

Vādīndra is a disciple of one Yogīśwara. His real name seems to be Hara Kiṅkara or Śaṅkara Kiṅkara[1]. The name Vādīndra or Vādīśa is perhaps due to his being a great expert in the art of dialectics (Vāda). His pupil Bhaṭṭa Rāghava, an author of a commentory on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* speaks very highly of his scholarship. He was the *dharmādhyakṣa* of the court of Śrīsiṁha.[2] In the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit library*, Benares, there is a manuscript of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava's commentary on the *Nyāyasāra*, called *Nyāya-sāravicāra*. It contains a date as given in the following verse—

Date of Vādīndra.

śake catuḥsaptatisaṅkhyake śataiḥ
śatādhikairabhyadhike ca pañcabhiḥ/
dvighātitaistatra babhūva vatsarai-
rdhruvaṁ vicāraḥ paribhāvi..vā.

This verse can be interpreted in two ways—(1) 500 × 2 = 1000 + 100 + 74 = 1174 Śaka = 1252 A. D. and (2) 500 + 100 = 600 × 2 = 1200 + 74 = 1274 Śaka = 1352 A.D. It is to be noted here that the first interpretation is correct and it has been supported by Mr. Telang in his Introduction to the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* of Vādīndra[3] and also by my teacher Mm. G. N. Kavirājaji in his introduction to his edition of the *Rasasāra* by Vādīndra. The obvious reason is that the manuscript referred to above has an inscription showing that it

1 *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, Pariccheda I, Verse 2.

2 III. 3.

3 PP. xii-xiv.

was purchased in Saṁ. 1428 = 1371 A. D. It means that the manuscript was transcribed earlier and that it was composed even earlier. So 1352 A. D. as the date of its composition does not appeal to us. Hence, it is better to accept the other alternative of 1252 A. D. as the most probable date of its composition.

His work

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra has written two books known so far : (1) *Rasasāra* a commentary on the *Guṇakiraṇāvalī* of Udayana. It has been published in the *Sarasvatī Bhavana Text series*. In the maṅgal verse the author bows down to Śiva—

namasyāmo dūrīkṛtabhuvanabhaṅgaṁ bhagavato
vapurviśvārambhasthitilayanidānam puraripoḥ /
yadaspṛṣṭaṁ bhogairapi dalitakāmaṁ karuṇayā
bhavānībhrūbhaṅgapraṇayakalahebhyaḥ spṛhayati[1] //

This verse occurs as the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of the third pariccheda of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*. Similarly, the *maṅgala* verse of his another work *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* is also in praise of Lord Śiva—

vākkāyacetaḥprabhavāparādha—
prabandhasambandhatamaḥprakāśa /
unmudritajñānasudhānidhāna
gaurīpate tvāṁ śaraṇam prapadye //

Besides, all other paricchedas of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* also have praised Lord Śiva. This shows that he was devoted to Lord Śiva. Further, we learn from the beginning verses of the third pariccheda of the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* that Śivāditya and other Tārkikas were puzzled to see the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (positive and negative arguments) forms of syllogism frustrated by fallacies (*upādhi-vyādhi-nirdhūta*), and then they adopted the *Mahāvidyā* form of syllogism through *kevalānvayi form*—

upādhivyādhinirdhūtamanvayavyatirekiṇam /
matvodbhinnamahāvidyāḥ śivādityāditārkikāḥ //

Then again, he says—

teṣāmeva viśeṣeṇa nirākaraṇasaṁbhramaḥ /
śrīsiṁhadharmādhyakṣeṇa vādīndreṇa vidhīyate //

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[1] P. 99.

This verse shows that Vādīndra wrote this book as the *Dharmādhyakṣa* of king śrīsiṁha and also that it was written to criticize the above mentioned *Tārkikas*. This Śrīsiṁha is identified with Singhaṇa of Devagiri who ruled from 1210-1247 A.D. This date is quite in conformity with the date 1252 fixed for Vādīndra. So he must have lived in the latter half of the 13th century A. D.

His works so far known to me are—

His works

(1) *Mahāvidyāviḍambana* seems to me to be his first work, as there is a reference to *Mahāvidyā* in the *Rasasāra*—

anvayinyupādhivirahācca pratibandhasiddhiḥ|iyañca mahāvidyā tattad-vyavasthāpakavad-vyakti-pakṣīkaraṇena sarvavipratipannajātisidhaye prayojyā iti saṅkṣepaḥ[1].........

which must have been written later.

Reference to the *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana*

The earliest reference to *Mahāvidyā* is found in the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukhācārya[2]—

athavā ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ etadghaṭānyatve sati vedyatvānadhikaraṇānyaḥ padārthatvāt ghaṭavat ityādi-mahāvidyā-prayogairapyavedyatvaprasiddhirapyūhanīyā.

Citsukhācārya is said to have lived in about 1200 A. D.

Next, we find Amalānanda referring to it in his *Vedāntakalpataru*-evaṁ sarvā mahāvidyā tacchāyā vānye prayogāḥ khaṇḍanīyā *iti*.[3] Amalānanda is said to have flourished about 1247-1260 A. D. Then we find Ānandagiri (1260-1320) referring to Mahāvidyā in his *Tarkasaṅgraha*. Lastly, we find the great Rāmānuja philosopher Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha, generally called Vedāntācārya, (1267-1369 A.D.), referring to Vādīndra and his *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana* in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi*[4] and *Tattvamuktākalāpa*.[5] Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara also has referred to it in his *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, a commentary on the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana.[6] Besides, there are

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[1] P. 8. [2] P. 13 Nirnayasagar Bombay, ed.

[3] *Vedāntasūtra*, II. ii. 37.

[4] PP. 125, 126, 273-276, 278, Choukhamba edition

[5] PP. 478, 485-491, Pandit edition.

[6] PP. 6, 23, 42. *Pandit reprint*,

so many other references to the *Mahāvidyā* in various forms which lead us to conclude that it must have been known and used before the 12th century A. D.

Mahāvidyāviḍambana is divided into three *Paricchedas.* In the first *Pariccheda,* the author defines *Mahāvidyā* as a *kevalānvayi probans.* The author explains the term *Mahāvidyā* as—

Kevalānvayini sādhye vyāpake pravartamāno hetuḥ pakṣe vyāpakapratītyaparyavasānabalādanvayavyatirekisādhyaviśeṣaṁ vādyabhimataṁ sādhayan mahāvidyetyucyate/tasya ca mahāvidyātvam asidhatvādisakaladoṣaviraḥ[1].

Translation—a *kevalanvayi* hetu, which being present in the *pakṣa* (subject) proves the *anvaya-vyatirekisādhyaviśeṣa* and as desired by the disputant (vādī) by force of the circumstances that the pervader (vyāpaka) would not be established, is called *Mahāvidyā.* It is so called because it is free from all fallacies of *asiddhatva* etc.

This may be illustrated as—
this sound is non-eternal,
because it is produced.

Here, in this premiss, the *probandum* (*anityatva*) to be proved by the *mahāvidyā probans* (*kṛtakatva*) is valid only when the *śabda* is non-eternal and not otherwise. So the non-eternity of sound has to be accepted by the force of circumstances. Such a *probans* is called *mahāvidyā.*

Justification for the use of the term *Mahāvidyā*

How it has come to be called by the name *mahāvidyā* is to be considered. The term originally meant the ten female deities, such as—

Kālī Tārā Mahāvidyā Ṣoḍaśī Bhuvaneśvarī
Bhairavī Chinnamastā ca Vidyā Dhūmāvatī tathā /
Vagalā Siddhavidyā ca Mātaṅgī Kamalātmikā
etā daśa Mahāvidyāḥ siddhavidyāḥ prakīrtitāḥ[2] //

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[1] *Mahāvidyāvidambana*, P. 3, *Gaekwad's Oriental series* ed.

[2] *Cāmuṇḍātantra*, quoted in the *Śabdakalpadruma*, under *Mahāvidyā*, Bengali edition, p. 996.

Further, about these ten *mahavidyās*, the *Mālinī-vijaya* says—

doṣajālairasaṁspṛṣṭāstāh sarvā hi phalaissaha, //

While commenting on the words *mantra* and *vidyā*, Bhāskara Rāya, the great Tāntrika scholar of the 16th century, writes in his commentary on the *Lalitā-sahasranāma*[1],

puṁdaivatyā mantrāḥ, strīdaivatyā vidyā iti mantravidyayor-lakṣaṇabhede'pi asyāḥ śivaśaktisāmarasyarūpatvādubhayātmateti dyotanāya mantrāṇāṁ madhye vidyetyuktam.

In the *Paiṅgalāmata*, as quoted by Raghava Bhaṭṭa in his commentary on the *Śāradātilaka*[2] also, it is said—

'śaktyādyā tu bhaved-*vidyā* śivādyo *mantra ucyate*/
So Vādīndra, or Kulārka Paṇḍita, the author of the *Mahāvidyādaśaślokīsūtra*, upon which this *Mahāvidyā-viḍambana* is based, used the term *vidyā* for the *keva-lānvayi-hetu* in a syllogism, most probably, due to the fact that there were sixteen factors in such a syllogism named after one of the Mahāvidyās, named *Ṣoḍaśī*. It is believed that Kulārka was a Tāntrika devoted to the *Ṣoḍaśī*. Then again, a further justification for naming it as such, may be given by its supporters that as the Tāntrika *Mahāvidyā* is *siddha* and free from every *doṣa*, so is the case with the proposed *Kevalānvayi hetu-doṣajālairasaṁspṛṣṭāḥ*. But Vādīndra does not believe in the validity of this type of syllogism. It is therefore that he says in the beginning of this work—

Samullasati Vādīndracandre śaṅkarakiṅkare/
unmīlanti mahāvidyā doṣakairavakorakāḥ//

Translation.—Faults of mahāvidyā become manifest when the moon-like Vādīndra the devotee of Śaṅkara, rises. And again, he says in the third chapter—

Upādhivyādhinirdhūtamanvayavyatirekiṇam
matvodbhūnnamahāvidyāḥ Śivādityāditārkikāḥ/
teṣāmeva viśeṣena nirākaraṇasaṁbhramaḥ
Śrīsiṁhadharmādhyakṣeṇa Vādīndreṇa vidhīyate/ /

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1 Verse 17. 2 P. 5. Kashi Edition

But it may be pointed out here that Vedāntācāry Śrīveṅkaṭanātha in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi* and *Tattva muktākalāpa* has refuted the view of Vādīndra that the *kevalānvayi-hetu* is entirely untenable. He holds that the method of *mahāvidyā* is not sound, but a *kevalānvayihetu* with a *kevalānvayi-sādhya* is sound.

Origin of the term Mahāvidyā

As to the origin of this term *Mahāvidyā* for this type of *hetu*, Bhuvanasundarasūri, a commentator on the *Mahāvidyāviḍambana*, says in this very book[1]—

bhāṭṭā nityaṁ śabdaṁ yaugādyā vādinastvanityam/
pratijānate tato'yaṁ jātaḥ teṣāṁ vivādo'tra//
tattasyānityatvam pratipādayitum tu bhāṭṭavādīndrān/
yaugācāryo varyaḥ kṛtavānetām *mahāvidyām*//

It is clear from the above that the Naiyāyikas founded this syllogism to convince the Bhāṭṭas on the non-eternity of sound.

The commentator also illustrates the syllogism as follows—

yatra mūlānumānaṁ mukhyānumānaṁ anvayavyatireki syāt tatra mahāvidyānumānaṁ prayojyam/kim viśiṣṭam? kevalānvayi/ tathā hi—

anityaḥ śabdaḥ, kṛtakatvāt, ghaṭavat, ityatra anvayavyatirekiṇi mūlānumāne mahāvidyānumānam yathā—

ayaṁ śabdaḥ svasvetaravṛttitvānadhikaraṇānityaniṣṭhadharmavān, meyatvāt, ghaṭavat. idañca kevalānvayi eva.

It is also to be kept in mind that in such syllogism all *nitya* and *anitya* objects and their *dharmas* are put forth as examples (*dṛṣṭāntas*).

Thus, in the first chapter he has given the syllogism and has refuted criticizms against this *hetu*. He has supported his views on the non-eternity of sound. In the second *paricchеda*, he says—
kevalānvayihetuviśeṣo mahāvidyā ityuktam—tanna.[2] He has criticized here several definitions of *kevalānvayi-hetu*. In the third *pariccheda*, he has pointed out how these syllogisms are frustrated with the fallacies of *upādhi*, *viruddha*, *anaikāntika and satpratipakṣa*. Thus, he has stated that these syllogisms cannot prove the

[1] P. 2.

[2] P. 76.

non-eternity of sound. Hence, it is of no use in a controversy.

The following are the references found in both:

Reference in the work.

Kulārka Paṇḍita,[1] Udayana[2], Bhāṣyakāra (Praśastapāda),[3] Śivādityaḥ, Śivāditya Miśraḥ.[4] Śrīsimhaḥ[5], Pūrvācāryāḥ.[6]

A similar *vaitaṇḍika* work is found to be the *Vādi-vinoda* of Śaṅkara Miśra of the 15th century.

It may be added at the end that just as the tāntrika *Mahāvidyās* are the *sādhana* (means) to achieve a *siddhi* (success) in any action, so this form of syllogism is believed to be, by its author, a great means to achieve success in any argument. Hence, the term *Mahāvidyā* seems to have been used for a particular type of syllogism.

2. CENNU BHAṬṬA

(14th century)

In the field of Nyāya, *Prācina* and *Navya*, we do not find any name of the Southern Scholars before the 13th century. The earliest work known to me is a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra by Cennu Bhaṭṭa, who was also known as Cinna Bhaṭṭa or Caitanya Bhaṭṭa. He was the son of Sahaja-Sarvajña Viṣṇu, younger brother of Sarvajña. Śrīharihara Mahārāja was his patron. This is what is found in the colophon of a manuscript of this commentary, noticed in the *Aufrecht Oxford Catalogue.*[7] The colophon runs as—

iti śrīhariharamahārājaparipālitena sahajasarvajña-viṣṇudevārādhyatanūjena sarvajñānujena cinnabhaṭṭena viricitāyām tarkabhāṣāprakāśikāyām prameyādiparicchedaḥ samāptaḥ.

Mahārāja Harihara, mentioned above, is undoubtedly identical with the famous king Harihara II of Vijayanagara (A. D. 1400). This Sarvajña Viṣṇu has been mentioned by the younger Mādhava, the son of Sāyaṇa Mādhava, in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*,

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[1] P. 17. [2] P. 83 [3] P. 98.
[4] PP. 74, 99, 107. 109, [5] P. 99. [6] P. 109.
[7] p. 224a

as the son of Śārṅgapāṇi and as his own *guru* and whom Sāyaṇa refers to as the author of *Vivaraṇavivaraṇa*, in his Śaṅkaradarśana of the *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* section—taduktaṁ vivaraṇavivaraṇe sahajasarvajñaviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāyaiḥ.[1]

References found in the commentary

Cennu Bhaṭṭa has referred to Udayana, Kandalīkāra, Maṇḍana Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra I, Varadarāja (most probably the author of the *Tārkikarakṣā*), Vādīndra and Śālikanātha.

According to the date of his patron and his relation with Sāyaṇa Mādhava, he may be placed in the 14th century.

3. VYĀSATĪRTHA

(1460-1539)

Vyāsatīrtha, Vyāsarāya, or Vyāsarāja Svāmin, as he is variously known, was the disciple of Brahmaṇyatīrtha who initiated him into the life of a *parivrājaka*, so he says in his *Tātparya-candrikā*—

kaṁsadhvaṁsipadāmbhoja saṁsakto haṁsapuṅgavaḥ /
brahmaṇyagururājākhyo vartatāṁ mama mānase //

while Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa muni, who was also called śrīpādarāja, was his *vidyāguru*. So he writes in his *Nyāyāmṛta*—

jñānavairāgyabhaktyādikalyāṇaguṇaśālinaḥ /
lakṣmīnārāyaṇamunīn vande vidyāgurūn mama //

His family history.

Vyāsarāja was born in or about 1460 A. D. in the village of Bannūr in the district of Mysore. Rallaṇṇa Sumati of Kāśyapagotra was his father and Akkamma was his mother. In his pre-initiation period he was called Yatirāja. But when he was initiated into the life of a monk of the *Mādhva-sampradāya*, he was baptised as Vyāsatīrtha by Brahmaṇyatīrtha. But soon his *guru* died and Vyāsatīrtha had to come to Kāñcī for the study of śāstras. He studied under the Paṇḍitas of Kāñcī

[1] P. Benares edition.

various *darśanas*. Then he left for Mulbāgal which was also a great seat of learning. He met Śrīpādarāja at this place. Here he stayed for about six or seven years and studied the Śāstra under Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa Munin, so he writes at the end of his *Mandāramañjarī*—

> lakṣmīnārāyaṇākhyāt dvaitakulatilakādadhītamadhvaśāstrāmṛtena vyāsayatinā viracitā mandāramañjarī samāptā.

From there he was sent by Śrīpādarāja to the court of Sāluva Narasiṁha at Candragiri in about 1485-86. There he stayed for some years and met several scholars, and had good discussions with them on Navyanyāya. He left for Vijayanagar in about 1493. He thus passed his time at Vijayanagar writing and reading and meeting scholars in disputations till 1539 when he passed away.[1]

His works

The following are his works known to me—(1) *Nyāyāmṛta*—This work was written with a view to criticize the *advaitins* and contribute some original views to the Mādhva thought. He has shown here his dialectic ability. It contains references to *Kusumāñjali*, *Bauddhādhikāra*, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* amongst many others of Vedānta schools. He says about his achievement in this work—

> vikṣiptasaṅgrahāt kvāpi kvāpyuktasyopapādanāt /
> anuktakathanāt kvāpi saphalo'yaṁ śramo mama //

(2) *Tātparyacandrikā*—It is a Vedāntika work dealing with the *Brahmasūtra* and its commentaries from the Mādhva point of view. He himself writes about his own contribution in this work—

> sūtre bhāṣye'nubhāṣye ca sannyāyavivṛtau tathā /
> ṭīkāsu ca yadaspaṣṭaṁ tacca spaṣṭīkariṣyate //
> pratisūtraṁ prakāśyete ghaṭanāghaṭane mayā /
> svīyānyapakṣayoḥ samyak vidāṅkurvantu sūrayaḥ //

(3) *Tarkatāṇḍava*—This is his best work which shows his great ability in discussion through dialec-

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[1] Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, *A history of Dvaita school of Vedānta*, pp. 24-34.

tical methods with the Naiyāyikas. Here he freely criticizes the views of Udayana, Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara, Pragalbha, Yajñapati and so on.

This work is divided into three chapters according to the three *pramāṇas* dealt with in the Mādhva school. He has changed the ordinarily recognized order of the *Pramāṇas*, that is, he has placed Anumāna after Pratyakṣa and Śabda. He says that according to the *Mādhvasiddānta*, Pratyakṣa and Śabda both strenthen Anumāna, so they should be treated before Anumāna.

Vyāsatīrtha with all his dialectical methods has vigorously criticized the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views and has established the Mādhva views on very sound footing. Besides, he has written (4) *Mandāramañjarī* in three parts, namely, *tattvavivekaṭīkā*, *Upādhikhaṇḍanaṭīkā*, and *Māyāvādakhaṇḍanaṭīkā* and *Mithyātvānumānakhaṇḍanaṭīkā* which are all meant to establish the superiority of Mādhva stand in Vedānta. (5) *Bhedojjīvanam*. This is also his *sāmpradāyika* work. In all these he has shown his dialectical superiority even over the Naiyāyikas. Perhaps in the South he may be said to be the best of the dialecticians. It is said that he had met Pakṣadhara for Śāstravicāra in Mithilā and was very pleased to see Pakṣadhara's scholarship due to which he had uttered the well-known verse—

yadadhītaṁ tadadhītaṁ yadanadhītaṁ tadapyadhītam/
pakṣadharavipakṣo nāvekṣi vinā navīnavyāsena//

It is not correct to say that Pakṣadhara went to Mulbāgal to see Vyāsatīrtha. He never took any such journey to the South. It was Vyāsatīrtha, a *Parivrājaka-sannyāsin*, who, while moving from place to place, might have come to Mithilā and met Pakṣadhara there.[1]

4. ŚEṢA-ŚĀRṄGADHARA

(16th century)

Śeṣa-Śārṅgadhara's date is not certain. He gives his own reference in his commentary on the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana as—

sagarvagarvadalanaśeṣaḥ Śārṅgadharaḥ sudhīḥ/
cakāra lakṣaṇāvalyā vivṛttiṁ kṛtinām mude//

[1] Dr. Sharma, *Hist. of Dvaita school*, P. 35.

Translation—The learned Śārṅgadhara who is (like) the *Śeṣa* the King of the Serpent in the destruction of the arrogance of his arrogant opponents wrote the *Vivṛtti* of the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* for the pleasure of scholars.

Date

His another reference is found in the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpaprabhā*, a commentary by Śeṣānanta on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara—

so'yaṁ śaśadharācāryakṛtivyākṛtikaitavāt/
śeṣaḥ śārṅgadharādiṣṭapuṣṭadhīrupatiṣṭhate[1]//

From this it is evident that Śeṣa was the teacher of Śeṣānanta. He could not have lived before the 14th century as he quotes from the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukhācārya[2] and *Vedāntakalpataru* of Amalānanda[3] both of whom flourished in the 14th century. Again, he must have lived earlier than the 17th century as is evident from the date of a copy of the manuscript of the *Padārthacandrikā* dated Sam. 1658=1715 A. D. Śeṣānanta in his *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpaprabhā* (beginning verse) says that Śeṣa Śārṅgadhara was his *guru*. This Śeṣānanta must have lived after the author of the *Līlāvatīprakāśa* of Varddhamāna, whom Śeṣānanta refers to.[4] Moreover, he had Pratāparāja of about 1500 Śaka =1578 A. D. as his patron.[5] So he can be placed in the 16th century.

His work and references.

His only work known so far is a commentary on the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* of Udayana. He says in two places-*-vistarastu anyatra*[6] which shows that he might have written another work. The author bows down to *Bālā*, a form of female deity. He has referred to Tattvapradīpikākāra, Citsukhācārya[7], *Daśaślokīvidambanam*[8], Tarkasaṅgrahakāra[9], Vallabhācārya[10], *Kalpataru* (of Amalānanda)[11], Vādīśāḥ[12], Vādīndrāḥ[13], Vādivāgīśvarāḥ.[14]

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[1] Here in place of *Śeṣaḥ* the *Pandit edition* reads *sataḥ* which does not seem to be a correct reading. Dr. A. Venis also accepts *Śeṣa* as the correct reading.

[2] *Nyayamuktāvalī*, PP. 4, 15.

[3] *Nyāyamuktāvalī*, PP. 23, 37. [4] P. 26.

[5] Introduction to the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*. [6] PP. 2, 11.

[7] PP. 4, 15, 23. [8] P. 6. [9] PP. 14, 38, 40-41.

[10] PP. 23, 35. [11] PP. 23, 37 [12] P. 29. [13] P. 42. [14] P. 51.

5. ANNAM BHAṬṬA

(17th century)

We know more about Annam Bhaṭṭa from his well-known and most popular primer called *Tarkasaṅgraha* with his own commentary, called *Dīpikā* or *Tarkadīpikā*. It is a small book written for the young children—'bālānāṁ sukhabodhāya kṛyate Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ' and he says the same in the beginning of his commentary on it—'ṭīkāṁ śiśuhitāṁ kurve tarkasaṅgrahadīpikām'. He has paid homage to Lord Viśveśvara in both the works, so I presume that he wrote these two works at Kāśī.

Annam Bhaṭṭa was the son of Tirumalācārya of the Advaitavedācārya Rāghavasomayāji family.[1] Mr. R. B. Godbole, in his *Dictionary of Modern History of India* gives some account of his family history which according to Bodas is not reliable.[2] There is enough influence on his *Tarkadīpikā* of later 17th century writers. So he can be placed in the 17th century at the latest. Moreover, the period when such syncretist works were written cannot fall before the 16th century. So I have placed him in the 17th century.

Annam Bhaṭṭa was an all-round scholar. His *Tarkadīpikā* on his *Tarkasaṅgraha* is a bit advanced type of work. In certain sections he has added some matter from the original navyanyāya works. Besides his two works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, he has written works on Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā, and Vedānta also. He has commented upon the *Āloka* of Pakṣadhara, called the *Siddhāñjana*. Aufrecht mentions the following works against his name in his *Catalogus Catalogorum*-*Mitākṣarā* (a commentary on the Bādarāyaṇasūtra), *Tattvabodhinīṭīkā*, *Nyāyapariśiṣṭaprakāśa* (*on Udayana's Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*) *and Subodhinīsudhāsāra* also known as *Rāṇakojjīvinī*. That he was a great scholar is proved by the following proverbial line—*Kāśīgamanamātreṇa nānnambhaṭṭāyate dvijaḥ*.

Tarkasaṅgraha, though an elementary work, has been commented upon by several standard writers. Some of

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[1] Vide colophon of the *Dīpikā*, Bodas edition.

[2] Vide *Introduction to his edition of the Tarkasaṅgraha* p. Lx.

their commentaries are named here—(1) *Tarkadīpikā* by Annaṁ Bhaṭṭa himself, (2) *Nyāyabodhinī* by Govardhana Miśra, (3) *Siddhāntacandrodaya* by Śrīkṛṣṇadhūrjaṭidīkṣita, (4) *Padakṛtya* by Candraja Siṁha, (5) *Tarkasaṅgraha-Tattvaprakāśa*, generally called *Nīlakaṇṭhī*, by Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa, son of Rāmabhaṭṭa. (6) *Ṭippaṇī*, also called *Nirukta*, by Paṭṭābhirāma. (7) *Candrikā* by Mukunda-bhaṭṭa Gadgil, (8) *Vākyavṛtti* by Meru śāstrī Godbole. (9) *Tarkaphakkikā*, By Kṣamākalyāṇa, (10) *Ṭīkā* by Anantanārāyaṇa. These are old commentaries. In modern times also scholars have written several commentaries, such as, *Sītā* by Nyāyācārya Ānanda Jhā, Lucknow University, *Gaṅgā* by Śivadatta Miśra, son of Mm. Prabhudatta Śāstrī, of Vārāṇasī.

6. MAHĀDEVA PUṆTĀMAKARA
(17th century)

Mahādeva was the son of Mukunda of the Puṇtāmakara family of Mahārāṣṭra. He lived at Kāśī. He was the pupil of Śrīkaṇṭha Dīkṣita. But in the Maṅgala verse three, he bows to his *guru* named Śitikaṇṭha. So he says in the beginning of his *Nyāyakaustubha*-Pratyakṣa—

mukundam pitaraṁ naumi ṣaṭśāstrīm tattvadarśinam/
yatpuṇyaparipākeṇa śāstre gatirabhūnmama //
puruhūtapurohitaṁ sabhāyām
kavitāyāṁ kila kālidāsamanyam /
nikhilākhilaśāstraviddhurīṇāṁ
śitika' ṭhābhidhasadgurum namāmi //

He writes in the beginning of his *Sarvopakāriṇī*[1]—
yadālambanato mūrkha-
stārkikāṇāṁ dhurandharaḥ /
budho bhavati tam bande
gurum Śrīkaṇṭhadīkṣitam //

Again, he writes—

Śrīkaṇṭhadīkṣitaṁ naumi guruṁ gautamarūpiṇam /
yena cūrṇīkṛtāssadyoviduṣāṁ garvaparvatāḥ //

[1] Ms. in the *Gaṅganātha Jhā Research Institute.*

It may be possible that, his *guru* had two names, that he had two different *gurus*. Any how, it is ɪr that his *guru* Śrīkaṇṭha was also a very great ɔlar. But so far we have not seen any of his works. He was a devotee of Śiva and also an *upāsaka* of ldess Siddheśvarī. So he says—Siddheśvarī Jagan-ā prīṇātu saśivā bhṛśam[1]. His date can easily be d with the help of several manuscripts transcribed him and preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan* library, ıares. Mm. Kavirājajī says that he has found dates the manuscripts ranging from Samvat 1727 = 1670). to Samvat 1753 = 1696 A. D. So he can be easily :ed in the second half of the 17th century A. D.

From an entry in one of the manuscripts it is gat-ed that he had once gone to Nadiā from Benares. It ʼ be just to attend a gathering of the Paṇḍitas which so common in those old days. He was regarded a ling scholar of Nyāya in that period in Benares.

He was the author of two commentaries on the *vānandī* on the *Anumāna-Dīdhiti*. He says in the inning of the *Sarvopakāriṇī*—

Bhavānandakṛtavyākhyāne'numānamaṇidīdhiteḥ /
vyākhyāyate nigūḍhārtha Mah¯devena tattvataḥ //

It is found that Bhavānanda was almost neglected his days. His commentary did not attract the ntion of any Bengali scholar for writing a nmentary. It was not honoured in Bengal. But had maintained its position in Benares. Its ɔortance was further realised by scholars when hādeva wrote two commentaries on this very work. himself says in the beginning of his *Sarvopakāriṇī*—

bhavānandīprakāśastu vistṛto racito mayā/
ataḥ saṅkṣepataḥ kurve vyākhyāṁ sarvopakāriṇīm//

out this commentary he writes at the end—

bhavānandīyathārthārthajñānecchā yasya vidyate /
tenopāyasahasreṇa saṅgrāhyeyaṁ kṛtirmama //
madīyakṛtimuttamāmabhinavārthavidyotinīṁ
vilokyamudamāpnūyādyadi satāṁ budhānāṁ gaṇaḥ /
tadābhavati nindayā kimiha vāliśānām śataiḥ
vidhuḥ kuvalayepsito na dinaṁ nindyate tāmasaiḥ //

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[1] End of the *Sarvopakāriṇī*.

The first commentary is called *Dīdhitigūḍhārthaprakāśikā*, or only *Bhavānandīprakāśa*. This commentary is big and is full of technical minutia. It was written to defend Bhavānanda against the latter's critics. It is very difficult and is meant for critical students of Nyāya. The other commentary is smaller and is meant for the beginners of lower standard. It is therefore, called *Sarvopakāriṇī*. He writes in the very beginning of this smaller work—

analocya siddhāntavāgīśavāṇyām
vṛthāsūyitaiḥ paṇḍitairgauḍajātaiḥ/
yadudbhāvitaṁ dūṣaṇābhāsavṛndaṁ
taduddhāraṇārtho mamodyoga eṣaḥ//

(3) He also commented upon the *Padārthaprakāśa of* Laugākṣi Bhāskara. Besides, he wrote independent works. *Nyāyakaustubha* is his *magnum opus* in this direction which he wrote after his *Bhavānandīprakāśa*. It is an original work on Nyāya. Here he has followed the line of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa. It is divided into four chapters according to the four *pramāṇas* accepted by Nyāya. While writing this work, Mahādeva says in the beginning of the Pratyakṣa *Kaustubha*—

mokṣahetupramāṇāditattvajñānāya saddhiyām/
mahādevena sudhiyā kriyate nyāyakaustubhaḥ//
nyāyasiddhāntaniṣkarṣe jijñāsā yasya vidyate/
saṅgrāhyastena sudhiyā nyāyakaustubha ādarāt//
nyāyāmbhodhiṁ samunmathya bhāvanāmandarādriṇā/
viṣṇuneva mahādevenāyaṁ kaustubha uddhṛtaḥ//

References found in the Pratyakṣa

The following are referred to in the Pratyakṣa which alone is so far published from the *Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit library*, Benares and edited by me. Ācāryamatam[1], Ācāryānuyāyinaḥ[2], Dīdhitikāraḥ[3], Dīdhitikārānuyāyinaḥ[4],

[1] P. 25 [2] P. 161

[3] PP. 3 , 38, 46, 53, 79, 108, 122, 153, 158, 228, 234

[4] PP. 169, 177, 185

.dharamiśrāḥ[1], Miśrāḥ[2], Miśramatam[3], Miśroktam[4], rimiśraḥ[5], Maithilāḥ[6], Līlāvatīkārānuyāyinaḥ[7], ı[8], *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*[9], *Dīdhitiḥ*[10], *Padārthatattvani-ım*[11], *Bhavānandīprakāśa*[12], Miśragranthaḥ[13].

e also wrote small tracts, such as *Īśvaravāda, yavāda and Nyāyānumitiparāmarśayoḥ kāryakāraṇa-vicāra.*

ıt the most important are the only three—*Bhavā-prakāśa* and the *Nyāyakaustubha* which he regards s two sons and the *Sarvopakāriṇī* as his daughter. therefore, that he says at the end of the *Sarvopa-*—

akāśakaustubhau putrāvātmajāmupakāriṇīm/
ıddhipatnyāmalaukikyāṁ mahādevo hyabhāvayat//
ukikyāṁ laukikaṁ patnyām alaukikyāmalaukikaṁ/
pādya patyamabhajan-mahādevaḥ kṛtārthatām//

he colophon of the manuscript, preserved in the *ınatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad, contains following—

śrī-Kāśīnivāsi-mahārāmdā(?)-nvayasambhūta-puṇ-ıbhakārothanāmaka śrīmanmukunda-paṇḍitātma-hādeva-paṇḍitaviricitā'numānadīdhiti-bhavānandī-ıyā-Sarvopakāriṇī sampūrṇā Sam. 1792. (=1735).

he above mentioned colophon makes it clear Mahādeva lived at Kāśī and that the manuscript reference was transcribed in 1735 A.D.

P. 41, 59, 61
P. 3, 6, 15-17, 24, 43, 62, 113, 217, 256
1-42, 45, 47, 48, 58, 62
P. 53, 54, 62-63
P. 34, 39,
6 P. 46
. 156
8 PP. 3, 256
. 16
P. 49-50, 172, 228, 256
P. 122
P. 243
P. 16, 42, 52

7. NĀRĀYAṆA TĪRTHA

(17th century)

He was a *sannyāsin* and so ordinarily, he should not have written or commented upon any work on Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika. But here is an exception. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has commented upon the *Kusumāñjalikārikās*, a manuscript of which is preserved in the *Vārāṇaseya Sanskrit University*. It is incomplete. At the end of the third *stavaka* of his commentary the colophon is *paramahaṁsa-parivrājakācārya*.[1] He has also written commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* and *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* of Viśvanātha (Kṛṣṇadāsa ?). He was the pupil of Vāsudeva Tīrtha and disciple of Rāmagovinda Tīrtha as he himself says in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*—

Śrīrāmagovindasutīrthapāda—
kṛpāviśeṣādupalabhya bodham/
Śrīvāsudevādadhigatya sarva—
śāstrāṇi vaktuṁ kimapi spṛhā naḥ//

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, the commentator on the *Siddhāntabindu* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, was his disciple. So he says in the beginning of his commentary—

śrīnārāyaṇatīrthānāṁ gurūṇāṁ caraṇāmbujam/
namāmi vāṅmanaḥkāyairananyaśaraṇaiḥ sadā//

His date

About his time it may be said that as he has commented upon Madhusūdana's works, he must have lived later than the 16th century. He must therefore be placed in the 17th century. He must be earlier than A. D. 1701(1758 Sam.), the date of a manuscript of the *Muktāvalīprakāśa* by Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, belonging to his private collection which is now preserved in the *Sarasvati Bhavan Sanskrit Library*.

He was the son of Nīlakaṇṭhasūri of Vārāṇasī and his name, during his *gṛhasthāśrama*, was Govinda

[1] fol. 186.

Śāstrī. So he writes at the end of his *Bhāṭṭabhāṣā-prakāśa*, a Mīmāṁsā work—

iti nīlakaṇṭhasūrisūnugovindaviracite Bhāṭṭabhāṣāprakāśe prathamo'dhyāyaḥ.

Again, he says—

bhagavacchivarāmatīrthaśiṣyo
munināräyaṇatīrthanāmadheyaḥ /
vyatanodadhikāśi bhāṭṭabhāṣā-
grathanam bhāṭṭanayapraveśahetoḥ //

From the above it appears that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha had two teachers, Vāsudeva Tīrtha and Śivarāma Tīrtha, unless both these were the names of the same person.

8. RĀJACŪḌĀMAṆI MAKHIN
(17th century)

Rājacūḍāmaṇi was a minister of the court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore. He wrote a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi* called *Darpaṇa* in 1630 A. D.[1]

9. GOPĪNĀTHA MAUNIN
(17th century)

He lived in Vārāṇasī during the time of Rājā Jayasiṁha. He is the author of *Śabdālokarahasya*, *Tarkabhāṣā-ṭīkā*, and *Padārthavivekaṭīkā*. So he says—

upadiṣṭam pitṛcaraṇaiḥ svayamapi niṣṭaṅkitam yatnaiḥ /
sabdālokarahasyam gopīnātho vivecayati //

He was the son of Jñānapati.[2] He is placed in the 17th century A. D.

10. KṚṢṆA BHAṬṬA ĀRDE
(18th century)

Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa was the son of Raṅganātha and Kamalā, pupil of Hari and younger brother of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa—

[1] *Indian Logic*, P. 485.

[2] *Indian Logic*, PP. 485-486.

Śrīkṛṣṇaṁ muhurānamya Kṛṣṇo nārāyaṇānujaḥ /
Gadādharamatārthānāṁ Ṭippaṇīṁ tanute'dbhutām //
Vaikuṇṭhamadhyāvasatoḥ kamalāraṅganāthayoḥ /
tanūjena kavitvānāṁ mālā bhīlā vitanyate[1] //

Again, in the *Gādādharīṭīkā*, called *Karṣikā*, he writes—

Rāṅganāthī kṛṣṇaśarmā paṇḍitebhyaḥ kṛtāñjaliḥ /
Yācate bhūya ānamya dūṣyaṁ buddhvā vaco mama //

He lived at Kāśī. He was the author of a commentary on the *Jāgadīśī*, called *Jagadīśatoṣiṇī* on the *Gādādharī*, called *Kāśikā*, and also on the *Śaktivāda* of Gadādhara. He flourished in the 18th century.

11. MĀDHAVADEVA PAṆDITA

(18th century)

Mādhavadeva Paṇḍita was the son of Lakṣmaṇadeva of Dhārāpura. He lived at Kāśī. All this is evident from the following :—

natvā viśveśvaraṁ devaṁ guruṁ Śrīlakṣmaṇābhidham /
dravyādīnām padārthānāṁ vivekaḥ kriyate'dhunā[2] //
and—iti dhārāpuranivāsi-lakṣmaṇadevātmaja-mādhavadevaviracito nyāyasāraḥ.[3]

His works.

He is the author of a commentary, called *Sāramañjarī* on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra and also on the *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti* of Raghunātha. He is also the author of a Vaiśeṣika work called *Nyāyasāra* published in the *Paṇdit*. From this work we learn that he had written *Samavāyavāda*[4] and also *Līlāvatībhāvaparicchеda* (asmatkṛtalīlāvatībhāvaparicchedoktayuktyā samavetapṛthivyādisiddhirdraṣṭavyā).[5] He also refers to his another work—*Guṇarahasyaṭippaṇī* (vistarastu asmatkṛtaguṇarahasya ippaṇyāṁ cāvaseyaṁ.)[6]

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[1] Sarasvati Bhavan Studies Series, VII.

[2] Beginning verse of the *Nyāyasāra*, Reprint from the *Pandit*.

[3] Colophnn of the *Nyāyasāra*. Mm. Śrī Kavirājajī says that he was the grandson of Mādhavadeva of Dhārāsūrapura.

[4] P. 5 asmatkṛtasamavāyavāde draṣṭavyam.

[5] P. 25. [6] PP. 116, 208.

In his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā*, he refers to Rudrabhaṭṭācārya of the latter part of the 17th century and Gaurīkānta of the end of the 17th century, so he may be placed in the 18th century A. D.

12. DHARMARĀJA ADHVARĪNDRA

(18th century)

Dharmarāja is well-known for his most popular work on Vedānta, named *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. From the very beginning verses of it, it is evident that his *guru* was Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha who lived in the village named

His date

Velāṅguḍi on the bank of the river Narmadā in the South. He was the inhabitant of a village called, Kandaramāṇikya and that he was the son of Trivedīnārāyaṇa Yajvan of the Kauṇḍinya gotra[1] as is clear from the following lines—

yadantevāsipañcāsyairnirastā bhedivāraṇāḥ /
tam praṇomi nṛsiṁhākhyaṁ yatīndraṁ paramaṁ gurum //

Śrīmadveṅkaṭanāthākhyān velāṅguḍinivāsinaḥ /
jagadgurūnaham vande sarvatantrapravartakān //

Mm. Kavirājajī identifies Nṛsiṁha yati with the author of the *Bhedadhikkāra* (A. D. 1547). He places him somewhere in the middle of the 17th century. I would like to place him in the beginning of the 18th century.

His works

He wrote a commentary called *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi* on the *Cintāmaṇi*. He claims to have criticized ten previous commentaries on it in his commentary. So he writes—

yena cintāmaṇau ṭīkā daśaṭīkāprabhañjanī /
tarkacūḍāmaṇirnāma kṛtā vidvanmanoramā[2]//

It seems that he had also written a *Vivṛti* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi-prakāśa* of Rucidatta. So he says—

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[1] Vide *Tanjore Catalogue*, P. 115b.

[2] Beginning verse of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

tatra kaṇḍaramāṇikkagrāmanivāsinā /
maṇiprakāśavivṛtirdharmarājena tanyate //
daśānāmapi ṭikānāṁ bhaṅgam kurvan kvacit kvacit /
anumānaprakāśasya vivṛtiṁ karavāṇyaham //

Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Kavirājajī says that he has also commented upon the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara, called *Nyāyaratna.*[1]

13. RĀMAKṚṢṆA ADHVARIN

(18th century)

Rāmakṛṣṇa was the son of Dharmarāja Adhvarin. He has commented upon the *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa* of Rucidatta.[2]

JAINA AND BUDDHIST CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN LOGIC

Beside what has been said before, there are other logicians who also deserve a brief mention in this place. Amongst the Jainas and so also amongst the Buddhists there were some who wrote independent works on logic and some who commented upon the works of others. In the treatment of independent writers there is no difference due to their being Jainas or Buddhists. Almost the same terminology and forms are used in their works also. But even then there exist some specialities of these writers which differentiate these schools.

JAINA LOGICIANS

Siddhasena Divākara, also called Kṣapaṇaka, was the first Jaina writer on systematic logic. He wrote his *Nyāyāvatāra*, a small treatise on Jaina logic, in thirty two short stanzas. It has been published along with a commentary called *Vivṛti* of Candraprabhasūri

[1] A copy of this work is present in the Tanjore collection by Burnell, P. 119b.

[2] Sarasvati Bhavana Sanskrit Studies, Vol. VII.

of the beginning of the 12th century A.D. Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan edited and translated it into English. It is a very important work on *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*. It is to be kept in mind that this *Nyāyāvatāra* is only a portion of his bigger book called *Dvātriṁśat-dvātriṁśikā*. He is said to have written 32 different works on logic, 21 of which are said to be available. All these have been discussed in the first volume.

Some of the more important Jaina writers on logic are—Akalaṅkadeva (about 750 A. D.), who is called *sakala-tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi*, Māṇikyanandī, the author of the *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*. It is divided into six sections and has been commented upon by Anantavīrya, called *Prameyaratnamālā*, or *Parīkṣāmukhalaghuvṛtti* or *Parīkṣāmukhapañcikā*. Māṇikyanandin is said to have flourished in about 800 A. D. It is said that Māṇikyanandī based his sūtra work on Akalaṅkadeva's work. So says Anantavīrya in the beginning of his commentary—

akalaṅkavaco'mbhodheruddadhre yena dhīmatā /
nyāyavidyāmṛtaṁ tasmai namo māṇikyanandine //

Again, at the end also he says—

akalaṅkaśaśāṅkairyatprakaṭīkṛtamakhilamānanibhanikaram
tatsaṅkṣiptam sūribhirurumatibhirvyaktametena //

Further, the same idea is found in another verse at the end—

tasyoparodhavasato viśadorukīrter—
māṇikyanandikṛtaśāstramagādhabodham /
spaṣṭīkṛtam katipayairvacanairudārair—
bālaprabodhakarametadanantavīryaiḥ //

Pramāṇa explained

Anantavīrya explains the term *Pramāṇa* by saying that it is a *jñāna* which ascertains the nature of what is uncertain to one's self. It is capable of acquiring the desired object and also of throwing aside the undesired object[1]. This *jñāna* is expressed in the form—

[1] PP. 9-10

ghaṭamahamātmanā vedmi (I know the jar by myself), which consists of four factors, namely, a subject, an object, an act and an instrument. *Pramāṇa* illumines both the knower as well as the thing known like a lamp.[1]

The validity of a *Pramāṇa* is both *Parataḥ* and *svataḥ*. In case of the knowledge of an object for the first time, it is *parataḥ* (through an agency different from itself), while in cases of repetition it is *svataḥ* (through the same agency which makes the object known)[2].

The Jainas refer only to broad divisions of *Pramāṇa*, namely, *Pratyakṣa* and *itara*, that is, *Parokṣa*, not known directly through sense-oragans. *Pratyaksa* is that knowledge which is not impeded by another knowledge (Viśadampratyakṣam, pratītyantarāvyavadhānena viśeṣavattayā vā pratibhāsamānām vaiśadyam)[3]. This *Pratyakṣa* is of two kinds, *Mukhya and Sāṁvyavahārika*. The former is the same as the *Pāramārthika*. For the rest vide *History of Indian Philosophy*.[4]

Towards the end of the 10th century A. D. there flourished a very good Tārkika, named Sarvadeva, who wrote his *Pramāṇamañjarī*. The book has been published in the *Rajasthana Purātana Granthamālā Series* and has been very well edited by Vidyāvācaspati Śrī Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī. It is really a work of Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, so it will be noticed in the next volume. It will be enough to say at present that the book deals more with the seven categories than with logic proper. It is something like the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annam Bhaṭṭa in an improved form. It has been commented upon by three great scholars, namely, Advayāraṇya, Vāmana Bhaṭṭa and Balabhadra Miśra, in order of their chronology.[5]

In about 1000 A. D. there flourished Abhayadeva Sūri who wrote his *Vādamahārṇava*, wherein he has

[1] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, I. 8-12

[2] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, I. 13

[3] *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, II. 3-4

[4] Vol. I, PP. 279-295

[5] *Vide* Pattabhirāma śāstri's *Introduction*, P. 6.

shown his great skill in Vāda, Jalpa etc. He also commented upon the *Sammatitarkasūtra*. About the same period there flourished another logician Kalyāṇacandra who commented upon the *Pramāṇavārttika* of *Dharmakīrti*. There were many more logicians amongst the Jaina scholars, but they did not add any substantial contribution to logic. They were more or less commentators.

In modern period Dr. Jitendra Jetli in his Introduction to the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa mentions some more works by Jaina writers which I consider worth mentioning at this place.

Naracandrasūri has written a small *Ṭippaṇa* on the *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara on the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. It is written in about 2500 verses only. Rājaśekharasūri, the well-known author of the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, has written a *Pañjikā* (a particular type of commentary) on the *Nyāyakandalī*. The manuscript of this work was preserved in some Jaina Bhaṇḍāra as noticed by Dr. Peterson in his Report, but it is not traced to day. Another Jaina logician Śubhavijayagaṇi has commented upon the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. Guṇaratnasūri has commented upon the *Tarkabhāṣāprakāśikā* of Govardhana Miśra on the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra. It is a big commentary influenced by Navyanyāya. Jinavardhanācārya has commented upon the *Saptapadārthī* of Śivāditya Miśra. It is called *Jinavardhanī*. Siddhicandragaṇi has written a commentary on the *Saptapadārthī*, on the *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī* of Cūḍāmaṇi Bhaṭṭācārya and also a small note on the *Maṅgalavāda*. Kṣamākalyāṇa was another reputed Jaina logician of the 19th century. He had studied under Ratnasomajī and Rāmavijayājī. He died in 1872 Vikrama era. He has written many works. A commentary on the *Tarkadīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa has been published by the *Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute* and edited by Dr. Jitendra Jetli of Ahmedabad. It is a very elaborate commentary and explains all the difficult lines of the *Dīpikā* in easy language. There are about seven commentaries on the *Dīpikā* of which this is the best.

BUDDHIST LOGICIANS

Besides what has been said before in the first volume, there is not much to add to the contribution of Buddhists to logic proper. In the modern period I do not find any independent contribution to logic proper by the Buddhists.

This is in brief a critical survey of the contributions of scholars to Nyāyaśāstra from various parts of the country. Though I have tried to collect material from all available sources, yet I am quite confident that the survey is quite incomplete. Hundreds of works and their authors are still hidden in dark. Our manuscripts which are the only reliable sources for this work are still unnoticed. They are being destroyed every day and efforts should be made to survey and collect them for writing a complete history of literature. They are not in safe hands and are being destroyed every day by fire, floods and white-ants. If the owners are not willing to part with them, efforts should be made to get their film-photographs or photostat copies before they are lost for ever.

III. *Doctrines of the school*

Having surveyed the different periods of Nyāya literature, I now proceed to deal with the doctrines mainly preached by the system. Before the doctrines are discussed, it is necessary to introduce them from the common-sense view-point which the school represents. It has already been said before that the ultimate end of Indian philosophy is to get rid of pain in all its entirety and achieve bliss for ever which can be achieved only by *ātmadarśana*. It is therefore, that all the various attempts by different schools of thought in India to achieve the end, have been made only to visualize the *ātman* from the lowest angle of vision to the highest after which alone the goal is finally realized.

Aim of Darśana.

The above statement presupposes that there is pain in the universe and that it has its cause both of

which are to be discarded. It further assumes beforehand that both the pain and its cause are destructible through the exclusive realization of the ultimate reality, for which there are means to achieve. Again, that all this is worth attempting as it necessarily leads to final emancipation, that is, *mokṣa*, called by various other names. This very idea has been elaborated by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* when he says that the *highest good* is attained when one has fully realized the real nature of that (1) which is fit to be discarded (*heyaṁ*), that is, pain along with its cause, namely, ignorance, desire, merit, or demerit all leading to pain; (2) that which is absolutely destructive of pain (*hānaṁ*), that is, true knowledge; (3) the means of its destruction (*tasyopāyaḥ*), that is, the scientific treatises; and (4) the end to be achieved (*adhigantavyaḥ*), that is, *mokṣa*[1]. This very idea has been repeated in the very beginning of the fourth chapter both by the authors of the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya*.[2]

Means to achieve the ultimate reality.

This is again, not only the opinion of this system, but the same has been expressed by the Buddha in his *Four Noble Truths*, namely, *Dukkha*, *Dukkha-samudaya*, *Dukkhanirodha* and the *Dukkhanirodhagāminīpratipada*. So has been said also in the *Āyurveda* which mentions the following four heads under which permanent cure of disease is possible, namely, disease (*roga*), its cause (*nidāna* or *rogahetu*), remedy of diseases (*hānanivṛtti*) and means to achieve the end.[3] So has been said in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtra*.[4]

yathā cikitsā-śāstraṁ caturvyūham—rogaḥ, rogahetuḥ, ārogyam, bhaiṣajyam iti evamidamapi śāstram caturvyūhameva, tadyathā—saṁsāraḥ, saṁsārahetuḥ, mokṣaḥ, mokṣopāyaḥ iti/ tatra duḥkhabahulaḥ saṁsāro heyaḥ pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṁyogo heyahetuḥ, saṁyogasyātyantikī nivṛttirhānam, hānopāyaḥ samygdarśanam.

[1] *Nyāya*-Bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 1;
Umesha Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol. I. pp. 343-45.

[3] Hemaraja Sharma—Introduction to *Kāśyapa-Saṁhitā*, p. 3.

[4] II, 15.

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Translation—Just as the medical science has four sections, namely, disease, cause of disease, cure and medicine, so also has this science (of *yoga* philosophy) its four aspects, namely, *saṁsāra*, cause of *saṁsāra*, its four aspects, namely, *saṁsāra*, cause of *saṁsāra*, emancipation, and means of emancipation. Out of these, the *saṁsāra* is full of miseries and hence, it is to be discarded, the cause of this discarding is the contact of *Pradhāna* and *Puruṣa*, the discarding is the absolute cessation of this contact, and the means to this discarding is the right-perception(*samyagdarśana*).

From the above, it is clear that all the streams of philosophical thought of India move towards the same end and in the same manner.

Ātman is the ultimate reality.

It is also obvious from the same that true knowledge of the *ultimate reality* alone will lead to the desired end, and this *ultimate reality* is the *Ātman*. This is to be realized or visualized (*darśana*) directly. Gotama has therefore, devised means to achieve the end. So he has divided the entire universe into two types of reality—*Sat* (positive) and *asat* (negative). It has to be kept in mind that Vātsyāyana does believe in *asat* or *abhāva* as an independent reality, like the *sat*. He explains these two terms as something which *is*, that is, *exists* and is apprehended as such, and not otherwise. Similarly, that which is *non-existent* and is apprehended as such, and not otherwise, is also a reality though of negative nature. Thus, there are two kinds of reality *sat* and *asat*.[1] Moreover, in order to have a complete (*akhaṇḍa* or *Pūrṇa*) picture of anything, worldly or non-worldly, it is very necessary that both the aspects, positive and negative, are brought into light. So, though Gotama does not seem to have included in this treatise the other side, yet he has, as interpreted by Vātsyāyana, made us aware of both the aspects, *sat* and *asat* which is as much real as the former. The former is divided into sixteen

[1] *Nyāyasūtra* bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

categories, true knowledge of which brings the *highest good.* These sixteen categories are :

Pramāṇa (means of right knowledge), *prameya* (knowables), *saṁśaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (motive), *dṛṣṭānta* (example), *siddhānta* (conclusion), *avayava* (factors of syllogism), *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning), *nirṇaya* (demonstrated truth), *vāda* (discussion), *jalpa* (disputation), *vitaṇḍā* (wrangling), *hetvābhāsa* (fallacious arguments), *chala* (casuistry), *jāti* (futile rejoinder), and *nigrahasthāna* (clinchers).[2]

Scope of Nyāya

But it must be kept in mind that correct knowledge of all these sixteen categories are exclusively required to have the correct knowledge of the *Ātman* which is the only object of knowledge (*prameya*) whose visualization (*ātmadarśana*) leads an enquirer to the realization of the highest aim of philosophy, life and religion. At the same time it is also to be understood that correct knowledge of all the above mentioned sixteen categories, in all its details, leads to the removal of wrong cognitions, or perverse knowledge, such as, identity of the Ātman with physical organism, sense-organs, vital-airs, *manas*, or *buddhi*, etc., or thinking non-eternal objects as eternal objects and so on. This will be followed by the removal of the defects (*doṣa*), such as, attachment, aversion and illusion which lead to meritorious or demeritorious deeds. This again, will make one free from activities (*pravṛtti*) which lead to *saṁsāra*. Then there will be no further birth and death and ultimately, the enquirer will be totally free from pain for ever. All these various steps represent stages falling between realization of the correct knowledge of the sixteen categories and the achievement of the highest end of life and philosophy,[2] that is, the *Ātmadarśana*. So says Vātsyāyana that in the present context of the

Gradual steps leading to the realization of the *ultimate end.*

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāysūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 2.

adhyātmavidyā, the knowledge of the reality, means the knowledge of the *Ātman*, that is, *Ātmadarśana*.[1]

Now, the next point is : after all, what was the necessity to mention the last fourteen categories separately when all these can easily be included under the first or the second categories, namely, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* alone? The Bhāṣyakāra himself apprehendeds this very question and so he says—

Place of categories like doubt etc in the system.

"The mention of *doubt* (*saṁśaya*) and the rest apart by themselves is superfluous; because, all these, being included either among the means of congnition or among the knowables, cannot be regarded as different from these. To this objection the answer has been given that even then these are separately mentioned simply to distinguish the scope of the *Science of Reasoning* from that of other systems. It, therefore, becomes quite clear that the last fourteen categories mentioned above are the specific topics dealt with exclusively in this system alone[1].

With these few general remarks, I now proceed to deal briefly with each and every category which forms the special features of the Nyāya system.

1. PRAMĀṆA

No doubt, the ultimate end of Philosophy is to visualize the *Ātman*, which is possible only when it has been defined and thoroughly examined and verified with the help of the last fourteen categories, which again, is possible only through the means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The knowledge of the reality, or knowables depends upon the means of right knowledge; so it is necessary to deal with *pramāṇa* first. Hence, the sūtrakāra also has mentioned it first amongst the knowables which circumscribe the scope of the stage represented by Nyāya system.[2]

Gotama has not defined *Pramāṇa* separately. He

[1] iha tvadhyātmavidyāyāṁ ātmādijñānaṁ tattvajñānam—*Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

has only classified it into three divisions.[1] Vātsyāyana, however, says that *Pramāṇa* is that which leads the knower (*pramātā*) to the cognition of the objects (*artha-pratipattiḥ*).[2] It is through the means of right-knowledge that verification of definitions of the object (*artha*) is done and the object is correctly known. It is again, because of this that the validity and the effectiveness of the *Pramāṇa* are established. The Bhāṣyakāra supports the above statement by saying that without *Pramāṇa* there can be no cognition of the objects and unless the objects are fully and correctly cognized, the validity and the effectiveness of the *Pramāṇa* cannot be established. He further says that a knower can desire to have an object or show hatred towards it, only when he has acquired the correct knowledge of those objects. He also says that the existence of a knower (*pramātā*), knowables (*prameya*) and the knowledge (*pramiti*) itself all depend upon the effectiveness of the *Pramāṇa*. But all the four, namely, *pramātā*, *prameya*, *pramiti* and *pramāṇa* are equally essential for acquiring correct knowledge of an object (*artha*). Of these again, *pramāṇa* is the most important factor. It brings into light both, things present and also absent, simultaneously. So says Vātsyāyana—tadevam sataḥ prakāśakaṁ pramāṇam asadapi prakāśayati.[3] It is because of the superiority of the *pramāṇa*, that it can function even independently in cognizing negation.[4] In this very connection, it has to be noted that the *vigraha* of the term *pramāṇa*, *pramīyate anena*, itself necessarily implies the existence of knowable, knower, knowledge and the means of knowledge. Hence, that is why the superiority of *pramāṇa* is established.

Pramāṇa defined and classified.

The term *Pramāṇa* is split up as *pramāyāḥ karaṇam*, or *pramīyate anena*. From what has been said above the former meaning does not apparently and directly seem to indicate the superiority of the *pramāṇa*. So

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1. [2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[4] *vide*, tatra svatantreṇa asadbhedā na prakāśante iti nocyante-*Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 1.

the latter is preferable for the purpose. The former needs some illucidation. It has two terms *pramā* and *karaṇa*. By the former, Vātsyāyana means 'the apprehending of the object', which is called right knowledge (yat arthavijñānaṁ sā pramitiḥ).[1] Gaṅgeśa defines it as the right knowledge of a thing as it exists, or right knowledge of a thing in the manner it exists (yatra yadasti tatra tasyânubhavaḥ pramā, tadvati tatprakārakānubhavo vā). Further, he makes it clear by defining *apramā*, as—knowledge of a thing as it is not, or knowledge of a thing in the manner it is non-existent (yatra yannāsti tatra tasya jñānaṁ, tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānam vā).[2] Others have explained it as right knowledge or direct apprehension not derived through memory (yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā).[3] Bhāsarvajña has also defined it in the same manner as samyaganubhavaḥ pramā.[4] So all the authorities mean by *pramā*, correct and direct experience. It does not depend upon anything else for its apprehension.

Meaning of *Pramā*.

Next, we come to the term *karaṇa*. Pāṇini has defined it as *Sādhakatamam karaṇam*.[5] That is, a *karaṇa* is the most efficient cause to accomplish a certain end. In other words, a *karaṇa* is that the presence of which necessitates the action (yasmin sati kriyā bhavatyeva). Summing up the two, it comes to mean that a *pramāṇa* is that which leads necessarily to the accomplishment of a certain action. In any case, it is a *kāraṇa*. So Vātsyāyana has said it is that by the instrumentality of which things are rightly cognized.[6]

Karaṇa explained.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[2] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyakṣa, pramālakṣaṇasiddhānta, P. 401, Bibliotheca Indica Series edition.

[3] *Tārkikarakṣā*, PP. 6, 8, Pandit edition; *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 8, Paranjape's edition; *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* of Jānakīnātha, P. 10, Benares edition.

[4] *Nyāyasāra*, Trivandrum edition P. 9.

[5] *Pāṇinisūtra*, I. iv. 42.

[6] *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 3. For the theory of Causality, see the author's—*Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Chapter VI. It is needless to repeat it here.

Jayanta explains *Pramāṇa* as a *sāmagrī* (totality of cause-kāraṇsamudāyaḥ), as sense-organ-contact etc. represent the *sāmagrī* in pratyakṣa of the nature of *bodha* (understanding) and *abodha* (ignorance), which is its *svarūpa* (nature), and that *sāmagrī* should lead to the cognition (*upalabdhi*) of the object which is not contrary (*avyabhicāriṇī*) to the reality and also which is free from doubts, which gives the real definition of a *Pramāṇa*—

Jayanta explains pramāṇa.

avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhāmarthopalabdhiṁ vidadhatī bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇaṁ, bodhābodhasvabhāvā hi tasya svarūpam avyabhicārādiviśeṣaṇārthopalabdhisādhanatvaṁ lakṣaṇam[1].

By *bodhasvabhāva*, he seems to mean that while a *pramāṇa* leads to the knowledge of an object, it also brings into light the absence or negation (that is, *abodha*) of something else. It was perhaps due to this nature of the *pramāṇa* that the Bhāṣyakāra has said—sataḥ prakāśakaṁ indriyam asadapi prakāśayati. Jayanta has also said the same thing—bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇamityuktam.' That the term *pramāṇa* denotes *karaṇa* is clear in the expressions, *pramīyate anena, anumīyate anena, upamīyate anena* and *śabdyate anena*.[3]

As to the question whether the *pramāṇas* are restrictive in their use or have their objectives in common, it may be said that both are possible. For instance, we find that the cognition of *Ātman* is realized through Āgama (Śabda-pramāṇa) and also through inference (anumāna), and according to some even through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), while in the case of the performance of *Agnihotra* to achieve heaven (*svarga*), there is only one *pramāṇa* and that is, the Āgama, and no other *pramāṇa*.[4]

Use of *Pramāṇa* restrictive as well as overlapping.

[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 12, Vizianagram sanskrit series edition.

[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*. P. 15.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

[4] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

It is a well-known fact that the number of *pramāṇas* accepted in a system depends upon the nature of the knowables (*prameyas*) accepted by that system. *Pramāṇas* are meant to cognize the knowables. If a *prameya* is such as can be known through only one *pramāṇa*, there is no need of believing in more than one and so on. So has been said—*mānādhīnā meyasiddhiḥ*, or *prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāt*. The Nyāyaśāstra has sixteen categories already enumerated and twelve *prameyas*, namely, *Ātman*, physical organism, sense-organs and their *artha*, namely, *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste), *rūpa* (colour), *sparśa* (touch), and *śabda* (sound),) intelligence (*buddhi*), action (*pravṛtti*), defect (*doṣa*), existence after death (*pretyabhāva*), fruition, pain, and final emancipation (*apavarga*)[1].

Divisions of *pramāṇa*.

It has to be pointed out that of these twelve *prameyas*, the ultimate object to be realized is the *Ātman* alone, so it is, in its own form, *upādeya*[2]. The *apavarga* is also *upādeya*[3] and the rest *śarīra* etc. are *heyas*. *Apavarga* is also meant for the *Ātman*. It has no independent importance. Hence, *Ātman* is the only most important *prameya* (apavargasyātmārthatvena prameyeṣu Ātmanaḥ prādhānyāt)[4]. All the rest are to be known simply because they are closely associated with *Ātman*, or helpful to realize its nature.

Ātman is the main *prameya*.

From the Nyāya stand-point, this *Ātman* and all its associates representing the *prameyas* in Nyāyadarśana are to be realized through four *pramāṇas*, namely, *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *upamāna* and *Śabda*. So they believe in four means of right cognition only.

Jayanta makes it clear by saying that *Ātman* and *Apavarga* are *upādeyas*, while other *prameyas* beginning with physical organism (*śarīra*) and ending with *duḥkha* (pain) in the *Nyāyasūtra*[5] are *heyas*. Even *Ātman*, which is of the nature of pleasure, pain and

Pure Ātman is identified with *Apavarga*.

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 9. [2] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, on I. i. 9.
[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 9. [4] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 10.
[5] I. i. 9.

has *bhoktṛtva*, is *heya*, but that which is free from all these is *upādeya*. He also further makes it clear that the *Ātman* which is free from *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc., is identical with *apavarga* (*etadviyuktastvātmaiva apavarga ucyate*).[1] Hence, the only *prameya*, really speaking, even in Nyāya, is the *Ātman*. Even then *apavarga* has been separately mentioned simply to emphasise that it is also worth realizing—sa ca upādeyatayā bhāvanīya ityata evātmapadasaṅgṛhītasyāpyasya punarnirdeśaḥ.[2]

Cognition of other *Prameyas* essential.

This being so, the last eleven *prameyas* are also to be thoroughly known; as without their correct knowledge *Ātman* cannot be known. Hence, means of right cognition are required to know these *prameyas* independently. Such means of right cognition are four. With the help of these four *pramāṇas* all the twelve *prameyas* are cognized. *Ātman* is cognized by *Pratyakṣa* according to some through yogic process. (*pratyakṣaṁ*—yuñjānasya yogasamādhijamātmamanasoḥ saṁyogaviśeṣādātmā pratyakṣa it.[3]

But all cannot have a direct perception of it, so one has to either depend upon *Āgama* or *śabda*, or he has to realize it through inference. *Apavarga* is also to be conceived through *Āgama*. The rest of the *prameyas* are realized either through *pratyakṣa*, or inference; and some, for knowing the similarity between two or more things, have to take help of analogy (*upamāna*). Thus, all the twelve *prameyas* are known through the four *pramāṇas* alone and there is no need of believing in any more *pramāṇa* for acquiring knowledge of the *prameyas* according to Nyāya.

Some however, do not accept *upamāna* as an independent means of right cognition. They include

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.

[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

Upamāna not accepted by some.

it partly in *pratyakṣa* and partly in *vyatireki* type of inference. Thus, they hold only three *pramāṇas* even according to Nyāya.[1] It may be reminded that Nyāya being an up-holder of common-sense view needs all the four *pramāṇas*.[2]

(i) *Prātyakṣam*

Pratyakṣa explained.

Of these, *Pratyakṣa* is the most important pramāṇa. It has been defined as—

—*indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.*[3]

Translation—That is, direct sense-perception is that cognition which is produced by sense-organ and object contact, is not expressible by words (*avyapadeśyam*), is without any instance to the contrary (*avyabhicārī*) and is decisive (*vyavasāyātmakam*).

There are four points in this definition to be noted. (1) Sense-organ and object-contact (*indriya-artha-sannikarṣa*), (2) *avyapadeśyam*, (3) *avyabhicāri* and (4) *vyavasāyātmakam*. The *Bhāṣya* explains the first point as—*akṣasya akṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*. That is, the *vṛtti* of each sense-organ upon its respective object is called *direct perception*. By *vṛtti*, Bhāṣyakāra means contact (*sannikarṣa*) as well as *jñāna*. (*vṛttistu sannikarṣo jñānaṁ vā*. Here, the word *vā* does not mean *vikalpa* (optional), but it means *samuccaya* (conjoined).[4] Uddyotakara says—some consider contact alone as *pratyakṣa*, but this is not correct, as there is no proof that *sannikarṣa* alone is the *pramāṇa*. Both *sannikarṣa* (contact) and *jñāna* are *pramāṇa*--

kecittu sannikarṣameva pratyakṣam varṇayanti, na tannyāyyam, pramāṇābhāvāt, sannikarṣa eva pramāṇamiti na pramāṇamasti / ubhayantu yuktam / ubhayaṁ pariccedakaṁ sannikarṣo jñānañca.[5]

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1 *Tārkikarakṣā*, p. 56.

2 *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 3.

3 *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 4.

4 *Kiraṇāvalī*, P. 288 Vindhyeśvarī Prasad Dvivedi edition.

5 *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 3.

Thus, the whole thing comes to mean—akṣasya akṣasya prativiṣayaṁ *sannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam* and akṣasya akṣasya prativiṣayaṁ *jñānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ*. So the contact of the sense-organ with its respective object and the knowledge produced about that object out of that contact, both are regarded as *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. In other words, when contact alone is the *vṛtti* or *vyāpāra*, it is *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, then again, there is the resulant *jñāna*, produced out of the contact, in the form of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*), or determinate (savikalpaka) knowledge which is also the *pratyakṣapramāṇa*. And when the *vṛtti*, that is, *jñāna*, is the *pratykṣa-pramāṇa*, then *hāna* (to set aside the object not desired), or *upādāna* (to accept the object desired), or *upekṣā buddhi* (indifference) is the resultant. It is also clear from this that according to the Bhāṣyakāra, *pratyakṣa-jñāna* includes both *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*, of course, there is difference of time in their apprehension, one leading to the other.

Gotama has said that the *pratyakṣa*, thus produced, should not be expressible through words(*avyapadeśyam*). That is, according to Nyāya, whenever there is any *jñāna*, it is invariably associated with the object of that *jñāna* (viṣaya).[1]

Vācaspati quotes Bhartṛhari in its support—
na s'osti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /
anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena bhāṣyate//

Translation—There is no cognition in this *loka*, which is dissociated with words. Every cognition is expressed through words as if the cognition is intermixed with a word (denoting the object of that cognition.)

So there is always a possibility that, because of the close relation of *artha* (object) and its *jñāna*, the *pratyakṣa-jñāna* may be taken to be indentical with *śābda-jñāna* and then pratyakṣa in its true sense may have no separate place. In order to avoid this confusion due to *ativyāpti*, Gotama wants to restrict the *Pratyakṣajñāna* to the jñāna itself and separates it from

[1] *Vākyapadīya*, I, 124.

expression associated with that *jñāna* in the form-*rūpam iti jānīte rasaḥ iti jānīte.*

To me it appears that Gotama means by *jñāna* in this context only *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* and so Vātsyāyana adds that when *jñāna* is expressed through words for the usage, as no *jñāna* is ever possibly bereft of *Śabda*, then it becomes *savikalpaka*. This is also, in a way, what Vātsyāyana indicates when he says[1]—

—tadevamarthajñānakāle sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate, vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate/tasmādaśābdamarthajñānamindriyārthasannikarṣotpannamiti.

Thus, at the time of cognizing the object, the *jñāna* produced is not intermixed with any word. Association with words comes only at the time of conveying that thought to others. Hence, *artha-jñāna* produced by the sense-organ and object-contact is free from all associations of *śabda*. This is the upshot of all the above arguments. This also makes the second point, *avyapadeśyaṁ*, quite clear. Gotama wants to be as accurate as possible in his statement. Thus, it seems that Gotama meant only *nirvikalpaka-jñāna* by the expressions *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam* and *avyapadeśyam*. But when he comes to the other part of his definition which is clearly required for worldly usage, he seems to hint at the *savikalpaka* form of *jñāna* also.

Coming to the term *avyabhicāri* of the definition, it is found that during the summer, for instance, the rays of the sun become mixed up with the heat-rays radiating from the surface of the earth and thus, the two together appearing at some distance come in contact with the eyes of an observer who apparantly seems to have a direct perception of water arising out of the sense-organ and the object-contact. Such cases of wrong notions will become covered by the two points of the definition given above. In order to avoid this, the word—*avyabhicāri* (which is not contrary to the reality) has been added to the definition.

Then again, sometimes from a distance it becomes difficult to ascertain through eyes whether something

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 4.

floating in the air is rising columns of smoke, or of dust. With the attributes mentioned above, it is not possible to have a correct notion. So the Sūtrakāra has added the term *vyavasāyātmakam* (decisive) to the definition. Thus, all the words used in the definition by Gotama are fully justified and give a clear conception of direct sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*).

The process involved in a case of *pratyakṣa* may thus be explained—

Process of Pratyakṣajñāna.

It is to be kept in mind that according to Nyāya, *Ātman* is the only *dravya* (substance) which is the seat of knowledge. All cognitions are produced in that substratum alone. So when the visual sense-organ comes in contact with *rūpa* or *rūpavat*, either by sending its own rays to the object of perception, or by coming in contact with the objects' rays received by the organ in its own place, sense-organs being *prāpyakārī*, the impression (*saṁskāra*) of the object is carried through the sense-organ to *manas*, which, in its turn, comes in fresh contact with the *Ātman*[1] where the knowledge about that object of perception is produced and then it is expressed in the form—*ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi* (I know a *ghaṭa*).

Types of contact.

As regards the sense-organ and object-contact, (*sannikarṣa*), it is of two kinds, namely, ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*). The former again, is of two types : *saṁyoga* (ordinary contact) and *samavāya* (inherence). A mere contact between two substances (*dravyas*) is called *saṁyoga* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. *Samavāya*, on the other hand, is defined as the conjunction between two *ayutasiddhas*. *Ayutasiddhas* are such pairs of object, between which the condition is that one, if in existence, must have the other as its substratum; so has been said—

Samavāya and Ayutasiddhas explained.

tāvevāyutasiddhau dvau vijñātavyau yayordvayoḥ /
anaśyadekamaparāśritamevāvatiṣṭhate //[2]

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[1] Umesha Mishra, *Conception of Matter*, P. 149.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 15.

Thus, these pairs, namely, part and whole (*avayava-avayavin*), quality and qualified (*guṇa-guṇin*), action and that which has action (*kriyā-kriyāvān*), genus and individuals (*jāti-vyakti*), specific attribute and ultimate eternal substances (*viśeṣa-nityadravya*), are *ayutasiddhas* and *avayavin*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, *jāti* and *viśeṣa* must exist, if they exist at all, in their counterparts respectively. Relation between such pairs is called *samavāya* (inherence). In case, *avayava*, *guṇin*, *kriyāvān* and *vyakti* are destroyed, their counterpart will have to exist without any substratum. As for example, a cloth has to remain without any substratum logically, if the threads (substratum of the cloth) are destroyed, at least for a moment. The secret of this is that there exists causal relation between such pairs and the effect will be destroyed only when the cause is destroyed. So the moment the cause is destroyed, the effect will have to wait for one more moment at least to be destroyed after. This kind of relation between such pairs is inseparable, in a way, during their existence.[1]

Types of contact.

Again, for the purpose of cognizing objects through *pratyakṣa*, it is necessary that there must be some sort of contact between the sense-organ and the object of perception. Naiyāyikas have accepted six kinds of contact, namely, (1) *saṁyoga*, ordinary contact between two substances, as between a stick and a drum; (2) *saṁyukta-samavāya*, in case of the cognition of the colour of a jar, for instance, the eyes have first contact with the jar (saṁyoga) and then with its *rūpa*, as expressed in *rūpam paśyāmi*, which exists in the jar through inherence (*samavāya*). So the contact between the sense-organ and the colour of the jar through the jar, is called *saṁyukta-samavāya*. According to the Naiyāyikas, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman* have *jāti* (genus), like *dravyatva*, *guṇatva* and *karmatva*. This *jāti* is also preceived through the same sense-organ by which the particular object, wherein that *jāti* exists, is perceived. Thus, in the above case, the eyes perceive *rūpatva* as well along with the *rūpa*. So the contact between the eyes and the *jāti-rūpatva*

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 15-17, Pandit edition.

is cognized through contact (between eyes, a substance and the jar, a substance), then *rūpa* (*guṇa*, inhering in the *guṇin*, jar) through inherence (*samavāya*) and then with *rūpatva* which inheres in the *rūpa* through *samavāya*. Thus, the eyes come to cognize the *ghaṭarūpatva* (*jāti* is denoted by a symbol-*tva*) through the relation called (3) *Saṁyukta—Samaveta—Samavāya*.

Sound is cognized through ears (as expressed in *śabdaṁ śṛṇomi*). So, the auditory sense-organ, that is, ears, comes in contact with sound. According to Nyāya; *śabda* is a quality of *Ākāśa* and as such, there exists *samavāya* relation between the two (*guṇa* and *guṇin*); auditory sense-organ being the same as Ākāśa, limited within the ear-cavity, is therefore, the *guṇin*. Hence, the contact between sound and the auditory-organ is called (4) *samavāya*. Sound has attributes of lowness, loudness etc. The auditory-sense-organ along with the sound also cognizes its attributes. So there must be some relation between the auditory sense-organ and the attributes of sound which are in relation of inherence with the sound. Thus, the auditory-organ cognizes the attributes of sound through the relation of (5) *samavāya-samavāya*, that is, *samaveta-samavāya*, in polished logical terminology.

The Naiyāyikas hold that negation is also cognized through *pratyakṣa*. As such, there must be some type of contact between the sense-organ and the negation (*abhāva*) of a particular object. The relations of *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* do not help us in this case. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas have coined a special type of relation, called (6) *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*, through which a sense-organ cognizes a particular negation, say the absence of a pot on a particular place, as expressed in *iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*. Now, there must be some contact between the negation of the pot and the visual sense-organ, for instance. The process is—the visual sense-organ is in contact with the particular place where the negation of pot exists, through the relation of *saṁyoga*, while the negation of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) is the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of that

bhūtala (place) and the *bhūtala* (place) is the *viśeṣya*. That is, the particular *bhūtala* is distinguished from other *bhūtalas* by its being in possession of the negation of the jar. So the relation between the visual sense-organ and the negation of the jar, in the particular place (*bhūtala*), is called *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* and through this very contact (*sambandha*), the visual organ cognizes the negation of that jar directly.

Similarly, according to the Naiyāyikas, *Samavāya* also is cognized by direct perception through the same relation of *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. Thus, the visual organ comes in contact with threads of which the *paṭasamavāya* (inherence of *paṭa* present in the threads) is the *viśeṣaṇa* and is expressed as, here is the *paṭasamavāya* in the threads. From the above it is clear that the sense-organ which cognizes a particular object also cognizes its negation, its inherence and its *jāti* (*yena indriyeṇa yad vastu gṛhyate tenaiva indriyeṇa tadabhāvaḥ tadgatā jātiḥ tatsamavāyaśca gṛhyate*).[1]

These six varieties of contact (*sannikarṣa*) are found mentioned in the *Nyāyavārttika* for the first time[2]. Through these contacts direct perception of objects of different types takes place.

Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka forms of Cognition.

It has been mentioned above that the *Nyāyasūtra* seems to refer to one kind of cognition produced out of the sense-organ and object-contact which may be called *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate knowledge). It is therefore, that it has emphasised its separateness from *śabda*, which I take to mean that the cognition thus produced through the sense-organ and object-contact is free from all attributes and is *simple cognition* and nothing else. But as it is not possible for such a *cognition* to be of any use in our common parlance, it has to be associated with some name, qualities, genus and so on. Then it comes to be called *savikalpaka* (nāmajātyādiyojanāsahitam); hence, the term

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1 *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 32-33; Pandit edition.

2 PP. 94-95, Calcutta Sanskrit series edition.

vyavasāyātmakaṁ has been added to the definition. Vācaspati holds that by the use of the term *Vyavasāyātmakaṁ*, the Sūtrakāra did mean *savikalpaka-jñāna* also. —vyavasāyātmakapadam sākṣāt savikalpakasya vācakaṁ, tathā hi-vyavasāyo viniścayo vikalpa ityanarthāntaram[1].

Types of direct perception.

It is to be kept in mind that the term—*prati-akṣam*, *akṣam akṣam prati vartate iti pratyakṣam*, indicates that it has been used only for visual sense-organ, as ordinarily the term *akṣa* (derived from *akṣū-vyāptau*, that which pervades) is primarily used for visual sense-organ alone and in the secondary sense, it is used for all the *indriyāṇi*. It is therefore, that though through the tactile sense-organ (*tvagindriya*) there can be direct perception of air, yet it is through *anumāna* that the existence of air is proved. Hence, Vaiśeṣikas do not believe in five types of *pratyakṣa*.[2] But Gotama does not agree to this view[3]. Vātsyāyana uses the term *indriya*, meaning—Svaviṣayagrahaṇalakṣaṇāni, that is, apprehenders of their respective objects, equally applicable to all the five sense-organs. Hence, there are as many types of *pratyakṣa* as there are sense-organs. Subsequently, *manas*, also produces direct apprehension of *sukha*, *duḥkha* etc. Hence, it is also a sense-organ. So there are six types of direct perception, namely, *cākṣuṣa* (visual), *śrāvaṇa* (auditory), *tvāca* (tactile), *ghrāṇaja* (through the sense-organ of smelling), *rāsana* (through the sense-organ of taste) and *mānasa* (mental).

Alaukika sannikarṣa sāmānyalakṣaṇā -pratyāsatti.

Beside these six types of ordinary contact, the Naiyāyikas believe in three extraordinary types of contact in a *pratyakṣa-jñāna*, called *alaukika-sannikarṣa*. These are *sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*, *jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsatti* and *yogaja*. The first means—*sāmānyaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ svarūpaṁ yasya*, that is, that which has *sāmānya* (genus) as its *svarūpa*. In

[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 133, Chowkhamba edition.

[2] Umesha Mishra, *Conception of Matter*, p. 40.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 12.

other words, *sāmānya* itself is the *pratyāsatti* (contact).[1] Here, in case of such direct perceptions, the connecting link is supplied by the genus (*sāmānya*). So when a person perceives a jar, for instance, his visual organ comes in contact with the *ghaṭa* as a *viśeṣyaka* which has the *sāmānya-ghaṭatva* (jarness), as its *prakāra* (adjective) and as the *ghaṭatva* is eternal and only one, the same being present in every *ghaṭa*, past, present and future, and as wherever there is a *ghaṭa*, it does possess *ghaṭatva* which had been perceived by the person, so he comes to perceive all the *ghaṭas*, past, present and future, through the same link of *ghaṭatva-sāmānya*. Thus, his knowledge is *ghaṭatva-prakāraka-ghaṭa-viśeṣyaka*. The result is that even in the absence of a *ghaṭa*, he has the knowledge of *ghaṭa*. In the absence of such a contact, smoke is pervaded or caused by fire cannot be explained. This is called an extra-ordinary type of contact.

It is to be added here that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi did not believe in *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*. Perhaps this was the reason why his *guru* Pakṣadhara Miśra had to say—

Vakṣojapānakṛt kāṇa saṁśaye jāgrati sphuṭam /
Sāmānyalakṣaṇā kasmādakasmādavalupyate //

In the case of *jñānalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*, the connecting link is the knowledge. For instance, when a piece of rope is taken for a snake, really there does not exist any contact between the sense-organ and the snake at that moment, but that the person has the knowledge of a snake cannot be doubted. Again, a person has the knowledge that there is good and sweet smell in sandle-wood. So when he happens to see or even remember sandle-wood, he comes to realize the knowledge of sweet smell of the sandle-wood, though there was apparantly no contact between the sense-organ and the smell at that time. Similarly, all the cases of wrong notion in direct perception are classed under *jñānalakṣaṇā*[2].

Jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti.

[1] *Dīdhiti*, as quoted by the *Nyāyakośa*, P. 934; *Muktāvalī*, under verse 63.

[2] *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Muktāvalī*, verse 65.

Yogaja.

Coming to the last type, *yogaja*, that which is produced through yogic powers, we find there are two varieties of it, *yukta* and *yuñjāna*. When a yogin perceives anything which is not in contact with his sense-organ through his advanced yogic powers, it is called *yukta* type of *yogaja-pratyakṣa*. When a yogin perceives a thing after concentrating his mind, it is known as *yuñjāna-sannikarṣa*.

(2) *Anumānam*

The next *pramāṇa* is Inference. It has been defined by Gotama as—

Anumāna.

Atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividhamanumānaṁ pūrvavat Śeṣavat śāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca[1].

That is, after having defined the *Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, Inference is being defined as a knowledge which is preceded by *Pratyakṣa*. Uddyotakara explains the term *tatpūrvakam* as *tāni te tat pūrvaṁ yasya tadidaṁ*[2]. If we take *tāni*, then it comes to mean that inference is preceded by all the *pramāṇas*, which, he says, in continuous order (*pāramparyeṇa*) comes to *pratyakṣa* alone. If however, we take *te*, then it means that an inference is that where a *pratyakṣa* is preceded by those two *pratyakṣas*, namely, the first *pratyakṣa* is the perception of the contact of *liṅga* (*prabans*, smoke, for instance) with *liṅgī* (fire, in the kitchen, for instance), and the second is the perception of the *liṅga* (smoke) in the mountain, for instance, in the inference-fire is in the mountain, as there is smoke in it.

Process of Inference,

As to the process of inference, Uddyotakara says that after the second perception of the *liṅga*, there is the remembrance (*smaraṇa*) roused by the manifestation of the impression of the kitchen. After the remembrance (smṛti), the person desirous to know the object perceives again, the *liṅga* (smoke) in the mountain which is expressed in the form-here is smoke (*ayaṁ dhūmaḥ*); and then, he comes to the inferential knowledge that there is fire in the

[1] I. i. 5. [2] I.i.5.

mountain. The last, that is, the third perception of the *liṅga* (smoke), being led up to by the previous two *pratyakṣas* and the subsequent remembrance, is called *Parāmarśa*, which is called the *Inference itself*[1]. This is how the term *tat* is explained in plural and in dual.

Now, let us see what does it indicate when it is taken in singular, that is, *tat pūrvaṁ yasya.* It then means that which is preceded by only one perception. Uddyotakara explains it that in that case, we have to disregard the distinction (*bheda*) made before, between the perception of the *probans* on the one hand, and the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, on the other; and then what happens is that the *Parāmarśa* of the *probans* (the recognition of its invariable concomitance with the *probandum*, which is *Anumāna*, the means of inferential cognition) comes to represent and imply— (1) the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, (2) the subsequent perception of the *probans*, and (3) the remembrance of the relation perceived before; as it is this that is really the *tatpūrvaka*, preceded by the perception of the *probans*.[2]

Inference involves four Pramāṇas.

There is one more point to be noted that when we take the term *tat* in plural, that is, as *tāni* meaning *pramāṇāni* and when *anumāna* means that what is inferred, it shows that in the process of inference there are all the four *prmāṇāni* which have preceded the *anumāna*, that is, *anumiti*, the resultant of the process. This is also clear from the fact that the five factorred syllogism consists of all the four *pramāṇāni*.[3]

Again, it has been seen above that *tatpūrvakaṁ* includes both, *remembrance* and the perception of the *liṅga*. So the question is what is *anumāna*, the means which leads to the inferential cognition? Is it the remembrance, or the perception, or both taken together? Uddyotakara is of opinion that all the

[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 39.

three factors mentioned above lead to *anumāna*. They are equally necessary. But of these again, *liṅga-parāmarśa* which immediately precedes the inference is the most important—

yasmālliṅgaparāmarśādanantaraṁ śeṣārthapratipattiriti, tasmālliṅgaparāmarśo nyāya iti, smṛtirna pradhānam/kiṁ kāraṇaṁ? smṛtyanantaramapratipatteḥ/na hi bhavati yatra dhūmamadrākṣaṁ tatrāgnimadrākṣamiti/etasyāśca smṛteranantaraṁ tasmādagniriti śeṣārthagraha iti yuktaṁ vaktum, tasmātsmṛtiranugṛhīto liṅgaparāmarśo'bhīṣṭārthapratipādako bhavatīti.[1]

Translation—The reason lies in the recognition of immediate sequence—As a matter of fact, we find that the inferential cognition of the *probandum* follows immediately after the *liṅgaparāmarśa*; and from this it naturally follows that this *parāmarśa* is what should be regarded as the means. The remembrance (of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*), on the other hand, cannot be regarded as the most predominant factor. Why? Simply because the remembrance is not immediately followed by inferential cognition; for instance, when we infer the presence of fire from smoke, it is not right to say that the conclusion embodying the cognition of the *probandum*, there is fire, follows immediately after the observer's remembrance—where I perceived smoke, I found fire. Hence, it is only right to hold that what brings about the required inferential cognition is the *liṅgaparāmarśa* as aided by the said remembrance.

Types of *Anumāna*.

Such an *anumāna* is mainly of two types—*Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna*, inference for one's own sake, that is, to convince one's own self about the existence of an object not directly visualized through sense-perception, through the perception of a *probans*, *vyāptismaraṇa* and *liṅga-parāmarśa* as mentioned above. This has been clearly explained by an illustration as follows—A person happens to see with his own eyes in kitchens and other common places smoke always accompanied by the presence of fire, by which he comes to a conclusion that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. After having thus

[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

arrived at the notion of the concomitant relation between smoke and fire, when he goes out and happens to see smoke coming out of a mountain, or any other place and perceives columns of smoke rising therefrom, his previous memory is aroused and he remembers his previous experience of the concomitant relation that wherever there is smoke there is fire and as this place also has such a smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire, he comes to a conclusion that here in this place also there is fire. This is the process of inference for *one's own sake.*

Some again, who has already inferred the presence of fire from smoke and wants to make others also know it, has to follow the regular process of utilizing all the five factors involved in the process of an inference in the form of a syllogism which is as follows—

Pratijñā—Parvato'yaṁ vahnimān, (This mountain is in possession of fire),

Hetu (probans)—dhūmāt (because there is smoke),

Udāharaṇa (example)—(yo yo dhūmavān sa so vahnimān, yathā) mahānase, (wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen),

Upanaya (re-affirmation)—dhūma-vyāpya vahnimānayam parvataḥ (this mountain is in possession of smoke which is in invariable concomitant relation with fire),

Nigamana (*anumiti*—conclusion)—tasmāt parvatoyaṁ vahnimān.

Parārthānumāna represents all the four Pramāṇas.

These five factors of Indian syllogism represent all the four means of cognition accepted by Naiyāyikas. Thus, the *pratijñā* represents *Āgama* (*śabd.*); *hetu* is inference; *udāharaṇa* is *pratyakṣa*; and *upanaya* is analogy. In this way all the four *pramāṇas* join together to produce one common object which is expressed through the nigamana. This whole process is known as *Paramanyāya.*[1]

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

Besides, it is to be noted that this whole syllogistic process fulfils the following five conditions, namely, *pakṣadharmatva* or *pakṣe sattvam* (that is, the hetu (*probans*) should be present in the *pakṣa* (parvata, for instance, in the above syllogism), *sapakṣe sattvam*, that is, the *probans* should also be present in the *udāharaṇa* (example), *vipakṣādvyāvṛttiḥ*, that is, the *probans* should not be present in the contrary instance, as for example, a lake, in the above syllogism; *abādhitaviṣayatvam*, that is, the presence of smoke in the parvata (*pakṣa*) should not be disproved by any stronger evidence; and *asatpratipakṣatvam*, that is, which has no counter-syllogism to prove the opposite of the above syllogism.

Five conditions of an anumāna.

This is the definition of *anumāna* according to *Nyāyavārttika* and others. Gaṅgeśa, however, says that *anumāna* is that which has *pratyakṣa* as its *upajīvaka* (dependent upon) and is accepted by many *vādins* and is a cognition which is produced by the knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* which is also qualified by having the invariable concomitant relation (vyāptiviśiṣṭa-Pakṣadharmatājñānajanyaṁ jñānamanumitiḥ[1]).

So an *anumāna* has two most important factors, namely, *vyāpti* (invariable concomitant relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*) and *Pakṣadharmatā* (meaning the existence of the *probans*, which is *vyāpya* of fire, in the inference, in the *pakṣa*; or it may be said that in the inference, mountain is fiery, as it has smoke, there is the *parāmarśa* in the form—there is smoke which is *vāpya* of fire, in this mountain; here *dhūma* is the *pakṣadharmatā*). .

Pakṣadharmatā explained.

There is another division of inference into *anvayavyatirekī*, *kevalānvayī* and *kevalavyatirekī*. The last two have been also named *anvayī* and *vyatirekī* only respectively by Uddyotakra.[2] The first is explained as—where

Divisions of anumāna.

[1] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Anumāna, PP., 1-2 *Bibliotheca Indica* edition.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 5.

the concomitant relation is established with the positive example; as for instance, yatra dhūmaḥ, tatra vahniḥ, as in the *mahānasa* (kitchen). Where an inference is drawn with such positive arguments, it is called *anvayānumāna*; and if the same is proved through negative example, as yatra vahnir-nāsti, tatra dhūmo'pi nāsti, as in a lake, then this is called *vyatirekānumāna*. Thus, such an inference, where both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are possible, is called *anvaya-vyatirekī-anumāna*. Here the *vyāpti* is established both positively and negatively. But in cases where *anvaya-vyāpti* alone is possible and no *vyatireka*, that is called *anvayī* or *kevalānvayī*. As for instance, 'śabdaḥ abhidheyaḥ, prameyatvāt, yathā ghaṭaḥ' (meaning-sound has a name, because it is an object of knowledge, as a pot); here, there is no possibility of having a negative argument like—'yatra abhidheyaṁ na, tatra prameyamapi na'. No example is available here. So, such an argument is not valid. Hence, it is called only *Kevalānvayī*. Similarly, an inference, where only negative is possible and no positive (*anvaya*), is called *kevalavyatirekī*. As for example, 'Pratyakṣādikaṁ pramāṇamiti vyavahartavyaṁ, pramākaraṇatvāt, yat pramāṇamiti na vyavahriyate tat na pramākaraṇam, yathā pratyakṣābhāsādi.' Here in this case, 'yat pramākaraṇaṁ tat pramāṇamiti vyavahartavyaṁ, yathā amukaḥ iti dṛṣṭānto nāsti,' because the entire class of *pramāṇa* has been included under the *pakṣa* and there is no *pramāṇa* apart from the *pakṣa* which may serve as an example. Hence, it is without any example. So it is called *Kevalavyatirekī*. Thus, there are three varieties of an inference.

But Gotama has other divisions of inference. He divides *anumāna* into *Pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*. *Pūrvat* type of inferece is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause; as for example, when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain. *Śeṣavat* type of inference is that wherein the cause is inferred from the effect; as for example, when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is fuller and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain. The *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is that in which the inference is

based on a general observation. As for example, we have observed in all cases of an object seen in a place different from where it was seen before, only when it has moved from one place to another; and from this fact of general observation, we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot actually perceive it moving, as we find the sun in the evening in a place where it was not in the morning.

It may be observed that these three terms are very old. They are found even in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.[1] The last variety is found in the Mīmāṁsā-*Śabarabhāṣya*[2] with a slight difference. Instead of *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, Śabara has *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-sambandha*, but there is no difference either in the meaning, or in the example.

Sāṅkhya divisions of anumāna.

Sāṅkhya, however, splits up inference into two varieties—*vīta* and *avīta* (positive—*anvaya* and negative—*vyatireka*). *Avīta* is the same as *śeṣavat*; which is the same as the *method of Residue* of the Western logic. But *vīta* is of two kinds, namely, *Pūrvavat* and *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*.

Vācaspati Miśra's explanation.

Vācaspati Miśra explains these as—The former is that which has for its object that universal (*sāmānya*) of which a particular instance is perceived; as for instance, a particular instance of fire in the kitchen, which has *vahnitva* as its sāmānya, is *seen* (dṛṣṭa) in the kitchen. The latter is that particular instance of a *sāmānya* which is *not perceived* (adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviṣayam); as for instance, the inference of a sense-organ, which is not perceived (*atīndriya*) in an inference of a *karaṇa* (instrument).

Meaning of these terms not quite certain.

Again, it is to be pointed out that even Vātsyāyana was not sure of the meaning of these terms. So he says—*Pūrvavat* inference *may* be that in which out of the two things perceived together on some former occasion, the one, that is not perceived at

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[1] Kārikā 5 as interpreted by the commentators and also found in the *Ṣaṣṭhitantra*.

[2] I. i. 5.

to things present, while inference refers to things both present and not-present (that is, past and future). As to the question why is it so? the Bhāṣyakāra says that inference refers to all the three times.

(3) *Upamānam*

The next *pramāṇa* accepted by the *Nyāya* system is *Upamāna* (analogy). It has already been said that some Naiyāyikas do not believe in *Upamāna* as a separate *Pramāṇa*. (Nyāyaikadeśinopyevaṁ)[1]. But Gotama did accept it to be an independent and separate *Pramāṇa*. So he has defined it as—

Prasiddhasādharmyātsādhyasādhanamupamānam,[2]

meaning that *Analogy* is that which proves the thing to be proved (sādhya), through the similarity to a known object. Vātsyāyana explains it as that which makes known what is to be made known, through similarity to an object that is already well-known; as for example—as the cow so the *gavaya*, that is, the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow.

Dr. Ganganatha Jha remarks here in this connection, in the foot-note of his English translation—

"There is some difference between the *Bhāṣya* on the one hand and the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* on the other. As regards the object of analogical cognition and the exact form of that cognition, there is no difference; as according to both, the object is the connection of the name with the object; the form of the cognition being-this object is what is named *gavaya*. There is however a marked difference of opinion as to the means of the cognition; that it is the similarity between the two objects that is the means, on this also all are agreed; but according to the *Bhāṣya*, it is this similarity as expressed in the assertion 'the *gavaya* is like the cow',—which assertion is remembered at the time that the man sees the animal resembling the cow; while according to the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* it is the similarity that is actually seen when the animal is seen to resemble the cow,—this perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the similarity expressed in the assertion, 'the *gavaya* is like the cow'. Says the *Pariśuddhi*,—*Sādṛśyasyaiva prajñāyamānasya karaṇatvamabhipraiti*.

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[2] I. i. 6.

the time of the inference, is inferred at the sight of the other. Example is the same, inference of fire from smoke. The *Śeṣavat* type may also be explained as an inference through the *method of Residue*; as for example, the inference of śabda as a *guṇa*. By *śeṣa* Vātsyāyana means 'remainder.' For example, as regards an object, there are certain possibilities, and out of them some possibilities are eliminated, as untenable and there being no other possibilities, when the remaining possibility is cognized in relation to the said object, it is *Śeṣa*. This cognition is said to be *śeṣavat* (prasaktapṛtiṣedhe anyatrāprasaṅgāt śiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ śeṣaḥ pariśeṣaḥ).[1] *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* may also be interpreted, says *Vātsyāyana*, as that inference wherein the relation between the *probans* (*liṅga*) and *probandum* (*liṅgī*) being imperceptible, *probandum* is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; as for example, the inference of *ātman* through the *probans* desire (*icchā*) etc.

From these various explanations it may be conjectured that these terms are very old and they seem to have lost their real significance even before Vātsyāyana. It was therefore, that Vātsyāyana could not definitely decide as to the exact sense in which these three terms have been used. So he has given alternative explanations of these three terms.

Vācaspati, while commenting on the example of the *Pariśeṣānumāna* given by Vātsyāyana, says that *idantu pariśeṣasyodāharaṇaṁ nādaraṇīyam vyatirekiṇo hi nāmāntaramidaṁ pariśeṣa iti*[2]. He means that *pariśeṣa* is only another name for the purely negative inference; while the example cited by the *Bhāṣya* is one of the positive-negative type. The example suggested is the inference of the fact that desire etc. are dependent upon the *Ātman*.

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The *Tātparya* interprets the *Bhāṣya* passage '*yathā gauḥ* *bā gavayaḥ*'[1] to mean that the similarity should be one that already known by means of such assertions. But we find e *Bhāṣya*[2] calling this assertion itself *upamāna*.

There is no doubt, that the view of the *Vārttika* and the *ātparya* is more logical. The latter rightly remarks that for the ignition that 'this animal is what is called *gavaya*', it is neceary that the observer should know of the assertion—'the *avaya* is similar to the cow', and also that he should perceive the milarity to the cow in the animal concerned. If the analogical ognition had for its means only this remembered similarity, ien its validity would be as doubtful as that of the remembrance self".

Vātsyāyana while explaining this *Pramāṇa* says—by means of this analogy when a person finds similarity to the cow, then he actually perceives the object that had been referred to in the analogy; and thence he comes to cognize the connection of that object with the name mentioned in the analogy; so that it is this latter cognition that is the purpose achieved through analogy. As for instance, when the analogy, in the form —'the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow', has been put forward, and the person who has heard this, happens, subsequently, to perceive through the contact of his sense-organ, an object similar to the cow, he then realizes that the word *gavaya* is the name of this object, and comes to cognize the connection of that particular name with that particular object.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that according to old Naiyāyikas analogy is the *atideśavākya* (direction of the forester that a *gavaya* is like a cow, which expresses similarity between a well-known object, and an object not so well-known which again, is the resultant of the cognition of the relation of a name with the object having that name (saṁjñāsaṁjñipratītiphalaṁ prasiddhetarayoḥ sārūpyapratipādakaṁ atideśavākyamevopamānam). That is, a person not knowing the form of a *gavaya* and being desirous to know about it, makes an enquiry about it from a forester who is in the know of it—*what is gavaya?* Thereupon the forester tells him—*yādṛśo gauḥ tādṛśo gavayaḥ*

[1] II. i. 2. [2] I. i. 4.

(*gavaya* is just like a cow). Such a statement about an object *not-known* through the similarity of a *well-known* (animal) cow, and through it he helps the enquirer know that the *not-known* animal is that which is called by the name *gavaya*. This is what is meant by *upamāna*.[1]

Utility of upamāna.

As to the query about the utility of this means of right knowledge, Jayanta points out that no doubt, through *Āgama*, which is the means to achieve emancipation, we realize the knowledge of the *Ātman*, through *Anumāna* the validity of *Āgama* is decided, and through *Pratyakṣa*, the invariable concomitant relation in an inference is established; so we should not understand that there are only three *pramāṇas* accepted by the system. There is the fourth *pramāṇa* called *Upamāna* which is useful in the performance of *dharma* (a dhārmic action), like the *gavayālambhana* (killing a *gavaya* in a sacrifice) though there is no utility of it for *Mokṣa*. So it should be regarded as a separate means of knowledge.[2] Hence, there are four types of *Pramāṇa* in Nyāya, neither less nor more.

Types of upamāna.

The *Siddhāntacandrodaya*, as referred to by the *Nyāyakośa*[3], says that there are three types of *upamāna*, namely, *Sādṛśyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam*, *asādhāraṇadharmaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam* and *vaidharmyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam*; as for instance, *gosādṛśyaviśiṣṭapiṇḍajñānam*, *khaḍgamṛgajñānam* and *uṣṭrajñānam* respectively.Again, the *Nyāyakośa*[4] refers to another three types of upamāna, namely, *Sādharmyopamānam* as in 'ayaṁ (gavayaḥ) gavayapadavācyaḥ; *Vaidharmyopamānam*, as in 'iyaṁ (pṛthivī), pṛthivīpadavācyā; *Dharmamātropamānam*, as in 'iyam pṛthivīpadavācyā.'

(4) *Āgama or Śabda*

The last means of cognition is the *Āgama-Pramāṇa*, also called *Śabda-Pramāṇa*. It has been defined by Gotama as—

[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 141.
[2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 145.
[3] p. 148.
[4] Page 148.

Āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ.[1]

That is, the assertion of a reliable person is what is meant by *śabda*. Here, not only the assertion in the form of a sentence or the thought expressed through that assertion is meant by *Śabda*, but both are included under the term *śabda*. By the word *āpta*, the *Bhāṣya* means one who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things, who is moved by a desire to make known to others the thing as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it.

Divisions of Śabda.

It is of two kinds, —*dṛṣṭārtha*, that of which the thing spoken of is *perceived*; and *adṛṣṭārtha*, that of which the thing spoken of is *not perceived*; for instance, Īśvara, svarga etc.

Conditions for Śābdabodha.

The author of the *Tarkabhāṣā* has defined *Śabdapramāṇa* as *āptavākyam śabdaḥ*. The term *āpta* has already been explained above. By *Vākya*, he means a collection of words which are mutually so related as to give some complete idea. As for instance, the sentence *Puruṣaḥ asti* is a collection of two words. The word *Puruṣa* possesses a sort of longing (*ākāṅkṣā*) to get its meaning accomplished by having some other word like *asti*, without which the word *Puruṣa* singly cannot convey any sense. So in a sentence the words must have some sort of mutual relation so as to accomplish the meaning of each of the words.

Besides, it is also to be seen whether the accomplishing word has the capacity to complete any desired sensible meaning or not. For instance, in the sentence-*agninā siñcati* (he sprinkles the land with fire), the sprinkling is not possible with fire. It is water alone which can sprinkle. So the *sentence-agninā siñcati* does not give any desired sensible meaning. Hence, there should be *yogyatā* (capacity to accomplish the act).

Then, it is also necessary that the words in a sentence should be uttered closely and not at long

[1] I. i. 7.

intervals, otherwise those words cannot be joined together so as to give any connected idea. Thus, it comes to mean that a sentence is that collection of words which possesses *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā and Āsatti* (nearness).

Besides, there is one more condition called *Tātparya*, intention of the speaker. As for instance, in the sentence—*saindhavamānaya* (bring the product of Sindhu), it is to be decided whether the speaker uses the term *saindhava* in the sense of a horse of *sindhudeśa*, which is wanted by the speaker for his going to a place with great swiftness, or he needs more salt in his food which is tasteless without it. So the attendent of the speaker, should know the intention (*tātparya*) of the speaker in uttering that sentence.

It has to be kept in mind that the words enter into the ears of the hearer and then it creates a desire in his mind to join together those words in such a way as to give a complete desired sensible idea. Thus, it is the hearer who is *Sākāṅkṣa*, but through the words entering into his ears thoughts are aroused in him, so both, words and thoughts, are also called *Sākāṅkṣa* by imposition.

This is in brief a description of the four kinds of *pramāṇa* accepted by Nyāyaśāstra through which the *prameyas* as circumscribed by it are cognized.

Validity of Pramāṇas.

The next, rather the most important problem of Nyāya, is the *Prāmāṇyavāda* (validity of the pramāṇas). After a cognition is achieved through any of the means of right knowledge, a question is raised, whether the cognition thus arrived at is to be taken independently as valid beyond any doubt, or it is necessary to take help of some other source to ascertain its validity. In other words, the question is—whether the *pramāṇas* are self-valid, or that its validity depends upon something other than itself.

There are two independent views amongst the philosophers. The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that (a) due to the sense-organ and object-contact a simple

cognition is produced in the *Ātman* in the form *ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ* (this is a jar) which is called, in the Naiyāyika terminology *vyavasāyātmakajñāna*, after the *nirvikalpakajñāna* of the same; (b) then there is the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the same knowledge which is expressed in the form of a judgement—'I possess the knowledge of a *ghaṭa*;' (c) then follows the remembrance of the two possibilities—*Prāmāṇya* and *Aprāmāṇya*; (d) then a doubt (*saṁśaya*), as to whether the cognition produced in the Ātman is valid or not, comes up; (e) and lastly, after the perception of the distinguishing feature (*viśeṣa*), the validity is cognized and expressed in the form—'*idaṁ jñānam pramā, samarthapravṛttijanakatvāt, jñānāntaravat*' (meaning, this knowledge is valid, as it leads to effective activities, like any other knowledge).[1] In brief, it is to be said that *vyavasāya* is the knowledge where its object is some object (*viṣayiviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ vyavasāyaḥ*) as for example, *idaṁ jalaṁ* (this is water); while *anuvyavasāya* is the knowledge where the object is the knowledge (*viṣayi*) itself (*viṣayiviṣayaṁ jñānamanuvyavasāyaḥ*), as for example—*jalamahaṁ jānāmi* (I know water). It is evident that a knowledge is obtained, through *mānasika pratyakṣa*, while its validity is attained through inference of the type of *kevalavyatirekī*—

I would like to quote here from the notes of M. R. Bodas based on the *Tarkadīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa about the self-validity or otherwise of *Pramāṇas* which *is a good summary of the relative views.*

"We see a jar and have the cognition *ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*, or *ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi*; but how do we know that we really see the jar, and that our perceptive knowledge is not a misapprehension of something that is not a jar? That is, how do we in practice distinguish a *Pramā* from *bhrama*? We may or we may not see the reality of *ghaṭa*, but what test is there to prove that we see the reality and not a shadow? A *Pramā* has been defined as *tadvati tatprakārakaṁ jñānaṁ* (meaning—a knowledge of a thing possessing any property as possessed of that property). It is thus comparatively easy to define what *Pramā* is; but how are we to ascertain whether a given piece of knowledge is a *pramā*

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[1] Jagadīśa, *Tarkāmṛta*, P. 16, Calcutta edition.

or *apramā*? The necessity of this ascertainment is obvious, for without it there can be no certainty of knowledge and all human intercourse would be impossible. The question, therefore, how to determine the truth of our cognitions becomes a necessary corollary to any theory of knowledge.

The question is resolved into the alternative whether right-knowledge is *svataḥpramāṇa* (self-proved) or *parataḥpramāṇa* (proved by something else). Mādhavācārya quotes two verses which summarize the four principal views on this point—

pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṅkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ/
naiyāyikāste parataḥ saugatāścaramam svataḥ//
prathamaṁ parataḥ prāhuḥ prāmāṇyaṁ vedavādinaḥ/
pramāṇatvaṁ svataḥ prāhuḥ parataścāpramāṇatāṁ//

Translation—Of the two things, authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) and non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*), the Sāṅkhyas consider both to be self-proved; the Naiyāyikas hold both to be known externally; the Bauddhas think that non-authoritativeness is self-proved, but the other is proved externally. Lastly, teachers of the *Vedas*, that is, the Mīmāṁsakas maintain that *prāmāṇya* is self-proved but *aprāmāṇya* requires external proof.

This diversity of opinions about *prāmāṇya* may be stated briefly by saying that according to Sāṅkhyas both the truth and falsity of a cognition are known *intuitively*; according to the Naiyāyikas both are proved by *independent reasoning* and therefore neither can be presumed until thus proved; according to the Bauddhas a cognition is *prima facie* incorrect and true if only proved to be so by special evidence; while the Mīmāṁsakas regard a cognition as presumably correct, but false when actually proved to be so.'[1]

As this is one of the most important problems of Nyāya which can be better understood along with the views of the rival schools I would like to add the following from my old article.[2]

Coming to the Mīmāṁsakas, we find that they have their independent views about this problem, which may be classed under three different sections, attributed to the three distinguished exponents of the theory, namely, Kumārila, Prabhākara and Murāri.

[1] Bodas, *notes* PP. 356-57.

[2] *Murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ*, All India Oriental Conference, Fifth Session, Lahore.

Kumārila school.

Kumārila holds that a *jñāna* is supersensuous (*atīndriya*) and its presence is inferred from a *dharma*, called *Jñātatā*, which is produced in that jñāna after the latter has been produced through sense-organ and object contact as usual, and then with that *Jñātatā* the validity of that *jñāna* is also inferred simultaneously. In other words, according to him, after the cognition, expressed in the form of a judgment—*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ* (this is a jar), a kind of *dharma* (attribute), called *jñātatā*, is produced in that *ghaṭa* and then we have the direct perception of this *jñātatā* whereafter the cognition is expressed in the form of a judgment—*jñāto mayā ghaṭaḥ* (a jar has been known by me), after which the presence of the cognition which was produced by the sense-organ and object-contact is inferred and is expressed in the form—*ahaṁ ghaṭatvaprakārakajñānavān, ghatatvaprakārakajñātatāvatvāt*; and along with this inference the validity of that inferred *jñāna* is also arrived at[1]. It is evident from this that Kumārila has not to depend upon the effectiveness of the effort (*samarthapravṛtti*) to prove the validity of the *jñāna*, like the Naiyāyikas. So in this case, the validity is not to depend upon any external agency (*parataḥ*).

Prabhākara school.

According to Prabhākara after the sense-organ-and object-contact a determinate (*savikalpaka*) knowsledge is produced which is afterward expressed in the form of a judgment which includes an object of *jñāna* (that is, *ghaṭa*), a subject of *jñāna* (that is, *Ātman*)[2] and *jñāna* is, of course, there already. *Jñāna*, according to him, being self-illumined (*svaprakāśa*) reveals itself along with its object and subject as well as the validity of its own-self.[3] Thus, it is through the first *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*) itself (*svataḥ*) that the vali-

[1] *Tarkāmṛta*, P. 16.

[2] It is to be noted here that according to Prabhākara the *Ātman* is essentially *jaḍa*, like that of the Naiyāyikas, but it becomes conscious (*cetana*) when jñāna is produced in it by the external source, as an adventitious quality.

[3] *Trkāmṛta*, p. 16.

dity of the *jñāna* is cognized. In other words, according to this school, the implements which lead to the production of *jñāna* also prove the validity of that *jñāna* (*svajanakasāmagrītaḥ*)[1]

Coming to the last exponent of the theory, we find that the school of Murāri Miśra holds that after the sense-organ and object-contact a *jñāna* is produced, which is expressed in the form of a judgment—*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*, after which comes the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the same *jñāna*, in the form of a judgment, 'I possess the knowledge of the *ghaṭa*.' This very *anuvyavasāya* gives us the validity of the *jñāna* expressed in the form of a judgment—'*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*'.[2] Here also, for the validity of the first *jñāna*, Murāri Miśra does not depend upon any other external source, but he depends upon the second *jñāna* itself. So it is also called *svataḥ pramāṇa*.

Murāri Miśra school.

Now, we see that the line of thought adopted by Murāri Miśra closely resembles that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But on close observation it is quite clear that there is a clear difference between the two schools. In the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, we have seen above that there is a *doubt* regarding the validity of the *jñāna*, which doubt is not present in Murāri's view. The reason is that in his case, the implement arriving at the validity (*prāmāṇyasāmagrī*) is the very presence of the *jñānendriya*, that is, *manas* (manasaiva jñānasvarūpavat tatprāmāṇyagrahaḥ iti murārimiśrāḥ)[3], which is ever present (Miśramuddiśyāha—jñānasyeti—tanmate jñānendriyasannidhireva prāmāṇyagrahasāmagrītvena tatpratibandhādeva saṁśayānutpattirityarthaḥ).[4] In other words, it is through the recognition

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[1] *Vide*—Mathurānātha, *Rahasya* on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Pratyakṣa, P. 126, Bibliotheca edition.

[2] Jayadeva Miśra, *Āloka*, Pratyakṣa, Ms. fols. 14a-15a; *Tarkāmṛta*, P. 16; *Bhāskarodayā* on the *Nīlakaṇṭhī* on the *Tarkadīpikā* of Annambhaṭṭa, p. 154, Bombay ed.; Jānakīnātha, *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, PP. 345-48.

[3] Varddhamāna in his *prakāśa* on the *Kusumāñjali*, p. 219.

[4] *Āloka*, Pratyaksa Ms. Fol. 25b.

(*anuvyavasāya*) that the validity is arrived at (and hence, in the unrepeated case (*anabhyāsadaśāyāṁ*), no *doubt* arises as to whether, for instance, the cognition of water is valid or not.[1] So it is clear that according to Murāri Miśra, it is through the *sāmagrī* of the direct perception of the cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), which is produced by a *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*), that the validity of the *vyavasāya* is cognized.[2]

Summary of the three views.

Keeping aside the details of the three views, we find that (a) *Prabhākara* holds that the *same thing* which produces *jñāna* also proves the validity of that *jñāna*; (b) *Kumārila* holds that it is through the *jñātatā* which is produced by *jñāna* that the validity of that *jñāna* which has produced that *jñātatā*, is inferred and not through the *jñāna* itself; (c) *Murāri Miśra*, on the other hand, is of opinion that the validity is arrived at through the *anuvyavasāya* (recognition), the *mānasika jñāna* of the first *jñāna* (*vyavasāya*).[3]

A critical analysis of the views of the three schools given above shows that the view of Prabhākara alone is very rigidly the expounder of the *svataḥprāmāṇya-vāda*, according to whom the validity is known through the very instrument which produces the *jñāna* (that is, *svajanakajñānasāmagrītaḥ*), in the true sense of the term. According to Kumārila, it is not directly through the *jñāna*, or the *jñāna* of the first *jñāna*, that the validity is cognized but through *jñātatā* which is not the same. So the rigid implication of the term *svataḥ* is not possible here. In his opinion the *jñāna* is produced through the sense-organ and object-contact as usual, although we are not aware of the *jñāna* before the establishment of the validity of that *jñāna* through the *pratyakṣa* of the *jñātatā*. It is to be kept in mind that according to Kumārila; *jñāna* is supersensuous and it is through the *jñātatā* produced by

[1] *Bhāskarodayā*, P. 154 Nirnayasagar edition.

[2] Mathurānātha, *Rahasya* on the *Cintāmaṇi*, p. 126.

[3] Mathurānātha, *Rahasya* a commentary on the *Cintāmaṇi*, p. 126.

that very *jñāna* and which is sensuous, that the existence of the cause of the *jñātatā*, namely, the *jñāna* is inferred. In other words, the *jñāna* is produced by one kind of instrument, while the validity of it is cognized by another kind of instrument of right knowledge. Hence, Kumārila should not claim to be a true exponent of the theory of the *svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda*, though there is, undoubtedly, a relative *svatastva*.

Similarly, the view of Murāri Miśra is far from being a supporter of the *svataḥ-Prāmāṇyavāda*. In his case also the means of right knowledge is not the same for proving the validity of knowledge also. So he is also more of a *Parataḥ Prāmāṇyavādin*.

It is clear from the above that the entire discussion rests with the interpretation of the term *svataḥ* or *sva*. If rightly explained and understood, it means, as has been interpreted before, that the instrument of knowledge, through which a cognition is arrived at, should also prove the validity of that cognition without the help of any other agency. It is found that this condition is found fulfilled by Prabhākara's interpretation alone. Thus, it will not be improper to repeat that Kumārila, Murāri and the Naiyāyikas are, more or less, the exponents of the *Parataḥ-Prāmāṇyavāda*, while Prabhākara alone is the upholder of the *Svataḥprāmaṇyavāda*. This view has been expounded by Mathurānātha also in his commentary, *Rahasya*, on the *Cintāmaṇi—svataḥ svāśrayajanakasāmagrītaḥ| svaṁ pramātvam| etacca gurumate| parataḥ-tadanyasāmagrītaḥ| etacca miśramata-bhaṭṭamata-nyāyamateṣu.*[1]

Nature of jñāna.

It will not be out of place to mention here that according to Prabhākara all knowledge is true, of course, so far as it goes, and consequently, the distinction between *pramā* and *apramā* does not arise. If *pravṛttijanakatva* (leading to action) is the test for the reality of knowledge, then the erroneous apprehension of silver on mother-o'pearl also sometimes produces a *pravṛtti*, and will therefore, be *pramā*, while that *pravṛtti* can be fully accounted for by the

[1] P. 117, also see-Umesha Mishra, *Murāresṭṛtīyaḥ Panthāḥ*.

recollection of the previous perception of silver and the percept of the object present. This, according to the Naiyāyikas, is not possible, because there is much *lāghava* in ascribing *pravṛttijanakatva* to the actual *pramā* itself. The erroneous apprehension of silver in *śukti* may appear to be true so long as it lasts, but it is not *pramā*, as it is not *tadvati tatprakāraka-jñāna*.

Nyāya position.

To make the position of Nyāya quite clear, I repeat it here. After the usual sense-organ and object-contact with water at a distance, for instance, the person starts to fetch it with a doubtful mind, and if he gets water there, his *pravṛtti* (moving towards the well to get water) is effective (*saphala*), and if he does not get water, his *pravṛtti* is *niṣphala*. So from the success of the *pravṛtti* or otherwise, the validity or otherwise of the previous cognition is realized. Hence, it is through the *kevala-vyatirekī* form of *anumāna* that the validity or otherwise of the cognition is achieved. This is what is called *Parataḥ-Prāmāṇyavāda*. But it is to be kept in mind that the Naiyāyikas accept the theory of *Parataḥa* only in the case of *jñāna* realized for the first time (*anabyhāsadaśāyām*). It means that the Naiyāyikas also believe in *svataḥ prāmāṇya* in cases of repitition.

Conclusion.

From the common-sense point of view it is true that we do not realize validity along with the cognition itself. But from a higher stratum we cannot deny the *svatastva* of the validity of any cognition. The Mīmāmsakas have to be very rigid, simply because they hold that *Śabda-Pramāṇa*, which is identified with the *Veda*, is self-valid; otherwise, *Veda*, which is *apauruṣeya* and hence, *svataḥ pramāṇa*, will have to be *pauruṣeya* and dependent upon *Īśvara* for its validity, as the Naiyāyikas hold. This, the Mīmāṁsakas cannot tolerate. This is in brief the substance of the *Prāmāṇyavāda* of the Naiyāyikas.

Lastly, it may be said at the end of the treatment of the *Pramāṇas* that from the point of the view held

by the Naiyāyikas, it is quite correct to say that there are four means of right cognition. But on a very critical examination, it seems that really speaking there is only one *pramāṇa*, namely, *Pratyakṣa*, which has been accepted as the most reliable one. Thus, *anumāna* cannot even take place, nor can it be relied upon without *Pratyakṣa*. It is the *Pratyakṣa* alone which, really speaking, gives to it any reliability. Moreover, *anumāna* is a means for carrying on the day to day usage in the world, which will not be possible if we entirely depend upon the *Pratyakṣa*. But it is a fact that the conclusions arrived at through *anumāna*, cannot be free from doubts. The worldly usage may be carried on, but there is every chance of the conclusions being upset at any moment. The reason is that an inference mainly depends upon *hetu* which may change and be found faulty by subsequent stronger *hetus*. No doubt, the aspect which is based exclusively on *Pratyakṣa* will be correct but conclusions drawn afterwards based on *hetus* which are again, dependent upon intelligence of the person using the probans cannot garanty their validity for ever, as it is in the case of things known through *Pratyakṣa*. It was therefore, that Bhartṛhari said—

Pratyakṣa alone is the valid pramāṇa.

yatnenānumitopyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ/
abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate//[1]

Translation—Even that which has been inferred with great precautions, is upset and explained otherwise by more intelligent persons.

Moreover, every school of thought does accept *Pratyakṣa* as the most reliable means of right cognition. No school denies its validity.

Coming to the *upamāna*, we know that it is partly based on *Śabda* (*āpta-vākya*) and partly on *Pratyakṣa*. The information received from the forester is really the *āptavacana*. The knower has full faith and confidence in the words of the forester who has

[1] *Vākyapadīya*, I. 34.

direct perception of the *gavaya* and also of the cow. In other words, the knower is so much confident of the information given by the forester, as if, he had himself seen it. That is to say, the *Śabda-pramāṇa* is, in a way, not different from the *pratyakṣa*. Then the knowledge of the similarity (*sādṛśyajñāna*) is also, really speaking, a *Pratyakṣa-jñāna*. Thus, the *upamāna* also fully depends upon *pratyakṣa*. As for the *Āgama*, or the *Śabda-Pramāṇa*, it is nothing but a *pratyakṣa-jñāna*. The *āpta-puruṣa* has *pratyakṣa* of the object at issue (sākṣāt kṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya,—one who has the direct and right knowledge of things as seen). The enquirer, that is, the knower, has so much confidence in the *Āpta* that he has practically identified himself with him and he has not an *iota* of doubt about the correctness of the information given by the *Āpta* about the particular object. In other words, he considers it to be like his own *pratyakṣa* and takes his words as correct as if, he himself has cognized the object directly. It is a fact which has already been said that *Pratyakṣa* is the only cognition which gives a correct and precisive knowledge of a thing. It was therefore, that even Śaṅkarācārya had to admit that *aparokṣa-jñāna* alone leads to the *Brahma-jñāna*. So says Citsukhācārya—*vedāntavākyaṁ nirapavādameva advitīye Brahmaṇi aparokṣa-jñānaṁ janayatīti*. It was with this view before him that Bhartṛhari has said—

Superiority of Pratyakṣa.

āvirbhūtaprakāśānāmanupadrutacetasām/
atītānāgatajñānaṁ pratyakṣānna viśiṣyate//
yo yasya svamiva jñānaṁ darśanaṁ nābhiśaṅkate/
sthitaṁ pratyakṣapakṣe taṁ kathamanyo nivartayet//

Translation—To whom light has manifested itself and whose *citta* is not perturbed, to them knowledge referring to past and future does not differ from *Pratyakṣa*. Again, he, whose knowledge is just like his own direct perception when takes his stand on

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1 *Citsukhī*, end of Chapter II. P. 332 Nirnayasagar, Bombay edition.

the view that there is only *Pratyakṣa*, no other means of knowledge can frustrate his view[1].

Inference cannot throw aside direct perceptions of objects supersensous and unintelligible through the eyes of great *ṛṣis*. In other words, *Pratyakṣa* alone is the right type of cognition. But as such, *pratyakṣa* is not always possible for the common usage, so we have to believe in other means of cognition also according to our needs.

Śaṅkara-Vedānta believes in Pratyakṣa alone.

We know that the utility of *pramāṇa* is only to know the *prameya* advocated in a system of thought, and as such, in Śaṅkara-Vedānta there being only one *Prameya*, that is, *Brahman* whose existence is proved ordinarily through *āgama*, that is, *Śruti*, there is no need of believing in any other Pramāṇa. And again, as *Āgama* is, as has been said above, in a way, *Pratyakṣa* of the *Āpta* and as we have full confidence in him, we almost identify ourselves with the *Āpta* and take his *pratyakṣa* as our own *pratyakṣa*, we may say that Śaṅkara-Vedānta believes in *Pratyakṣa* alone for the system.

Justification for believing in six Pramāṇas.

But even then in order to know Brahman which is *avāṅmanasagocara* and is not realized directly, six types of *Pramāṇas* have been accepted by the Śāṅkara-Vedānta to know the constituents of *Māyā* and then to realize Brahman through the method of elimination which is possible only through as many *Pramāṇas* as are found necessary, to cognize the consituents of *Māyā*. Hence, they hold that there are six *Pramāṇas* in Śaṅkara Vedānta; othersise, there, is only one *Pramāṇa* to realize the only *Prameya* of Vedānta.

Moreover, Vātsyāyana himself has said that *Pratyakṣa* is the most important of the *pramāṇas*. For instance, if when a person is told something about a particular object by an *Āpta* person, he desires, to ascertain the same through inference as well. In other words, his desire to know the thing correctly

[1] *Vākyapadīya*, I. 37-39.

is not satisfied by what the reliable person has said, so he wants to get the same proved through inference. But even with the conclusion so derived from the inference he is not fully satisfied and his desire to get the correct and undoubtful conclusion is not satisfied till he happens to perceive the same with his own eyes. This makes it quite clear that *Pratyakṣa* is the only *Pramāṇa* which can remove doubts and give a correct apprehension of an object. Other *Pramāṇas* are not capable of removing the doubts and hence, they are meant only to carry on the worldly usage somehow. But for right knowledge *Pratyakṣa* alone has been recognized, hence it is the most important *prāmaṇa*[1].

2. PRAMEYA

Meaning of Prameya.

Coming to the next category of Nyāya, namely, *Prameya*, we find Gotama not giving any defintion of it, perhaps due to its meaning being very clear from the very word *Prameya*. But Vātsyāyana makes it clear by explaining it as *yo'rthaḥ pramīyate tat prameyam*, that is, that object which is rightly cognized is called *prameya*[2]. Jayanta makes it quite clear. He says that *Prameya* is that for the knowledge of which *Pramāṇas* have been accepted and explained. (yadarthaṁ tatparīkṣaṇaṁ tat prameyam)[3]. But he further has specified that the term here in the Nyāyaśastra, is limited to only those objects of knowledge which Gotama has mentioned, namely, *Ātman*, *Śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *pravṛtti*, *doṣa*, *pretyabhāva*, *phala*, *duḥkha* and *apavarga*,[4] and does not include any other item (teṣāmeva prameyatvaṁ nānyasyeti niyacchati). This has been said by Vātsyāyana also—

> asyatu tattvajñānādapavargo mithyājñānat saṁsāra ityata etadupadiṣṭam[5].

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[1] *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya*, I. i. 3, along with the *Vārttika* and *Tātparya*.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya* I. i. 1.

[3] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 427.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 9.

[5] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9.

Again, Jayanta further adds that by the term *Prameya* any and every object realized through *Pramāṇa* is not meant here, but only those which, when known thoroughly or partially, lead to emancipation (*mokṣāya*), or to confinement (*bhavāya*)—

jñātaṁ samyagasamyagvā yanmokṣāya bhavāya ca/
tatprameyamihābhīṣṭaṁ na pramāṇārthamātrakaṁ//

Why the term *prameya* as used here, has been so limited in its implication is due to the fact that this Nyāya-śāstra is itself a mokṣa-śāstra and as such, it is not meant for any purpose other than being an independent means leading to *apavarga* through the removal of wrong notions etc., as expressed by Gotama in his *sūtra*,[1]—

Duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānāmuttarottarāpāye tadantarāpāyādapavargaḥ.

Process of realizing Apavarga.

It has to be kept in mind that as far as this system is concerned and as far as the ultimate end of this system has been kept in view by Gotama, the correct knowledge of these twelve knowables alone will lead to final emancipation. That the Sūtrakāra does not, however, deny the knowability of any other object beside these twelve prameyas, is evident from the term *Tu* used in the sūtra[2]. So, the seeker after *mokṣa* should know at this stage, only these twelve *prameyas*[3]. The *Vārttika* makes it clear that for the purpose of achieving *mokṣa*, Ātman etc., are the only *prameyas*, but thereby, the knowability of other objects for worldly purposes is not denied. Hence, keeping in mind the aim of the system, *ātman* etc., alone have been accepted as *prameyas*.[4] Uddyotakara however, adds that the remaining two prameyas ordinarily accepted in the system, namely, *dik* and *kāla* are implied in the sūtra itself due to there being *pravṛtti* and *saṁskārakatva* in these.[5]

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[1] I. i. 2. [2] I. i. 9. [3] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 9.
[4] I. i. 9.
[5] *Nyāyavārttika and Tātparya*, I. i. 9.

Of these twelve kinds of knowables, as has been already pointed out, some are *upādeya*, while others are *heya*. That is, *śarīra*, *indriya*, *artha*, *buddhi*, *manas*, *doṣa*, *pretyabhāva*, *phala* and *duḥkha* are *heya* (to be discarded), while *Ātman* and *apavarga* are *upādeya* (worth acquiring). Again, of the *Ātman* also, that which is of the nature of *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *bhoktṛtva*, that is, which is worldly in nature, is to be discarded (heya), while that which is aversed (*parāṅmukha*) from experiencing worldly pleasure and pain, is to be realized (*upādeya*).[1]

General characteristics of prameya.

(i) *Ātman*

Coming to the details of the above mentioned twelve kinds of knowables, *Ātman* comes first. It is to be noted that the *Ātman* has two aspects in this system, *heyatva* and *upādeyatva*. The former refers to the *Jīvātman* which is the observer (*draṣṭṛ*) of all the means of pleasure and pain, is one which experiences (*bhoktā*) all pleasure and pain and their causes, and as it apprehends all pleasure and pain and their causes which constitute this universe, it is all-knowing (*sarvajña*) and it has personal experience also of all the pleasure and pain and their causes, hence, it is *sarvānubhāvī*.[2] From the above description it appears that the author speaks of the *Jīvātman* in the present context. Hence, in this form it is not worth realizing and is not much different from physical organism, etc. It is however, worth realization in its other aspect.

General nature of the Ātman and other prameyas.

This *physical organism* (*śarīra*) of ours is its abode to experience pleasure and pain; the *sense-organs* (*indriyāṇi*) are its means to experience the same; the *objects* of sense-organs, that is, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, are objects to be experienced; *apprehension* (*Buddhi*) consists of the experience itself. It is a fact that the external sense-organs are not capable of cognizing all the objects, hence, the existence of *manas*, which has everything as its object, is

[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.   [2] *Bhāṣya*, I.i.9.

accepted for the cognition of everything, past, present and future. Then there is *pravṛtti* (action) and *doṣas* (defects) which are the causes for the existence of physical organism, sense-organs and their objects, knowledge, pleasure and pain. It is to be understood that the present organism of a *Jīvātman* is not its first organism, nor is it necessarily the last, so there is no beginning of its previous births, but there is the end of the future birth. That is, there will be a day whereafter there will be no more birth and the *Jīva* will achieve final emancipation (*apavarga*). This means that there was a series of births and re-births prior to the present one. This is called existence after death (*pretyabhāva*).

The experience of pleasure and pain along with their causes, namely, organism, sense-organ, etc., represent fruition (*phala*). There is no mention of pleasure in the *sūtra*, but it should not be taken to mean that there is its total negation and so the sūtrakāra has left it out. What it means is that there is no pleasure in this universe which is not mixed with pain in some form or the other. This has been intentionally said so, because the ultimate end of our life and also of this system of philosophy is to achieve freedom from worldly attachments, which is possible only when the *Jīva* experiences that everything in this universe is mi xed with pain, which alone will lead it to become disgusted with this world and become indifferent to every worldly object, and will ultimately, achieve final emancipaton.

By *apavarga* is meant the absolute cessation of deaths and births and subsequently, the achievement of absolute cessation of all pains by the *Jīva*. It is also evident from the above that during *mokṣa*, according to this system, there is no feeling of any sort in the *Ātman*. It is free from all knowledge. It has been therefore loosely compared with a piece of stone or a log of wood. It is therefore that Jayanta has even identified such an *Ātman* with *apavarga* itself[1].

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[1] *Nyāyamañjarī*, P. 428.

Realization of Ātman.

This Ātman is directly cognized by a particular type of contact of the *Ātman* with the particular *manas* produced by the yogic *samādhi* of the *yuñjāna* type of yogins[1]. So through the *yogic pratyakṣa, Ātman* is directly realized. Again, the notion of *ahaṁ* expressed in cognitions like, *ahaṁ jānāmi*, also shows that *Ātman* is directly realized. They misunderstand the implication of the term *ahaṁ* in various ways according to their *buddhi*, so for ordinary average class of people, it is through inference that its existence is proved. The *probans* to prove its existence are-*icchā* (desire), *dveṣa* (hatred), *prayatna* (effort), pleasure, pain and knowledge[2]. Vātsyāyana elaborates it through an illustration; thus—"The *Ātman*, having experienced pleasure by coming in contact with a particular type of object, whenever, comes to see in future that very kind of object, it wishes to acquire that object; and this desire to acquire the same thing, is possible only in one who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several things at different times, as it arises from his remembrance of a previous perception. It is thus, that the desire becomes an indicative of the existence of the *Jīvātman*. This is how through inference the existence of the *Jīvātman* is proved."

Vācaspati's view regarding the realization of Ātman.

Vācaspati adds the following to clarify the same in the following way. He says—having found a certain kind of thing to give pleasure, the person expresses his judgment in the form of an expression—'*this kind of thing gives me pleasure.*' This forms the major premiss; when he perceives that kind of thing again, he has the idea—'*this is that kind of thing which gave me pleasure*'. This forms the minor premiss. From these two premisses, he concludes that '*this will give (me) pleasure* (even now), *as it has done in the past;*' and then, he comes to have a *desire* to acquire that thing. Thus, this desire proves that

[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 3.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 10.

the agent who has this desire must be the same, who already has the three cognitions presented to him by the two premisses and the resultant conclusion, there being a common agent for all the four; if the agent were not the same, there could be no such recollection, or fusion of the several cognitions involved; and it is this common agent, who is the perceiver of the thing, the experiencer of that pleasure, the rememberer of the thing being the source of pleasure, and the desirer of the thing, which is the *Jīvātman*[1].—

yajjātīyasyeti vyāptismṛtikathanam, tajjātiyam paśyanniti pakṣadharmopanayaḥ/tasmādayaṁ sukhahetur ityanumāyādātumicchati, seyamicchedṛśī vyāptigrahaṇa-tatsmaraṇa-pakṣadharmatāgrahaṇānumānecchādīnāmekakartṛtvaṁ sūcayati, bhede pratisandhānābhāvena tadanupapatteḥ; tadidamuktam-*ekasyeti*; yaścāsāveko'nubhavitā ca smarttā cānumātā ceṣitā ca sa ātmā, na ca śarīramevambhavitumarhati, tasya bālyakaumārayauvanavārdhakabhedenānyatvāt/nendriyam, indriyāntaragṛhīta indriyāntareṇāpratisandhānaprasaṅgāt/ yamahamadrākṣaṁ taṁ spṛśāmīti/nāpi manaḥ, tasya karaṇatvenaivānumānāt.

In the same way, the existence of *Jīvātman* can be proved through hatred, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge. Thus, when one and the same person perceives several objects, that, on recollecting a previous perception, he comes to have *hatred* towards that thing that has been the cause of pain to him. Again, when a certain object has been found to be the cause of pleasure, on subsequently seeing an object of that kind, the man makes an attempt to obtain that thing; and this *effort* would not be possible if there were not one agent perceiving a number of objects and recollecting his past perceptions. This common agent is the *Jīvātman*.

Existence of Ātman proved.

Similarly, the effort which is made to get rid of pain proves the existence of an agent called *jīvātman*. Again, a man, by remembering his previous experience of *pleasure* and *pain* from a particular object, happens to derive pleasure and pain at the sight of that object at any other time. This is possible only when there

[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 10.

is a common agent for both the experiences. Lastly, when a man is desirous of *knowing* the real nature of a certain thing, at first he thinks over it in the form, what may this be? and after thinking over it, he comes to know it that it is so and so. This knowing of the object is by the same agent as the previous one who had desired and had thought over it. Thus, *this knowledge becomes the probans of the existence of the Jīvātman.*

Udayana on direct perception of the Ātman.

It will not be out of place to note here that according to Udayanācārya and some other Naiyāyikas[1] also the *Jīvātman* is an object of direct individual perception. Even then to the question why Gotama has adduced proofs to prove its existence through inference?, Udayana says that inferences are required to cognize the *Jīvātman* in the body of another person and not for cognizing his own *Jīvātman* within his own body which is always directly perceived. Further, Udayana continues that no doubt, *Ātman* is directly cognized through *Pratyakṣa*, as is clear in the expression *ahamiti*, but as this expression is also attributed to the physical organism, it may be said, as is declared by the materialists, to be referring to the physical organism itself and not to the *Ātman* within it; so this expression of *ahamiti* cannot distinctly prove the existence of the *Ātman* within the organism, unless the former's existence as distinct from physical organism etc. is also proved through other means of knowledge; hence, it is necessary to adduce inferences to prove the existence of the *Ātman* existing apart from the physical organism etc.,—

ahamiti yadyapi savastuko'yaṁ tathāpi śarīrapratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyāt tadvastuka evāhamityapi syāt/ato na tadatirikte vastuni pramāṇayituṁ śakyate tāvad yāvad dehādibhyo bhinna ātmā pramāṇāntareṇa na sādhyate.

ahamiti jñānam gaurādyākāraṁ śarīrāvabhāsanaṁ na śakyaṁ ghaṭādijñānavad drāgātmani pramāṇayitumityabhiprāyaḥ, paradehavartyātmābhiprāyam vā—[1]

This *Ātman* is distinct from physical organism, sense-organs, *manas*, intellect and feelings of pleasure and pain (*vedanā*) taken separately and also from their aggregate. The reason is obvious. If sense-organs are separately regarded as the *Ātman*, then there will be as many as six *Ātmans* in a single body and consequently, there will be six agents of action in one single organism at one time. In that case, our experience expressed in the form, *what I have cognized through my visual senseorgan is also cognized through my tactile sense-organ* will not be correct. But such an experienced expression cannot be denied; it is apprehended by all to be a valid cognition. It is clear in the above expression that both the object of cognition and the apprehending agent are one and the same. Such a common apprehension cannot be possible, if it were due to either the aggregate of the various constituents of our organism, such as, sense-organs, *manas*, intellect etc., or to the sense-organs taken separately. Hence, the agent who is the perceiver of the said one thing through the visual sense-organ and by the tactile sense-organ, and who in the manner shown above cognizes the two perceptions as apprenending the same object, as having an agent and as brought about by different instruments, is something entirely different from the aggregate and the sense-organs; and this is the *Ātman*.[2]

Ātman is distinct from organism, etc.

Again, that *Ātman* is distinct from the physical organism is proved from the fact that had the body been identical with the *Ātman*, then an assassinator of the body would not have incurred any sin[3]; for the assassinating body, having been burnt after death, would not have stayed at the time of the fruition of

[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, P. 210, chowkhamba edition; for further arguments in this connection refer to Umesha Mishra, *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, Chapter XI.

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is a common agent for both the experiences. Lastly, when a man is desirous of *knowing* the real nature of a certain thing, at first he thinks over it in the form, what may this be? and after thinking over it, he comes to know it that it is so and so. This knowing of the object is by the same agent as the previous one who had desired and had thought over it. Thus, this knowledge becomes the *probans* of the existence of the *Jīvātman*.

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Udayana in his *Pariśuddhi*[2] while commenting upon the *Tātparya's* line—

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[1] svayūthyā api kecana-*Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 429

[2] *Pariśuddhi* Ms. P. 633 with the author.

ahamiti jñānam gaurādyākāraṁ śarīrāvabhāsanaṁ na śakyaṁ ghaṭādijñānavad drāgātmani pramāṇayitumityabhiprāyaḥ, paradehavartyātmābhiprāyam vā—[1]

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[2] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. i. 1-2.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 4.

that sin, that is, in future birth. So the question of merit and demerit would not have arisen.

Similarly, a sense-organ cannot be identical with the *Ātman*. The reason is that in our ordinary expression we say that whatever I have seen with one eye, is also being visualized by my other eye. If an eye were identical with the conscious agent, namely, the *Ātman*, then the same object would not have been seen by the other eye; for another agent cannot recognize the same which has been cognized by the other[1].

Again, through inference also it is proved that the *Ātman* is distinct from the aggregate of the body, etc. In other words, when a person, for instance, has tasted a sour fruit and found that its taste is con-comitant with a certain colour and smell, if, at some future time he happens to perceive its colour or smell, by means of a sense-organ (of vision or odour), there appears a change in the organ of taste, which is totally different from the organ that has apprehended the colour or smell; that is, there is remembrance through association of the taste of the fruit which gives rise to a longing for that taste which brings about the flow of the liquid (saliva) from the roots of the teeth. This phenomenon would not be possible if the sense-organs themselves were the conscious agent (*Ātman*); as an agent can never remember or recall what has been perceived by another[2].

In the same manner, it is proved that *Ātman* is different from the *manas*. It is a fact that the means of cognition (*jñānasādhanāni*) belong to the conscious agent (*jñātā*), as is clear from the expressions—he sees with his eyes, he smells with his nose, he touches with the tactile organ. Similarly, there is the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*manas*), which is the means of cognition of every object by which the cognizer (*mantā*, the agent), who

[1] *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, III. i. 7; *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, I. 15.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 12.

does the seeing, smelling etc., with the visual and other sense-organs, does the cognizing of all objects. On that account the means of congnizing also operates naturally on all objects, and it is by means of this *manas* that the *mantā* (the cognizing agent) does the conceiving. Such being the case, it seems that while admitting the existence of the cognizer, its being called the *Ātman* alone is being denied and its being called *manas* is accepted. Similarly, though admitting that there is an instrument of cognition, its being called *manas* alone is being denied. So the quarrel is merely in the name and that there is difference of opinion in having the two objects, a conscious agent and a means to cognize the objects.[1] Thus, it is obvious that there is a conscious agent, called *Ātman*, quite distinct from body, sense-organs, *manas*, intellect and the feelings of pleasure and pain.

Eternality of Ātman discussed.

That such an *Ātman* is eternal, that is, prior to its assuming the extant physical organism, it had its existence and that it will have its existence even after its death, is not quite clear from the above reasons. All that has been said above in support of a separate existence of the *Ātman* is possible within the span of one life, from birth to death. But this cannot prove its prior and future existence leading to its eternality for ever. This is a problem to which an answer is given below :

Previous births proved.

As a matter of fact, it is found that when an infant is born, he actually experiences the feelings of joy, fear and sorrow, even though during his shortest span of present life he has not experienced anything that could give rise to joy, fear and sorrow in him ; and that he actually experiences these is inferred from certain clear indications of child's movements, smiling and crying. These experiences could proceed only from the continuity of remembrance, and not from any other source; this continuity of remembrance

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III, i. 16.

again, could not but be due to previous repeated experiences. This previous experience cannot be of the present birth. It naturally refers to the child's past life or lives. This proves that there is something which exists even after the body is destroyed after death. This continuous entity is the *Ātman*. Thus, it is proved that the *Ātman* is eternal and it continues life after life[1].

Again, in the infant just born we see a desire for the mother's milk, the presence of such a desire being indicated by the child's activities in the shape of the moving of its hands and mouth towards the mother's breasts. This desire could not arise except from repeated experiences in the past. It is found in the case of all living beings that when they are afflicted with hunger, there appears in them a desire to take some food, which desire arises from continuity of remembrance due to repeated experiences in the past. Now in the case of the newly born infant, the appearance of such a desire cannot but be explained as being due to repeated experiences in a previous body. From this it is inferred that the infant had a body previous to this present one, in which body, it had gone through repeated experiences of feeding which have given rise to its present desire for sucking the milk from its mother's breasts. From all this it follows that what happens is that the *Jīvātman*, having, at death, departed from his previous body, has become endowed with a new body and on being afflicted with hunger, remembers his repeated feedings in the past birth and accordingly, desires the milk from the breast of the mother. Hence, it cannot be true that there is a different *Ātman* attached to each of these bodies. It must be the same *Jīvātman* that continues to exist even after the perishing of its former body. It must be kept in mind that this is not true of human beings alone, but it is so in case of every being.[2]

This is further supported by the fact that persons free from longings are never found to be born again. In other words, when a person is born, he is born as

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 18. [2] *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, III. i. 21.

beset with longings. This longing could be due only to the recalling to the mind of things previously experienced; and this previous experience of things in a preceding life could not be possible without a body; hence, what happens is that the *Ātman*, remembering the things experienced and found pleasant by him in his previous body, comes to have longings for them in the newly obtained body. This is what forms the connecting link between his two lives. There are similar links between his previous life and his life preceding that and between that and a life preceding that, and so on and on, to infinity. This shows that the connection of the *Ātman* with bodies has been without any beginning, and without beginning has been its connection with longings. From this beginningless series of attachments and subsequent bodies, it is evident that the *Jīvātman* is eternal.[1] From what has been proved above, it also follows that the *Jīvātman* also is beginningless and that its connection with some physical organism is also without any beginning. Besides, it is also clear that the creation itself is also beginningless. It is not possible to explain various problems of the universe, ulness the beginninglessness of creation is also accepted. No doubt , after every deluge(*pralaya*) there is a creation and this may be called its beginning, but then it is not correct to say that there was no creation prior to the present one. The *saṁskāras* of the past deeds of the last creation remain dormant during the period of deluge and when all those *saṁskāras* become ready to yield fruits (*Pākonmukha*), then another fresh creation begins based on the *saṁskāras* of the past creation. Similarly, one creation is preceded by another, which again, was preceded by another and so on till eternity. This is how we say that the creation also has no beginning.[2]

Connecting link between previous and present births.

[1] *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, III. i. 24.

[2] For the rest of the aspects of the *Jīvātman* and also *Paramātman* the reader is advised to read the 11th chapter of the author's *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*.

(ii) *Śarīra*

Now, we come to the second *Prameya* (knowable), called *Śarīra* (physical organism). It is the abode of *Jīvātman* to stay for reaping the fruits of its past deeds. It has been said before that its connection with the *Jīvātman* has been from time immemorial for experiencing pleasure and pain within its limitations[1] due to its past deeds. Here, a question may be raised how do the deeds of the past life produce the body to reap their fruits in the next birth? This can be fully explained by referring to the functioning of the *law of karman* which has been already dealt with[2] and need not be repeated.

Law of karman.

Physical organism has been defined as—

Ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ Śarīram.[3]

That is to say, a physical organism is that which is the substratum of *ceṣṭā*, meaning, actions leading to the attainment of desired objects, or to the discarding of the undesired objects. In other words, when one comes across something which has been the source of pleasure in the past, he is moved by a desire to obtain that thing, and the movement that follows from this desire is what is meant by *ceṣṭā* (action); similarly, when one comes across something which has been the source of pain in the past, there is an activity in the shape of a movement towards the abandonment of that object, and this movement constitutes what is called *ceṣṭā*.[4] Physical organism is that which is a substratum of such activities.

Physical organism explained.

Similarly, it is defined as the substratum of sense-organs. In other words, that thing alone can be regarded as the substratum of sense-organs by whose benefit the sense-organs are benefitted and by whose injury they are injured; and it is according to this

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 27.

[2] Umesha Mishra—*History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. PP. 150—160.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 11.

[4] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 11.

benefit or injury, that they act upon their objects, good and bad; and such a thing is the physical organism.[1]

Again, that wherein the feelings of pleasure and pain, caused by the contact of sense-organ and object, appear is the substratum of *artha* (meaning-smell, taste, colour, touch and sound). That is to say, these feelings are found only in a physical organism and not anywhere else. Hence, a physical organism is said to be the *āśraya* of *artha*.[2] It is to be made clear here that the words, *ceṣṭā* etc. have been used not in ordinary sense, but due to their particular context, in special sense. Even in common parlance, the word *ceṣṭā* is not used in the sense of every kind of action, but only in special type of action.[3]

For *bhoga* body is necessary.

It has to be kept in mind that as the physical organism has been regarded as the receptacle of the experiences of the feelings of pleasure and pain and as the experiences are possible only through action, means of experience and objects of experiences, it is but natural to have defined the physical organism to be the *āśraya* of *ceṣṭā*, *indriya* and *artha* without which no *bhoga* is possible and these again, must be in the same abode, that is, the body.

Bhoga is possible through *Ceṣṭā*, *Indriya* and *artha*.

Contact of Jivātman with a physical organism from eternality.

The universe exists only for reaping the fruits of the past and also in some cases, present actions which are, really speaking, naturally connected with every *Jīva*. No *Jīva* can ever remain without any action at any time. This itself presupposes the existence of the *Jīva* even prior to a particular birth. This is also without any beginning, like the beginninglessness of the universe. This being so, it is also presumed that as the experiences of pleasure and pain are without any beginning, the receptacle of these feelings also must be without

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 11.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 11.

[3] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 11.

any beginning. Again, on the same ground, we have to admit that the contact of a *Jīva* with a particular organism is also without any beginning. So says Vātsyāyana that the connection of an organism with the *cetana* is *anādi*.[1]

It is to be kept in mind that the organism is the receptacle of pleasure and pain only in the sense that they serve the purpose of qualifying and differentiating it; it is the *Jīvātman* which is really the receptacle of pleasure and pain; as a receptacle of a thing, in the proper sense of the term, must be such as forms its substratum, that in which the thing subsists by inherence, and not merely the container.[2] And that a particular *Jīva* becomes connected with a particular organism is also due to a particular kind of action done by the *Jīva* in the past births, in order to reap the fruit for which that particular type of organism alone was essential.

It is also to be noted here that the physical organism is produced under the influence of the merit and demerit accrued from the deeds of the person concerned done in his previous birth or births.

Formation of the physical organism.

Vātsyāyana discusses this point in his *Bhāṣya* thus[3],—The *manas*, along with the sense-organs, is found to operate only within the body and not outside the body[4] of the cognizing person, so also all experiencing of objects, consisting of apprehension etc., is found to occur only in the body and likewise, his acquiring of the desired and abandoning of the undesired things and all other similar operations carried on by the man are found within the body.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 27.

[2] *Bhāṣyacandra*, on III. i. 27.

[3] III. ii. 60.

[4] It is the rays emanating from the sense-organs which go out of the body and come in contact with the object and assume its form and through those very rays the form of the object enters into the body and then through the *manas* the cognition also takes place within the body in the substratum of knowledge, the Ātman.



With regard to the formation of the body, there is a diversity of opinion, which gives rise to the following doubts: Is the formation of the man's body due to his past *karmans*, or is it the product of the *Bhūtas* (material substances), independently of any *karman*?

We have several views on this point expressed from different angles of vision, but the reality from the Nyāya point of view is given by Gotama in his *Sūtra*[1].

The formation of the physical organism is due to the persistence of the effect of previous deeds. Vardhamāna in his commentary on the *Nyāyavārttika* says, man's experiences occur in the body and so also the *manas*, like all sense-organs, functions within the body; and these facts can be explained only on the basis of man's body being produced due to his past deeds.

Again, some people think that the body of the child is due to the *karmans*, not of the child itself, but of the father and the mother of the child. But this is not wholly correct; because the body of the man must be the product of the acts of that very person who regards that body as his own self, and acts for the expreriences obtained through and in that body. But in some aspect the parent's *karman* also is responsible for the child's body.

Vātsyāyana explains the position of Gotama as follows,—

He says that the previous deeds of the person are in the form of activity of speech, thought, and physical activity, that were done by the person in his previous body (birth); the effect of the said acts consists of merit and demerit produced by them; the persistence (*anubandha*) of that effect, means the continuing of it as subsisting in the *Ātman*, and the formation of the body is out of the material substances as operated upon by the said persistence of merit and demerit, and not out of the material substances by themselves. That particular body belongs to the *Ātman* subsisting in which the *Ātman* regards it as '*I*', attached to which

[1] III. ii. 60.

and desiring experiences in which, that *Ātman* obtains the various kinds of objects and acquires merit and demerit; and when this body falls off on death, another is brought into existence by the force of the *saṁskāra* in the shape of the said merit and demerit along with and operating upon the material substances; when this second body has come into existence, there go on again, actions for the fulfilment of the man's purpose, just as in the previous body; and the man's activities also go on as in the previous body. All this phenomenon is possible only on the basis of the assumption that the production of the body is out of the material substances as operated upon the Ātman's acts. In the case of such objects, as the chariot and the like, we find that being intended for the accomplishment of man's purpose, they are brought into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by man's quality in the shape of effort; and on the analogy of this we can infer that the body, being meant to accomplish the man's purposes, comes into existence out of such material substances as are operated upon by some qualities belonging to the man, such for instance as his merit and demerit[1].

Further, Gotama makes it quite clear that the parents are the cause of the formation of the physical organism[2]. Vātsyāyana elucidates it still further and says that every physical organism is produced from seeds in the form of ovule (*lohita*) and semen (*retas*) which constitute the seeds of the body and what brings about the birth of the body out of the material substances in the mother's womb are, (1) that *karman* of the personality himself, which is conducive to the experiences to be gone through by him in the mother's womb and (2) the *karman* of the parents which is conducive to the experiences resulting from the birth of the child. In other words, when the *semen* of the father comes in contact with the *ovule* present in the mother's

[1] *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 60.

[2] *Sūtra*, III. ii. 63.

womb, it is all due to the *karman* of the father. This *karman* leads to the experiences of pleasure and pain to be experienced by the would be child in the womb of the mother and also the *karman* is the cause of the experiences of the parent's pleasure and pain due to the birth of the would be child.

Besides, it is also necessary to point out that similarly the cause of the formation of the physical organism is the food (*āhāra*). Food (*āhāra*) stands for both solid and liquid substances; and the juices, brought about by the digestion of the *āhāra*, entering into the seed embedded in the mother's womb, undergo development along with that seed; and in that seed there is as much development as suffices for the accretion of the necessary aggregate; the accretion thus formed goes on to develop into such aggregates as (1) the cell, (2) the mass, (3) the foetus, (4) the embryo, which are all the various developing stages of the foetus, (5) the arteries, (6) the head, (7) the feet, etc.,[1] and ultimately, into what comes to be the substratum of the sense-organs. When the foetus has been formed, the juices of the food are absorbed by it through the umbilical cord, and it continues to grow till it becomes fit for being born. No such development is found to occur in the case of food lying in the dish (and not eaten by a person). From all this follows that the development of the body of the child depends upon the past *karman* and the *saṁskāra* produced thereby of the parents[1].

This is further supported by the fact that every connection of the parents does not bring about conception; and the only explanation of this is that there is no conception when the necessary influence of past deeds of the parents is absent; and when this influence is present conception does take place. This is the only explanation possible of the said uncertainty of conception. If the material substances alone were independent (of any such influence as past *karman*), there should be no obstacle in the way of con-

[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā* on III. ii. 64.

[2] *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 64.

ception; for, under that hypothesis, there would be no element wanting in the causes necessary for the formation of the physical organism.[1]

Connection of Jīva with a particular body.

Then, there is another question as to how does a particular body become connected with a particular *Jīva* in order to come to the world? To this both Gotama and Vātsyāyana say that as a physical organism consists of an aggregation, brought about by means of an arrangement or disposition, most difficult to encompass, of such (heterogeneous) components as the arteries through which the bodily *humours and life-breath flow, the humours of* the body culminating in the semen; the tenden, skin, bones, veins, muscle, embryo and foetus; head, arms and belly; the thighs, wind, bile and phlegm permeating the body; and the mouth, throat, chest, stomach, intestines and bowels; we conclude that its formation is also due to the past deeds of the *Jīva* (parents) concerned. In the same manner, if among the causes, bringing about the body, there is nothing that is related to any particular *Jīva*, the earth and other material substances that would constitute the body would be equally related to all the *Jīvas*, among whom there would be nothing to distinguish one from the other, and there being nothing in the earth etc., themselves that would connect them with any one *Jīva*, and not with the rest, the body formed out of these would be the common substratum for the pleasure, pain and cognition of all the *Jīvas*. As a matter of fact, however, each body is found to be connected with only one particular *Jīva*; and the only explanation of this restriction is that *karman* of the past life or lives is the cause that brings about the formation of the body, so that the *kārmic* residuum of each *Jīva* being restricted to itself, it produces a body fit for being the substratum of the experiences of that particular *Jīva* in which the residuum subsists, and connects that body with that *Jīva*. Thus, it is found that just as *karman* and its *saṁskāras*

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 65.

of the past life are the causes of the formation of the body, so is also the connection of that body with a particular *Jīva*.[1]

The question may be further elucidated thus— When a body is born, it comes in contact with all the jīvas, since all are equally ommipresent, so that a body should belong to all the jīvas equally. To this in the light of what Gotama has said, it may be pointed out that though in a general way, all the jīvas are in contact with each and every body, yet a particular jīva alone is in contact with a particular body because of the influence of the past deeds and their *Saṁskāra* of the particular jīva, the friution of which is possible in that particular body alone. Then again, the fruition of the parent's deeds also requires that their child must have that particular type of body and no one else.

Composition of an organism-earth material cause.

Now, a further question is raised: whether the physical organism is composed of one single element or of more than one element? In reply to this Gotama says that the physical organism is mainly made of earthly elements, as the distinctive quality of earth, that is, smell, alone is found in it.[2] Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti* includes blue colour, etc., solidity and others also as the distinctive quality of earth. But this is not the place to enumerate all that is found in earth. It is necessary to mention only that which differentiates earth from other substances, like water etc.

Other elements required for body.

It is to be added that though the physical organism has earth alone as its material cause, yet it is to be understood that the earthly body can be the *adhikaraṇa* of the feelings of pleasure and pain for the *Jīva* only when other substances, like water, air, fire and *ākāśa* also constitute the earthly body; otherwise, *bhoga* cannot be possible in that body. And if the body be not an abode of *bhoga*, then it cannot be called a physical organism, nor is then there any utility of the body.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 66.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 27.

This again, is quite obvious; for the *bhoga* is possible through the instrumentality of all the five elements of this world. This is also supported by the fact that in the heavenly regions of Varuṇa, Sūrya and Vāyu though the organisms are mainly of water, fire and air respectively, as the material cause, yet those bodies also in order that *bhoga* may take place there, possess the other elements also. In order to experience pleasure and pain, it is very necessary that there must be *sthairya* (stability) in the organism, which is possible only when there is in it earthly element.[1]

Uddyotakara makes full analysis of this theory of composition of an organism. He says—an object composed of earth and water would be without any smell; because, smell subsisting in a single constituent is not capable of producing smell in the product, the single element possessing smell and if it be a cause, it cannot produce any product.

Composition of paramāṇus in a body.

Vācaspati makes this point very clear when he says that in the first place no single *dvyaṇuka* (diad) can be produced out of the combination of one earthly *paramāṇu* and one watery *paramāṇu*, as there can be no production out of one single element of one nature. Further, he says that even suppose some product is produced out of the combination of the two *paramāṇus*, earthly and watery, and as they have colour, taste and touch, even then the product cannot have smell, so it cannot be an earthly product. Again, nor can there be any product out of two earthly atoms and one single watery atom; that is, out of such three *paramāṇus*; because, many *paramāṇus* together do not produce any effect; the plurality of number in *paramāṇus* does not produce any effect, just as, it is found in the case of the production of a jar constituted of a collection (*pracaya*) of *paramāṇus*.

It is to be noted here that the order of the destruction of an object should also be in the same manner

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 27—30.

as its creation. Now, in the present case, if a jar, for instance, is produced out of the three *paramāṇus* alone, then when it is destroyed, there should be no destruction into parts,like *kapāla*, *śarkarā*, *cūrṇa* etc.. The destruction should be only, at once simultaneously, into so many *paramāṇus*, which is not a fact. So out of merely three *paramāṇus* there can be no creation.

Composition of body and its attributes.

Again, an object composed of earth and fire would be without smell and without any taste; the reason is the same, that is, the smell and the taste of the single component *paramāṇus* would not be productive of anything; again, an object composed of earth and air would be without smell, taste and colour; because, air is without smell; and object composed of earth and *Ākāśa* would be without smell, taste, colour and touch; because, *Ākāśa* is devoid of all these. The principle underlying all these cases is the same, that is, the quality of any single component cannot be productive of any effect.

Again, he continues, an object composed of water and fire would be without any smell and without any taste; that composed of water and air would be without any smell and without any taste and also without any colour; that composed of water and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless, colourless and touchless; that composed of fire and air would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; that composed of fire and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless, colourless and touchless; similarly, also that composed of air and *Ākāśa*; as also that composed of earth, water and fire; and also of earth, water and air; and also of earth, water and *Ākāśa*; and again, that object which is composed of earth, air and fire would be odourless and tasteless; so also that composed of earth, air and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; that composed of earth, air and *Ākāśa* would be odourless and tasteless; so also that composed of water, fire and *Ākāśa* would be odourless, tasteless and colourless; so also that composed of fire, air and *Ākāśa*; and that composed

of earth, water, fire and air would be odourless; so also that composed of earth, water, fire and *Ākāśa* and that composed of earth, water and *Ākāśa*; that composed of earth, air, fire and *Ākāśa* and that composed of earth, water and *Ākāśa*; that composed of earth, air, fire and *Ākāśa* would be odourless and colourless; so also that composed of water, air, fire and *Ākāśa*; that *composed of earth, water, fire* and air would be odourless; *for the simple reason that the quality of any single constituent is incapable of producing any effect.*[1]

Single Paramāṇu cannot produce anything.

It is further to be kept in mind that if any single component (*paramāṇu*) were the productive cause of anything, then there would be either constant production, or constant non-production; and the product would be eternal.[2]

Vācaspati makes this point still clear by saying that a single (*paramāṇu*) being by itself sufficient to produce its effect, and it being eternal, it would go on, without ceasing, producing its effect; or if it were non-active, then the effect would never be produced; and the destruction of an effect can be brought about either by the destruction of the constituent cause, or by the destruction and disruption of its several components; and in the event of a single *paramāṇu* being the cause, neither of these contingencies would be possible; being eternal, it cannot be destroyed; and being single, there can be no disruption of components, so that the product would be indestructible, and eternal.[3]

So it is clear that the physical organism has only earth as its material cause, while connection with other four elements is also essential as its instrumental cause for the production of the body. It is to be also noted that an earthly product is produced out of two earthly *paramāṇus* and one watery *paramāṇu*.

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 28.

[2] *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 28.

[3] *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the *Nyāyavārttika*, III. i. 28.

Of these again, earthly *paramāṇu* alone will be the material cause, while the watery one will be the *nimitta-kāraṇa*.

Then there is also the Śruti to support the above fact. It says—*pṛthivīṁ te śarīraṁ spṛṇomi* (I create thy body out of earth); and so about the body after death, the Śruti says, *pṛthivīṁ te śarīraṁ gacchatāt* (may thy body go to earth).

(iii) *Sense-organ* (*Indriyam*)

Sense-organs explained.

Next, we come to the fourth *prameya*, namely, the *sense-organ*. It is to be always kept in mind that this world exists only for reaping the fruits of the past deeds by the *Jīvas*. The constituents of the world accordingly are also only to help the *bhoga*. Consequently, there should be means to experience the feelings of pleasure and pain through various ways. These means of *bhoga* are called sense-organs. These are also of the same nature as the objects of *bhoga*. The objects of *bhoga* are the five substances (*bhūtas*), namely, earth, water, fire, air and *Ākāśa*. So these are the five sense-organs produced out of the five substances mentioned above, that is, the sense-organs of odour, taste, vision, touch and hearing. So says the *Nyāyasūtra*—the sense-organs are regarded as being of the same nature as the *bhūtas*, because there is cognition through them of the specific qualities of these substances.[1]

Functions of the sense-organs.

Vātsyāyana explains the functions of these sense-organs thus—that by whose instrumentality one smells things is the *olfactory organ*; so called because it apprehends odour. That by whose instrumentality one tastes things is the *gestatory organ*; so called because it experiences taste. That by whose instrumentality one sees things is the *visual organ*; so called because it perceives colour. That which is located in the skin is the *cutaneous organ*; so called indirectly, because of its location. It is to be noted here that

[1] III. i. 61.

the other sense-organs are named after what is apprehended by them; while the cutaneous organ apprehends the touch of things; hence, the name *cutaneous organ* applies to it, not directly, in the sense in which the names of other organs apply, but only indirectly, in the sense that the skin is the locus of that organ.[1] That by whose instrumentality one hears sound is the *auditory organ*; so called because it apprehends sound. Thus, from the force of the literal significance of the names, the sense-organs are to be defined as the apprehenders of their respective objects.

Sense-organs are *bhautika*.

That each of the five sense-organs performs its respective function is due to the fact that each one has its separate function due to the fact that each one has its separate material cause,[2] namely the five *bhūtas*. Then, this is also to be pointed out that as the cause of the various sense-organs is the five *bhūtas* respectively, all of them are *bhautikas*, that is, products of *bhūtas*. As for instance, the pupil (*kṛṣṇasāra*) is the eye-ball which is made of fiery elements, which is a *bhūta*. Again, it is to be noted that the centre of *tejas* is within the body which sends its rays through the two eye-balls. Eye-balls are not the visual organ. Same is the case with the rest of the four substances. Hence, all the five sense-organs are material (*bhautika*).

These sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects either by sending their rays to the object or by receiving their material contact in their own place. On account of the five-foldness of the processes also there is diversity in the sense-organs : namely, in visual perception, the visual organ encased in the pupil issues rays outside and then gets at the object possessed of colour and assumes the form of the object; the organs of touch, taste and odour, on the other hand, are themselves got at by the objects, which latter reach the organs by the movements of the

[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, I. i. 12.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 12.

body in which the organs exist; while the contact of the auditory organ with the sound (heard) is obtained by reason of this latter proceedings in a series.[1] Hence, they are called *prāpyakārins*.

It may also be pointed out here that the visual sense-organ being a product of fiery elements, possesses rays through which the sense-organ comes in contact with its objects far or near, small and big. Then there is the direct perception of the object. In *tejas* there are *rūpa* and *sparśa* (colour and touch). But the visual organ is not visible. Like other sense-organs, it is supersensuous. But this is somewhat strange that in spite of the fact that visual-sense-organ is a product of fiery elements which has colour and touch and through which objects are perceived, it itself is super-sensuous.

Sense-organs are super-sensuous.

To clarify this point Vātsyāyana says, that in order to have direct perception of colour it is necessary that the colour to be perceived is manifest and not unmanifest. The visual organ, no doubt, possesses *rūpa*, but it is unmanifest. The reason why it is so is that the formation of the sense-organs, being due to merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*) (which are unmanifest) is subservient to the purposes of man (*puruṣārthatantra*).[2] In other words, as a matter of fact, these sense-organs are produced due to the merits and demerits of a man for his *bhoga*. Each and every sense-organ is so formed under the influence of a particular type of merit or demerit, as to facilitate the *bhoga* of the deeds of a man's past life. This is again, possible only when a sense-organ comes in contact with its object. It is therefore, that the sense-organs are called *prāpyakārins*.

Then, the next question is whether there is only one sense-organ pervading throughout the body and due to its different locations the single sense-organ performs different functions, or that there are several sense-organs in a physical organism? For instance, there

One sense-organ alone is in a body or five discussed.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. i. 60.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 39.

sense-organ and the single sense-organ with all the five objects of sense, namely, colour, odour, touch, taste and sound; so that in every act of cognition, the contact of the *Ātman*, the *manas*, the sense-organ and all the five objects being present, there would be apprehension, at one and the same time, of all these five objects. But this is not a fact. Moreover, by reason of the non-concomitance of the cognition of objects, it cannot be accepted that there is a single sense-organ apprehending all the five objects; if there were concomitance of cognitions of several objects, then there would have been no blindness etc.[1] From all these it is concluded that there are five sense-organs, namely, the sense-organs of vision, taste, smell, touch and auditory organ which cognize the five objects, namely, colour, taste, odour, touch and sound respectively.

No *karmendriya* in Nyāya.

It is also to be noted at this place that according to Gotama and also other ancient Naiyāyikas, there are only five sense-organs and that they do not accept any other organ, for instance, *karmendriya*. Vācaspati Miśra says that there is a restriction as to the perception of particular qualities. This restriction leads us to deny *manas's* being a sense-organ (*niyamagrahaṇaṁ manonivṛttyartham*). Again, he says that by the declaration that there are only five sense-organs, it is implied, that the other five, *karmendriyāṇi*, namely, hands, feet, anus, the organ of generation and organ of speech, are not sense-organs, for the simple reason that they do not fulfil all the conditions which a sense-organ is to satisfy. These con-

is only one sense-organ namely, *tactile organ* (*tvag-indriya*), which is present every-where in the body and as without its aid no sense-organ can function, it may be presumed that the tactile sense-organ is *the only sense-organ pervading throughout a body.*[1] Hence, it follows that there is a single sense-organ, namely, the tactile organ, by which all sense substrata are pervaded, and in whose presence alone the perception of things is possible and all other cognitions through sense-organs take place.

Criticism of ekendriyavāda.

But this is a wrong view, says the Bhāṣyakāra; because, there is really no perception by the tactile organ of the objects of other sense-organs. The distinctive feature of the tactile organ is that it is the instrument of the perception of touch alone; and when by means of this tactile organ, the touch of a certain object is experienced, there is no experience of the objects of other sense-organs, such for instance, as colour, etc., by such persons as are devoid of the visual organ, even though endowed with an efficient tactile-organ. Again, it is to be noted that the blind man should have perceived colour as well as he can feel touch, but this is not a fact. He never perceives colour though there is the tactile organ throughout his whole body even in the substratum of his eyes. Hence, it is concluded that it is not true that there is only one sense-organ; because, several objects are not cognized simultaneously.[2]

Vātsyāyana makes the point more lucid when he says that according to the view that there is only one sense-organ apprehending all objects, what would happen is that the *Ātman* would come in contact with the *manas*, the *manas* with the single

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[1] This *ekendriyavāda* is an old Sāṅkhya view as has been mentioned in the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (II. ii. 10) upon which the *Ratnaprabhā says*—tvaṅmātrameva jñānendriyaṁ ekamanekaśabdādijñānakāraṇam. It is therefore, that they believe in seven sense-organs namely, the five usually recognized sense-organs and *manas* and *Buddhi*. *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya* III. i. 53.

Nyāyasūtra and *Bhāṣya*, III, i. 53.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III, i. 54.

sense-organ and the single sense-organ with all the five objects of sense, namely, colour, odour, touch, taste and sound; so that in every act of cognition, the contact of the *Ātman*, the *manas*, the sense-organ and all the five objects being present, there would be apprehension, at one and the same time, of all these five objects. But this is not a fact. Moreover, by reason of the non-concomitance of the cognition of objects, it cannot be accepted that there is a single sense-organ apprehending all the five objects; if there were concomitance of cognitions of several objects, then there would have been no blindness etc.[1] From all these it is concluded that there are five sense-organs, namely, the sense-organs of vision, taste, smell, touch and auditory organ which cognize the five objects, namely, colour, taste, odour, touch and sound respectively.

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Conditions to be recognized as *indriya*.

If it be said that the three conditions laid down above are meant for the organs of cognition, while

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 54.

hands, feet etc., are organs of action so they also may be recognized as sense-organs. But it is not correct. After all, they are also to be recognized as sense-organs, so they also must fulfil the three conditions. Further, Vācaspati says that in that case, the definition of a sense-organ itself will have to be changed. And accordingly, if the definition for these be that which is *āśrita* in a body and performs special actions and their special actions be speaking, taking in, walking, excretion and delight, then it may be pointed out that all these deeds can be performed by mouth, etc.; and again, by neck, heart, stomach (*āmāśaya*-small intestine and *pakvāśaya*, large intestine), etc., which also have their special functions may equally be called *indriyāṇi*. But it is not so. Hence, there are really only five sense-organs; and so not even the *manas* has been included amongst the sense-organs.[1]

Sāṅkhya has for the first time recognized the other six sense-organs.

By the way, it is to be mentioned that it is at the stage of the Sāṅkhya system alone that the rest of the six sense-organs have been accepted as sense-organs and not in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Jayanta also holds the same view[2]. Again, it is further said that the five sense-organs being the means of cognition and as these are the means to lead to the existence of *indra* (*Ātman*), these are called *indriyāṇi*.

(iv) *Artha*

By *artha* the Nyāya system understands the specific qualities of earth, water, fire, air and *Ākāśa*, namely, odour, taste, colour, touch and sound respectively; which are the objects of *bhoga* through the five sense-organs.[3] So really speaking, by *artha* is meant the objects of the five sense-organs only (indriyāṇāmarthāḥ).

It has to be pointed out at this place that though there can be *ṣaṣṭhī samāsa* in *pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ*, *pṛthivyā-*

[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, III. i. 61. [2] *Nyāyamañjarī*, PP. 483-484.
[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 14.

dīnāṁ guṇāḥ, *dvandva* as *pṛthivyādīni ca guṇāśceti*, and also *bahuvrīhi* as *pṛthivyādayo guṇā yeṣāmiti*, yet Uddyotakara takes it as a case of *dvandva-samāsa* and rejects the possibility of other *samāsas*. This interpretation is supported both by reason and authority, says Uddyotakara. He quotes the *Gotamasūtra-darśanasparśanābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāt*,[1] where the author has used the word *artha* in the sense of any cognizable object. This same sūtra also gives the reason that, as a matter of fact, we recognize the organs of both vision and touch as apprehending the same thing; as we have such a notion as 'I am touching the same thing which I had seen' and this experience supplies the *reason* as regards sight and touch bearing upon earth; and the sūtra quoted above supplies the *authority* and the requisite *authority* is also afforded by the fact that the Nyāya-śāstra declares that *Sāmānya* is perceptible by the senses, and *Sāmānya* belongs to earth, etc., also, and not only to odour and the other qualities. So, it is proved that there is *dvandva-samāsa* in the term *pṛthivyādiguṇāḥ*, meaning, earth etc., and their qualities.[2]

Uddyotakara's view.

But it appears that Uddyotakara has misunderstood the meaning of the term *artha* used in the *Sūtra*[3] quoted above. In this place, the word *artha* is used in ordinary sense, meaning *objects*; while in the *Sūtra*[4] under reference, the term *artha* has been used in the technical Nyāya-sense. So in this context, the specific qualities of each of the five *bhūtas* separately have been mentioned.

Uddyotakara's view not correct.

Moreover, the direct realization of the five specific qualities, namely, odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, of the five *bhūtas* respectively, is a direct cause of *apavarga*; and it is therefore, that they alone have been used here in this sense. Hence, the term *artha* has been used here in this particular *Sūtra* in the special sense and not in ordinary sense.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. i. 1.
[2] *Nyāyavārttika* on I. i. 14.
[3] III. i. 1.
[4] I. i. 14.

(v) *Buddhi*

Buddhi (cognition) has been defined as *bhoga*.[1] It means direct experience of pleasure and pain. It is a quality of the *Ātman* and not of the sense-organs, nor of the objects (*artha*).[2] As cognition or experience is possible even if the sense-organs are destroyed, as when we say that *we have seen a particular object even when the organ of vision is destroyed*, or the object of perception is destroyed, it cannot be said to be a quality of the sense-organ, or of objects. Nor can it be a quality of *manas*, whose existence is inferred from the fact that *jñāna* of objects is not simultaneous and also because the cognition of things is not simultaneous, and again, also because the simultaneous cognition of things actually appearing in mystics would be inexiplicable, if cognition belonged to *manas*.[3]

Buddhi explained.

It has been variously defined. Some define it as light (*prakāśa*) which has *Ātman* as its *āśraya* (substratum),[4] while some hold it as light (cognition) of objects (*arthaprakāśaḥ*). The *Siddhāntacandrikā*, however, defines it as *jnāna* which is the cause of all our day-to-day actions[6]. Buddhi has no form. It is always to be expressed through some object alone. Thus, the cognition in the form—*I possess the knowledge of a jar*, alone is correct.[7]

Divisions of Buddhi.

This *Buddhi* (cognition) is of two types—*smṛti* and *anubhava* (remembrance and experience.) Both these forms are attributed to non-eternal type of cognition, while the eternal cognition (*nitya-jñāna*) is attributed to the *Paramātman* alone. Non-eternal form

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9. [2] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. ii. 18.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, III. ii. 19.

[4] *Padārthacandrikā*, a com. on the *Saptapadārthī*, P. 30; *Saptapadārthi*, p. 47.

[5] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 149; *Tārkikarakṣā*, P. 124; Reprint from the Pandit.

[6] *Nyāyakośa*, P. 557; *Tarkasaṅgraha*, P. 173 Bodas edition.

[7] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 150-51.

of *Buddhi* belongs to the *Jīvātman*. Again, this is either correct or erroneous. All cases of *smṛti* are non-eternal and belongs to the *Jīvātman* alone. *Anubhava* is also eternal and non-eternal. Eternal form of *anubhava* belongs to the *Paramātman* and is only of one type, that is, direct perception (*sākṣāt-kārī*). Non-eternal forms of *anubhava* belongs to the *Jīvātman* and is of four types according to Nyāya, namely, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda. All these are *Pramāṇas* and have been already discussed before. As regards the *smṛti* all that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools have to say are given below :

Nature of universe.

It is a fact that nothing is lost in the universe. It is only a change of form that takes place, while the essentials remain the same. Each and every form that appears before us retains its individuality and retires in the same form in some other corner of the mental world after giving rise to another form in succession. This is not only true of the material substances but also of the mental objects, such as, cognition, desire, will, etc. Thus, when a man perceives something, no doubt, that actual perception vanishes from the sight in the next moment giving place to another cognition, but nevertheless, it is retained in some subtler form somewhere else. In other words, it can be said, with certain confidence, that everything, whether mental or extra-mental, that comes to exist once, does remain in some subtler form in the Ātman although new forms spring up out of it in succession. It is, therefore, true to say that everything and anything of the past experience, either of this life or of the previous life or lives, can very well be recalled in some other form, without changing it in essence. This is a fact which cannot be gainsaid. If the experience had entirely changed or lost, it would not have been possible to *recall* and *recognize* it even after a short interval and express it as 'I had cognized it even

As there is not much difference between the views of the two schools on *smṛti*, I treat the problem from both the points together at this place.

before.' So has been said—'*nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*.

The mental faculty which is responsible for the above statement is *Smṛti*. About the definition of this term no clear idea is found in either the *Nyāya* works or the *Vaiśeṣika* works. The little that we know of it is that *Smṛti* is an attribute of the *Ātman*,[1] and that it cannot be anything else.[2] This being a fact, *Smṛti* can be included in the *Buddhi* or *Jñāna* only. In other words, we can define *Smṛti* as a form of *Buddhi* which inheres in the *Ātman* by *Samavāya* relation. It is that faculty of living beings upon which worldly *vyavahāra* (usage) entirely depends.[3] It is generally expressed in the following forms of judgment :—(a) I knew that thing; (b) I had cognized that thing; (c) That thing had been cognized by me; and (d) I had a cognition in regard to that thing.[4] From all these it is clear that the act of *Smaraṇa* is a *recognition* of what had been already cognized.

Smṛti defined.

[Similar idea is found in the *Vaiśeṣika* works also.[5] *Praśastapāda* makes it more clear and says that *Buddhi* is of two kinds—*Vidyā* and *Avidyā*. *Smṛti* is one of the four sub-divisions of the former.[6] *Vidyā* has been characterised as a cognition which is free from doubts and contradictions and is decisive; hence, *Smṛti* is also of the same nature.][7]

Difference between Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

Almost all the later writers on *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* hold a similar view about the meaning and classification of *Smṛti*. The only difference is that

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra*, III. i. 14; I. ii. 40.

[2] *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* on *Ibid*.

[3] *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya*, III. i. 4. p. 455, Dr. Jha's Edition.

[4] *Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, III. i. 14. p. 456.

[5] *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, 9. ii 6.

[6] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*. pp. 172 and 186, Vizianagaram Series Ed.

[7] *Kandalī* p. 172.

they differ from *Praśastapāda* in sub-dividing *Buddhi*. They hold that *Buddhi* is sub-divided into *Anubhava* and *Smṛti*; and the former is again sub-divided into *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna*, and *Śabda*, while the latter is left alone. In other words, *Smṛti* is not classified under the same head along with *Pratyakṣa* etc. by the later writers, as has been done by *Praśastapāda*.[1] This shows that according to *Praśastapāda*, *Smṛti* is a separate means of right cognition like *Pratyakṣa* etc. This view has found its support in the *Nyāya-līlāvatī*. *Vallabhācārya* says that its being a separate means of cognition should not be denied on the ground that it is not used as *Pramā*; for, when it tallies with the actual past experience, it is clear that there is the use of *Pramā* as regards *Smṛti*. *Gautama* and *Kaṇāda* and their followers do not hold this view.[2] Later on, the author of the *Kandalī* refutes it.[3] The position of *Vallabhācārya* is clear; for, according to him, it appears, *Pramā* is that which corresponds to the reality.

Process of Smṛti-formation.

After the usual process of cognition, when the result is obtained, a kind of impression (*Saṁskāra*) is left behind by that resultant cognition which itself vanishes afterwards. Such an impression, which is the exact copy of that cognition, has got the *Ātman* as its substratum. Every piece of cognition leaves behind it an impression. But those which are due to (a) intensified (*Paṭu*) cognitions, (b) repeated cognitions, and (c) impressive (*ādara*) cognitions produced by special efforts, are more vivid and are easily recalled.[4] This has been explained by *Śrīdhara*,[5] as :—

(a) *Paṭupratyayaia*—We find that a *forcible mental impression* is produced when the *Ātma-Manas-contact* is influenced by the *intensified cognition* of an

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[1] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 186.

[2] *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, pp. 67-68, Nirnayasagara Ed. 1915.

[3] *Kandalī*, p. 257.

[4] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, p. 267; Dr. Jha's Trans. pp 573-74.

[5] *Kandalī*, pp. 267-268.

object that excites the wonder of the observer; as for instance, the man of the South having never seen a camel finds it a wonderful object; hence, when he perceives it, his cognition of it is so intensified that it leaves behind it a lasting impression on his *Ātman* and thus, it makes him vividly remember it later on.

(2) *Abhyāsapratyayaja*—In regard to such things, as (a) *study* : learning of the śāstras and *Āgama* etc.; (b) *arts* : painting of pictures etc., and (c) *physical exercise* : practice of the use of the weapons etc., we find that these are regularly practised with reference to one and the same object, and the impression produced on the *Ātman* remains for a long time and thus, the *Smṛti*, due to this, is extremely vivid.

(3) *Ādarapratyayaja*—When a man puts forth special efforts to perceive an object never seen before, the cognition, that he has, is as impressive as the perception of the flash of lightning; and it is such a cognition that is meant by the term *ādarapratyayaja*, and when the *Ātma-Manas-contact* is aided by such a cognition, there appears a peculiarly intensified impression on the *Ātman*; this character is indicated by the fact of its not disappearing even after the interval of a long time. For example, on the full-moon day of the month of *Caitra*, which has come in contact with the *spica-star* (*Citrā-nakṣatra*), at midnight are seen silver and golden lotuses in the *Devahrada*. Having heard this, many people gather on that day on the banks of the lake, with a view to witness the phenomenon, and when the middle of the night is about to arrive, they fix their eyes and their *Manas* intently on the lake. The lotuses actually appear and even though they are perceived but for a moment, the sight is so impressive that the impression created on the *Ātman* is very vivid and tends to the fact being remembered very distinctly even after a lapse of time.

Such an impression is left behind, by the cognition, on the *Ātman*. After the cognition and the impression of that cognition have been stamped on the *Ātman*, the man who had that cognition forgets

altogether that act of cognition. He is also not aware of the fact that any impression had been produced and left behind on the *Ātman*, for the impression was not perceptible to our external sense-organs.

After this when the same man, who had the cognition and on whose *Ātman* the impression was stamped, desires to recollect his particular cognition of the past through some associations, he makes an effort by directing his *Manas*[1] towards it, and with the help of the following causes, *Praṇidhāna* etc., the impressions are aroused and through the *Law of Association* and the resemblance of the charcteristics of the particular thing to be remembered, recollection of the desired object takes place.

The following are some of the causes by which *Smṛti* takes place[2]:—

Causes which arouse Smṛti.

1. *Praṇidhāna*—when we desire to remember anything, we withdraw our *Manas* from all other things and direct it towards that very thing which we want to recollect or towards the attributes of that very thing which will finally lead us to the desired object. This act of concentrating the *Manas* is called *Praṇidhāna*.
2. *Nibandha*—when a number of topics are treated in one book, those topics become mutually related so much so that when one of these is seen, others are also remembered. For instance, says Vācaspati Miśra,[3] in this very *Bhāṣya* of *Vātsyāyana*, the *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya* etc. are arranged in one connection, so that when a man cognises *Pramāṇa* he also remembers *Prameya* and *Vice Versa*.
3. *Abhyāsa*—is an attribute of the *Ātman* produced by the repetitions of the same object.[4]

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[1] *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-Sūtra*, III. ii. 30, p. 582, Dr. Jha's Ed.

[2] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 41.

[3] *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, p. 574, Kashi-Sanskrit Series, Benares, Ed.

[4] This *Abhyāsa* produces *Saṁskāra* which then produces *Smṛti*.

4. *Linga*—is of four kinds—(a) *Saṁyogi*, as for instance, smoke is the *Saṁyogi-Linga* of fire; (b) *Samavāyi*, as for instance, the horn is the *Samavāyi-Linga* of the cow; (c) *Ekārtha-Samavāyi* (co-inherence in one substratum), for instance (1) the hand is the *Ekārtha-Samavāyi-Linga* of the feet;[1] (2) and the colour is the *Ekārtha-Samavāyi-Linga* of touch[2]; and (d) *Virodhi*—for example, non-*bhūtas* are the *Virodhi* (*contradictory*)-*Linga* of the *Bhūtas*.

5. *Lakṣaṇa*—as the limb of an animal reminds us of the class of that animal.

6. *Sādṛśya*—the resemblances of *Devadatta* seen in the picture remind us of *Devadatta*.

7. *Parigraha*—ownership—as the servant reminds us of the master and *Vice Versa*.

8-9. *Āśraya* and *Āśrita*—as the sight of the leader reminds us of his subordinates and *Vice Versa*.

10. *Sambandha*[3]—the pupil reminds us of the teacher and the priest of the *Yajamāna*.

11. *Ānantarya*—sequence—where the first act reminds us of the consequent acts.

12. *Viyoga*—separation—when a man is separated from another and feels the separation, he remembers the other and *Vice Versa*.

13. *Ekakārya*—co-profession, as for instance, one cutter reminds us of another cutter.

14. *Virodha*—of two rivals. The sight of one reminds us of the other.

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[1] This illustration is possible when the *Samāsa* of the term is as—

ekasyāvayavinorthasya samavāyotra.

[2] In this case the *Samāsa* would be—ekasminnarthe Samavāyo yasya.

[3] Some sort of relationship is involved in all that is enumerated here. Hence, *Sambandha* here stands for other than that which is specially enumerated—*Tātparya*, p. 575.

15. *Atiśaya*[1]—Greatness reminds us of that which produced it.

16. *Prāpti*—when one has either acquired a thing, or wishes to acquire it, he is frequently reminded of the thing to be acquired.

17. *Vyavadhāna*—Cover reminds us of that which is hidden under it; as the sheath reminds us of the sword.

18-19. *Sukha* and *Duḥkha*—Pleasure and pain remind us of their causes.

20-21. *Icchā* and *Dveṣa*—Desire and Aversion remind us of that which is desired or hated.

22. *Bhaya*—Fear reminds us of its cause.

23. *Arthitva*—reminds us of the objects which are required.

24. *Kriyā*—The action of a man reminds us of that man; as the movement of a chariot reminds us of its maker.

25. *Rāga*—Love reminds us of the beloved.

26. *Dharma*—Merit reminds us of our castes of previous births.

27. *Adharma*—Demerit reminds us of the causes of pain experienced before.

These are some of the causes which according to the *Nyāya-Sūtra* lead to *Smṛti*. A careful study of these shows that all these are so many phases of one and the same general law-the *Law of Association* which is stated as—ekasambandhijñānamaparasambadhinaṁ smārayati.

Thus, the directed *Manas* comes in contact with the *Ātman* which possesses that impression of particular cognition which is to be remembered; and through the *Ātman* the *Manas* comes in contact with the particular impression by the relation of *Saṁyukta-*

[1] It also means *Saṁskāra*. In that case the *Upanayana-Sāṁskāra* reminds us of the *Ācārya*.

Samavāya and then that impression is revived and the past experience is recalled. Sometimes recollection takes place very soon while in some cases, it takes time. In the former case, it is due to the intensity and the vividness of the impression. In the latter case, there are two reasons : (a) a very simple reason is that the impression is very dull due to the unforcible nature of the cognition; (b) the *Ātman* is *Vibhu*. It extends even outside the limitations of our body. Impressions find their place on the *Ātman* both in and out of the organism; for, no two impressions can exist together in the same place. In case the impression, for the revival of which an effort is to be made, be on the *Ātman* which is not within the limitation of the organism, the *Manas* has to go out of the organism, to come in contact with the *Ātman* on which that impression is stamped; and it is, therefore, that the *Smṛti* takes place after a long lapse of time.[1]

Causes of delay in recollection.

This view has been refuted by *Gotama* and his followers. They hold that (a) the *Manas* cannot go out of the organism as long as the particular man who is to remember is living. If the *Manas* goes out, the body will fall down as dead. (b) If at all, the *Manas* goes out, the *Ātman-Manas-contact* thus brought about cannot produce any cognition; for, cognition being a form of *Bhoga* must take place and be felt in the *Bhogāyatana*, that is, the organism.[2]

The opponent holds against the above that the organism will not fall down; for, the *Manas*, being very swift in moving, can go out of the organism. With the revival of the impressions, it returns so quickly and gives rise to that *Prayatna* which will allow the organism not to fall down. It may be just the otherwise also. That is, the *Manas* after producing the *Prayatna*, goes out and returns very swiftly. Hence, the *Manas* can arouse the impressions outside the

[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 25. and 29.

[2] *Nyāya-sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 26-28 pp. 578-81; *Tātparya*, p. 567.

organism as well as can cause the organism to be retained also.[1]

This has been also rejected.[2] *Vātsyāyana* gives his own explanation for the delay in recollecting. Thus, he says that the *Manas* is held concentrated with a desire to remember and there appears a series of thoughts; and when of those thoughts, there appears the thought of object which serves to be the specific characteristic of the thing to be remembered, then *Smṛti* takes place.[3] This whole process takes some time which causes delay in *Smṛti.*

Simultaneity of recollection discussed.

As to the question of simultaneity of *Smṛti*, we know that the *Ātma-Manas-contact* is an essential factor of a cognition. *Manas*, being atomic, cannot come in contact with more than one point on the *Ātman*, at a time. Thus, there is no possibility of simultaneity of any cognition. But this does not put an end to our query; for, even this being a fact, the seat of *Smṛti*, which is the *Ātman*, is not a material substance and hence, we cannot speak of there being points (*Pradeśas*) on the *Ātman*, and also of the fact that impressions occupy separate place on the *Ātman*. That is, all the impressions may co-inhere in the same substratum without there being any overlapping.

This being the fact, when the *Manas* comes in contact with the *Ātman* and through it with the impressions, why does not the *Manas* come in contact with all the impressions inherent there and cause the *Smṛti* of all the impressions simultaneously?

The answer is that no doubt, the *Manas* can come in contact with all the impressions but that is not the only cause of cognition. There are other *auxiliary causes* which being absent do not make the simultaneity of cognition possible. It is, therefore, that the word *Pratyāsatti* has been explained by *Uddyota-*

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 29, PP. 581-2

[2] *Nyāya-sūtra and Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 30

[3] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, III. ii. 30.

kara as meaning "*The presence of auxiliary causes.*" The case is the same as that of sound. It is this : all the several sounds appearing in a series inhere in *Ākāśa*, a common substratum, yet only those of them are actually heard the *auxiliary causes* of whose cognition are present, and others are not heard. Similarly, in the present case, those impressions alone lead to *Smṛti* which have for their revival their *auxiliary causes* present.[1] Hence, like all other cognitions, *Smṛti* also does not happen simultaneously.

Smṛti and Anubhava.

Smṛti and *Anubhava* have been separated under two distinct heads by the later *Naiyāyikas*. But *Anubhava*, used in its widest sense, meaning cognition, can include the former under it. This is clear from the treatment of it by *Praśastapāda*.

Pratyabhijñā and Smṛti.

Pratyabhijñā and Smṛti :—These are two different processes of our mental faculty. In the case of *Smṛti*, it is not at all necessary that the thing which is to be remembered should be present before our sense-organs, while in the case of *Pratyabhijñā* it is essential that the thing which is to be recognized should be perceived by the external sense-organ at the time of its recognition. When a man, for instance, who has seen a tree with a monkey on it, sees either the tree or the monkey alone, he at once remembers the other one, through the *Law of Association*. This is a case of *Smṛti*. In the case of *Pratyabhijñā*, the object which is recognized is actually present before the external sense-organs. Thus, in *Pratyabhijñā* the impression as well as the actual perception of the thing perceived before are equally important. As for instance, on seeing *Devadatta* who had been seen before, one recognizes that he is the same *Devadatta* whom one had seen before.

Some are of opinion that impression is the direct cause of *Smṛti*, while in *Pratyabhijñā*, *Smṛti* produces remembrance of identity, which, in its turn, is the

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 427, Benares edition.

direct cause of *Pratyabhijñā*. Truly speaking, *Pratyabhijñā* depends upon *Smṛti* for its existence.

Smṛti and Svapna.

Smṛti and Svapna :—Some identify these two terms. The reason is that there is some resemblance between the two, as some of their causes are, in several respects, common.[1] But they are two different things of our mental world. *Smṛti*, which tallies with the actual occurrence, is not included under *avidyā*— false knowledge—while *Svapna*[2] is generally false except in some case of "*Prophetic dreams*" etc. which always refer to the future. *Smṛti* is only a *reproduction* of the past experience ordinarily without any addition of novelty. There is no *displacement* in it. In the case of *Svapna*, the displacement and novelty are mostly found.

Smṛti and Anuvyavasāya.

Smṛti and Anuvyavasāya :—These are also two different processes. According to *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* when any cognition takes place, there is a desire in the mind of the cognizer to know whether the cognition has really taken place. Hence, just after the cognition the cognizer has to direct his *Manas* towards that cognition and then he perceives through his *Manas* the previous cognition and expresses within himself in the form "I possess the knowledge of a jar." This *Mānasika* perception of the previous cognition is called *anuvyavasāya*. It should be treated as different from *Smṛti* for following reasons : (a) there is no lapse of time; and (b) there is no necessity of the revival of the impression. The common points are : (a) both are objects of our *Mānasika* perception; and (b) a desire to direct the *Manas* towards the bringing up of the previous cognition is also common.

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[1] *Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. ii. 34; *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, IX.ii. 6-7; Umesha Mishra—*Dream Theory in Indian Thought*, pp. 273-85, Allahabad University Studies, Vol. 5.

[2] For further details *vide*—Umesha Mishra—*Dream Theory in Indian Thought*, Allahabad University Studies, Vol. 5.

About the erroneous type of *anubhava* Uddyotakara has defined it as *atasmin tat iti pratyayaḥ* (that which it is not, knowing it to be that)[1]. In other words, erroneous cognition is that which is not proved through any means of right knowledge and is contrary to the reality.[2] As for instance, cognizing a piece of rope as snake, or a piece of *śukti* as silver.

Erroneus cognitions explained.

Wrong cognition is of three types—doubt (*saṁśaya*), *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning) and perverse knowledge (*viparyaya*). Doubt has a special place in this system. It distinguishes the Nyāyaśāstra from its being identified merely with *adhyātmavidyā* (metaphysical science).[3] No *Science of Reasoning* can be possible without believing in *doubt*, nor any conclusion can be arrived at without *doubt*; so says the *Gotamasūtra*,[4] which means—on any matter held in suspence, that is, it is doutful, when the reality of sides things is ascertained by means of considering the two of the quetion, we have what is called *demonstrated truth* (*nirṇaya*).

Divisions of erroneous cognition.

Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any object is wanting, and which arises either, (1) from cognition of the characters common to the objects concerned, or (2) from the cognition of characters that serve to distinguish an object from diverse objects, or (3) from the presence of contradictory opinions; and the appearing of such wavering judgments is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions.

Doubt and its causes.

Vātsyāyana explains these three along with the other two with the following illustrations. For instance, he says, (1) when a man perceives the quali-

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[1] *Nyāyavārttika*, I. i. 2, P. 72 Calcutta edition.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 150 Pandit edition.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

[4] I. i. 41.

ties of length and breadth which are common to a man and a post, and is desirous of detecting the previously perceived characters that would distinguish the one from the other, there arises in his mind the idea whether it is this or that; and he cannot ascertain whether it is the one or the other; it is this uncertain cognition that constitutes *doubt*; and what raises the doubt is the *want*, appearing in the form,—I can perceive only such characters as are common to the two things, and do not perceive the distinctive features of either.

(2) The second type of *doubt* is illustrated thus—Sound is found to be endowed with a specific property, in the form of being produced by disjunction; and the cognition of this character gives rise to the *doubt* as to whether sound is a substance, a quality, or an action. Inasmuch as the specific characters of things are found to serve both purposes of distinguishing from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things, there naturally arises a doubt as to whether, (a) being an entity, sound is a *substance* distinguished by the said specific character from qualities and actions, or (b) being an entity, it is a *quality* distinguished by that character, or (c) being an entity, it is an *action* distinguished by that character. And in this case the *want* of the cognition of the specific property (*viśeṣā-pekṣā*) is in the form of the idea,—I do not preceive any such character as would definitely indicate any one of the three (substance, quality and action).

(3) The third type of *doubt* is thus explained by Vātsyāyana—One system of philosophy asserts that the *Ātman* exists, while another declares that there is no such thing as the *Ātman*; and when no proof, one way or the other, is available, there is an uncertainty as to the truth; and this constitutes *doubt*.

(4) The fourth type of *doubt* is caused by the uncertainty attaching to perceptions. As a matter of fact, there is perception of really existing water, as in the tank and such other reservoirs; there is perception also of non-existent water, in the rays of the sun appearing in the mirage; so that when in any

particular case there is perception of water, and yet there is no proof available which would determine the real character of what is perceived, there arises *doubt* as to whether the water perceived is really existent or non-existent (*upalabdhi-avyavasthā*).

(5) The fifth type of cause which creates *doubt* is thus explained :—As a matter of fact we find that even really existing things are not perceived; as for example, we do not perceive the water within the roots and branches of trees; and there is non-perception also of what is non-existent, that is, of what is not produced at all; or what has been destroyed; so that whenever there is non-perception of a thing there arises *doubt* as to whether what is not perceived really exists or it does not exist at all.

Vātsyāyana gives reason as to why has he separated the last two types of *doubt* as quite distinct. He says in the first two kinds of *doubt*, the common properties and the property distinguishing particular object from diverse (*aneka*) objects are such as subsist in the object cognized itself, while in the fourth kind, the perception and the non-perception subsist in the cognizing person; and it is only by reason of this difference or peculiarity that these have been mentioned separately.

View of Vārttika and Tātparya about the divisions.

It is to be pointed out here that the *Vārttika* and the *Tātparya* both defer from the above view and hold that there are only *three* types of doubt and not five as the *Bhāṣya* explains. So says the *Vārttika*—Some (which includes the *Bhāṣya* as well) take the words of the sūtra to mean that there are five kinds of *doubt*; they construe the sūtra as—*doubt* is that wavering judgment in which the cognition of the specific character of any object is wanting and which arises from the cognition of common characteristics, and so on also with each of the remaining terms. But this interpretation is not correct. The *Vārttika* discusses this point at great length and

ends with a clear remark that, thus, it is established that there are only *three* kinds of *doubt*.[1]

The next erroneos cognition is known as *Tarka*. It has been defined and explained by the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* as—When the real character of a thing is not well-known, there is put forward, for the purpose of ascertaining that real character, a reasoning in support of a certain conclusion, which indicates the presence of proof showing the undesirability or absurdity of a contrary conclusion. This is called *Tarka*.[2] It is thus illustrated—As an example of this *Tarka*, we have the following in regard to the cognitive *Ātman* being a product and having a beginning, or being beginningless. First of all there arises a desire to know the real character of the cognizer, the agent, who cognizes what is to be cognized; this desire being in the form—may I know the real character of the cognizer? Then comes the doubt in the form, has this cognizer a beginning, or is it beginningless? Thus, the real character of the thing being in doubt, and not well-known, the enquirer accepts and assents to that particular character in support of which he finds proofs and grounds for acceptance. For instance, in the particular case, the proof would be in the following form—If the cognizer (*jñātā*) were beginningless, then alone would birth and rebirth and release be possible for him; birth and rebirth consisting in the functioning, one after the other, of pain, birth, activity, defect and ignorance, among whom that which follows is the cause of that which precedes it; and release consisting in the disappearance, one after the other, of these same and both of these would be impossible for him, if the cognizer had a beginning; for in that case the cognizer would be connected with a particular set of body, sense-organs, intellect (*buddhi*) and feelings (*vedanā*), only when he would come into existence for the first time; so that these body and the rest

Tarka explained.

[1] PP. 249—53, *Calcutta Sanskrit series edition.*

[2] I. i. 40.

could not be the product of his own past actions; and further, anything that is born also ceases to exist very soon after; so that, becoming non-existent or destroyed, he would not be these to undergo the experiences resulting from his actions; thus, then for any one cognizer, it would be absolutely impossible to have either connection with more than one body or disconnection from any body at all. If in another instance, the reasoner finds no such proof forthcoming, he does not accept or assent to the conclusion. It is a reasoning of this kind which is called *Tarka.*

Tarka cannot be said to be embodying the *knowledge* itself; because, as a matter of fact, it is indecisive, being purely permissive in its character, the reasoner simply asserting to the assertion of one of the two suspected characters, on the strength of the proof adduced; and one cannot by this reasoning alone accurately determine that the thing must be so and so. So *Tarka* only helps the *Pramāṇas* to acquire knowledge and is not a *Pramāṇa* itself (*pramāṇānāmanugrāhakastarkaḥ, na pramāṇam*).[1]

Viparyaya is the third type of wrong notion. It has been explained as taking a thing to be some particular thing which it is not; as for example, taking a piece of *śukti* which is not silver, to be a piece of silver.[2]

(vi) *Manas*

We now come to the sixth *prameya*, called *Manas* translated as mind in the absence of a more accurate term. It has been defined by Gotama as— *Yugapajñānānutpattirmanasoliṅgam*.[3] Meaning-as it is not directly perceived, its existence is proved through the non-simultaneous production of knowledge. That is, it is not perceived through *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, so its existence in only inferred. For inferring its existence, the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions is

Existence of *manas* proved.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 40.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 150.

[3] I. i. 16.

the probans.[1] Vātsyāyana explains it as—inasmuch as remembrance and the rest like inference, verbal cognition, doubt, intuition, dream, imagination, perception of pleasure, existence of which cannot be denied, are not brought about by the instrumentality of the external sense-organs, they must be due to some other organ. As a matter of fact, we find that even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects, like odour and the rest, are in close proximity to the respectively perceptive sense-organs, the visual organ and the rest, yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is no other cause, *by whose proximity cognition appears, and on* account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear; this other organ being in contact with the several sense-organs, and helping them, and being non-pervasive in its dimension. If the proximity of sense-organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the *manas*, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.[2]

It is atomic in dimension and thus, eternal, and is in contact with the pervasive *Ātman*. By atomic the science means that particular element which does not occupy any space and is the smallest particle, smaller than which no element exists. It is the inner sense-organ. It is eternal and possesses *saṅkhyā* (number), dimension (*parimāṇa*), *pṛthaktva* (separateness), contact and disjunction, *paratva*, *aparatva* and velocity (*vega*).[3]

Attributes of manas.

As there is no simultaneous cognitions, it is proved that there is only one *manas* is one organism.[4] Vātsyāyana explains it thus,—there are two kinds of non-simultaneity of cognitions-(1) The non-simultaneity of several cognitions produced through the same sense-organ, and (2) the non-simultaneity of cognitions of

Number of manas in an organism.

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 16.
[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 16.
[3] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 126.
[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, III. ii. 56.

several things produced through several sense-organs. Of these, the former is not what is spoken of as indicating the singleness of *manas*; this non-simultaneity being due to the fact that one instrument, such as sense-organs are, can, by its very nature, accomplish only one thing at a time; it is therefore, the latter simultaneity of the cognitions of several things through several sense-organs that is regarded as indicating the singleness of *manas*.

If there were several *manas*, it would have been possible for several sense-organs to be in contact with all *manas* simultaneously; whereby there should have been several cognitions appearing through their contacts at one and the same time; but this never happens. So it is concluded that there is only one *manas*. Non-simultaneity of cognitions also proves the atomic nature of the *manas*.

Manas is inner sense-organ in Nyāya.

It has to be also pointed out that though in the treatment of *manas*, Nyāya system has accepted it to be an inner sense-organ, yet it has not been included in the enumeraion of the sense-organs by Gotama in his *Sūtra* work.[1] Vātsyāyana gives an answer to this that because the sister system, that is, Vaiśeṣika, has already accepted *manas* as an inner sense-organ, and it is a convention with all the systems that those doctrines of other allied systems which are not directly negatived are meant to be approved as accepted facts. Then again, as to the question why it has been omitted from the Sūtra, Vātsyāyana says that as there are certain marked differences between the character of the *manas* and those of other sense-organs, such as other sense-organs are composed of material particles, are effective upon only a few specific objects and are capable of acting as organs only as endowed with certain specific qualities, while the *manas* is immaterial, effective on all objects, and capable of acting as an organ without being endowed with any quality, *manas* has not been included in the

[1] I. i. 12.

Sūtra enumerating the sense-organs. Thus, the Nyāya system also accepts *manas* as a sense-organ.[1]

Manas exists even after death, and due to *adṛṣṭa* it enters into a fresh body after death when it goes out.[2] In the śrutis *manas* has been described as created, that is, it is not eternal. But the Naiyāyikas take it to be eternal, of course, from their own common-sense point of view. So what the śruti means is, hold some Naiyāyikas, that by creation of *manas* we should mean the first contact of the *manas* with the particular fresh body with which it has come in contact for the first time. Again, with the help of *manas* alone the Jīva takes another birth.[3]

(vii) *Pravṛtti*

Pravṛtti explained.

Now, we come to the seventh *prameya*, called *Pravṛtti*, which has been defined by Gotama as—

Pravṛttirvāgbuddhiśarīrārambhaḥ.[4]

It means activity which consists in the operation (*ārambha*) of *Vāc* (speech), *Buddhi* (manas) and *Śarīra* (physical organism). In other words, by *Pravṛtti* is meant all actions, good and bad, leading to merit and demerit. This *Pravṛtti* is of two kinds, namely, *jñānajanaka* (leading to cognitions) and *kriyājanaka* (leading to actions). In other words, the term *vāc* here stands for those things which produces *jñāna*. Again, even meditation on one's own *iṣṭadeva* (particular personal deity) through *manas* and also cognition of good and bad objects through the sense-organs, like the organ of vision etc., are all is included under *jñānajanaka*.

Kriyājanaka pravṛtti is again, of two kinds, *śarīrajanya* and *manojanya*. Through the body protection (paritrāṇa), service (paricaryā) and giving gift (dāna) are performed; through speech *satya* (truthfulness), *hita* (beneficial) and *priya* (agreeable) and *svādhyāya* (study) type of actions are done; through *manas* sym-

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 4.
[2] *Tarkavāgīśa*, III. ii. 60.
[3] *Tarkavāgīśa*, p. 330.
[4] *Gotamasūtra*, I. i. 17.

pathy (*dayā*), desirelessness (*aspṛhā*), and faith (*śraddhā*) are shown. These are the ten kinds of *pravṛtti* leading to merit (dharma). Similarly, there are ten demeritorious actions opposed to all the ten meritorious acts mentioned just above.[1] It is also to be added that all the three varieties of *pravṛtti* belong to the *Jīvātman*. *Pravṛtti* is the cause of good and mean births.[2]

(viii) *Doṣa*

Like *pravṛtti*, *doṣa* (defects) also is the cause of physical organism, sense-organs, things (*artha*), like odour etc., *buddhi* (jñāna), pleasure and pain.[3] It has been defined by Gotama as—

Doṣa and its functions explained.

Pravartanālakṣaṇā doṣāḥ.[4]

It is that which makes the *Jīvātman* move towards meritorious or demeritorious deeds. This defect is of three types, namely, attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and ignorance (*moha*). These three incite the *Jīvātman* towards activity. These are differentiated by their action : the man who has attachments does that action whereby he experiences pleasure or pain; similarly, the man who has aversion, or one who has ignorance does similar action. It is necessary to make it clear that attachment etc. are causes of activity in order to produce disgust against them, which fact could not have been brought about by the mere mention of attachment and other defects. Both attachment and aversion are produced out of *moha* and urge a man to activity.

All these three subsist in the *Jīvātman*, as its attributes. These are the causes of the universe, as these are the sources of activity and as they have the force to bring about re-birth. Since this series of births and re-births is beginningless, *defects* are regarded as

[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 2.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 2.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 10.

[4] I. i. 18

operating in a continuous series and also have no beginning. Wrong knowledge ceases when right knowledge is attained; and on the cessation of wrong knowledge the whole series of affections and aversions drop off, whereupon follows final release and from this it is clear that *defects* are liable to appearance and disappearance.[1] Attachment and aversion are found where there is nescience.[2] When the three *defects* drop, then there is no Action (*pravṛtti*) to take another birth after the previous birth.[3] Rebirth is caused by *tṛṣṇā* (desire), and when desire is destroyed, there is no re-birth and then he gets emancipation.

Three groups of defect and their functions.

There are further, three groups of *defect* : (1) *Desire-type* (*rāgapakṣa*)—under this are included love (*kāma*), selfishness (*matsaratā*), longing for acquiring desired objects (*spṛhā*, in a lawful manner, what belongs to another). hankering (for re-birth, *tṛṣṇā*) and greed (*lobha*, desire for obtaining, in an unlawful manner, what belongs to another); (2) *Hatred-type* (*dveṣapakṣa*) which includes anger (*krodha*), jealousy (*īrṣyā*), envy (*asūyā*), malice (*droha*), and resentment (*amarśa*); (3) *Illusion-type* (*mohapakṣa*) under which are included error (*mithyājñāna*), suspicion (*vicikitsā*), pride (*māna*), and negligence (*pramāda*). Of these three, illusion (*moha*) is the worser evil (*pāpīyān*) and one who is not under illusion, the other two do not appear in him; that is, unless one is affected by illusion, desire and hatred do not appear in him; and when a man has become influenced by illusion, one or the other, of the other two types, does appear in him in accordance with the man's *saṅkalpa* (notions) when the man's impressions in regard to a thing are attractive, such as create attachment, they produce in him desire for that thing; while when his notions are repulsive, such as create aversion, they produce hatred. Both these notions are nothing other than illusion (*moha*) which consists of wrong notions. Thus, it is that desire

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 2.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 18.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 64.

and hatred have their source in illusion. When illusion is destroyed by right knowledge, both desire and hatred cease to appear; this is what accounts for their having one and the same thing for their antithesis. This is all what has been described in the *Gotamasūtra* of the first adhyāya and first āhnika.

(ix) *Pretyabhāva*

Pretyabhāva.

It has been defined by Gotama as—

Punarutypattih pretyabhāvaḥ[1].

That is, existence after death, meaning being born again. In other words, it means giving up of the already assumed body etc. and taking up another fresh body etc. in their place in the world which is a continuous series of causality between pain etc. and upto wrong notions as enumerated by Gotama in the second Sūtra.

As regards the question of re-birth, it is said, that re-birth belongs to the *Jīvātman* which is eternal. But there can be no re-birth of the *Jīvātman*, as no eternal thing is ever found to be born or to die, and as the *Ātman*, that is, the *Jīvātman*, is eternal there is no possibility of its birth or death.

Possibility of re-birth discussed.

Vācaspati makes this point very clear in his *Tātparya*. Thus, he says, the doubt in regard to *re-birth* is as to its belonging to the *Ātman* or to apprehension (buddhi), or to the body. To this form of doubt, the objection is raised in Varddhamāna's *Prakāśa* that, it having been already determined[2] that re-birth is of the *Ātman*, there can be no room for such a doubt. The answer given is that from the definition provided[3] re-birth appears to consist in death and birth; hence, the further question naturally arises, how can death and birth belong to the *Ātman*, which, being eternal, cannot die or be born?

To this Gotama says—Rebirth is possible only because the *Ātman* is eternal.[4] What the Sūtrakāra

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 19,

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, i. 1. 19.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.19.

[4] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. 1. 10.

means is that since time immemorial the same *Jīvātman* assumes another organism after having given up the previous one. This continues from time immemorial to *ad infinitum*. This is what is meant by *Pretyabhāva*. It is the body with which the connection of the *Jīvātman* is dropped and again, taken up afresh. So says Vātsyāyana, it is the eternal *Jīvātman* that departs (*praiti*), that is, abandons the former body, dies and goes out; and having departed (*pretya*), that is, having abandoned the former body at death, comes to exist (*bhavati*) again, that is, be born, takes up another body. It is these two *departing and coming again* that have been spoken of as *pretyabhāva* (re-birth).

Re-birth possible.

By the way, this question of re-birth leads us to discuss how according to Nyāya system a physical organisn is produced? This very question has been raised by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya*.[1] He also supplies the following answer after Gotama, who says, the production of perceptible (*vyakta*) things is from perceptible objects, which is obviously proved by *Pratyakṣa*.[2] It has to be noted that Uddyotakara in his *Vārttika* says that *vyakta* is that substance (*dravya*) which possesses colour etc. and hence, due to the similarity, the cause of earth etc., such as, *Paramāṇu*, is also called *vyakta*. Further he says *rūpādisāmānyāt paramāṇavo vyaktā ityucyante*, that is, *Paramāṇus* are called *vyaktas*, because they possess the qualities of colour etc. in common with earth etc. So jar, cow, etc., which possess perceptible qualities of colour etc., and are perceptible (*vyaktas*), are produced out of *Paramāṇus* which possess qualities of colour etc. This is proved through direct perception. So whatever substance is produced, which is *vyakta*, is produced out of the similar substance alone. Hence, from the *vyakta*, *kapāla* (part of the jar), a jar is produced, both being *vyaktas*.[3]

Production of physical organism.

[1] IV. i. 11.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. 1. 11.

[3] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 13. There are several views about the cause of production given the *Nyāyasūtra* and the Bhāṣya, but as they are not acceptable from the Nyāya point of view, they have been omitted here.

One more point regarding the causality of the universe attributed to *Iśvara* is to be noted at this place. Whether *Iśvara* is the cause of the universe independently or does he depend upon the merit and demerit of the things or creatures to be created to produce the things or create the universe? The *siddhānta* view is that *Iśvara*, independent of the *karman* of the would be created beings, is not the cause of the universe for various reasons[1].

Isvara is not an independent cause of the universe.

(x) *Phala*

Phala (fruition) consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to either pleasure or pain. It has been defined by Gotama as—

Meaning and scope of *Phala*.

Pravṛttidoṣajanitorthaḥ phalam[2].

That is, fruition is the *artha* which is produced due to action and defects. And as pleasure and pain appear only when the body, the sense-organs, objects and apprehension (*bu 'dhi*) are present, these are also regarded as fruition. In other words, due to his meritorious or demeritorious acts a *Jīva* gets pleasure and pain in his next or even in the present birth. In order to reap those fruits, as results of his past deeds, he has to get a body, sense-organ etc., which alone would help the *Jīva* to experience such pleasure and pain which his past deeds demand for their fruition. So it has been defined as a thing (*artha*) produced by activity and defect[3]. In ordinary course, the fruition of the past or even of the present deeds is received by a man who performed them and it is relinquished by him; and each time it is relinquished, it is again, received by him; so the process goes on continuously without any break. Hence, there is no end or absolute cessation of these *receivings* and *relinquishings*; and it is by this unceasing current of receivings and relinquishings that the entire worldly process is carried on[4].

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 19—21.
[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 20. [3] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 20.
[4] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 20.

Fruition is immediate or takes some time to appear, discussed.

Now, a question is raised whether fruition of a deed takes place immediately after the deed is performed, or it takes some time to appear? It is found when a man cooks rice or milks cow, the result, in the shape of rice and milk respectively, appears immediately; whereas when he ploughs the field and sows the seeds, the result, in the shape of the harvest, accrues to him after some time. From this it is assumed that though the action stops, yet some sort of activity in some other form continues till the result accrues. For instance, when a man who desires fruits renders such services to the tree, as pouring water at its roots, and so forth; and it is only after the actual act of watering has ceased to exist that the earthly particles, under the tree's roots, become lumped together by the particles of water, and becoming heated with the heat underground, they produce a juicy substance, as modified by the heat, comes into contact with the tree and, in a peculiarly modified form enters into it and produces leaf etc., and the fruit. In this manner the action of watering etc. is fruitful and yet the result does not quite follow from a cause that has entirely ceased to exist. In the same manner, actions produce in the *Jīvātman* a *saṁskāra* in the shape of *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit). And this *saṁskāra*, after being produced, comes to be helped by other causes, such as time, place etc., and thus, brings about the results at a later time[1]. So it is evident that the fruition is not necessarily immediate; it is such as can be experienced only at a later time.[2] Again, of the action (*karman*), some directly precedes the effect, while some again, precedes its effect indirectly through some other form (as has been already explained above). It may also be further illustrated by the example of the performance of a *agnihotra* sacrifice for attaining heaven, which when it is complete does not take the performer of the *agnihotra* to heaven at once. The action ceases, it

[1] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 47.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, IV. i. 45.

leads to some merit, which remains with the *Jīva* in the form of *saṁskāra.* The man dies. He attains another body which is capable of taking him to the heaven or to any other place. At that time though the action is not present yet the *saṁskāra* of that act remains functioning which ultimately takes the man to heaven. Thus, he attains the fruit of his action which remains prior to the fruition in some other form, but does not give any fruit immediately.[1]

(xi) *Duḥkha*

Duḥkha means suffering, injury, pain. So says Gotama—

Bādhanālakṣaṇaṁ duḥkhaṁ[2].

Meaning of *Duhkha* and its scope.

Anything and everything inseparably connected with the feelings of pain, such as physical organism etc. and also pleasure and pain, are all included under *duḥkha*. Finding everything to be intermingled with pain, when one desires to get rid of it, he finds that life itself is nothing but pain, and thus, becomes disgusted with the life itself and being disgusted, he loses all attachment and being free from attachment, he becomes finally released.[3]

Pleasure is not dissociated with pain.

It is to be noted here that in this system there is no separate mention of *pleasure* (*sukha*). It has been included under *pain* itself, as there is nothing in this world which is not mixed up with pain, and so the Sūtrakāra has not mentioned it as a separate entity. But it should not be therefore, taken to mean that the author totally denies the very existence of pleasure. It does exist in some form or other. It is not permanent and eternal, but even then it does exist. So says Vātsyāyana—it is not possible totally to deny *pleasure*, to whose existence testimony is borne by all men. The teaching that pleasure

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, IV. i. 44—47.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 21.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 21.

should be looked upon as *pain* is meant for the removal of all pain, for the person who has become disgusted with the sufferings caused by the experiences undergone during a series of births and deaths and is anxious to get rid of all similar experiences. It is further found that the bodies of all living beings, of all the regions where people are born, all re-births (all conditions of life), every one of these is beset with annoyance, being inseparable from pain; and it is in view of this fact that the sages have tendered the advice that pain is that which is connected with annoyance.[1] And the meaning of this is that all the aforesaid things should be looked upon as pain.[2] Again, the *Bhāṣya* continues that the term *janma* in the *Sūtra*[3] stands for that which is produced, that is, body, the sense-organs and so forth; and the *utpatti* or *janma* in the same *Sūtra* (*vividhabādhanāyogāt duḥkhameva janmotpattiḥ*)[4] is the coming into existence of the body etc., in their various forms.

Reason why pleasure is looked upon as pain.

It is to be further added that the several annoyances (*bādhanā*) are distinguished as—the *least*, the *medium* and the *greatest* (*utkṛṣṭa*). The greatest annoance is of those who are in hell; the *medium* (*madhyama*) is of that of the lower animals; and the *least* (*hīna*) is that of human beings. Of the divine beings, as of those who have got rid of all attachments, it is still less. When a person perceives that every condition of life is beset with annoyance (*bādhanā*), he becomes confirmed in his experience that pleasure and its causes, in the shape of the body, sense-organs, and cognitions, are all to be regarded as *Pain*, and when he has come to look upon all these as *pain*, he loses all attachment to all things of the world, and after he has formed this dis-attachment, all his longings for

Degrees of *Duḥkha*.

Feelings of pain lead to absolute freedom from world.

[1] *Sūtra*, I. i. 21.

[2] *Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 54.

[3] IV. i. 55.

[4] IV. i. 55.

worldly things come to an end; and his longings having come to an end, he becomes freed from all sufferings, just as, when one understands that by the contact of poison, milk becomes poison, he no longer seeks to obtain milk, and by not obtaining it, does not suffer the pangs of death.[1]

During intervals wordly pleasure is felt.

Again, it has to be kept in mind that worldly pleasure also is felt during intervals. Hence, it cannot be denied entirely. So says Gotama—

bādhanānivṛttervedayataḥ paryeṣaṇadoṣādapratiṣedhaḥ.[2]

That is, there is no denial of pleasure; because all that is meant is that inasmuch as the man experiencing pleasure is oppressed with the fraility of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him. Vātsyāyana makes it clear and says, *longing* is wish, the eager desire for acquiring a thing; and the fraility of this longing is as follows :—when a man experiences pleasure from a certain thing, he desires that thing, and sometimes the desire is not fulfilled, or if fulfilled, it is fulfilled only in part, or is fulfilled in such form as is beset with obstacles; and from this fraility of longing, there arise various kinds of mental sufferings; so that the man experiencing pleasure, being oppressed with the fraility of longing, there is no cessation of annoyance for him; and it is because there is no cessation of annoyance, that it has been taught that pleasure should be looked upon as pain, and not because there is no pleasure at all. This is what has been expressed in the following verses :—

Longings are augumented by *bhoga*.

kāmaṁ kāmayamānasya yadā kāmaḥ samṛddhyati /
athainamaparaḥ kāmaḥ kṣiprameva prabādhate //

Translation.—For the man who desires a desirable thing, as soon as that desire is fulfilled, another desire quickly besets him.

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, IV. i. 55.
[2] IV. i. 57.

apicedudanemi samantād-
bhūmimimāṁ labhate sagavāśvāṁ,
na sa tena dhanena dhanaiṣī
tṛpyati kinnu sukhaṁ dhanakāma iti.[1]

Translation.—Even though a man obtains the entire sea-girt earth, along with all cows and horses, that seeker after wealth does not become satisfied with that wealth; what pleasure, then, can there be for one who desires wealth?

A similar idea is expressed in the following verse also—

na jātu kāmaḥ kāmānāmupabhogena śāmyati /
haviṣā kṛṣṇavartmeva bhūya evābhivarddhate //

Translation.—By the experiencing of longings, longing (for wordly enjoyment) is never exhausted or satiated, just as fire is never extinguished by pouring *ghī* into it, rather it becomes augmented more and more.

Pains are wrongly regarded as pleasure.

Again, there are several kinds of pain which people wrongly regard as pleasure, says Gotama.[2] The *Bhāṣya* elaborates the idea and says, the ordinary man, addicted to pleasure, regards pleasure as the highest end of man, and feels that there is nothing better than pleasure; and hence, when pleasure has been attained, he feels happy and contended, feeling that all he had to attain had been attained; and under the influence of illusion, he becomes attached to that pleasure, as also to the things that bring about its accomplishment; becoming so attached, he makes an attempt to obtain the pleasure; and while he is trying for it, there come down upon him several kinds of pain, in the form of birth, old age, disease, death, the contact of disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, the non-fulfilment of desires and so forth; and yet all these several kinds of pain he regards as *Pleasure*.

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[1] *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, IV. i. 57.

[2] *Sūtra*, IV. i. 58.

In fact, pain is a necessary factor in p] out suffering some pain, no pleasure can or experienced; hence, as pleasure, this pain is rega man as *pleasure*; and such a n his mind obsessed by this pleasure, never escapes from metempsycho consists of a running series of births anc And it is an antidote of this notion of that we have the teaching that all this sh looked upon as *Pain*.

Pain is a necessary factor in pleasure.

Similarly, birth has been called pain, bec its being beset with pain, and not because t no such thing as pleasure.

(xii) *Apavarga*

Apavarga (final release) is the last *prameya* acc ing to the system. It has been defined as—

Tadatyantavimokṣopavargaḥ,[1]

meaning, absolute freedom from pain which has bc just discussed above. All the types of pain and t so-called pleasure including birth hav been explained above and absolut freedom from these is called *apavarga*. Vātsyāyana explains it thus, when there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken and the non-resumption of another, this condition, which is without end or limit, is known as *final release*, by those who know what final release is. This condition of immortality, free from fear, imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss is called *Brahman*. (*tadabhayamajaramamṛtyupadaṁ brahma kṣemaprāptiḥ*).

Apavarga explained.

Others have even said that absolute freedom from the twentyone types of pain, namely, physical organism, six kinds of sense-organs (olfactory, gestatory, visual, cutaneous and the auditory and

Absolute freedom from twenty-one kinds of pain.

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 22.

In fact, pain is a necessary factor in pleasure; without suffering some pain, no pleasure can be obtained or experienced; hence, as leading to pleasure, this pain is regarded by the man as *pleasure*; and such a man, having his mind obsessed by this notion of pleasure, never escapes from metempsychosis, which consists of a running series of births and deaths. And it is an antidote of this notion of pleasure that we have the teaching that all this should be looked upon as *Pain*.

Pain is a necessary factor in pleasure.

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 22.

manas), six types of their specific objects, six types of cognitions attained from these six sense-organs, and pleasure and pain is called *apavarga*. Of these twenty-one kinds of pain, some are major, while others are minor. It has already been explained that pleasure is also a kind of pain, as it is always associated with pain.

Process of attainment of apavarga.

Keśava Miśra explains the process of its attainment. Thus, one who becomes disgusted with the world after having found defects in everything, due to the attainment of the correct knowledge of things, becomes desirous of attaining final emancipation. He attains direct perception of the *Ātman* through the process of *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*; and when he attains perfect *samādhi* and perceives the *Ātman*, all his pains disappear. But even then, as he is maintaining his physical organism, he continues to perform action, but those acts of his then are not aimed at any particular achievement, so no merit or demerit accrues to him thereafter.

Process of kāyavyūha to exhaust past karmans.

Then he, through his yogic powers, comes to know of all the *saṁskāras* of the deeds of his previous births. He thereafter assumes various physical forms without destroying the present one, within himself, through the process of *kāyavyūha* and exhausts the results of all his past deeds by experiencing pleasure and pain due to accrue to all of them. He thus, becomes free from the *saṁskāras* of his previous births and so after he exhausts the *prārabdha-karman* and when his present body falls as dead, he does not assume another body after that for the simple reason of his having exhausted the fruits of the deeds of all his previous births through *kāyavyūha*. So he becomes absolutely free from all the types of pain and becomes *mukta*.[1]

Viśvakarmā, in his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā*, says that the process of *kāyavyūha* as described

[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 153—55; Pandit reprint.

below is to be adopted only if one is very eager to achieve *mokṣa* after having attained *tattvajñāna* and not otherwise. He quotes the following lines from some *Āgama* explaining the process of *kāyavyūha* :

ātmano vai śarīrāṇi bahūni manujeśvara/
prāpya yogabalaṁ kuryāt taiśca sarvamihācaret//
bhuñjīta viṣayān kaiścit kaiścidugraṁ tapaścaret//
saṅgrahecca punastāni sūryastejogaṇāniva//

Translation—O King ! A *mumukṣu* should collect all his bodies which his previous *karmans* enjoin on him for reaping the fruits of the deeds of all his previous births (within himself). In the extant body itself he should undergo all the *bhogas* of those births. Through some bodies he should experience pleasure and pain, through others he should perform hard penance and so on. After that he should collect them again together like the Sun collecting his rays after having them allowed to stay in the universe in the day (and finish them for ever. Thereafter, he attains final release).

This finishes a brief treatment of the *prameyas* according to Nyāya.

Some other *prameyas* which are also accepted by Nyāya.

Besides these objects of cognition there are others, like *dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya*,[1] and also negation (*abhāva*) which though belong to Vaiśeṣika are also accepted by Nyāya and which have been dealt with by me in the *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and will be treated briefly in the next volume, so, they are omitted here.

These are the doctrines which the Nyāya system has to discuss at great length in relation to other views held by different schools of thought. As my aim has been throughout to present to my readers exclusively what a particular system has to say from a particular angle of vision in order to get a clear and exclusive knowledge of the *Ātman* which is the ultimate end of the *jijñāsu*, I have made no attempt to give any comparative idea about these *prameyas* at this

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 9.

place. It is for the purpose of realizing the correct vision of these *prameyas* that the system has dealt with the means of cognition *pramāṇas* as discussed before.

(iv). *Integral factors of the Science of Reasoning*

Other categories accepted by Nyāya.

The two fundamental categories of the system have been discussed above, but there are other categories accepted by the system which are regarded as the integral factors of the system. In fact, all the topics of discussion included in the system for *Ātmadarśana*, can easily be included under the two categories of *Pramāṇa* and *Prameya* only. So there is no need of dealing with the rest of the of fourteen categories mentioned by Gotama in his *Sūtra*.[1] To this we have already said that as these are the specific categories of the *Science of Reasoning* which alone distinguish the system from other systems, they have been mentioned here to give a correct vision of the *Ātman*.

(a) *Prayojana*

Of these fourteen categories, some have been already discussed above, so we will take up only those which are not yet dealt with. I now start with *Prayojana*. It has been defined by Gotama[2] as—

yamarthamadhikṛtya pravartate tatprayojanam.

It is that, on being urged by which man has recourse to activity, that is to say, it is that, desiring either to obtain or reject which, a man has recourse to action. This is common to every system and every being. It forms the basis of all reasoning. In other words, it is for the attainment of pleasure and for getting rid of pain that there is the need of *pravṛtti*, which makes a man do some action.[3]

(b) *Dṛṣṭānta*

Meaning and need of dṛṣṭānta.

Dṛṣṭānta (example) is something that is directly perceived, that is, which cannot fail to be perceived by all enquirers, ordinary persons and also learned and which needs no further proof. So it has been defined by

[1] I. i. 1. [2] I. i. 24.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 24; *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 139-40,

Gotama[1] as—

laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṁ yasminnarthe buddhisāmyaṁ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.

That is, example is that with regard to which both parties, the ordinary man and the trained investigator, entertain similar ideas.

It is self-evident. It is only when there is an example to corroborate the premiss, for instance, and not otherwise, that there can be a valid inference, or verbal (*Āgama*) cognition. It is thus, the basis of all our reasonings. It is also to be kept in mind that an example must be agreeable to both the parties, *vādī* and *prativādī*.[2] In refuting the opponent's position, it is necessary to show that it is opposed to an example admitted by both the parties and in establishing ones own position also, it is necessary to show that it is corroborated by an example. Again, through an example, the position of the Buddhists, who believe in the theory of flux or momentariness, becomes untenable. If an atheist admits a corroborative example, he renounces his nihilistic position, as by nihilism all things have merely momentary existence; and hence, it is not possible for the example, which must be in the form of something that existed in the past, to be present at the time, that it is put forward; if on the other hand, he does not admit an example, on the basis of what could he attack the position of his opponent? It is all due to such reasons that it has been included amongst the categories by Gotama[3].

Types of example.

There are two types of example, positive and negative (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), that is, in the case of an inference, like mountain is fiery, because it possesses smoke, as for

(c) *Siddhānta*

Siddhānta, its meaning and importance.

Siddhānta is a statement of facts in the form that *it is so*. It is accepted as most valid. Gotama has defined it[1] as—*tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṁsthitiḥ*, meaning, *Siddhānta* is a theory (*saṁsthiti, vyavasthā*), or conviction in regard to the exact nature of a thing dealt with by *tantra* (science or *śāstra*). It is of four types—(1) Doctrine common to all the schools of śāstra (*sarvatantra*), (2) Doctrine peculiar to one school (*pratitantra*), (3) Doctrine resting on implication (*adhikaraṇa*), and (4) Hypothetical doctrine (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*).

Varieties of *Siddhānta* explained.

Thus, that scientific conviction which is not incompatible with any school of thought is called *sarvatantra-siddhānta*. As for instance, the opinions like, the olfactory-organ and the rest are sense-organs; odour and the rest are the objects cognized by means of these sense-organs; the earth and the rest are material substances; things are cognized by means of the instruments of cognition.[2]

Pratitantrasiddhānta is that which is accepted only by one school of science; as for instance, the following doctrines are peculiar to *Sāṅkhyas*, that which is absolutely non-existent can never come into existence; that which is real and existent can never be non-existent; intelligence (*Puruṣa* or *cetana*) is without any attribute and unchanging; modification belongs to the three gross products, like, body, sense-organs and *manas* and also to the subtle causes of these, that is, *Buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and the five *tanmātrās*. Again, the following which are peculiar to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy,—the material creation is due to the past deeds of the *Jīva*; the defects of men and also their activities are the causes of *karman*; intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities; that thing alone is produced which had no existence before and that which is produced is destroyed.

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i 26.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 28.

Gotama[1] as—

laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṁ yasminnarthe buddhisāmyaṁ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.

That is, example is that with regard to which both parties, the ordinary man and the trained investigator, entertain similar ideas.

It is self-evident. It is only when there is an example to corroborate the premiss, for instance, and not otherwise, that there can be a valid inference, or verbal (*Āgama*) cognition. It is thus, the basis of all our reasonings. It is also to be kept in mind that an example must be agreeable to both the parties, *vādī* and *prativādī*.[2] In refuting the opponent's position, it is necessary to show that it is opposed to an example admitted by both the parties and in establishing ones own position also, it is necessary to show that it is corroborated by an example. Again, through an example, the position of the Buddhists, who believe in the theory of flux or momentariness, becomes untenable. If an atheist admits a corroborative example, he renounces his nihilistic position, as by nihilism all things have merely momentary existence; and hence, it is not possible for the example, which must be in the form of something that existed in the past, to be present at the time, that it is put forward; if on the other hand, he does not admit an example, on the basis of what could he attack the position of his opponent? It is all due to such reasons that it has been included amongst the categories by Gotama[3].

Types of example.

There are two types of example, positive and negative (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), that is, in the case of an inference, like mountain is fiery, because it possesses smoke, as for example-in the kitchen. Here, there is a similarity between the case under question and the instance put forth, so it is called *sādharmya* or *anvaya-dṛṣṭānta*; while in the case of the same inference, if the *hetu* be put in the form, *yatra dhūmo nāsti, tatra vahnirnāsti*, as for example, a lake; it is called *vaidharmya* or *vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta*.

[1] I. i. 25, [2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 160, [3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

(c) *Siddhānta*

Siddhānta is a statement of facts in the form that *it is so.* It is accepted as most valid. Gotama has defined it[1] as—

Siddhānta, its meaning and importance.

tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṁsthitiḥ,

meaning, *Siddhānta* is a theory (*saṁsthiti, vyavasthā*), or conviction in regard to the exact nature of a thing dealt with by *tantra* (science or *śāstra*). It is of four types—(1) Doctrine common to all the schools of Śāstra (*sarvatantra*), (2) Doctrine peculiar to one school (*pratitantra*), (3) Doctrine resting on implication (*adhikaraṇa*), and (4) Hypothetical doctrine (*abhyupagama-siddhānta*).

Varieties of *Siddhānta* explained.

Thus, that scientific conviction which is not incompatible with any school of thought is called *sarvatantra-siddhānta*. As for instance, the opinions like, the olfactory-organ and the rest are sense-organs; odour and the rest are the objects cognized by means of these sense-organs; the earth and the rest are material substances; things are cognized by means of the instruments of cognition.[2]

Pratitantrasiddhānta is that which is accepted only by one school of science; as for instance, the following doctrines are peculiar to *Sāṅkhyas*, that which is absolutely non-existent can never come into existence; that which is real and existent can never be non-existent; intelligence (*Puruṣa* or *cetana*) is without any attribute and unchanging; modification belongs to the three gross products, like, body, sense-organs and *manas* and also to the subtle causes of these, that is, *Buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and the five *tanmātrās*. Again, the following which are peculiar to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy,—the material creation is due to the past deeds of the *Jīva*; the defects of men and also their activities are the causes of *karman*; intelligent beings are endowed with their own respective qualities; that thing alone is produced which had no existence before and that which is produced is destroyed.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i 26.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 28.

Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta is that on the knowledge or acceptance of which depends the knowledge or acceptance of another fact; as for instance, the fact that the cognizer is distinct from the body and the sense-organs is proved or indicated by the fact of one and the same object being apprehended by the organs of vision and touch. The facts implied in the above are : that there are more sense-organs than one; that the sense-organs operate upon particular kinds of objects; that they have their existence indicated by the apprehension of their objects; that they are the instruments bringing about the cognitions of the cognizer; that the substratum of qualities is a substance other than the qualities of odour and the rest and that intelligent beings cognize only particular objects. All these facts are included in the aforesaid fact of the cognizer being distinct from the body etc., as this fact would not be possible without all those other facts.[1]

The *abhyupagama-siddhānta* is described, as when a fact is taken for granted without investigation, and thence proceeds the examination of its particular details. As for instance, it is taken for granted without any investigation that sound is a substance, and thence proceeds an investigation as to whether sound is eternal, or non-eternal, in which investigation are examined such details of sound as its eternality or non-eternality.

(d) *Avayava*

Avayavas are the factors of a syllogistic argument. It consists of five factors, namely, (1) *Pratijñā* (statement of the proposition). It consists in the assertion of what is to be proved (probandum). That is, it is that assertion which speaks of the subject which is intended to be qualified by that property which has to be made known or proved by the reasoning. As for instance, *Sound is non-eternal.*

Factors of syllogism are explained and illustrated.

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 30.

(2) *Hetu* (probans) is that which demonstrates the probandum (*sādhya*), through its similarity, that is, a property common to it and to the corroborative instance. That is to say, when one notices a certain property in the subject with regard to which the conclusion is to be demonstrated and notices the same property also in the corroborative instance, and then puts forward that property as demonstrating, or proving the probandum (*sādhya*). This putting forward of the said property constitutes the statement of the probans.

As for example, in the above quoted instance, sound is non-eternal, *because sound has the character of being a product* is the *hetu*; as a matter of fact, everything that is a product is non-eternal.

This very statement of probans is also proved through dissimilarity (*vyatireka-hetu*) to the corroborative instance.

As for example, sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced; that which has *not* the character of being produced is always eternal, like *Ātman* etc.[1]

(3) *Udāharaṇa* (example) is that instance which, through similarity to what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is possessed of a property of that (*sādhya*), constitutes the statement of the corroborative instance. This is preceded by the statement of invariable concommitant relation (*savyāptikam*); as for instance, all the cases of possessing smoke are the cases of possessing fire, as the kitchen.[2]

As already pointed out, there is also a dissimilar statement of corroborative instance (*vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta*).

The other kind of statement of corroborative instance is that which is contrary to what has been described above. In other words, the other kind

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 34-35. [2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 162.

of statement of the instance consists in that familiar instance which, through dissimilarity to what is to be proved, is not possessed of a property of that subject; that is, sound is non-eternal, because it has the character of being produced; everything not having the character of being produced is eternal, as the *Ātman* etc. Here the Ātman etc. constitute the required familiar instance, which through their dissimilarity to what is to be proved, that is, on account of their not having the character of being produced, are not possessed of the property of the subject, that is, the property of non-eternality. When we find that in the case of the *Ātman*, the character of being produced being absent, it does not possess non-eternality, we infer the contrary in the case of sound, because sound is possessed of the character of being produced, so sound is non-eternal.

To make the above further clear, it is said that when the probans is stated with a view to similarity, that is, in the affirmative form, what constitutes the statement of the instance is that familiar instance, which through its similarity to what is to be proved, is possessed of a property of the subject, and when the probans is stated with a view to dissimilarity, that is, in the negative form, the statement of the instance consists of that familiar instance which, through its dissimilarity to what is to be proved, does not possess the property of the subject. In the former case, the observer perceives, in the instance, that it possesses two properties so related that the presence of the one proves the presence of the other, and from this he comes to infer that in the case of the subject also, the presence of the one should prove the presence of the other; and in the latter case, he observes in regard to instance that there are two properties so related that the absence of the one proves the absence of another; and from this, he comes to infer that in the case of the subject also, the said properties are similarly related, the absence of one proving the absence of the other.[1]

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 37.

(4) *Upanaya*—Coming to the fourth factor, namely, *upanaya*, Gotama says—

udāharaṇāpekṣastathetyupasaṁhāro
na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayaḥ[1].

That is, the re-affirmation which, on the strength of the instance, re-asserts the subject as being *so*, that is, as possessing the character which has been found, in the instance (*udāharaṇa*), to be concomitant with the probandum; or as being *not so*, that is, as not possessing the character which has been found, in the instance, to be concomitant with the negation of the probandum. In other words, the reaffirmation of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* (subject) is what is called *upanaya*. As for instance, in the example :

(1) Sound is non-eternal;

(2) Because it possesses the character of being a product;

(3) all that possess the character of being a product are non-eternal, like a dish (*sthālī*);

(4) the character of being a product which is established through a concomitant relation between the probans and the probandum, is found in sound.

This fourth factor is what is called *upanaya*. This factor is really the most important one and so is the probans also.

Again, the re-affirmation is also proved through *vyatireka*, that is, where there is absence of possessing the character of being a product, there is eternality, just as in the *Ātman*. In this way, through re-affirmation a syllogistic argument is established.[2]

(5) *Nigamana*—The last factor is what is called *nigamana*. Gotama defines it as—

hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanam nigamanam.

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[1] I. i. 38. [2] *Nyāyasūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, I. i. 38.

It means the re-statement of the proposition on the basis of the statement of the probans.[1] The probans having been stated either *per* similarity, or *per* dissimilarity, we have a re-capitulation of the entire syllogism in accordance with the instance; and this recapitulation constitutes the final conclusion. Which is in the form,—*therefore, having the character of the product, soun i is non-eternal.*

Utility of each factor.

The *Bhāṣya* discusses the utility of each and every factor. Thus, in every inferential statement, which consists of the five factors, several distinct *pramāṇas* commingle and co-operate towards the accomplishment of the end in the shape of inferential cognition. There is commingling in the following cases; (a) in the inference bearing on sound, the proposition, (*pratijñā*) in the form —sound is non-eternal, comes under verbal cognition (*Śabda*); and verbal assertion, unless it is heard directly from a *ṛṣi*, cannot by itself be accepted as trust-worthy, and it stands in need of corroboration by perception and inference; (b) in the statement of the probans (*hetu*) we have an inference, being deduced, as it is, from the cognition of similarity by the statement of the instance; (c) the statement of the instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) represents *perception*; the deduction of the unseen from the seen being only natural; (d) the re-affirmation (*upanaya*) is in the form of the denial of the contrary character; (e) the final conclusion (*nigamana*) serves to show how all the factors combined together are capable of bringing about the cognition of a single object.

Mutual co-operation among factors.

There is mutual co-operation also among the five factors; namely, (a) if there were no Proposition (*pratijñā*), there would be no basis on which the statement of the probans and other factors could proceed; (b) if there were no statement of the probans (*hetu*), the instrumental efficiency of what, towards the bringing about of the cognition, could be shown by the inference? What again

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 39.

would that be whose connection with the instance and the probandum could be shown? On the basis of what again, could there be the final conclusion consisting in the re-statement of the proposition? (c) If there were no statement of the instance (*udāharaṇa*), what would that be to which there would be similarity, or dissimilarity, of what is put forward as the means (probans) of proving the probandum? On the strength of similarity to what too would be final recapitulation proceed? (d) If there were no reaffirmation (*upanaya*), the character put forward as proving the probandum, not having its presence in the probandum reasserted, could not accomplish its purpose; (e) lastly, in the absence of the final conclusion (*nigamana*), there would be nothing to indicate the mutual relationship among the proposition and the other factors, or the fact of their combining to accomplish a common purpose, and what too would it be that would be declared as proved by means of such expressions as *so is this*?

It is clear from the above that the final conclusion is not the same as the proposition; the latter puts forward the fact only tentatively, as requiring confirmation by the reasoning with the aid of the probans and the instance, while the former puts it forward as one fully established, and thus, precluding the possibility of the truth being contrary to it. This cannot be done by the proposition (*Pratijñā*), as, if it did, then the rest of the factors would be entirely futile.[1]

Ten factored syllogism.

Vātsyāyana mentions that there were some old Naiyāyikas according to whom there are *ten factors* in a syllogism and they are the following five in addition to the other recognized five: (1) *jijñāsā* (desire to know). It is only that which urges, or brings forward, the purpose meant to be accomplished by the cognition of a thing not already cognized. As to the question why does a man desire to know what is cognized, it is said that he does so simply

[1] *Tātparya* on I.i.39.

with a view that when he comes to know it in its true character, he will either abandon it, or acquire it, or treat it with indifference; so that the ideas of abandoning, or acquiring, or treating them with indifference are the purposes served by the true knowledge of the thing; and it is for the sake of this purpose that the man desires to know the thing.

To this it is said that certainly, this desire does not prove anything and as such, cannot be regarded as a factor of reasoning which is meant to prove the conclusion.

(2) Doubt (*saṁśaya*). It forms the basis of the desire to know, it apprehends mutually contradictory properties; and as such, it can be regarded as only proximate to true cognition; as of the two contradictory properties only one can be true. So though it is regarded as a separate category, yet it cannot be regarded as a factor of a syllogism. It cannot prove anything not being of the nature of true cognition.

(3) *Śakyaprāpti* (capacity to accomplish what is desired). As for instance, the instruments of right cognition have the capacity of accomplishing, for the cognizing agent, the apprehension of the objects of cognition. This could not form part of an argument put forward for proving a proposition, in the manner in which the statement of the proposition forms part of it.

(4) *Prayojana* (purpose) which consists in the ascertaining of the real nature of the thing sought to to be known. This is the result, and not a factor.

(5) *Saṁśayavyudāsa* (dispelling of doubt) which consists in the setting forth of the counter-proposition and then denying it. This only tends to lend support to some other instrument of right cognition (*pramāṇa*).

So this cannot be regarded as a part of the argument put forward to prove a proposition. Hence, Nyāya does not believe in these five as distinct factors.

Besides, the Jainas also had accepted ten factored syllogism which has been already discussed in the first volume.[1]

(e) *Nirṇaya*

Nirṇaya (demonstrated truth)—when there is an ascertainment of the real character of the thing after duly deliberating over the two sides of the question, an argument in favour of a certain conclusion and also that in its confutation, we have what is called *nirṇaya*. So Gotama has defined it as—

vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyāmarthāvadhāraṇaṁ nirṇayaḥ[2].

Vātsyāyana clarifies it as—in regard to every matter of dispute we have two opposite views, one seeks to establish the truth of a certain conclusion with regard to the thing under investigation, and the other denies that conclusion, and seeks to confute the former view; and these two, the arguments favouring and the arguments refuting, are based upon the conclusion (*pakṣa*) and its confutation (*pratipakṣa*) and the two sets of arguments themselves (when appearing together come to be spoken of respectively as *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*. And of these two views, it is necessary that one should be rejected and the other confirmed; and when one is confirmed, the ascertainment with regard to that is called *nirṇaya*.[3]

(f) *Vāda*

Now, we come to a different type of subject. Reasoning helps the reasoner to arrive at a definite conclusion either by himself alone, or by holding a consultation with others. In the latter case, there arise occasions for discussion and mutual criticism and it is this method of arriving at a conclusion that constitutes *vāda*, *Jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*. A brief survey of all these is also necessary to be given in this *Science of Reasoning*.[4]

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[1] PP. 289-91.

[2] *Gotamasūtra*, I. 1. 41.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. i. 41.

[4] *Pariśuddhi* on I. ii. 1.

Vāda (discussion) has been defined as consisting in the putting forward, at least by two persons, necessarily for the purpose of knowing the *ultimate truth* of a conception and a counter-conception, in which there is supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, neither of which is quite opposed to the main doctrine, and both of which are carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors already explained. So says Gotama[1]—

Meaning and scope of Vāda.

pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ.

It is explained by Vātsyāyana as when two contrary particular characters are alleged to subsist in the same substratum, they are called *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*, as when we have two such allegations as *Ātman is* and *Ātman is not.* And it is this sort of assertion that constitutes *Vāda.* It is mostly between a teacher and a taught for arriving at the *truth.* It is subject to such eight clinchers (nigrahas), namely, *nyūna* (when the syllogism falls short of any factor), or *adhika* (when some more factors are unnecessarily added to the syllogism) and *apasiddhānta* (use of wrong doctrines) beside the usually recognized five types of fallacies.

The *Pariśuddhi* is of the view that of the 22 types of clinchers, there are six, namely *pratijñāhāni*, *pratijñāsannyāsa*, *nirarthaka*, *arthāntara*, *avijñātārtha* and *apārthaka*, which by their very nature cannot he urged in *Vāda*; there are again, the following seven wrong methods of arguments which though possible to be used, should not be urged. These are : *pratijñāntara*, *hetvantara*, *ajñāna*, *apratibhā*, *vikṣepa*, *matānujñā*, *and paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa.* Again, there are the following seven which may be urged in *Vāda.* These are : *virodha*, *aprāptakāla*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *punarukta*, *ananubhāṣaṇa and apasiddhānta.* Again, there are two which when used put an end to the controversy.

Place of wrong arguments in Vāda.

[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. ii. 1.

These are *hetvābhāsa* and *niranuyojyānuyoga*. It is also to be noted that in *Vāda* the supporting and condemning are done strictly in accordance with proofs and reasonings and not by means of casuistry etc. which are used only for attaining *jaya* (victory) or *parājaya* (defeat), while in *Vāda*, it is the desire to arrive at the *reality* that the two parties carry on the debate.

(g) *Jalpa*

Disputation (*Jalpa*) is that which is endowed with the characteristics found in the *Vāda*, namely, it puts forward a conception and a counter-conception, it consists in supporting and condemning by means of proofs and reasonings, is not opposed to the main doctrine and is carried on in full accordance with the method of reasoning through the five factors, and in which, there is supporting and condemning by means of casuistry (*chala*), futile rejoinder (*jāti*) and clinchers (*nigrahasthāna*). The last characteristic shows that *Jalpa* is distinct from *Vāda*.

It is to be noted that though *chala* etc. are not directly helpful to prove one's own argument, yet through *pramāṇas* they also help the reasoning by condemning the views of the opponent.[1] So has been said that *Jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* serve the purpose of safeguarding the sprouting of seeds.[2] Similarly, when a person condemns a counter-conception by means of proofs, if he employs casuistry etc., they become helpful in setting aside or warding off the attacks that might be made against that condemnation. Thus, casuistry etc. are employed only as subsidiary auxiliaries.

(h) *Vitaṇḍā*

Vitaṇḍā (wrangling) is the same as *Jalpa* with the condition that there is no establishing of the counter-conception (*Pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā*) in the former.[3] That is to say, out of the above described two allegations in regard to two contrary characters as subsisting in the same

[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 2. [2] *Sūtra*, IV. ii. 50.

[3] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 3.

substratum, which have been mentioned above, as *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* (conception and counter-conception), the wrangler does not establish one that he himself holds and which he does not like to commit, but only goes on criticizing the proofs adduced for establishing the conception of the other person. He does not proceed to establish the proposition which he lays down as to be proved by himself, as is found in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* of Śrīharṣa.[1]

(i) *Hetvābhāsa*

Hetvābhāsa (fallacious probans) are so called, because they do not possess all the characteristics of a correct probans, and yet are sufficiently similar to the probans to appear as such. It is to be again, pointed out at this stage that a good and correct inference has to fulfil five conditions, namely, (1) the *hetu* must be present in the *Pakṣa* (subject, or minor term), (2) the *hetu* must be present in the *sapakṣa* (a similar instance or a positive instance), (3) *vipakṣādvyāvṛtti*-the *hetu* must be absent in the counter-instance, like a lake in the inference of fire from smoke, (4) *avādhitaviṣayatva*-that is, the *hetu* must not be such as can be subverted by any stronger proof, and (5) *asatpratipakṣa*, the *hetu* should not be such as can give a chance for proving the opposite. These may be well illustrated in the following manner:

Five conditions of a correct *hetu*.

(I) *Pakṣadharmatvam*—In the inference, *Parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt*; the hetu *dhūmavatva*, a *dharma*, must be present in the *pakṣa*, *parvata*. Again, (2) The same *hetu* is also present in the positive instance, namely, kitchen (*sapakṣa*). (3) The same *hetu* is totally absent from the lake which is the *vipakṣa* in this inference. (4) The presence of the *sādhya* of this *hetu*, that is, fire, is not disproved in the *pakṣa*, that is, *parvata*, in the same inference. And (5) this *hetu* does not give a chance to another *hetu* which may prove just the opposite conclusion (*sādhyaviparīta-sādhakaṁ hetvantaraṁ*

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. ii. 3.

yasya na vidyate). If any of these five conditions is not fulfilled, it becomes a case of *hetvābhāsa*.[1]

Gotama has classified it under five heads, namely, (1) *savyabhicāra* (inconclusive), (2) *viruddha* (contradictory), (3) *Prakaraṇasama* (neutralised), (4) *Sādhyasama* (unknown) and (5) *Kālātīta* (mistimed). These are all the fallacies of the probans.[2]

It is necessary to explain and illustrate these. Thus,

Varieties of fallacy explained.

(1) *Savyabhicāra* (inconclusive). It is also called *anaikāntika*. It is that type of probans which makes the *sādhya* indecisive. For instance, in the example—Sound is non-eternal (śabdo'nityaḥ), because it has the characteristic of having *prameyatva* (knowability). In this inference, *prameyatva* is the *hetu* which is present in the *pakṣa* (śabda), in the *sapakṣa* (eternal *Ākāśa*) and also in the *vipakṣa* (jar, for instance). This should not be; for the *hetu*, as it is here, cannot prove the eternality of sound. It is called *Sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*.

Another subdivision of it is *Asādhāraṇa anaikāntika*; for instance, in the inference, *bhū* (earth) is eternal, for it possesses odour. Now, the *hetu* (*gandhavattva*) is not present in the *sapakṣa* (eternal *Ākāśa*), nor is it present in the *vipakṣa*, non-eternal water etc. But it is present only in *pakṣa*, *pṛthivī*. Hence, this is a fallacious probans.

(2) *Viruddha* (contradictory) is that which is in concomitant relation with the opposite of the thing to be proved (*sādhya*). For instance, in the inference-*śabdo nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt* (sound is eternal, as it is produced), the *hetu*, that is, being produced, is in concomitant relation with non-eternal things, like a jar or so, being based on the argument, all that is produced is non-eternal.

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[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, PP. 52, 53, 166, 167.

[2] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. ii. 4.

(3) *Prakaraṇasama* (neutralised). It is also called *satpratipakṣa*. As for instance, in the inference, *śa daḥ anityaḥ, anityadharmānupalabdheḥ* (sound is non-eternal, because it does not possess the characteristics of eternal objects). This gives a chance to argue in opposite way also. Thus, one may say, *Śabdaḥ nityaḥ, anityadharmānupalabdheḥ* (sound is eternal, as the characterstics of non-eternal objects are not found in sound).

Gotama, however, defines it as that which is put forward to establish a definite conclusion, while it is one that only gives rise to suspense (and vascillation) in regard to the point at issue (*prakaraṇacintā*).[1]

(4) *Sādhyasama* (unknown). It is that type of *hetu* (probans) which, being still to be proved, is not different from the *sādhya* (probandum). As for instance, in the inference, Shadow is a substance (*chāyā dravyam*), because it has motion (gatimattvāt). Here, the probans does not differ from the probandum. Both are equally to be proved. In fact, it is a mistake to take the shadow moving. What actually happens is that as the object moves along, it obstructs certain portions of light, and what is perceived as shadow is only the continued absence of those portions of light that are obstructed by the moving objecct.[2]

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* defines it as that whose subsistence in the subject is as unsettled as that of the probandum. The *Tātprya*, however, says that the definition given by Gotama is meant to include all the four types of *asiddha*, namely, *svarūpāsibda*, *ekadeśāsiddha*, *āśrayāsiddha* and *anyathāsiddha*; as every one of these is still to be proved and as such, it is similar to the probandum. It is also called *pakṣāsiddha*. Udayanācārya has defined it as, *vyāptasya hi pakṣadharmatayā pratītiḥ siddhiḥ tadabhāvaḥ asidhaḥ*(*sidha* is that *hetu* which is *vyāpta* of the *sādhya* and is known to be present in the *pakṣa*, while the negation of this is *asiddha*).[3]

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[1] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 7. [2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I. ii. 8.

[3] *Pariśuddhi*, Ms. Fol. 1211; *Kusumāñjali*, III. 7.

(5) *Kālātīta* or *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. It is defined as that inference in which the absence of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* (subject) is denied through *pratyakṣa*, or any other *pramāṇa*.[1] It is also called *Bādhitaviṣaya*. As for instance, *agniḥ anuṣṇaḥ, kṛtakatvāt, jalavat*. Here, the presence of the *sādhya-anuṣṇatva* (not being hot) is proved to be totally absent in the *pakṣa*, fire.

These are the five types of fallacy accepted by the Nyāya system. Besides, there are three more generally recognized fallacies, *avyāpti*, *ativyāpti* and *asambhava* (too narrow, too wide and impossible probans) which are also included under those very five fallacies.[2] So there is no more than five fallacies in the Nyāya system.

(j) *Chala*

Chala (casuistry) consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the one intended.[3] It is of three kinds, *Vākchala* (verbal casuistry), *Sāmānyachala* (generalising casuistry) and *Upacārachala* (figurative casuistry).

Meaning of the divisions of Chala.

(1) *Vākchala* is that which consists in assuming a meaning other than that intended to be conveyed by a word, when the meaning intended is not definitely specified. For instance, *Navakambalo'yam brāhmaṇaḥ*. In this sentence what the speaker means is that the brāhmaṇa has got a *new* blanket. But the compound word *navakambala* has been misrepresented as *nine* blankets and the opponent throws out the argument by saying that how can this poor brāhmaṇa possess *nine* blankets ? So what the other man has said is wrong. This is due to the opponent's twisting the meaning of the word, not meant for the purpose.

(2) *Sāmānyachala* consists in the urging of an absurd signification, which is rendered possible by

[1] *Tarkabhāṣā*, P. 178.

[2] *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 179.

[3] *Gotamasūtra*, I. ii. 10.

the use of a too generic term.[1] As for instance, when one man says—oh ! this Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character; and another replies, learning and character are quite natural to a Brāhmaṇa. The latter assertion is met by opposition, by assigning to the word (*Brāhmaṇa*) a meaning other than the one intended, that is, by assigning to it an entirely absurd meaning. This opposition being in the following form,—if learning and character are natural to the *Brāhmaṇa*, then they should be found in the *Vrātya* (the Brāhmaṇa who has not been initiated into *upanayana* ceremony within the period prescribed) also, as he also is a *Brāhmaṇa*.[2]

(3) *Upacāracchala.* A statement being made on the basis of the secondary (figurative) denotation of words; if it is opposed by a denial of the existence of what is asserted (on the basis of their primary denotation), this constitutes figurative casuistry.[3] As for instance, some one says—the platform is howling (*mañcāḥ krośanti*). But this sentence is misinterpreted as platform never howls; it is the man standing on the platform who is howling. This is a case of figurative casuistry.

(k) *Jāti*

Jāti explained and illustrated.

Jāti (futile rejoinder) is that objection which is taken on the basis of mere similarity and dissimilarity.[4] When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that follows is called *jāti*. The objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a

Jāti, futile rejoinder, as it comes up as an opponent to the original reasoning.[1]

The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains that the futile rejoinder is that which is urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity alone, that is, irrespectively of any idea of invariable concomitance; in fact, it continues, similarity and dissimilarity do not enter into all cases of futile rejoinder. It makes a futile rejoinder when no notice is taken of invariable concomitance. This is what has led the modern logicians to define *Jāti*, futile rejoinder, simply as *asaduttaram* (wrong answer), that is, an answer which is either incapable of shaking the opposite view, or which is vitiated by self-contradictions.

Vācaspati's view.

The *Tātparya* has an interesting note here. It says that it is not always reprehensible to put forward a futile rejoinder; for instance, when a man, upholding the authority of the Veda, is met by a series of arguments against its authority, and at the spur of the moment he does not find proper answers to these arguments, he is fully justified in urging what is really a futile rejoinder, if he feels that by so doing he will crush the atheistic tendency of the audience produced by his opponent's arguments. But in other cases, a futile rejoinder is urged only unknowingly.[2]

There are several varieties of this *Jāti*, such as, *utkarṣasamā*, *apakarṣasamā*, *Sādharmyasamā*, *vaidharmyasamā*, etc.

Viśvakarman in his commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣā* says that there are twenty-two other types of *Jāti* which also should be included under this very head[3] as given in the *Gotamasūtra*.[4] The other twenty-two types are: *varṇya*, *avarṇya*, *vikalpa*, *sādhya*, *prāpti*, *aprāpti*, *prasaṅga*, *pratidṛṣṭānta*, *anutpatti*, *saṁśaya*,

[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 18.

[2] Notes from Dr. Ganganatha Jha's English translation on I. ii. 18.

[3] P. 182. [4] V. i. I.

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[1] *Gotamasūtra*, I. ii. 13.
[2] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 13.
[3] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 14.
[4] *Sūtra*, I. ii. 18.

Jāti, futile rejoinder, as it comes up as an opponent to the original reasoning.[1]

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[1] *Bhāṣya*, I. ii. 18.

[2] Notes from Dr. Ganganatha Jha's English translation on I. ii. 18.

[3] P. 182. [4] V. i. I.

prakaraṇa, *ahetu*, *arthāpatti*, *aviśeṣa*, *upapatti*, *anupalabdhi*, *anitya*, *nitya*, and *kārya*.[1]

I give below in brief the meaning of each of the types of *Jāti* mentioned in the *Gotamasūtra*.[2] Vātsyāyana has explained and illustrated these in his *Bhāṣya*. Thus he says :—

(1-2) *Sādharmya and Vaidharmya-sama*[3] (Parity *per* similarity and *per* dissimilarity)—When the original proposition is propounded on the basis of similarity, if the opposition to it, seeking to establish contrary to its predicate, is set also on the basis of similarity, and this opposition does not differ from the argument put forward in support of the original proposition, it is a case of that opposition which is called *Sādharmya-sama*.

As for example—

Kriyāvān ātma,
dravyasya kriyāhetuguṇayogāt;
dravyaṁ loṣṭaḥ kriyāhetuguṇayuktaḥ, kriyāvān,
Tathā cātmā, tasmāt kriyāvān.

The opposition sets up the following opposition to it also on the basis of similarity :—

niṣkriyaḥ ātmā, vibhuno dravyasya niṣkriyatvāt, vibhu ca ākāśaṁ niṣkriyam ca, tathā ca ātma, tasmān-niṣkriyaḥ.

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[1] *Sūtra*, V. i. 1. [2] V. i. 1.

[3] Udayanācārya in his *Bodhasiddhi*, also called *Nyāyapariśiṣṭa*, thus explains the significance of the term *Sama* occuring at the end of all these terms. (1) According to the *Vārttika*, it means *equalization*; that is, the futile rejoinder is put forward for the purpose of counter-poising or neutralizing the effects of the original reasoning; (2) According to the *Bhāṣya*, it means that the futile rejoinder is put up with a view to show that there is nothing in the original reasoning which differentiates it from what is now put forward; (there is not much difference between these two). (3) Others explain it as meaning that the futile rejoinder puts the original *reasoner* on exactly the same footing as his opponent putting forward the rejoinder. (4) The *equality* of the futile rejoinder lies in the fact that while demolishing the reasoning of the first party, it demolishes itself also. It is to be added that Udayana admits himself the last explanation.

Translation.—Ātman is active, as every substance is, endowed with qualities, conducive to activities; the clod of earth, which is a substance, is endowed with qualities and is conducive to activity, and is found to be active, so is the *ātman*, hence, the *ātman* must be active.

The opposition sets up the following opposition to it also on the basis of similarity :—*Ātman* is inactive, as every all-pervading substance is inactive; *Ākāśa*, which is an all-pervading substnce, is inactive, the *Ātman* is also so, hence, *Ātman* is inactive.

There is no special reason why on the ground of similarity to active substances the *Ātman* should be regarded as active, and it should not be regarded as inactive, on the ground of its similarity to inactive substances. Thus, inasmuch as there is no special reason which makes one or the other more valid, this is an instance of futile rejoinder *per* similarity.

Similarly, *parity per dissimilarity* may be illustrated as follows :

niṣkriyaḥ Ātmā, vibhutvāt; kriyāvad dravyamavibhu dṛṣṭam, yathā loṣṭaḥ; na ca tathā Ātmā, tasmānniṣkriyaḥ.

Translation—the clod of earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to activity, is found to be limited in its extent; the *Ātman* is not so limited; therefore, the *Ātman* cannot be active, like the clod of earth.

There being no special reason why, on the basis of similarity to an active substance, the *Ātman* should be regarded as active; and why on the basis of its dissimilarity to the active substance, it should not be regarded as inactive; and inasmuch as there is no such special reason, it is a case of *Vaidharmyasama*. (3) *Utkarṣasama*—It is explained thus: when the opposer puts forward the contingency of an additional property of the example subsisting in the subject it is called *Parity per Augmentation*.

As for example—

yadi kriyāhetuguṇayogāt loṣṭavat kriyāvān Ātmā, loṣṭavadeva sparśavānapi prāpnoti / atha na sparśavān, loṣṭavat kriyāvānapi na prāpnoti /

Translation—(Against the proposition that the *Ātman* is active, because it is endowed with properties conducive to action, like the clod of earth), the opposition is set up, if by reason of the presence of qualities conducive to action,the *Ātman* should, like the clod of earth, be regarded as active, then like the clod of earth, it has to be regarded as tangible also; if it is not tangible, like the clod of earth, then it should not be active either; or you should point out some special reason why it should be regarded as active and not as tangible.

(4) *Apakarṣasama.*—When the opposer urges the contingency of the *absence of a certain property* in the subject, on the analogy of the example, it is *Parity per subtraction.*

As for example—

loṣṭaḥ khalu kriyāvān avibhuḥ dṛṣṭaḥ; kāmaṁ Ātmā'pi kriyāvān avibhuḥ astu, viparyaye vā viśeṣo vaktavyaḥ.

Translation—The opposition is set up (against the same proposition), inasmuch as the clod of earth is found to be active and not all-pervading, the *Ātman* also, if active, should be regarded as not all pervading; or you should point out some special reason (why it should be regarded as active and not as all-pervading. Here the property of all-pervadingness is subtracted from the *Ātman*.)

(5-6) *Varṇya and avarṇya-sama—Varṇya* means that which is yet to be known; hence, uncertain; and *avarṇya*, certain, is the reverse of that. These two properties meaning uncertainty and certainty belong respectively to the subject and the example (the presence of the probandum in the example being known for certain, while its presence in the subject is still uncertain); and when, in opposition, the opposer

reverses these qualities, then we have the *Parity per uncertainty* and *Parity per certainty.*[1]

(7) *Vikalpasama*—The example, being endowed with the property that constitutes the probans (proving the desired proposition), if the opponent attributes to it some other property, and then urges the fact of this other property being such as is not invariably concomitant with the properties of the probandum it is a case of *Parity per shuffling.*

Example—kriyāhetuguṇayuktam kiñcidguru, yathā loṣṭaḥ/kiñcillaghu, yathā vāyuḥ/evaṁ kriyāhetuguṇayuktam kiñcit kriyāvatsyāt, yathā loṣṭaḥ; kiñcidakriyaṁ yathā Ātmā.

Translation—(against the above mentioned proposition) we have the opposition, one thing endowed with the qualities conducive to action is found to be possessed of gravity, as we find in the clod of earth; while another thing similarly endowed is found to be devoid of gravity, as we find in air; similarly, it is possible that while one thing, the clod of earth, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is active, another thing, the *Ātman,* which is similarly endowed, may be without action.[2]

(8) *Sādhyasama*—That character is called *Sādhya* which is found to be one upon which the whole force of the probans and the other factors of reasoning is operative; and when such character is attributed to the example, it is *Parity per probandum.*

Example—yadi yathā loṣṭaḥ tathā Ātmā prāptaḥ, tarhi yathā Ātmā tathā loṣṭaḥ/ sādhyaścāyamātmā kriyāvān iti kāmaṁ loṣṭo'pi sādhyaḥ/atha naivam, na tarhi, yathā loṣṭaḥ tathā Ātmā.

Translation—If the *Ātman* is to be regarded as active, in the same manner as the clod of earth is active, then it comes to this that the clod of earth is like the Ātman; and the *Ātman* is the subject in regard to which the presence of activity is still to be

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 4.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 4.

to action, must be active; and until the reason is mentioned, nothing can be accepted as true.[1]

Again, when the opposition is based upon a counter-instance, it is *parity per counter-instance.*

As for example—The original proposition having been put forward in the form—the *Ātman* is active, because it is endowed with qualities conducive to action, like the clod of earth; the opponent sets up a counter-instance,—*Ākāśa*, which is endowed with qualities conducive to action, is found to be without action, and hence, why cannot the *Ātman* be regarded as active, like *Ākāśa*? But what is that quality in *Ākāśa* which is conducive to action? It consists of contact with air, which aided by *saṁskāra* leads to action, as is found in the case of the contact with the tree.[2]

(13) *Anutpattisama*—The proposition being stated in the form,-sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the jar. The opponent sets up the following opposition—Before it is produced, the sound has not appeared; hence, at that time the character of coming after effort, which is the ground urged for its non-eternality, does not subsist in sound; and since this character does not subsist in sound, it follows that sound is eternal; and that which is eternal is never produced. This opposition based on non-generation is *Parity per non-generation or non-production.*[3]

(14) *Saṁśaya-sama*—The proposition being put forward in the form—sound is non-eternal, because it

[1] The *Tātparya* thus explains the difference between *parity per continued question* and *parity per probandum*: In *parity per probandum*, the opponent urges the necessity of the probans and all other factors of reasoning being provided in support of the example, exactly in the same manner as is done in support of the probandum; while in the *parity per continued question*, he only wants to know by what means of cognition the example is known.

[2] The contact of air with the tree leads to the action of moving in the tree; hence, the contact of air in *Ākāśa* also should be conducive to action.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 12.

comes after effort, like the jar; the opponent opposes it by casting doubt over it : even though sound comes after effort, it has this similarity to the eternal *Sāmānya*, that both are perceptible by the senses; and the same also constitutes its similarity to the non-eternal jar; thus, by reason of its similarity to both eternal and non-eternal things, there must be doubt as to the real character of sound.[1]

(15) *Prakaraṇasama*—By reason of the *similarity* (of sound) to both, eternal and non-eternal things, there is likelihood of the two contrary views (i. e. the original Proposition as well as its contrary):—this is what is meant by the term '*prakriyā*', or 'vacillation' in the Sūtra: One view being—'sound must be non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the Jar',—the other view is propounded on the basis of the similarity (of sound) to eternal things ('sound must be eternal, because it is cognized by the auditory organ, like the *śabdatva*,). Thus, then, it is found that when the Probans-'because it comes after effort'—is put forward as constituting the similarity (of sound) to non-eternal things, it is not free from the possibility of the contrary view being set up; and in the face of this possibility, the conclusion sought to be based upon that Probans cannot be established. The same holds good in regard to a Probans that would be put forward as constituting the 'similarity' (of sound) to eternal things. The Opposition put forward on the basis of this 'vacillation' constitutes '*Parity per Neutralisation*'.

What has been said in this Sūtra applies also to the case of *Dissimilarity*; and 'by reason of Dissimilarity to both, there arises vacillation,—and Opposition based upon this reasoning constitutes *Parity per Neutralisation*''.[2]

(16) *Ahetusama*—'Probans' is that which proves; and this could exist only either (a) before, or (b) after, or (c) together with, the probandum (that which

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 14.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 16.

it is intended to prove). Now, (a) if the Probans is held to exist before the Probandum,—at the time that the Probandum is not there, of what could it be the 'probans', 'means of proving'? (b) If it is held to exist after the Probandum,—in the absence of the Probans, of what could there be the 'Probandum' (to be proved)? (c) If the Probans and the Probandum are held to exist (simultaneously), since both would be equally existent, which could be the 'probans' (means of proving) of what? From all this follows that the 'probans' does not differ from what is *non-probative*'.

This contention, thus based upon similarity to what is non-probative, constitutes '*Parity per Non-probativeness*'.[1]

(17) *Arthāpattisama*—The proposition having been sought to be established by the reasoning—'sound is non-eternal, because it comes after effort, like the jar',—if the opponent seeks to establish the contrary conclusion by means of Presumption,—this is a case of '*Parity per Presumption*'.

It is as follows :—'If sound is held to be non-eternal, on the ground of its coming after effort, which constitutes its similarity to non-eternal things,—then it follows by implication, that sound must be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its similarity to eternal things, consisting in the fact that it is intangible, like eternal things'.[2]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 18.

This Futile Rejoinder differs from '*Parity per Convergence*' and '*Parity per Non-convergence*' on the following points :—(1) In these latter the question raised was in regard to the form of the Probans, while in the present case, it is raised in regard to its causal efficiency; (2) in the latter two the convergence, or otherwise, was in regard to the thing denoted by the words of the probans, while here it is the verbal expression that is taken up for enquiry; (3) there were only two alternatives, while here we have three; (4) those two had the semblance of the contention urging the fact of the qualification of the Probans being untrue, while here the contention urges a reasoning to the contrary—*Bodhasiddhi* of Udayana.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 21.

(18) *Aviśeṣasama*—The single (common) property, in the case in question, is that of coming after effort; and because this single property is present in sound and in the jar, if these two things be regarded as non-different,—i.e., both be regarded as 'non-eternal';—then all things should have to be regarded as non-different—Why?—Because the property of 'existence' is present in all; the one property of 'existence' is present in all things; and since 'existence' is present in all things, all things should be regarded as non-different. Such contention constitutes '*Parity per Non-difference*'.[1]

(19) *Upapattisama*—"If sound is held to be non-eternal, because there is present ground (or evidence) for its non-eternality—there is present evidence for eternality also, in the shape of intangibility; so that it may be regarded as eternal also". This, being an opposition based upon the presence of grounds for both, 'Eternality' and 'Non-eternality', is '*Parity per Evidence*'.[2]

(20) *Upalabdhisama*—Even in the absence of the *character of coming after effort* which is mentioned as the cause (ground) of 'non-eternality'—this 'non-eternality' is found in that sound which proceeds from the breaking of the branches of the tree shaken by the wind (this sound not being the product of the effort of any person);—and the opposition, based upon this fact of the Probandum being found to exist even in the absence of the Probans, constitutes '*Parity per Apprehension*'.[3]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 23.

Udayana in his *Bodhasiddhi*, notices a different interpretation of this *Sūtra* by which the meaning is as follows :—'The single property that constitutes the Probans is really effective; so that if the Subject and the Example were taken as possessed of the unqualified probandum, then *they would be non-different in every way*, *Sarvāviśeṣaḥ*; because their co-existence is well-known.'

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 25.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 27.

The *Bodhasiddhi* mentions five kinds of this *Futile Rejoinder* : (1) The Subject existing in the absence of the Probandum, which makes it a case of the Fallacy of 'Contradiction';—

(21) *Anupalabdhisamā*—(The First Parity puts forward the Proposition in the following form)— 'It is not true that even before it is uttered, sound exists and (if it is not heard), it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it';—this is not true—why?—because we do not perceive any covering or obstruction; that is, in the case of such things as water (underground) and the like, we find that when they are existent, if there is non-apprehension of them, it is due to the presence of obstruction (in the shape of the surface of the ground under which the water lies); in the case of sound, however, we do not find its non-apprehension to be due to the presence of obstruction or any such causes of non-apprehension; and such cause of its non-apprehension would certainly have been perceived (if it existed), just as it is perceived in the case of water etc.;—as a matter of fact, however, no such cause is perceived (in the case of sound); hence, it follows that when sound is not apprehended (heard), its condition is contrary (not analogous) to that of the water etc. (i.e. while water etc., are existent, sound is non-existent.)

"The '*Non-apprehension*' *of Obstruction* etc., is not apprehended;—and from this 'non-apprehension of the non-apprehension,' it follows that the latter does not exist; and this 'non-apprehension' being non-existent, what has been urged by the First Party as the 'Probans' of his reasoning is found to be non-existent; all which leads to the conclusion that obstruction etc., are existent. And since the contrary conclusion is thus proved, the original proposition—'it is not true that even

(2) the Subject existing without the Probans,—this being a case of the Fallacy of the 'Unknown';—(3) the Subject existing without both Probans and Probandum,—when there are both of the said fallacies;—(4) the Probandum existing without the Probans—this being a case of untrue premiss, the Probans not being invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—(5) the Probans existing without the Probandum, in which case also the necessary invariable concomitance between the two would be wanting. It goes on to cite examples of the *Futile Rejoinder* based upon each of these five.

(24) *Kāryasama*—The original proposition is put up in the form-'sound is non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort'; now that which is 'the outcome of effort' is such as, not having previous existence comes into existence; as is found to be the case with such products as the jar and the like; that which is 'non-eternal', on the other hand, is such as, having come into existence, ceases to exist. Such being the condition of things, the opposition is set up on the basis of the diverse character of the products of effort. 'Coming into existence after effort' we find in the case of the jar, and we also find the 'manifestation' of things concealed under some obstruction, by the removal of the obstruction (and this also is the outcome of effort); and there is no special reason to show whether sound comes into existence after effort, or there is only manifestation of it (after effort); and the opposition set up on the basis of this fact of both these (production and manifestation) being equally the 'products of effort;[1] is '*Parity per Character of Effect*'.[1]

(25) *Kathābhāsa*—(The first step consisting of the Proposition, 'sound must be non-eternal, because it is the outcome of effort, like the jar'), it is urged against this that the Probans is 'inconclusive', and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the 'conclusion' —(this represents the second step);—(to this the First Party, offers the following wrong answer, which represents the third step)—If my Probans cannot prove the conclusion because it is inconclusive, then—that is, the denial also is 'inconclusive'; it denies something, and does not deny other things; and being 'inconclusive', it cannot prove the desired conclusion.

to the property put forward by the First Party, and shows that none of these is admissible, and then proceeds to urge that the Subject cannot, on that account be accepted as having that property;—this form of opposition constitutes '*Parity per Etenality*'—*Bodhasiddhi* (Udayana).

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 37.

The mere fact of Sound being the 'outcome of effort, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is non-eternal, it comes into existence or is destroyed; for even if it were only manifested, it could be regarded as the 'outcome of effort'.

before it is uttered, sound exists, and it is simply that there is non-apprehension of it'—is not proved.

Thus, it is found that the probans, 'because obstruction is not apprehended', is equally applicable to the obstruction, and to the non-apprehension of the obstruction."

This opposition, based upon non-apprehension, constitutes '*Parity per Non-apprehension*'.[1]

(22) *Anityasama*—"When the First Party says that—'sound should be regarded as non-eternal, by reason of its similarity to the jar, which is non-eternal',—he becomes faced with the undesirable contingency of having to regard all things as non-eternal, by reason of their similarity (consisting of existence) to the jar, which is non-eternal".—This opposition based upon 'non-eternality' constitutes '*Parity per Non-eternality*'.[2]

(23) *Nityasama*—The proposition is put forward in the form—'sound is non-eternal'; now, is this 'non-eternality' of sound eternal, everlasting, or non-eternal, evanescent? If it is present in sound at all times, then, since the property (non-eternality) is everlasting, the thing to which that property belongs (sound) must also be everlasting, so that sound should be eternal. If, on the other hand, the said property (non-eternality) is not present in sound at all times,—then since (at some time or other) 'non-eternality' would be absent in sound, sound would be 'eternal'. This opposition based upon 'Eternality', constitutes '*Parity per Eternality*'.[3]

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 29.

[2] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 32.

This *Futile Rejoinder* is described as based upon 'similarity'; it includes also a similar rejoinder based upon dissimilarity'—says the *Bodhasiddhi*.

[3] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 35.

In this Sūtra, the mention of 'non-eternality' is meant to include all those specific reasons that may be adduced in support of the non-eternality of sound. The sense of the definition of '*Parity per Eternality*' is as follows—When the opponent puts forward certain exhaustive alternatives in regard

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[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 37.

The mere fact of Sound being the 'outcome of effort, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is non-eternal, it comes into existence or is destroyed; for even if it were only manifested, it could be regarded as the 'outcome of effort'.

Or, the opponent having said—"If sound be held to be non-eternal, there is no special reason why what happens to sound, after effort, is production, and not manifestation",—(he is met by the First Party with the following wrong answer) if sound be held to be eternal, then also there is no special reason why what happens to sound is manifestation, not production. Thus special reasons being equally wanting in both views, both are equally inconclusive.[1]

(l) *Nigrahasthāna*

Nigrahasthāna (clincher) is the last of the wrong process to defeat one's opponents. It has been defined as a case of misapprehension as also when there is incomprehension (*vipratipatti* and *apratipatti*). All the types of clinchers are meant for defeating an opponent and rarely to strengthen the truth. There are twenty two varieties of it mentioned by Gotama. They are : *pratijñāhāni*, *pratijñāntara*, *pratijñāvirodha*, *pratijñāsannyāsa*, *hetvantara*, *arthāntara*, *nirarthaka*, *avijñātārtha*, *apārthaka*, *aprāptakāla*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *punarukta*, *ananubhāṣaṇa*, *ajñāna*, *apratibhā*, *vikṣepa*, *matānujñā*, *paryanuyojya*, *upekṣaṇa*, *niranuyojya*, *anuyoga*, *apasiddhānta*, and *hetvābhāsas*. These are all explained and illustrated by Vātsyāyana in his *Bhāṣya*,[2] and is briefly explained below :

(1) *Pratijñāhāni* (violating the proposition)—The *Bhāṣya* explains it as—the opposition having been set up on the basis of a certain property which is contrary to the Probandum, if the first party admits that that contrary property, which belongs to the counter-instance cited by the opponent, is present in the example cited by himself, he violates his original proposition; hence, this becomes a case of *Pratijñāhāni*.

As for Example—Sound is non-eternal (anityaḥ śabdaḥ), because it is perceptible by the senses (aindriyakatvāt), like the jar (ghaṭavat).

But the opponent says, that we find that generality (sāmānya) which is eternal, is also perceptible by the

[1] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, V. i. 39. [2] V. ii. 1.

senses, and so why sound also should not be eternal (nitya)? Being met with this opposition, the first party may say, if *sāmānya*, which is perceptible by the senses, is eternal, the jar also may be eternal; and in this the first party attributes eternality to the example that he had cited in support of his proposition and in so doing he violates his entire *pakṣa* (view point).

The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the sūtra describes two kinds of violating the proposition,—the first is described by the very name, *Pratijñāhāni* and another by the rest of the sūtra—*pratidṛṣṭāntadharmābhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte pratijñāhāniḥ*, meaning when the property of the counter instance, urged by the opponent, is admitted by one to be present in the example cited by himself, it is a case of *Pratijñāhāni*.[1] The example of the former kind would be that case when, finding that he cannot bring forward arguments to sustain his position, the first party entirely surrenders his point saying—all right, I give up my point: Sound is not non-eternal. What is cited above is the example of the second kind.

(2) *Pratijñāntaram* (shifting the proposition). It has been defined as the subject of the original proposition having been denied, if the first party finds a diversity in the properties (of the example and the counter-instance), and puts it forward with a view to establish the former proposition.[2] The *Bhāṣya* says that in the same instance quoted above when the subject of the original proposition is denied, the first party finds a diversity in the properties of example and the counter-instance; that is, he finds that while both, jar and *sāmānya*, have a certain property, being perceptible by the senses, in common, there are others in which they differ, namely, that *sāmānya* is perceptible by the senses and all pervading, while the jar is perceptible and *not-all-pervading*; and perceiving this diversity of properties he puts it forward with a view to establish his former proposition, in the following manner: Just as the jar is not-all-pervading, so is sound also not-all-pervading and hence, like

[1] V. ii. 2. [2] V. ii. 3.

the jar, it should be non-eternal also. Now, here the former proposition was —sound is non-eternal; while sound is not-all-pervading is a totally different proposition.

The *Tātparya* adds the following to this : though when the first party puts forward the fact of sound being not-all-pervading, the idea in his mind is that, after having brought this home to the other party, he would add that as a qualifying clause to his original premiss, stating it in the form,—because sound, while being not-all-pervading, is perceptible by the senses, it must be non-eternal; yet until he actually does so, his position is clearly subject to the said clincher.

(3) *Pratijñāvirodha* (contradicting the proposition). The *Bhāṣya* explains it thus, the proposition is stated in the form—

Substance must be something different from the quality, because no objects are ever perceived, except colour etc.

Here, in this case there is a contradiction, that is, if substance is something different from quality, then it is not possible that nothing except colour etc. should be perceived; while if nothing except colour etc. is perceived, then it is not possible that substance should be something different from quality; thus, there is a conflict between the two statements—substance must be different from quality and nothing except colour etc. is perceived, which are mutually nugatory and are impossible.

The *Bodhasiddhi* remarks that the contradiction between the proposition and the statement of the probans has been mentioned only by way of illustration; as a matter of fact, there is contradiction of the proposition whenever there is any inconsistency between any two factors of the reasoning, and also when the proposition is inconsistent with a well-ascertained fact.

in the form—Sound is non-eternal, because perceptible by the senses. The other party s *Sāmānya* is perceptible by the senses, and is yet ete and similarly, sound also which is perceptible b senses, may be eternal. The original thesis thu ing opposed, if the first party happens, to say— says that sound is non-eternal? This retractic what had been affirmed in the proposition is wl called *pratijñāsannyāsa*.

(5) *Hetvantara* (shifting the probans). The B explains it as—The proposition is set up in the fo

Everything that is manifested has a single oı because products emanating from a single origin a definite magnitude (parimāṇa),

in the case of cup and other products of clay find a definite magnitude (*parimāṇa*),

the product being of the same magnitude as composition of the original substance, and magnitude is found in every product;

and every manifested thing is found to have a finite magnitude;

hence, from the fact that every product eman from a single origin has a definite magnitude conclude that everything that is manifested emai from a single origin.

Against this argument of the first party, the fol ing opposition is set up with a view to show the probans is not invariably concomitant with probandum :—

As a matter of fact, magnitude is found pre in products emanating from the same origin, as in those emanating from several origins. This o sition having been put forward, the first party my reasoning would then be because a definite ma tude is found in the cup and other products, ir which there subsists the same original substa

from this follows that no other original substances being found subsisting in all manifested things, they must all have a single origin in the form of *Avyakta*.

Now, here it is found that in the first instance the first party stated the probans in an unqualified form, *because they have a definite magnitude* and when this was objected to, he added a qualification to it, in the from —*while having the same original substance subsisting in them*; and this thus becomes a case of *hetvantara*.

(6) *Arthāntara* (irrelevancy)—It means—something which is not relevant in the context. As for instance, in order to prove his statement—Sound is non-eternal, if he adduces the *hetu*, because that sound is the quality of *Ākāśa*, it is a case of *arthāntara*; or *Śabdaḥ nityaḥ, asparśatvāt*. Here also the *hetu* has nothing to do with the thesis.

(7) *Nirarthaka* (meaningless jargon). As for instance, sound is eternal, because ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa are ja, ba, ga, ḍa, daśa and so on. All this is meaningless.

(8) *Avijñātārtha* (unintelligibility). If the assertion is made and is not understood by the audience and the second party even if stated three times, this constitutes unintelligibility. This may be due to the use of words having double meaning or having used words not ordinarily used, or uttered hurriedly.

(9) *Apārthaka* (inco-herence). In a case where, there being no connection between the expressions following one another, they are found to offer no connected meaning; as for instance, the words uttered-ten pomegranats (*daśa dāḍimāni*), six *apūpas* (breads) etc. where there is no connection.

(10) *Aprāptakālam* (inconsequentiality), when the factors of reasoning are stated in the reversed order. As for instance, in a syllogism, there is a natural order of the factors which gives a meaning and if this order is reversed whereby no natural meaning is derived, it is called a case of *aprāptakālam*.

(11) *Nyūna* (incomplete) and (12) *adhika* (redundant)-when less or more factors in a syllogism are offered.

(13) *Punarukta* (repitition). The re-statement of words and ideas constitutes repitition except in the case of reproduction.

(14) *Punarvacanam*—Repeating the actual statement by means of directly expressive words of what is already implied.

(15) *Ananubhāṣaṇam*—If the first party fails to restate what has been stated by the second party, three times, and duly understood by the audience, it is a case of *non-reproduction.*

(16) *Ajñānam*—when the statement is not comprehended, it is a case of *incomprehension.*

(17) *Apratibhā*—It is embarassment when the party does not know the answer and keeps silent.

(18) *Vikṣepa*—When the party breaks off the discussion under the pretext of business, it is a case of *evasion.*

(18) *Matānujñā*, if the party admits flaw in his own thesis, and then urges the same in that of the opponent, it is a case of *confessing the contrary opinion.* In other words, when the party admits that defect in his thesis, which has been urged against it by the opponent, and without trying to show that his thesis is free from that defect, he simply says, the same defect is found in your statement also.

(19) *Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*—When one party has rendered himself subject to a clincher, if the other party fails to bring it home to him, by directly charging him with it, the latter himself becomes subject to the clincher of *overlooking the censurable.*

(20) *Niranuyojyānuyoga*—when one party urges a clincher when there is no clincher, incurred by the other party, it is a case of *censuring the un-censurable.*

(21) *Apasiddhānta*—Having taken up one standpoint, if the party carries on the discussion without restriction, it is a case of *inconsistency*.

Hetvābhāsas have been already discussed before. This ends all the methods which in a debate the various parties can apply to obtain victory over his opponent.

It may be pointed out that though the ultimate end of Indian philosophy, particularly the Nyāya system, is to get rid of all the pains including the so-called pleasures, yet it is in reality, the correct knowledge of the absolute (*tattvajñāna*) which is the ultimate end of the system. This again, is possible through the direct perception, realization, of the *Ātman* as given in the śruti—*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*. It is therefore, that Gotama says—*Tattvādhyavasāyasaṁrakṣaṇārtham jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṁrakṣaṇārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat*,[1] meaning, disputation and wrangling should be carried on for the purpose of defending one's own determination to get at the truth; just as the hedge of thorny branches is put up for the protection of sprouting seeds.

Though Gotama mentions disputation and wrangling alone for the purpose of protecting the truth, yet it seems that all the other various categories, namely, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti and nigrahasthāna*, are also at times, to be utilized for protecting the truth. Besides, to me it seems that, no doubt, the system is an *ādhyātmika* school of philosophy in order to realize the *svarūpa* of the *Ātman*, yet those various methods of fighting for victory over the opponent are also meant to fight against the Buddhists and other *nāstikas* who preached against the *ādhyātmika* philosophy as ordinarily understood in common parlance for which the system of Nyāya stands.

Of these categories, *Vāda* alone is directly meant for the correct realization of the absolute reality, while all the rest are indirectly meant to be used in debates to gain the superiority over the opponents and that also to realize the *Truth* ultimately.

[1] IV. ii. 50.

This practice of utilizing these methods of defeating the opponents became so popular in India and also in Tibet, later on, that it smashed the ultimate end of the śāstras. All the intelligent students became so very interested in this process of *jaya and parājaya* that they forgot that the ultimate end of all the schools was *Darśana*, visualizing the *absolute truth* and not *jaya* and *parājaya*.

These categories thus, have double edged function like the thorny hedges placed round about the flowers. They protect the most desired end, that is, flower, or the absolute reality and also prick those who approach them to destroy their existence. It is in this way, that the real nature of the *Absolute reality* is possible to be visualized without being mislead by the *Nāstikas*. This is the purpose of including these categories in this *Science of Reasoning* which is also ultimately meant to help the enquirer (*jijñāsu*) to have a vision of the *Ātman*. It is therefore, that the above section has been called the *Tattvajnānaparipālana prakaraṇa* (section dealing with the guarding of the true knowledge).

It is thus, that the correct knowledge of all the sixteen categories leads to the gradual removal of *mithyājñana*, thereafter, defects (*rāga, dveṣa and moha*), *pravṛtti* (action, that is, the feelings of pleasure and pain), birth and ultimately, entire pain for ever.[1] Therefore, I repeat what Vātsyāyana has said here—this *Science of Reasoning* dealing as it does, with the means of right cognition and the other categories, is the lamp to all sciences; the means of the knowledge of all things, it is the basis of all activities and as such, it has been expounded at the very outset of all the scientific investigations.

As regards the knowledge of the truth and the attainment of the highest good(spoken of in the *Nyāyasūtra*), it must be borne in mind that there is such knowledge and such attainment dealt with in (and pertaining specifically to) each of the four sciences

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[1] *Nyāyasūtra*, I. i. 2.

or branches of knowledge, mentioned in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, namely, *Ānvīkṣikī*, *trayī*, *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*, in its own peculiar manner. In this science we are dealing with the science of the *Ātman* which is the knowledge of the truth, is the knowledge of the *Ātman* and other objects of cognition; and the attainment of the highest good, is the obtaining of Final Release, of course, from the standpoint of the Nyāya system. Gotama, even being fully aware of the *ultimate* *Reality* of Indian philosophy, that is, the *Ātma-darśana*, has confined his treatment in his system only from the common-sense point of view, keeping in mind the synthetic gradation amongst the various schools of philosophy.

At the end one thing I want to repeat. There is no system of Philosophy, including those of Cārvaka, Jaina and Buddhist, which really aims at any mutual criticizm of stand-points. They preach from their different *angle of vision* about the same *ultimate Truth-Ātmadarśana* which is the only goal of Indian thought in every field of learning. So has been said by Puṣpadanta in his *Mahimnaḥ stotra*—

> *Rucīnāṁ vaicitryāt*
> *ṛjukuṭilanānāpathajuṣāṁ*
> *nṛṇāmekogamyaḥ*
> *tvamasi payasāmarṇava iva* ||

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